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PART IV. A

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

13

From January to March 1854.

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Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

No. 1.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 18, 1854.*

AT the Conference which took place on the 16th instant, Count Buol requested M. de Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, to inquire of our respective Governments in what way they would propose that the answer which may be expected from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as to the proposals of negotiation should be transmitted to the Porte. He thought that an early decision upon this subject should be come to, in order that no time should be lost in forwarding the communication after it had been received. The answer of Count Nesselrode would naturally be addressed to himself, and he should communicate it to the Conference before he took any further step with regard to it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 2.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, January 23.)

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{1}{13}$ Janvier, 1854.

LES Représentants d'Angleterre et de France viennent de m'annoncer verbalement la résolution prise par leurs deux Gouvernements de faire entrer leurs flottes combinées dans la Mer Noire, dans le but de mettre les ports et les côtes de la Turquie à l'abri d'une attaque de notre part. Le motif donné à cette détermination a été le coup porté à l'escadre Turque à Sinope, opération navale que les deux Cabinets représentent comme une agression gratuite. Ce n'est pas sans une pénible surprise que je l'ai entendu qualifier ainsi, lorsqu'il est de notoriété que l'escadre Turque, commandée par Osman Pasha, était partie du Bosphore chargée d'armes, d'argent, de munitions et de troupes de débarquement destinées pour nos côtes de la Circassie; par conséquent dans un but agressif—dans le but de développer les opérations également agressives qui ont déjà ensanglanté le territoire Russe en Asie. Cette escadre n'avait pas sans doute quitté son ancrage du Bosphore pour venir s'établir à Sinope. Ce qu'elle y avait cherché ce n'était point une station maritime, mais bien un refuge passager. Devions-nous souffrir patiemment qu'elle eût plus tard accompli sa destination hostile? Parceque, en Valachie, territoire Turc, nous avons déclaré vouloir attendre l'attaque des forces Ottomanes, sommes-nous tenus à l'attendre également sur nos propres côtes? Devons-nous penser qu'aux yeux des Puissances, dans une guerre que nous n'avons pas voulue, et qui nous a été déclarée, à la Turquie seule appartient le privilège de l'offensive, et que certains d'une agression prochaine et imminente, nous nous sommes interdit à nous-mêmes le droit de la prévenir?

Si j'ai bien compris le sens des déclarations qui m'ont été faites, et notamment ce qui m'a été dit par le Représentant Anglais, l'intention des deux Puissances serait d'empêcher le retour d'un désastre semblable à celui de Sinope, et d'établir dès aujourd'hui une sorte d'armistice naval, prévenant toute attaque de notre part contre les ports ou le pavillon Turcs, mais veillant, d'un autre côté, à ce que l'escadre Ottomane ne commette aucune agression contre les bâtiments et le territoire Russes.

Il est essentiel, M. le Baron, que ce point soit nettement établi. Assurément c'est le moins que les deux Cabinets puissent faire pour ôter, du moins en apparence, au motif de l'entrée de leurs flottes dans la Mer Noire le caractère d'une hostilité flagrante contre nous; car, permettre l'attaque aux Turcs, en prétendant nous l'interdire, ce serait prendre une part active à une guerre qu'ils ne nous ont point encore déclarée.

Il est seulement à regretter que les deux Puissances, si elles voulaient prévenir de semblables collisions, n'aient pas, dès l'origine de la lutte, arrêté les entreprises maritimes dirigées par les Turcs contre nos rivages Asiatiques—entreprises dont le conflit engagé à Sinope n'a été qu'une conséquence forcée—ou plutôt encore qu'elles n'aient point empêché les Turcs de nous déclarer la guerre; car du moment qu'elles leur permettaient de nous la déclarer et de nous la faire, en Asie comme en Europe, l'évènement qui vient d'arriver ne pouvait demeurer entièrement exclu de leurs prévisions. Que si elles ont regardé comme contraire à l'indépendance de la Porte la prétention de lui interdire entièrement les hostilités, nous cherchons comment celle de ne lui permettre désormais que des hostilités limitées serait plus conforme à l'idée qu'elles se font de cette même indépendance? Quant à nous, il nous est impossible d'envisager une résolution pareille autrement que comme une atteinte portée à nos droits de belligérants. L'Empereur se voit donc obligé de protester solennellement contre le principe de la déclaration qui lui a été faite, et ne saurait en aucune façon en admettre la légitimité.

Il attendra, pour se décider sur le parti ultérieur qu'il adoptera, la manière dont cette déclaration aura été mise à exécution par les Amiraux des deux flottes, et l'attitude que leurs vaisseaux prendront à l'égard des nôtres.

Il ne peut que regretter de voir la paix avec l'Angleterre et la France, que jamais il n'a voulu rompre, compromise par ce nouveau développement donné au système de pression que les deux Puissances maritimes ont cru devoir, dès l'abord, adopter à son égard, et qui, progressant de mesure en mesure, engageant chaque fois davantage sa dignité comme la leur, en même temps qu'il encourageait les Turcs à pousser les choses à l'extrême, a fini par conduire la situation en Orient à son état de tension actuel. Un hasard suffit aujourd'hui pour produire une collision d'où naîtrait une conflagration générale, et l'Empereur repousse d'avance la responsabilité de l'initiative qui en aura donné le signal.

Votre Excellence voudra bien donner au Cabinet Anglais lecture et copie de cette dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh, January $\frac{4}{16}$, 1854.

THE Representatives of England and France have verbally announced to me the resolution adopted by their two Governments to cause their combined fleets to enter the Black Sea with the view of securing the ports and coasts of Turkey from an attack on our side. The reason assigned for this determination was the attack on the Turkish squadron at Sinope, a naval operation which the two Cabinets represent as a gratuitous aggression. It is not without painful surprise that I have heard it thus characterized, when it is notorious that the Turkish squadron, commanded by Osman Pasha, left the Bosphorus freighted with arms, money, ammunition, and troops for disembarkation, destined for our Circassian coasts; consequently with the intention of giving greater extension to the operations equally aggressive which have already stained with blood the Russian territory in Asia. That squadron had doubtless not left its anchorage in the Bosphorus in order to station itself at Sinope. What it had sought there was not a maritime station, but a temporary shelter. Ought we patiently to allow it afterwards to execute its hostile purpose? Because, in Wallachia, which

is Turkish territory, we have declared our intention of waiting for the attack of the Ottoman forces, are we obliged equally to wait for it on our own coasts? Are we to suppose that, in the opinion of the Powers, in a war which we have not wished for, and which has been declared against us, the privilege of acting offensively belongs to Turkey alone, and that when certain of being immediately and suddenly attacked we have precluded ourselves from the right of preventing it?

If I have rightly understood the sense of the declarations which have been made to me, and specifically what was said to me by the English Representative, it would be the intention of the two Powers to prevent the recurrence of a disaster resembling that at Sinope, and to establish henceforth a species of naval armistice, preventing any attack on our part upon the Turkish ports or flag, but taking care, on the other hand, that the Turkish squadron should not commit any upon the Russian ships and territory.

It is essential, M. le Baron, that this point should be clearly established. Assuredly it is the least that the two Cabinets can do in order to divest, at least in appearance, the cause of the entrance of their fleets into the Black Sea of the character of flagrant hostility against us; for to allow the Turks to attack, while assuming to prohibit us from doing so, would be to take an active part in a war which they have not yet declared against us.

It is only to be regretted that the two Powers, if they were desirous of preventing such collisions, had not, from the commencement of the contest, put a stop to the maritime expeditions directed by the Turks against our Asiatic coasts, expeditions of which the conflict at Sinope has been only a necessary consequence, or still more that they had not prevented the Turks from declaring war against us; for from the time that they allowed them to declare it and to wage it against us, in Asia as well as in Europe, the event which has occurred could not altogether be excluded from their anticipations. But if they considered as contrary to the independence of the Porte the pretension entirely to interdict it from engaging in hostilities, we ask how that of allowing it henceforth to undertake hostilities only to a certain extent would be more consistent with the idea which they entertain of that same independence? As for ourselves, it is impossible for us to look upon such a resolution in any other light than as a violence offered to our belligerent rights. The Emperor, therefore, finds himself obliged solemnly to protest against the declaration which has been addressed to him, and can in no wise admit its legality.

He will await, in order to decide upon the course that he shall adopt, the manner in which that declaration shall have been carried into execution by the Admirals of the two fleets, and the attitude which their vessels shall take with regard to our own.

He cannot but regret to see the peace with England and France, which he has never been desirous of interrupting, put in jeopardy by this fresh extension given to a system of pressure which the two maritime Powers have deemed it their duty to adopt towards him, and which, advancing step by step, involving each time more and more his dignity as well as their own, at the same time that it encouraged the Porte to push matters to extremities, has ended by bringing affairs in the East to their actual state of tension. At the present moment a mere chance is sufficient to bring about a collision from which a general conflagration would ensue, and the Emperor disclaims beforehand the responsibility of the first step which shall have given the signal for it.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to the English Cabinet.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 3.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

M. le Comte, *Chesham House, le* $\frac{12}{24}$ *Janvier*, 1854.

A LA fin du mois de Mai, j'ai eu l'honneur de placer entre les mains de votre Excellence le résumé des communications jusqu'alors échangées entre nous sur la situation des affaires d'Orient.

J'ai cru devoir continuer cette relation, en rendant compte des négociations subséquentes, depuis la fin de la mission du Prince Menchikoff jusqu'à ce jour.

Permettez-moi, M. le Comte, de mettre cette relation sous vos yeux, en vous priant de la joindre à la première partie de mon travail, qu'elle sert à compléter.

Vous ne méconnaîtrez pas, j'en suis sûr, l'intention qui me porte à présenter, sous leur vrai jour et dans leur ensemble, les soins que nous avons employés à amener à une solution pacifique le différend qui a fait l'objet de nos délibérations.

Si elles ne parviennent point d'assurer ce résultat, il m'importe pourtant de constater la persévérance de nos efforts durant cette négociation.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Memorandum.

LA mission du Prince Menchikoff est arrivée à sa fin le 21 Mai.

Avant de quitter Constantinople il a cru devoir faire un dernier essai de conciliation. Désirant écarter les difficultés élevées par le Divan contre la forme d'un engagement bilatéral, il a renoncé au projet de Sened et il l'a remplacé par la réduction d'une note remise confidentiellement à Reshid Pasha.

Cette pièce se réduisait en substance à quatre paragraphes. Elle déclarait :

1. Que le culte orthodoxe d'Orient jouirait, sous l'égide du Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui lui ont été assurés *ab antiquo*, ou qui lui ont été accordés à différentes reprises, par la faveur Impériale, et dans un principe de haute équité participerait aux avantages accordés aux autres rits Chrétiens.

2. Que les firmans concernant le maintien du *status quo* des sanctuaires en Palestine seraient fidèlement observés, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes.

3. Que la Cour Impériale obtiendrait la faculté de fonder à Jérusalem une église et un hospice pour les pélerins Russes.

4. Que les ordres nécessaires seraient donnés pour remplir ces décisions souveraines, et que l'on s'entendrait ultérieurement sur les points de détail à régler concernant leur exécution.

Lorsque le jugement impartial de l'histoire contemporaine examinera un jour ces quatre propositions, il décidera si, pour le fond et pour la forme, elles portaient atteinte aux droits du Sultan, et si, dans leurs résultats, elles étaient de nature à compromettre la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman!

Ces offres d'accommodement, si elles avaient été acceptées, auraient mis fin au litige et épargné à l'Europe les conséquences de leur rejet.

Sans faire retomber immédiatement sur la Turquie la responsabilité de ce refus, l'Empereur a voulu laisser encore une fois au Divan le temps de la réflexion.

Le Chancelier de l'Empire, ayant invité directement Reshid Pasha à accepter le projet de note du Prince Menchikoff, le Divan a préféré la rupture à l'accommodement, aimant mieux compromettre le repos de l'Europe que de se prêter à une transaction à l'amiable.

J'ai reçu l'ordre de soumettre ces considérations à l'examen du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, au moment où le Cabinet Impérial s'efforçait encore de faire prévaloir à Constantinople le langage de la raison.

A la distance des lieux, sous l'impression défavorable des vues qui prédominaient à Constantinople, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, approuvant la marche suivie par son Ambassadeur, a laissé au Divan le soin de juger de ce qu'il lui convenait d'accepter ou de refuser.

Je n'ai point à me reprocher d'avoir négligé d'user de tous mes efforts pour convaincre alors le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique de la gravité des conséquences auxquelles devait conduire le refus de la Porte.

L'événement n'a point tardé à justifier mes prévisions.

Le rejet des offres de conciliation itérativement faites par l'Empereur, a

déterminé Sa Majesté à prendre une attitude plus prononcée, afin de vaincre l'obstination du Divan, sans mettre en danger l'existence de la Turquie par des actes d'hostilité.

Dans ce but l'occupation temporaire des Provinces Danubiennes a été reconnue par le Cabinet Impérial un gage matériel de sûreté jusqu'à ce que le Sultan eût accordé à la Russie la réparation de ses griefs.

Les motifs de cette détermination et les limites dans lesquelles l'Empereur avait exprimé le ferme désir de la restreindre, tant qu'on ne l'obligerait point à élargir le cercle de son action, ont été indiqués dans la dépêche du $\frac{20\text{ Juin}}{2\text{ Juillet}}$, que j'ai eu l'honneur de placer sous les yeux du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Quatre semaines avant qu'elle me fût parvenue, ce Ministre m'avait averti de l'ordre donné à l'escadre Anglaise d'avancer de Malte à l'entrée des Dardanelles.

C'est le $\frac{21\text{ Mai}}{2\text{ Juin}}$ que M. le Comte Clarendon a bien voulu m'informer de cette disposition prise à la suite d'un avis télégraphique, qui mandait que le quatre corps de armée se rapprochait des frontières de la Moldavie.

Je me borne à constater le fait que nos troupes n'avaient point franchi le Pruth lorsque l'ordre a été donné à l'escadre Anglaise de prendre une position voisine du théâtre des événements.

A l'époque où l'occupation des Principautés s'est effectuée, cette mesure a formé l'objet de mes explications les plus franches avec M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Il a jugée que l'attitude alors prise par le Cabinet Impérial au-delà des frontières de l'Empire, tracés par nos Traités avec la Porte, donnait à celle-ci la faculté de regarder cette mesure comme une lésion de territoire; mais il a reconnu, en même tems, qu'il serait sage et désirable qu'elle ne considérât point ce fait comme un cas de guerre. C'est dans cet esprit qu'il m'a exprimé l'intention de se prononcer envers le Divan, afin de prévenir une complication sérieuse.

La Porte a déféré à cet avis. La guerre n'a pas été déclarée. Les voies sont restées ouvertes à un accommodement, au moyen d'une entente à l'amiable.

Ce désir, partagé par le Cabinet Impérial et par toutes les grandes Puissances, est devenu l'objet de leur sollicitude unanime.

Ce serait ne pas rendre justice à la diplomatie Européenne si l'on revoquait en doute le soin que chacun a pris dans la sphère de son activité, pour arriver à une solution pacifique du litige en question.

M. le Comte Clarendon ne me désapprouvera point, lorsque je dis que, tous deux, nous avons voué à ce résultat salutaire nos soins les plus assidus.

Dans les premiers jours du mois de Juillet, je me suis livré à l'espoir que ces efforts ne resteraient pas sans succès.

En effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, après de mûres réflexions, a jugé alors désirable de faciliter un accommodement entre les deux parties directement intéressées, en substituant à la note antérieurement proposée, un projet de Convention.

Ce mode semblait présenter l'avantage incontestable, d'une part, de dispenser la Porte de souscrire à un Acte qu'elle avait déjà rejeté, tandisque de l'autre elle offrait à la Russie la forme d'une transaction que le Cabinet Impérial aurait lieu de considérer comme plus satisfaisante qu'une simple note.

J'ai apprécié sincèrement le bon esprit dans lequel ce plan a été conçu.

Son exécution a rencontré des difficultés que j'ai regrettées. Le projet Anglais dans ses détails ne faisait pas mention du réglement de l'affaire des Saints Lieux. Cette lacune, je le crois, aurait pu être facilement comblée par un protocole additionnel ou par une note séparée.

Cette opinion a été partagée par le Cabinet Impérial. Il m'a chargé de présenter à cet effet un travail, qui se composait d'un projet de Convention et de Protocole. Je me suis acquitté de cette communication le $\frac{27\text{ Juillet}}{8\text{ Août}}$.

Mais dans l'intervalle deux autres projets s'étaient croisés, suggérés tous deux dans un intérêt de conciliation commun à tous les Cabinets.

Le premier avait été rédigé à Paris. Il réunissait, sous une forme habilement combinée, les rédactions des notes précédentes du Prince Menchikoff et de Reshid Pasha.

Le second, élaboré à Vienne, avait réuni des suffrages des Représentants des Puissances intéressées à l'applanissement de ce litige. Ce travail, ayant été porté à la connaissance des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, a obtenu leur complète adhésion.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a résolu de

ne pas donner suite à son projet de Convention, pour ne pas entraver le succès de la note de Vienne, revêtue, comme elle l'était déjà, d'un assentiment unanime des Quatre Puissances.

Le Cabinet de Russie n'a pas hésité à accepter cette note telle quelle, déclarant, en même temps, qu'il y adhérait à condition que la Porte l'adoptât de son côté sans modification aucune.

J'ai reçu l'ordre de porter cette détermination à la connaissance de M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, en lui communiquant la dépêche adressé à cet effet au Baron de Meyendorff.

Nous étions ainsi dans l'attente certaine d'une issue favorable de ce litige, grâces aux soins réunis de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler ici combien le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a su apprécier alors l'empressement avec lequel l'Empereur a donné son assentiment à ce plan de pacification.

Son désir d'en faciliter le succès a été constaté de nouveau lorsque même, après la rédaction définitivement adoptée à Vienne, les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris ont proposé d'y introduire un changement de rédaction, qui n'a rencontré à Pétersbourg aucun obstacle.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne s'attendait point à ce que la resistance vint de Constantinople.

Le fait l'a prouvé. Sans tenir compte des témoignages d'intérêt que les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe n'avaient cessé d'accorder à la Porte, sans apprécier le resultat de leurs efforts nouvellement constaté par l'adoption de la note de Vienne, le Divan n'a eu d'autre objet en vue que de défaire cette œuvre de paix, en la déconcertant.

Dans ce but il a mis en avant la demande d'apporter des changemens à cet acte, tandisque l'Empereur de Russie y avait adhéré de plein gré, sans aucune modification.

De prime abord, on a considéré à Vienne ces changements comme dénués de toute signification. Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat voudra bien me rendre la justice de dire que je n'ai point partagé cette impression, et qu'en lui signalant l'esprit de chicane dans lequel les amendements Turcs me paraissaient conçus, j'ai présenté l'accueil défavorable qu'ils rencontreraient à St. Pétersbourg. Cette attente n'a pas manqué de se réaliser.

Par une dépêche adressée au Baron de Meyendorff, en réponse aux ouvertures du Cabinet de Vienne, le Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode a déclaré que l'Empereur, après avoir adhéré à la note de Vienne, sous condition qu'elle fût signée sans modification, ne pouvait que persister dans cette détermination.

Si le Cabinet de Russie l'avait voulu, il aurait pu se renfermer dans cette réponse catégorique.

Mais, il est allé plus loin dans sa franchise. Il n'a pas voulu déguiser le jugement qu'il portait sur la tendance des modifications Turques. Il les a examinées, une à une, dans une analyse que le Baron de Meyendorff a été chargé de mettre sous les yeux du Cabinet Autrichien.

J'ai été autorisé à donner lecture au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de ce travail, destiné à démontrer qu'aux yeux du Cabinet Impérial, les modifications proposées à Constantinople n'étaient point aussi insignifiantes qu'on les avait jugées de prime abord.

Ici, l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a différé de celle énoncée à St. Pétersbourg, quant à l'interprétation de la note de Vienne.

A l'avis du Ministère Anglais les amendements Turcs ont été jugés conformes à l'esprit de cette note.

Selon le jugement du Cabinet Impérial, ils en différaient d'une manière notable.

Cette divergence de vues a eu pour résultat la conclusion formée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique qu'il devenait impossible d'insister à Constantinople sur l'acceptation de la note de Vienne pure et simple, dès que le texte de cet Acte donnait lieu à une interprétation en sens contradictoire.

Devant cette difficulté la note de Vienne a échoué.

Des deux côtés, comme cela arrive ordinairement, on s'est adressée le reproche mutuel de s'être mal compris.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a penché en faveur des amendements Turcs, disant qu'ils s'accordaient avec le sens qu'on avait attaché, dès l'origine, à la rédaction adoptée à Vienne.

Le Cabinet Impérial a soutenu le contraire.

S'il m'était permis de ramener cette controverse à une conclusion pratique, elle se réduirait à celle-ci; savoir, que la Porte a malheureusement obtenu l'objet qu'elle tenait en vue, lorsqu'elle a employé de subtiles détours de chicane pour détruire l'ouvrage auquel tous les Cabinets avaient travaillé avec persévérance et avec loyauté.

Ainsi par une étrange contradiction, tandis que l'Europe Chrétienne voulait la paix, dans l'intérêt bien entendu de l'Empire Ottoman, le Divan seul ne la voulait point.

C'est cette fatalité que le Comte Clarendon se souviendra de m'avoir signalée un jour lui-même, à l'époque où se passait entre nous la discussion dont je viens de faire le résumé.

Elle a lieu au moment où l'Empereur, arrivé alors à Varsovie, était à la veille de rencontrer Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche à Olmütz.

C'est là où les deux Monarques amis et alliés ont consacré encore une fois leurs soins réunis à l'applanissement du différend qu'ils avaient également à cœur, tous deux, de résoudre à l'amiable.

Dans cette intention salutaire, ils sont tombés d'accord entr'eux sur un nouveau plan qui semblait réunir les meilleurs chances de succès.

Ce plan reposait sur une base solide et simple. La Porte aurait été invitée à signer le texte de la note de Vienne; mais, pour la déterminer à y adhérer sans le moindre préjudice pour sa dignité et pour ses intérêts, les Représentants des Quatre Puissances lui auraient remis une déclaration dont la formule avait été concertée de commun accord par les deux Monarques.

Elle énonçait dans les termes les plus clairs et les plus précis:

"Qu'en demandant, en vertu du principe posé dans le Traité de Kainardji, que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs privilèges spirituels sous l'égide de leur souverain le Sultan, l'Empereur ne demande rien de contraire à l'indépendance et aux droits du Sultan, rien qui implique une intention d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman.

"Ce que veut l'Empereur de Russie c'est le maintien strict du *status quo* religieux de son culte; savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Eglise Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes de la Porte; par conséquent, la jouissance en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque des avantages déjà accordées à ces communautés."

Je cite littéralement le texte de la déclaration d'Olmütz, parcequ'elle démontre jusqu'où l'Empereur de Russie portait son désir de faciliter au Sultan un arrangement à l'amiable, et d'épargner par là à l'Europe les calamités inséparables d'une complication Orientale.

Le Cabinet Autrichien, usant des bons offices dont l'Empereur de Russie lui avait confié le soin, s'est chargé de porter la parole pour faire adopter à Londres le plan concerté entre les deux Monarques.

Ayant reçu l'ordre d'appuyer les démarches dont M. le Comte Colloredo a été rendu l'organe au nom de sa Cour, j'ai partagé avec lui le regret de voir nos efforts rester stériles.

Comme cette ouverture a été faite par l'Autriche, c'est à elle que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a exposé directement les motifs qui l'ont empêché de s'associer au plan proposé.

La difficulté que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat y entrevoyait, provenait de l'impossibilité qu'il y aurait eu, à son avis, de déterminer la Porte à signer la note de Vienne pure et simple. Les assurances données par les quatre Cours, selon lui, seraient démeurées inefficaces. Pour surmonter sa résistance, la persuasion aurait été vaine. L'emploi de la force aurait à peine suffi pour arriver à ce résultat. Dés lors le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'a pas cru devoir s'associer à une démarche dont l'insuccès lui paraissait démontré d'avance.

J'ai trouvé cette persuasion trop fortement établie dans la pensée du Cabinet Anglais pour qu'il me fût possible de l'ébranler, dans un moment surtout où les informations reçues de Constantinople représentaient la situation de la capitale comme dominée de plus en plus par l'esprit de fanatisme qui commençait, disait-on, à pousser le Gouvernement Turc à la guerre.

Ces rumeurs ont acquis bientôt un caractère alarmant. On croyait la vie du Sultan menacée, et la sécurité des habitans Chrétiens à la veille d'être gravement compromise au milieu de l'effervescence de la population Mussulmane.

Dans cet état des choses, les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre ont avisé à faire entrer dans le Détroit des Dardanelles une division des deux escadres, jusqu'alors en station dans la Baie de Bésica.

Lorsque cette détermination est parvenue à ma connaissance, j'ai cru devoir rappeler au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les stipulations établies par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, quant à la fermeture des Détroits au pavillon de guerre.

Par une note adressée au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, en date du 13 Septembre, j'ai élevé à ce sujet mes remonstrances et pris mes réserves.

La réponse de M. le Comte Clarendon, du 1 Octobre, motivant la présence des vaisseaux de guerre devant Constantinople par la nécessité de veiller à la sûreté des nationaux Anglais, a maintenu qu'en principe la fermeture des Détroits avait cessé virtuellement d'être en vigueur dès l'instant où l'occupation des Principautés avait mis fin à l'état de paix entre la Russie et la Porte.

J'ai combattu cette doctrine par une note responsive du 21 Septembre/3 Octobre, en rappelant au souvenir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique l'époque où l'Angleterre n'a pas cessé d'être en paix avec la Turquie, malgré la journée de Navarin.

D'accord avec M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat j'ai jugé, d'ailleurs, que cette discussion devait s'arrêter pour moi du moment où la Porte venait de déclarer ouvertement la guerre à la Russie.

Cet évènement a marqué le jour où l'espoir de prévenir une complication grave en Orient m'a paru s'affaiblir et disparaître de plus en plus.

La déclaration de guerre avait à peine été publiée à Constantinople, que déjà les troupes Turques ont franchi le Danube et envahi le territoire Russie en Asie.

C'est ici l'endroit, où pour l'intelligence des faits qui vont suivre, il faut que je rende compte de ce qui s'est passé entre les Cabinets de Londres et de St. Pétersbourg au sujet des éventualités que pourrait faire naître la rupture survenue entre la Russie et la Porte.

Dès le principe, le désir de renfermer ces éventualités dans le cercle le plus étroit, a servi de régler aux déterminations prises à St. Pétersbourg. Le corps d'occupation en Valachie a reçu ordre de ne point attaquer les Turcs aussi longtemps qu'ils resteraient dans leur position sur la rive droite du Danube. Le Prince Gortchakoff en a informé officiellement Reshid Pasha. Sur la frontière d'Asie, les troupes Russes se sont maintenues également sur la défensive. Sur mer les mouvements de l'escadre, loin de toute démonstration hostile, se sont bornés à l'envoi de renforts d'un port Russe à l'autre. C'est dans ce système défensif que l'Empereur, comme il l'avait déclaré, a désiré restreindre son action, tant qu'on ne le forcerait pas d'en sortir.

De son côté, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, j'en ai l'entière persuasion, a tenu, dès l'origine, à renfermer son action dans un déploiement de forces maritimes qu'il destinait essentiellement à la protection de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Je ne crois pas m'éloigner de la stricte vérité, en affirmant que les instructions transmises à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, dès le principe, limitaient le cas prévu de l'appel des escadres, à la défense de la capitale et à l'éventualité où le théâtre de la guerre se porterait sur la rive droite du Danube.

En adoptant de part et d'autre ce système d'observation défensive, les deux Cabinets, je le constate, ont été guidés par la sage pensée de se tenir à distance, pour prévenir la chance d'une collision tant qu'ils le pouvaient.

Il n'y a eu entr'eux, je le constate de même, aucun engagement pris, aucune promesse donnée qui fût de nature à enlever à tous deux leur parfaite liberté d'action, quant à l'avenir.

Mais, leur intention était alors d'accord sur un but qui leur était commun ; celui d'éviter un choc, dont l'effet eût réagi inévitablement sur l'Empire Ottoman, en compromettant son existence.

On était également d'accord sur une autre prévision humainement certaine; savoir, que la saison d'hiver, en suspendant les opérations actives, laisserait aux négociations une marge assez large pour qu'il fut permis de profiter de cet intervalle de repos afin d'arriver à une solution pacifique.

Tel était le désir de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe.

La Porte seule ne l'a point partagé. De propos délibéré, elle a voulu engager les hostilités avant l'entrée de l'hiver, afin de contraindre l'Empereur à sortir de son système défensif ; obliger les Puissances maritimes à adopter, à leur tour, une attitude plus prononcée en faveur de la Turquie ; et compromettre ainsi

les Cabinets de l'Europe les uns envers les autres, pour les entraîner malgré eux dans une lutte qu'ils tenaient à cœur d'empêcher.

S'il m'est permis de me servir de l'expression de M. le Comte de Clarendon, la Porte, en se livrant à ce fatal calcul, se sentait dominée encore par une irrésistible destinée.

Dès cet instant, les évènements, dans leur succession rapide, ont dépassé les prévisions les plus justes et déconcerté les intentions les plus loyales.

Les miennes, si elles ont manqué de succès, n'ont pas fléchi devant cette épreuve.

A mesure qu'elle s'est présentée à mes yeux sous un aspect de jour en jour plus grave, j'ai cru remplir un sérieux devoir en m'expliquant envers les Ministres Anglais avec la plus entière franchise sur les éventualités qui pourraient compromettre les relations de bonne intelligence entre nos deux Cabinets.

Je me suis acquitté de ce devoir envers le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à l'époque où les escadres ont été appelées par les Ambassadeurs à occuper une position plus avancée dans le canal de Constantinople.

Leur destination pour la Mer Noire ayant acquis, dès lors à mes yeux, un degré de probabilité sur lequel je ne pouvais pas me méprendre, j'ai jugé nécessaire de m'énoncer sans réserve sur cette éventualité.

Je l'ai abordée franchement dans un entretien que j'ai eu avec M. le Comte de Clarendon dans les premiers jours du mois d'Octobre.

J'ai pris soin de dégager cette question de toute susceptibilité qui pouvait naître de part et d'autre d'une discussion théorique sur le droit de navigation en général. Je l'ai traitée simplement sous le point de vue des résultats qu'elle pouvait produire en saine politique.

Sous ce rapport, je n'ai pas hésité à prononcer envers le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat la conviction consciencieuse où j'étais, que l'entrée des escadres combinées dans la Mer Noire, en multipliant les chances d'un conflit, se présentait à mes yeux comme une cause éventuelle de rupture.

M. le Comte de Clarendon, j'en suis certain, me rendra la justice de reconnaître l'esprit de loyauté dans lequel j'ai énoncé cette persuasion, inspirée, comme elle l'était, par un désir sincère de prévenir entre nos Cabinets un motif de mésintelligence que je prévoyais.

Après avoir accompli ce devoir, je suis resté en observation calme, devant les faits qui se sont succédés rapidement depuis lors.

Vers la fin du mois d'Octobre, j'ai appris que de nouvelles instructions transmises à l'Amiral Dundas lui prescrivaient de tenir l'escadre prête à couvrir les ports Turcs de la Mer Noire contre une agression navale.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne m'a point laissé ignorer cette disposition.

Il importe de préciser ici les circonstances sous lesquelles elle a été adoptée. Les Turcs avaient été les premiers à prendre l'offensive. Ils avaient envahi le territoire et enlevé par surprise un fort Russe sur le littoral Asiatique. Les navires Ottomans portaient des munitions et des armes sur la côte de Circassie. L'escadre Russe, opposant la force à la force, allait réprimer ces actes d'agression et les punir.

Dans cet état des choses j'ai maintenu que la guerre nous ayant été déclarée par la Porte Ottomane, nous étions libres d'user envers elle des droits qui en résultent, et que les officiers de la Marine Impériale seraient en devoir de les exercer selon leurs instructions, sans que la présence du pavillon d'une Puissance tierce, jusqu'ici en relation de paix avec la Russie, fût appelée à mettre obstacle à l'exercice de ces droits, qui dérivent rigoureusement de l'état de guerre.

Je me suis trouvé dans l'obligation de reproduire ces mêmes réflexions et d'y insister lorsqu'au mois de Décembre le combat naval de Sinope est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

A mon vif régret, la sensation produit en Angleterre par cet évènement, a inspiré au Cabinet Britannique de vives et sérieuses préoccupations.

Sous l'influence de cette impression il a ressenti la défaite d'une partie de l'escadre Ottomane comme un désastre que le voisinage des flottes réunies dans le Bosphore aurait dû empêcher. Il a pensé que l'intention qu'il avait éventuellement annoncée de protéger les ports Turcs, aurait dû servir à mettre celui de Sinope à l'abri d'une attaque dirigée par les forces Russes contre l'escadre Ottomane, en rade devant ce port. Il en est resulté pour le Gouvernement de

Sa Majesté Britannique la persuasion que cette attaque, accomplie en opposition à ses désirs éventuellement exprimés, constituait un fait qu'il avait lieu de regarder comme une provocation.

J'ai combattu cette assertion. Elle ne m'a point paru fondée, en ce que l'intention du Gouvernement Anglais de couvrir de sa protection les ports Turcs, par la présence de son escadre, bien qu'elle eût été manifestée, n'avait nullement obtenu l'adhésion du Cabinet Impérial. Pour ma part, je m'y étais opposé, de la manière la plus explicite, en maintenant, comme je l'avais fait, l'entière liberté de notre action, quant à l'exercice du droit de guerre, dans toute son étendue, dans toute sa rigueur. J'ai insisté d'après cela sur la faculté pleine et entière dont les officiers de la Marine Impériale avaient usé, en poursuivant les vaisseaux Turcs partout où ils pouvaient les atteindre. L'Angleterre ne s'y trouvait nullement mise en cause. Son pavillon même n'était pas en présence. L'intention présumée d'un acte de provocation me semblait donc inadmissible, de droit comme de fait.

J'ai maintenu ces principes dans les entretiens que jai eu l'honneur d'avoir à ce sujet avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Cependant, leur décision d'adopter une attitude plus prononcée, après l'évènement de Sinope, avait déjà été prise.

M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat m'en a informé dans une entrevue qui a eu lieu le $\frac{1}{13}$ Décembre.

Il m'a annoncé que le Ministre d'Angleterre recevait l'ordre de s'acquitter à ce sujet d'une communication directe auprès du Cabinet Impérial.

Il a bien voulu m'en indiquer la substance, disant que les instructions complémentaires transmises à l'Amiral Dundas lui prescrivaient de protéger le littoral et le pavillon Ottoman; que cette détermination, prise dans un but défensif, était destinée à empêcher une collision entre les parties belligérantes de manière à la prévenir et non pas à la provoquer, enfin que dans cette intention le chef de l'escadre Anglaise veillerait à ce que nul acte d'agression ne fut commis de la part des navires Ottomans contre le territoire et contre le pavillon Russe.

Comme Sir H. Seymour a été rendue l'organe de cette communication à St. Pétersbourg, j'ai dit qu'il appartiendrait au Cabinet Impérial de prononcer lui-même le jugement qu'il porterait sur l'objet de ce message.

Pour ma part, mon devoir se bornait à me renfermer dans la position que j'avais déjà prise, quant au libre exercice de notre droit de belligérants, nonobstant la présence d'un pavillon étranger, reconnu comme celui d'une Puissance jusqu'ici en paix avec la Russie.

Mes explications avec le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat se sont arrêtées à ce point, dans l'attente des ordres ultérieurs de ma Cour.

Mais, tandis que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique en ce qui regarde son action maritime, s'avançait ainsi dans une voie dont les conséquences me semblaient affaiblir l'espoir de la conservation de la paix, ses efforts diplomatiques n'en continuaient pas moins à tendre vers un résultat qu'on persistait encore à considérer comme pacifique.

Dans cette vue, de nouveaux essais de rapprochement ont été tentés par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances, et à Vienne et à Constantinople.

Je n'ai pas été dans l'obligation de prendre part à ces travaux.

Mais chaque fois que la confiance dont les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique m'ont donné, au milieu de cette crise, plus d'un preuve, m'a appelé à énoncer mon opinion personnelle, je n'ai point hésité à leur offrir les avis que je croyais utiles pour éviter encore, s'il se pouvait, le malheur d'une complication générale.

Ainsi, lorsque le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique s'occupait du soin de combiner une nouvelle formule où la note de Vienne se trouvait complétée par la déclaration d'Olmütz, je me suis permis de dire qu'après le manifeste de guerre émis par la Porte Ottomane, le tems de rédiger des notes était passé, et qu'il fallait arriver à un Traité formel de paix entre la Russie et la Turquie, pour rétablir entr'elles des relations aujourd'hui violemment rompues par des actes flagrants d'hostilité.

Cette vérité n'a pas manqué d'être appréciée et reconnue par tout. Elle a formé la base des travaux des Représentants réunis en conférence à Vienne, ainsi que des instructions transmises à Constantinople.

Je me suis tenu à l'écart de ces délibérations.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu me prévenir toutefois qu'elles partaient de l'idée qu'il fallait commencer d'abord par asseoir les bases d'une transaction à laquelle la Porte s'engagerait à souscrire, Sa Majesté l'Empereur ayant énoncé l'intention de ne prendre en considération qu'un arrangement que le Divan ne chercherait point à éluder, encore une fois, par de nouveaux subterfuges et par de nouveaux amendemens, mis en avant après coup.

Le Cabinet Anglais a puisé cette persuasion dans une source d'information qui m'est inconnue. Elle ne vient pas de moi. Mais les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique ont cru se conformer aux intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, lorsqu'ils ont cherché, d'abord, à s'assurer de certaines bases dont la Porte ne s'écarterait point par de nouvelles tergiversations.

De mon côté, je me suis borné à constater qu'une négociation, pour être accompagnée d'un résultat pratique, devrait conduire à un Traité de Paix directement à conclure entre un Plénipotentiaire Russe et un Plénipotentiaire Ottoman.

Les propositions concertées à Constantinople et transmises de Vienne en dernier lieu à St. Pétersbourg, n'ont point formé l'objet de mes entretiens avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Au moment où elles seront portées à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial, une réflexion me frappe: c'est leur coincidence avec les communications dont les Représentants d'Angleterre et de France se seront acquittés vers la même époque, à peu de jours d'intervalle.

Si les unes influaient défavorablement sur les autres, n'y trouverait-on pas une nouvelle preuve de cette même fatalité qui a frappé durant cette négociation, tant d'efforts; démenti tant d'espérances; et contraint l'intelligence humaine à reconnaître que ses œuvres restent stériles, lorsque la Providence Divine conduit les évènements vers des résultats qu'elle seule dirige selon ses impénétrables desseins?

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

Londres, le $\frac{11}{23}$ *Janvier*, 1854.

No. 4.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 15, 1854.

UPON the breaking up of the Council on the night of the 12th instant, the opinion of the Government, if I am correctly informed, was decidedly favourable to moderate measures; or, as I should rather say, to the policy of temporizing. It was admitted that an affront had been offered to Russia, but it was agreed that it was desirable to gain time, and to ask for explanations from London and Paris before taking decisive measures.

On the following day, however, fresh excitement was occasioned by the appearance, in the "Moniteur," of the circular despatch of the 30th ultimo, and by the arrival of an aide-de-camp of Prince Menchikoff with the notice which had been addressed to the Commander at Sevastopol by the English and French Admirals. These fresh circumstances increased the indignation already felt by the Emperor at the resolution taken by the allied Governments, and, as I understand, were nearly leading to the immediate issue of passports for General Castelbajac and myself.

The "Moniteur's" communication was, I believe, considered even more offensive than the naval summons, particularly as it was found to contain no notice of the restraint which it is proposed to exercise upon the Turkish ships of war. Once more however, as it is believed, the prudence of Count Nesselrode prevented any decisive measure being adopted by his Imperial master, and up to the present moment no notice has been taken by the Government of the communications made to them on the 12th instant by General Castelbajac and myself.

Being unfeignedly desirous that war should be avoided, I should rejoice over the hesitation (followed, as it probably will be, by a resolution to keep back the

passports,) if I could bring myself to believe that hesitation meant peace, and that peace meant the permanent securing of that blessing.

Unfortunately it is not in my power to hold such an opinion. If a rupture is for the time avoided, it is because the moment for declaring war is not considered opportune, and beyond this, which I do not expect, even if the propositions which may be expected from Vienna should be acceded to, their acceptance will be coupled with the secret resolution of not long abandoning a purpose which has been so pertinaciously entertained.

Excited as are the feelings of the Sovereign, worked upon as have been the religious prejudices of his people, extensive as the preparations of war are seen to be, I cannot imagine that all this is likely to subside at the receipt of conditions which, if honestly desired, might have been obtained without effort months ago.

I believe—I know, indeed,—that the Emperor considers that he is giving proof of great magnanimity in being willing still to adhere to the conditions which he originally demanded of the Porte.

With these convictions, considering war to be inevitable, and believing that war will bring with it the chastisement which should always wait upon bad faith and insolent ambition, your Lordship will, I trust, excuse me if I admit that I cannot desire the prolongation of a state of uncertainty of which I can see but one conclusion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 5.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 45.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 16, 1854.

THE French Minister addressed a cyphered letter to his Government on the 14th instant, stating that he had reason for knowing that the language of Baron de Meyendorff's despatches by no means confirmed the hopes which M. de Bourqueney's reports had given rise to, the Russian Envoy having sent fresh and very positive assurances of the neutral position which would be maintained by Austria in the struggle which appeared approaching. If this be the case, I can only say that the Austrian Government are rendering a very important service to a Government by which it is very little appreciated.

At the present moment the Austrians are as cordially abused here as the English and French; and the same popular rumour which prevailed on the 14th instant, as to the sending away of General Castelbajac and myself, represented Baron Lebzeltern as being our travelling companion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 6.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 49. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 16, 1854.

SINCE my despatches up to this number were written I have had a most interesting conversation with a person deep in the Emperor's confidence and master of many of his secrets.

This person assures me, upon his word of honour, that he is convinced that the Emperor is sincerely desirous of peace, that the influence of Count Nesselrode appears to be returning, and that His Majesty is evidently beginning to ask himself whether a heavy responsibility will not attach to him if he should neglect any means for preventing a general war. Upon my professing some incredulity the person in question entreated me to suspend my belief, to defer

the departure of the messenger, and to see whether the events of the next two or three days confirmed my opinion or his assertions.

I have accordingly determined that the messenger Blackwood should only set off on the 18th or 19th instant, by which time I shall of course have received some answer Count Nesselrode to the notification made to him on the 12th instant.

Learning that the Emperor was in a softened state of mind I have endeavoured to prevail on the person above alluded to, to represent or cause to be represented to His Majesty what a splendid part he may yet play if, after completing his immense military and naval preparations, he should point to them and say, Precisely the means which I now possess of carrying on war on the most extensive scale enable me to give the world a convincing proof of my moderation.

Some time since your Lordship was informed that a half-formed purpose existed here of despatching Count Orloff upon an extraordinary mission to London.

Whether the idea has been resumed I am unable to say, but circumstances have come to my knowledge which induce me to believe that this may prove to be the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 7.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 23, 1854.

THE Turkish Ambassador at this Court placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands a few days ago a note on the part of his Government, intended to be supplementary to and explanatory of the note addressed by the Porte on the 31st ultimo to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, stating on what terms the Porte would be willing to treat for peace with Russia. Your Lordship has no doubt received a similar note from M. Musurus, and you will have heard that it has been equally addressed to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, and that Count Buol returned it to the Turkish Envoy at Vienna with the remark that the Emperor of Austria refused to accept it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me yesterday that Count Buol had proposed to summon the Conference to take this note into their consideration, with a view of placing on record their disapproval and disavowal of its contents. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was averse to this proceeding, although he blamed the conduct of the Turkish Government. In the first place he did not see how Count Buol could bring before the Conference a document which he had himself repudiated and secondly, he thought that the interference of the Conference would give greater importance to the note than it was desirable it should obtain. He had, he said, expressed himself in this sense to M. de Hübner. He considered the observations now made by the Porte to be premature and to be matter for discussion hereafter, should the present attempts at negotiation ever reach that point. In fact, the Conference could not entertain the note, whether for approbation or disapprobation, without informing the Russian Government that they had done so. They could not ignore it and discuss it in the same breath.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys again this morning, when he said that he had received advices from London and Berlin which showed that these two Governments coincided in opinion with him, and he did not doubt that when this was known, the Austrian Cabinet would agree to adopt their view.

He proposed returning no answer to Vely Pacha, but addressing an instruction to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, stating that the French Government considered that they had discharged their task for the present in forwarding the Porte's propositions to St. Petersburgh, with a recommendation that they should be accepted. Whatever more the Porte might have to say, must be left for the Conferences which would necessarily be established whenever the belligerent parties named Plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of a peace.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he thought it very desirable that the Four Powers should address the Porte in terms as nearly identic as possible, and with this view he intended drawing up a short note, which he should propose for the acceptance of the other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 8.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this morning a summary drawn up for the Emperor of despatches received from General Castelbajac dated the 16th instant.

Previous despatches of the 13th and 14th had painted in strong colours the anger of the Emperor of Russia on being informed of the communication made to Count Nesselrode by the French and English Ministers respecting the orders given to the Admirals commanding the combined fleets in the Black Sea. The first intention of the Emperor appears to have been to send those Ministers their passports, but reflection and the advice of Count Nesselrode, Count Orloff, and General Rochow, the Prussian Minister, not to precipitate events unnecessarily, joined to pressing instances in the same sense on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, so far mollified the first ebullitions of his anger as to induce him to order instructions to be sent to MM. de Brunnow and Kisseleff desiring them to protest against the attitude assumed by the two Governments, to ask explanations, and, in the event of an unsatisfactory answer, to demand their passports.

General Castelbajac says, that the Emperor Nicholas was particularly annoyed that no mention was made in the instructions sent to him, as had been done in those addressed to his English colleague, of an intention to prevent the Turkish fleet from attacking the Russian possessions. His Majesty characterized it as gross partiality. At the same time there seems to have been a prevalent idea that a difference would be made between the French and English Missions, and that Sir Hamilton Seymour would alone receive his passports. In that case, General Castelbajac determined not to accept the distinction, but to demand his own passports. I may add, that a despatch dated the 1st of January would have enabled the French Minister to place himself in the same line as Sir Hamilton Seymour respecting the prevention of attacks on Russian territory by Turkish vessels.

General Castelbajac appears to think that the Emperor Nicholas is resolved, if possible, to avoid declaring war, and to let the first aggressive act proceed from France and England; but his letters, as well as those of others from St. Petersburgh which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has seen, bear the stamp of conviction that the main object of the Russian Government is to gain time, so as to be prepared for every eventuality in the spring.

All the seamen on the Admiralty Rolls had been ordered to their stations by the 15th of March.

While engaged in this conversation a telegraphic despatch dated last night reached M. Drouyn de Lhuys from Count Walewski. Count Walewski states in it that your Lordship had informed him of a messenger being on the road for M. de Brunnow, instructing that Minister to ask for explanations of Her Majesty's Government respecting the entry of the British fleet into the Black Sea, and to demand his passports if those explanations were not satisfactory. That your Lordship supposed that similar instructions would be sent to M. de Kisseleff, and that you proposed that the two Governments should state for answer that they referred to the propositions sent from Vienna, that if the Emperor of Russia desired peace he would accept them, but that a refusal would imply an intention to go to war, and that the two Governments were prepared for either eventuality.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after consultation with me, appeared to think that the best course which the two Governments could pursue would be to receive

the communications of the Russian Government *ad referendum*, to abstain from any observations or conversation on the contents of them until they could exchange opinions as to the exact words of the answer which they should return, and which should be, as nearly as possible, identic on the part of the two Secretaries of State. He proposes acting in this way, and would be glad to learn that your Lordship adopted it likewise. As yet he has had no intimation from M. de Kisseleff that the latter has received or is expecting a messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 9.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1854.*

I HAVE communicated confidentially to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that part of Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatch No. 18, which relates to the manner in which M. de Kisseleff represented M. Drouyn de Lhuys to have spoken of the English Government, and its pressure for hostile measures on that of France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is indignant at this misrepresentation, he having in fact rather asserted the contrary in his conversation with M. de Kisseleff, as I had the honour to state in my despatch No. 995 of the 29th of December.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys intends to write confidentially to M. Castelbajac on the subject, and to desire him, whenever an opportunity offers, to set Count Nesselrode right in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 74.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has read to me a despatch dated the 19th instant, and addressed to Count Walewski, in which his Excellency calls the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the necessity under which the two Cabinets will be of asking the future intentions of Austria and Prussia, should the Russian answer be unfavourable to the entertainment of the propositions lately sent from the Porte.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys recapitulated with his usual felicity of language the different steps taken by the Austrian and Prussian Governments since the beginning of the Oriental question, and which all but bind them to more serious action should the present negotiations fail of success.

I asked whether it would not be better to await the arrival of the answer from St. Petersburgh before deciding on the course which should then be taken. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, certainly, that was what he meant; but he thought that the two Governments might in the meantime interchange opinions as to the different eventualities they might have to consider.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 11.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 30.)

Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, inclosing copies of a correspondence with the Prussian Representative at Constantinople on the subject of the entrance of the combined British and French fleets into the Black Sea; and I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the regret of Her Majesty's Government that M. de Wildenbruch should have thought it his duty to interfere respecting the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, which was a measure rendered indispensable by the disaster at Sinope, and the danger of aggression upon the Turkish territory which England and France had declared their determination to protect. Your Lordship will express the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the same cordiality of feeling which exists between England and Prussia should be maintained by their Representatives at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 12.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Berlin, January 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I CALLED this morning on Baron Manteuffel. We had some general conversation on the Oriental question, and I have much satisfaction in reporting that the opinions of the Prussian Minister appeared to me to be everything Her Majesty's Government could expect under existing circumstances. He spoke with great candour of the difficulties of his own position with the King, but he uttered not a word implying a doubt as to the success which he felt must attend his efforts to place Prussia in an independent position. I did not fail to state to him that Her Majesty's Government had been well pleased with the late mission of Count Pourtales, as giving a proof that the Prussian Government intend to act with us, and that I was able to convey to his Excellency the assurance that the desire of cordial cooperation existed in England as strongly as he could wish it; that if war with Russia became inevitable the union of Prussia with the maritime Powers would ensure an earlier termination of the differences than would otherwise be the case; but that we still should devote all our energies to the maintenance of peace, which was the true interest of all. Baron Manteuffel then told me that the Russian Minister had received despatches from St. Petersburgh this morning, and that the answers to the communication lately made to the Imperial Government by Sir Hamilton Seymour and General Castelbajac on the entrance of the fleets into the Black Sea had already passed through Berlin on their way to London and Paris, and that Baron Budberg was coming to him this evening.

I immediately asked his Excellency to permit me to call on him again, and I am just returned from my second interview.

Baron Manteuffel told me that the Russian Minister had left with him copies of two instructions of the $\frac{1}{13}$th instant to Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff. The first contains some observations on the verbal communication made by Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh endeavouring to show the unreasonableness of our proceedings in this matter, and defending the attack at Sinope as essential to prevent the Turks from carrying supplies and troops to attack the Russian territory in Asia; and the second instruction, which is confidential, directs Baron Brunnow to address an official note to your Lordship requiring a written explanation of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government

* See Part III, No. 665.

in sending the fleet into the Black Sea, and demanding whether that fleet is meant to support the Turkish naval forces in carrying on aggressions against Russia. Baron Brunnow is directed if the explanations which shall be given by Her Majesty's Government are unsatisfactory to demand his passports, and to notify to all Russian subjects to quit the British dominions.

Such, Baron Manteuffel said, was the nature of the communication to London and Paris, and he, therefore, feared that the crisis to which we had been looking with anxiety was close at hand.

I replied to his Excellency that the gravity of the case was such that it became more essential than ever for Prussia to come to an early decision as to her policy. He rejoined that nobody was more ready to admit this than he was, and that an armed neutrality was that which he wished to follow; that if required the Prussian army could be placed on a war footing in three weeks, as he had been assured by General Bonin, the Minister of War, and that preparations to this effect were under consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 13.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 4.)

Berlin, January 21, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions conveyed in your despatch No. 16 of the 16th instant to Lord Augustus Loftus, I took the opportunity this evening of inquiring from Baron Manteuffel what course the Prussian Government would pursue in the event of war with respect to Prussian ports.

His Excellency replied that this subject had not yet been taken into serious consideration: but that he thought that Prussia might take the same course as that which had been adopted by the Scandinavian States.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 14.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

Londres, ce $\frac{13}{25}$ *Janvier*, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près Sa Majesté Britannique, a reçu l'ordre de s'expliquer et de s'entendre avec son Excellence M. le Comte de Clarendon, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères, sur le sens précis d'une communication dont M. le Ministre d'Angleterre à St. Pétersbourg vient de s'acquitter verbalement auprès de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire.

Si elle a été motivée par le désir d'éloigner l'éventualité d'une collision entre les forces navales Russes et Ottomanes, ce résultat ne pourrait s'accomplir que par l'observation d'un principe de juste réciprocité.

A cet effet, il faudrait d'abord qu'il fût expressément entendu que l'escadre Ottomane eût désormais à s'abstenir de toute agression contre le pavillon et contre le territoire Russes sur la côte d'Europe et d'Asie.

Sous cette condition, une égale sécurité serait acquise en faveur du pavillon et du littoral Ottomans.

En second lieu, pour qu'il fût permis aux navires Turcs de continuer, sans obstacle, à entretenir les communications d'un port Ottoman à l'autre, afin d'y envoyer des vivres, des munitions et des troupes, il faudrait que la même condition demeurât assurée aux navires de la marine Impériale pour maintenir librement les communications d'un port Russe à l'autre, sur le littoral d'Europe et d'Asie.

Ces dispositions, ainsi convenues et strictement mises à exécution, auraient

pour résultat de suspendre, de fait, les hostilités par mer entre les parties belligérantes.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur d'inviter son Excellence M. le Comte de Clarendon à vouloir bien l'informer, en réponse à cette note, si les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sont d'accord avec celles du Cabinet Impérial sur les principes de parfaite réciprocité établis par la présente communication.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

London, January $\frac{13}{25}$, 1854.

THE Undersigned, &c., has received orders to have an explanation, and to come to an understanding with his Excellency the Earl of Clarendon, &c., as to the precise meaning of a communication which the English Minister at St. Petersburgh has just made verbally to the Chancellor of the Empire.

If it was caused by the wish to avert the contingency of a collision between the Russian and Ottoman naval forces, that result could only be effected by the observance of a principle of just reciprocity.

For this purpose it would be requisite, in the first instance, that it should be expressly understood that the Ottoman squadron should refrain from all aggression on the Russian flag and country on the coast of Europe and of Asia.

Under this condition equal security would be obtained for the Ottoman flag and coast.

In the second place, in case the Turkish ships should be allowed to continue without impediment to keep up communications between one Ottoman port and another for the transport of provisions, ammunition, and troops, it would be necessary that the same condition should be secured to the ships of the Imperial marine for freely keeping up communication between one Russian port and another on the coast of Europe and Asia.

These arrangements, thus agreed upon and strictly executed, would have the effect of suspending, in fact, hostilities at sea between the belligerent parties.

The Undersigned has the honour to request his Excellency the Earl of Clarendon to have the goodness to inform him, in reply to this note, if the intentions of Her Britannic Majesty's Government are in accordance with those of the Imperial Cabinet as to the principles of perfect reciprocity established by the present communication.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) BRUNNOW.

No. 15.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me the despatch which Count Buol has addressed to Baron Lebzeltern, transmitting to him the reply of the Porte to the identic note of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, and earnestly recommending its adoption by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and I have to inform you that the substance of that despatch corresponds with the report contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 18 of the 13th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 16.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 16 of the 12th instant, reporting the steps taken by the Austrian and Prussian Representatives at Constantinople in consequence of the entrance of the combined English and French fleets into the Black Sea; I herewith transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject, and I have to observe that I nowhere find in the correspondence of Lord Stratford any trace of the report contained in your Lordship's despatch, that the step taken by the Internuncio at Constantinople was in consequence of a note from Reshid Pasha, stating that the fleets had sailed with the approbation of the Four Representatives; and I have accordingly to instruct your Lordship to request further explanations on this subject, and, if the report referred to should not be confirmed, at the same time to express to Count Buol the regret of Her Majesty's Government that the Austrian Internuncio should have thought it his duty to interfere respecting the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, which was a measure rendered indispensable by the disaster at Sinope, and the danger of aggression upon the Turkish territory, which England and France had declared their determination to protect.

Your Lordship will express the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the same cordiality of feeling which exists between England and Austria should be maintained by their Representatives at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 17.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 23 of the 18th instant, conveying the request of Count Buol to be informed in what way Her Majesty's Government would propose that the reply of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the proposals which have been forwarded from Vienna should be transmitted to the Porte, I have to state to your Lordship that the mode of dealing with this reply must entirely depend upon its nature. When it arrives you will lose no time in informing me by telegraph.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 18.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January* 26, 1854.

COUNT ARNIM has been directed by telegraph to avoid communicating with Count Orloff, and if necessary to plead absence of instructions.

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* See Part III, No. 665.

No. 19.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 48. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 16, 1854.

I FIND myself at this moment in such a maze of intrigue as to be utterly unable to follow its windings. I can but make out some of the objects which are sought, and discover the features of certain of the persons engaged. Among them there are a few who from their position should have been restrained by a sense of dignity from engaging in these exercises of dexterity.

The principal points to be attained appear to be these:—To induce Austria and Prussia to pursue a policy very different to that which their true interests should prompt them to carry through, and to put an end to that alliance between England and France which the conduct of Russia herself has brought about.

As I am desirous to refrain as much as possible from mentioning names, I will only say that diplomatists and soldiers, courtiers of both sexes, and persons of still higher rank, are engaged in cabals and negotiations of a kind happily unknown in England.

Paramount to all other objects is that of putting an end to the Franco-Anglo alliance, to effect which all means, as I am bound to infer, are considered to be legitimate.

Matters are pushed to such a point—the desire to establish a difference of bearing towards England and France is so manifest—that I can assure your Lordship very seriously that it would not surprise me if it should prove that a distinction were made between General Castelbajac and myself, and that I alone were to receive my passports.

It is only by the disposition which might dictate such an artful move, that I can account for the laboured attempt now making to vilify me, and to exalt the character and qualities of my French colleague.

I had the honour of stating to your Lordship some time since, that it occurred to me, that in the course of a long and most unpleasant negotiation I might have been at times wanting in the energy which became a servant of the English Crown; but it appears that my failings have been of an opposite kind. My impetuosity and violence (as I now ascertain) have been of such a nature as render me unfit for the transaction of business of importance! whilst the moderation of General Castelbajac has very much tempered the offence which otherwise might have been conveyed by the acts of his Government.

I will not, at all events at present, dwell upon this comparison, but proceed with my French colleague.

As I have before stated he is a worthy and amiable man, but his weakness, and his blind and avowed admiration of the Court is such, that whilst this Court cajole him, make use of him, and then turn him into ridicule, the French Government must not be surprised if their policy is mistrusted, if their views are not carried out, and if illusions are preserved here, which even in the interests of peace should long ago have been dissipated.

I can better exemplify than describe a constant system of courtiership pursued by General Castelbajac towards the Emperor Nicholas, which at all times would be undignified, and which under existing circumstances is most mischievous.

On the 1/13th January my unfortunate colleague wrote a complimentary letter to Count Nesselrode, with a second complimentary message for the Emperor, which of course was speedily conveyed to its destination.

His Majesty replied by some flattering expressions which were written on the back of General Castelbajac's letter, sent in original by the Chancellor, which portion of letter the General was allowed to detach, and to keep in recollection of the Emperor's feelings towards him.

When it is considered that these adulatory overtures are made as often as occasion offers, that they are accompanied by the warmest assurances of confidence in the Emperor's professions, by expressions of surprise at the mistrust of His Majesty exhibited by England, and even France, and when several very unguarded observations with regard to Sinope are current, your Lordship will

readily believe that it cannot be otherwise but that His Imperial Majesty is confirmed in his belief that the Emperor Napoleon is ready to answer as soon as he shall be called in a friendly manner.

To General Castelbajac that may be all very agreeable; to me, with the duties imposed upon me, it is to the greatest degree embarrassing and perplexing.

I entreat your Lordship's attention to what follows, which is certainly very remarkable. I had written the preceding part of this despatch, down to the words "friendly manner," when General Castelbajac entered my room, and at once began speaking of the intrigues set on foot to separate France and England. "We," he said (the French), "are not so much abused; you and the English are dreadfully, and as that has an object, it has occurred to me whether it is possible that the Russians can meditate playing a trick (mauvais tour), whether they may not be capable of sending you your passports, and of leaving me quietly here. I can assure you it would place me in a very false position."

I told General Castelbajac that some suspicions of the same kind had passed across my mind, and I added this: "All that is passing is a miserable attempt to break up our alliance; first England is abused, then France, then England again; just now it happens to be our turn, to-morrow possibly it may be yours. Maintenant, Général, faites attention à ce que je vais avoir l'honneur de vous dire. Je n'ai point la prétention de vous dicter la conduite que vous avez à suivre, mais je vous dis ceci. Nous voila embarqués dans une entreprise commune. Si par hazard c'est à la France qu'on en voudra, si c'est vous qui allez recevoir vos passeports, je vous declare d'avance que sans hésitation et sans instruction je demanderai les miens aussi. D'ailleurs le cas échéant, faites comme vous l'entendez."

I think it right to state a singular occurrence, but I am not sure of being able to offer your Lordship its explanation. It is not, however, improbable that it may be found in the fact of my having as a colleague a man who is utterly unfit to deal with the very difficult affairs into which his evil star has conducted him.

I will only add, that as I am prepared for fresh foul play, so likewise I am prepared to meet it. If the Russian Government send me alone my passports I shall treat the matter as a personal question, and address a note to Count Nesselrode, stating that the resolution with regard to watching the Black Sea having been taken in common by the English and French Governments, I can only infer that I must have given unwillingly some offence, the nature of which I shall call upon the Emperor to explain.

My French colleague now acquaints me that when he had his interview of the Chancellor he forgot to state that the Turkish ships were to be kept back from attacking the Russian coasts, and that he has now given that assurance to Count Nesselrode in a private letter!

I do not doubt that it will prove that he has done so in terms that will make up for the delay and inadvertency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 20.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 18, 1854.

WHEN I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship I refrained from alluding to a speech made by the Emperor to a large group of officers on New Year's day (the 1/13th instant), because I was not sure of being able to report His Majesty's words exactly. I am now able to do so.

Upon quitting the chapel of the palace His Majesty turned to the military officers, who were collected in considerable numbers, and wished them all happiness during the coming year; he added this, "Vous savez sans doute, Messieurs, quelle est ma position. Je me suis trouvé entraîné par les événements au-delà de ce que je voulais, mais je compte sur vous tous, comme tous vous pouvez compter sur moi."

Turning to Count Münster, the Prussian Military Commissioner, and to Captain Geyer, another Prussian officer who has arrived here as Aide-de-camp of Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, His Majesty added, "Quand vous écrivez en Prusse, parlez de moi à vos officiers à Berlin et à Potsdam; ils sont tous mes bons camarades, comme moi je suis le leur;" saying which the Emperor kissed Count Münster on each cheek, and shook hands very cordially with Captain Geyer.

Both officers were moved almost, if not altogether, to tears, and the Emperor's purpose was no doubt obtained—that of conveying to the whole Prussian army the feeling of its having been honoured by the marks of Imperial favour bestowed upon their two Representatives.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 21.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 51. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 18, 1854.

IF ever there was a time when greater difficulty than at any other existed in arriving at the truth, and yet when its discovery was essential for the conduct of affairs, it is the present moment.

I think it right accordingly to state to your Lordship that I have reason for believing that Count Reiset was the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor Napoleon to General Castelbajac, and that this letter has been shown to the Chancellor.

What its contents may be I am wholly unable to state, and neither the French Minister nor his Secretary of Legation have alluded, in speaking to me, to the existence of such a letter.

Princess Lieven, whose diplomatic functions are well known to your Lordship, writes word that having had the honour of an audience of the Empress Eugénie, the Emperor Napoleon came into the room and conversed with her for three-quarters of an hour; his whole conversation, the Princess states (but with what correctness is at least doubtful), consisted of inquiries about the Emperor, and in friendly messages to be conveyed to His Imperial Majesty.

With reference to my despatch No. 48, I may take this opportunity of informing your Lordship that my conversation with General Castelbajac appears to have produced a good effect: on the 16th instant he wrote to his Government to say that he had some reason for believing that it was in contemplation to send Her Majesty's Minister away and not to deliver him his passports.

General Castelbajac added, that should this attempt at establishing a difference in the position of the two Missions be made, he should consider it to be his duty to demand his passports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 22.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 18, 1854.

THE task of reporting favourably of one's colleagues is as agreeable as it is painful to notice those who are wanting in their public duty.

It is, then, with alacrity that I beg to state to your Lordship that the conduct of General de Rochow during the last anxious days has been highly conciliatory and very much to his credit.

I have not been able to obtain sight of a letter which he has lately addressed to Count Nesselrode, but I am assured that it contained a very judicious and pacific appeal to the calm judgment of the Emperor, and that, upon being laid

before His Majesty, it appeared to shake his warlike resolutions more than any representation which as yet has been made to him.

It is, however, but too probable that the voices of the many, whose only object is to recommend themselves to the Imperial opinion and prejudices, will drown those very few which are raised in the cause of good sense, moderation, and humanity.

It is only by a sort of chance, and under a promise of secresy, that I have learned a very judicious suggestion which was made to the Emperor by the King of Prussia at the time His Imperial Majesty was at Olmütz.

The King of Prussia wrote to His Imperial Majesty to say that the Eastern question had given rise to too much writing, and had not been sufficiently discussed by persons perfectly masters of the subject. He proposed, accordingly, that Count Nesselrode, a man well known and esteemed in England, should be directed to proceed to London for the purpose of conferring with your Lordship.

The suggestion was well thought of by the Chancellor, who was willing—and even eager—to undertake the mission, but was not sanctioned by his Imperial master.

I may take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that the intrigues of the ultra-Russian party against Count Nesselrode are more active than ever; and whilst, according to one of their reports, Count Nesselrode is actually in the pay of England, according to another he is the man who, underhand, is encouraging the Emperor to plunge his country into war. My attention has been called to this latter report by one of my diplomatic colleagues.

What is obvious to all eyes is, that at this moment St. Petersburgh is a perfect maze of intrigue.

Fortunate the diplomatist who can find his way through these entanglements; still more fortunate he who is not compelled to approach such tortuous and mazy paths.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 23.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 56.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 18, 1854.

IF I am correctly informed, the indignation felt by the Emperor at reading in the public papers the French circular of the 30th ultimo, and at receiving the letter addressed to the Admiral at Sevastopol by the English and French Admirals, was such that he determined upon sending away General Castelbajac and myself, and had even given directions to that effect.

More moderate or more politic councils prevailed, and these orders, which I believe to have been issued on the 13th instant, were withdrawn.

Previous to this, however, as I am informed, a courier, or even two successive couriers, have been despatched to Sevastopol with orders to the Admiral not to put to sea with his fleet.

During these days I had no kind of intercourse with the Chancellor, but was led to believe, by some of my diplomatic colleagues, that General Castelbajac and myself should receive a summons to the Foreign Office, when we should learn what resolution had been taken with regard to the communication made by our respective Governments.

I was led at the same time to believe that His Imperial Majesty was in a more conciliatory frame of mind than he had been of late, and that he had determined upon asking for explanations of Her Majesty's Government and of that of France before taking any final decision.

Under these circumstances, as your Lordship was informed by my despatch No. 49, I determined upon keeping back the messenger, who ought to have left St. Petersburgh on the 16th instant.

This morning, not having received any summons from the Chancellor, and thinking it probable that he must have written to Baron Brunnow without apprizing me, I addressed him a short private note, in which I acquainted him

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with my intention of dispatching the messenger to-morrow, and requested that he would name a time for receiving me.

Count Nesselrode returned an immediate answer, in the usual courteous tone, to say that he should be ready to receive me at 2 o'clock this day.

In a later despatch I shall have the honour of stating to your Lordship what will pass at this meeting.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 24.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 19, 1854.*

THE indications of that will to which all in Russia is subservient are so contradictory, that it becomes extremely difficult to determine what are the views and intentions of the Sovereign.

On the 13th instant, the Emperor, as I have reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 50, stated to a large number of his officers "qu'il avait été entraîné par les événements au-delà de ses intentions." It was then to be inferred that at the time His Majesty, being sensible of having advanced too far, was desirous of retracing his steps, and with this view that he would be eager to calm the excitement which his own acts had produced.

Two or three days afterwards, however, His Majesty became very impatient for the representation of a new theatrical piece, which was to come out, illustrative of the glories of Sinope—of the Russian Trafalgar—as the late wretched affair is termed by the more patriotic here.

This piece was produced last night, and the theatre was thronged upon the occasion. All the Imperial family (with the exception of the Emperor, who was kept away by business) were present. The pit had been filled, by orders of the Grand Duke Constantine, with naval cadets, and fourteen of these boys, who were understood to be the children of officers serving in the Black Sea, were put in possession of the Emperor's box.

Splendid scenes of Sevastopol and Sinope, with the destruction of the Turkish fleet, and the accompaniment of the National Anthem, made up a representation entirely deficient in dramatic interest, but very striking and well calculated to work upon the feelings of a sensitive people, many of whom believe, in their ignorance, that their religion is in danger if the Emperor does not carry through victoriously the war which he has undertaken with the Turk.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 25.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 60. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 19, 1854.*

WERE it not that the character of a public servant is in some degree public property, I should not trouble your Lordship with the following short detail of circumstances, of interest only to myself.

I have been for some time past aware that feelings very unfavourable to me have been entertained in a high quarter, and that being expressed, they had the effect which they could not fail of producing in a society where every one follows the signal given by the lord and master. All this was a matter of comparative indifference to me, and I should have readily borne the reproaches of ill-temper and incapacity, my object in truth being to perform the duties assigned to me rather than to seek the approbation of those with whom I have nothing in common.

Lately, however, I have ascertained that my misdoings at this Court were

of a graver character, and that I have been charged not only with intemperance of conduct, but of such wilful misrepresentation of statements as had tended to bring about, or at least to complicate, the difficulties which are thickening around us.

It may be susceptibility, my Lord, or it may be only the sense of dignity which is felt by every English gentleman, but so it is that this imputation, however high the quarter from which it may proceed, is to me intolerable.

I resolved accordingly to open myself to Count Nesselrode, and I did so yesterday.

It was with reluctance, I said, that I must speak to him, in the midst of grave affairs, of myself, but I had no option.

I then alluded to the reports which had been circulated as to my unconciliatory conduct, and the want of faithfulness in my reports of declarations which required peculiar fidelity in their transmission to my Government; and added that I was quite aware that, if such was the opinion entertained of me, my continued residence at this Court would be an obstacle to the renewal of those friendly relations between the two Governments which would, I hoped, follow as a matter of course if existing disagreements were once happily reconciled.

I begged, however, to assure his Excellency that no such obstacle was to be apprehended, as nothing could be more settled than my purpose of requesting your Lordship to be pleased to take measures for my recall from St. Petersburgh as soon as present difficulties should be removed.

Count Nesselrode was of opinion that I attached too much importance to flying reports and unauthorized statements.

"This," I said, "M. le Comte, might be the case elsewhere; but we know what Russia is. In this country, men, and men highly placed, do not pronounce strong judgments without having high authority on their side. In this injustice of which I have to complain I do not choose to acquiesce.

"Now, M. le Comte," I continued, "you have heard what my conduct here has been represented; you shall permit me to tell you what it has been.

"Towards the end of last May it began to be clear that the policy of the Russian Government was very different from that which Her Majesty's Government had been led to expect from declarations from various sources which had been made to me.

"I immediately felt that serious complications were likely to ensue. I felt that my removal might facilitate explanations and agreement, and I accordingly wrote to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to say, that under these altered circumstances my continuance here might prove an embarrassment which I thought the Government would do well to remove. What I offered then was my place and my professional reputation; and in thus acting I acted as every English gentleman would have done. I take no merit for my conduct, but I do say, that afterwards to be reproached with wilful misrepresentation, and with having acted in a manner to embroil international relations, is an injustice which to me is wholly unbearable."

Count Nesselrode in a few kind words expressed his satisfaction at the official relations which had always existed between us, saying that for his part he should be always ready to bear testimony to the temper which I had shown in the discussion of affairs, often of a very trying nature.

After a pause his Excellency added, "You have spoken frankly to me; I will beg to be equally frank with you. May it not be said that in conversing with other persons upon public affairs you have occasionally departed from that calm and moderation which you have observed invariably when transacting business with me?"

"M. le Comte," I replied, "my answer shall be a very plain one; and it will be exactly what I should return to the Emperor if he were to do me the honour of addressing me the same question. It has been observed that a diplomatic agent is a man who is sent abroad to lie for the good of his country. My principle is a very different one. I hold it that he is sent to speak the truth in the service of his country. I have the greatest respect for truth.

"You ask me whether I have not occasionally spoken warmly (avec vivacité) upon matters of public interest? I reply that I have done so often and often; that I have constantly felt very keenly, and have in many instances expressed myself strongly. I will only beg leave to remark that this is not a matter of

public interest. You shall decide whether in the transaction of public affairs I am deficient in calm and self-possession. What I am in private life concerns no one but myself."

Having said so much, I added, "Your Excellency may be sure that I shall trouble you no more with a matter of an exclusively personal nature."

Your Lordship will perhaps have the kindness to bear in mind the purport of my conversation with Count Nesselrode, and, when the fitting time shall come, to take the necessary steps for confiding this very arduous post to some person better qualified for the discharge of its duties than myself.

A person unacceptable to the Russian Court would be little able to do justice to English interests, and one upon whose word a shade of doubt is cast would be wanting in self-respect were he to remain here longer than his services are actually required.

Having discharged what I consider to be a duty towards Her Majesty's Government and myself, I will only request your Lordship not to infer that I am desirous to leave my post at a moment of crisis and difficulty. As long as my feeble services can be considered useful, so long I shall be glad that they should be turned to account.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 26.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 61.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 19, 1854.*

WHEN I waited upon Count Nesselrode yesterday, his Excellency acquainted me that the Emperor could not permit (admettre) that in time of peace His Majesty should be prevented from exercising all the rights of a belligerent against a Power with which he is at war; but that the position which had been assigned to him would be in some measure changed if it was the *bonâ fide* intention of the English and French Governments to act towards Turkey as they were doing towards Russia. That accordingly, with a view to ascertaining whether it were yet possible to avoid a rupture with England and France, orders had been sent to the Imperial Missions at London and Paris to demand explanations of the two Governments, and to request that these declarations should be given in writing.

The communication made by Count Nesselrode to the French Minister an hour later was to the same effect.

It appeared that the courier who was the bearer of these instructions to Baron Brunnow left St. Petersburgh on the evening of the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 27.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 62.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 19, 1854.*

IT is now certain that Count Orloff, on the evening of the 17th, set off upon a foreign mission; but with regard to his destination a considerable difference of opinion prevails.

It will prove, I believe, that he has orders to proceed to Vienna, where he will have to express the Emperor's regrets at being unable to depart from the demands which he originally made upon the Porte.

If this be so, it is to be hoped that the Austrian Government will not fail to perceive that their sense of dignity, and the necessity of establishing that they

have not been a party to a contrivance for gaining time, will require that a neutral position must be changed for a defensive one against a Power aggressive in its policy and insidious in its modes of attack.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 28.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 64.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 19, 1854.*

IF peace be the object and purpose of the Russian Government, certainly every effort is made to mislead the public mind, for in every direction preparations are making for wholesale war.

The forces in Asia being, as the Russian bulletins acquaint us, victorious at all points, are about to be reinforced by 27,000 men, who are on their march through the southern Provinces of the Empire, and who appear to be received everywhere (thanks to the arrangements which are made) in a triumphal manner.

Immense provisions of lead and sulphur are being made, and that without reference to expense.

I have just heard of the purchase, on public account, of 30,000 poods (about 500 tons) of the latter material; whilst as respects lead, it has been purchased of the person who had the largest store, disregarding those forms which in general are rigidly observed in Russia with regard to contracts.

In a word, all around betokens approaching war, and the distress which war brings in its train. The prices of foreign produce rise from day to day, while home produce is very low; the price of stocks is not quoted, and Companies' shares are almost unsaleable.

I heard of a merchant having made yesterday an extensive sale of sugar, and of his getting it back immediately afterwards at an advanced price from the broker, and of his re-selling with great profit before the close of the market. The case is illustrative of the expectation which prevails among commercial men.

It need not, I think, be added, that these classes are very averse to the idea of war; but the feeling is so little confined to them that a gentleman who has been passing several days at Cronstadt assures me that war is equally unpopular with the officers of the fleet. They are brave men (my informant said), these Russian sailors; and let me tell you that you may yet find that they will fight much better than you have been led to believe; but while they declare their readiness to encounter death if such be the will of the Emperor, the mass of them will confess that the war which seems so imminent is wholly uncalled for and pernicious.

As I have alluded to the rise in prices in foreign articles, it may be well to quote figures. I will state, then, that within the last month sugars have risen from 9½ to 13 roubles silver the pood; lead, from 21 to 33 roubles silver; and coals from 25 to 33 roubles silver.

The only indications of individual confidence in the continuation of peace which have come to my knowledge are the discounting of long bills at 7 per cent. by the house of Gasser and Co. of St. Petersburgh, and the extensive purchases of hemp and tallow by a well-known London house, the name of which I am not at liberty to mention.

I would beg your Lordship's attention to the experiments making by the house of Stieglitz, and by an English firm likewise of this town. The former has sent off a quantity of tallow by land for shipment at Hamburgh; the latter, a quantity of the same article for shipment at Memel. The object is to ascertain the exact cost of the exportation of Russian produce in the event of the Baltic being closed by war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 29.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

Vienna, January 27, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT NESSELRODE has informed Baron Meyendorff that Count Orloff is sent on a special mission to Vienna. His arrival at Warsaw has already been announced by telegraph. He is expected here to-morrow.

No. 30.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

Vienna, January 27, 1854, 3 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL gives up the Protocol he had proposed as to the second despatch of Reshid Pasha, and he is perfectly satisfied with your mode of treating that subject as reported by Count Colloredo.

No. 31.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 83.)

Paris, January 25, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Russian Minister had an interview yesterday evening with M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the purpose of placing in his Excellency's hands the copy of a despatch dated the 16th instant, which Count Nesselrode had addressed to the Russian Representatives in Paris and London, and which had for its object to obtain more precise information respecting the intentions of the French and English Governments in sending their fleets into the Black Sea. M. de Kisseleff read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys at the same time part of another letter or despatch instructing him to require from the French Government explanations in writing, and in case those explanations should not appear to him satisfactory, to ask for his passports and to leave Paris, with all other Russian subjects resident there. In execution of this latter instruction M. de Kisseleff showed M. Drouyn de Lhuys the draft of a note which he proposed addressing him, offering, if there were any expressions in it to which the French Government objected, to take them into consideration, and to alter them if possible. Lastly, M. de Kisseleff made some remarks upon a notable difference to be found in the communications made by the two Governments to St. Petersburgh, communications which had been the cause of the present representation. While the English Envoy had given the Russian Government to understand that in interdicting to Russia all aggressive attacks upon the Turkish territory it was intended that the same rule of conduct should prevail towards Turkey, the French Envoy was altogether silent respecting Turkey.

With regard to this latter point, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that from despatches received from General Castelbajac of the same date as Count Nesselrode's despatch, namely, the 10th instant, he could assure M. de Kisseleff that this apparent discrepancy had disappeared, and that a further communication from General Castelbajac must have convinced Count Nesselrode that the omission complained of had been unintentional.

As to M. de Kisseleff's offer of revising his proposed note, should M. Drouyn de Lhuys desire it, the latter remarked that it was an unusual proceeding to take. It was not his business to express beforehand any opinion respecting the tenor or argumentation of a note about to be addressed to him, but if M. de Kisseleff's inquiries applied to the the form of the document, all he could say was that it appeared to him to follow the usual form of such documents.

With regard to the main question at issue, M. de Kisseleff would understand, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, that for the moment he could do no more than lay the papers before the Emperor and take His Majesty's orders.

M. de Kisseleff inquired whether he might expect an answer to-day, to which M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, certainly not; and that he would apprize him whenever he was in a position to return an answer.

Having given me this detailed account of his interview with M. de Kisseleff, M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say that he had had an interview with the Emperor this morning, and that he had submitted the following advice to His Majesty, which had been accepted.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion that the answer returned by the two Governments to the Russian despatch should be short and reserved, but temperate; that the refutation of the assertions of the Russian Government should be left to facts; that all recrimination should be avoided; and that the two Governments should rather restate their case than attempt to explain what was already clear. While Russia alleged the extraordinary pressure exercised upon her by the two Governments ever since the commencement of this question as the cause of the present crisis, he would state the cause to be the occupation of the Danubian Provinces. He would show that when Russia abandoned negotiation to have recourse to violence, even then the Porte and her allies remained patient and unprovoked, and it was not until proof was given that negotiation could effect nothing, that the Porte appealed to the sword, and that the allied fleets proceeded step by step from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea. The position now of England and France was this;—that whereas Russia had considered it necessary to have a material guarantee for the fulfilment of her claims upon the Porte by the possession, both administrative and military, of the Danubian Provinces, England and France, to restore the equilibrium of the East, thus dangerously and, in their opinion, dishonestly disturbed, had thought it necessary to have a material guarantee against the encroachment of Russia, by the possession of the Black Sea, and as Russia would not allow a Turk to appear in the Principalities, so England and France would not allow a Russian ship to navigate the Black Sea. The one was an equivalent for the other.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes to introduce here some phrase which shall not amount to an engagement, but which shall show that it is the intention of the allies not to countenance any naval expedition from Turkish ports on Russia, so long as the Russian flag is interdicted in the Black Sea; but he does not intend to apply the same rule in regard to sending soldiers, arms, &c., from one Turkish port to another, because he cannot admit that the two countries ought to be placed on the same footing, the one having committed an act of aggression which the other is only seeking to repel.

Russia, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asks if we mean to institute a sort of naval armistice. I answer, Not exactly so, but I say that it depends on Russia to establish one. She says she means peace; so do we. Let her accept the bases of negotiation offered by Turkey, and recommended from Vienna. Let her evacuate the Principalities, and give guarantees to the two Powers, to Turkey, and to Europe that the like acts of violence are not to be feared for the future, and the measures which England and France have taken will be no longer necessary. If she refuses this offer we ought to consider her refusal as a declaration of war.

Such, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was the proposition which by the Emperor's orders he should instruct M. de Walewski to-morrow to submit for your Lordship's consideration. He proposed drawing up in the course of the evening the draft of an answer in this sense.

It is impossible to judge a proposition intended to be committed to writing until the pen has done its office; but M. Drouyn de Lhuys' plan seemed to me on the whole to be temperate, firm, and judicious. His object appears to be to present such a document to the world as must utterly condemn the Russian Government in the sight of every loyal and sensible mind, and as must make it exceedingly difficult for Austria and Prussia to withhold their sympathy and support from Turkey.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys to whom he proposed transmitting this or any other answer that might be agreed upon between the two Governments. It should, I thought, be conveyed to the knowledge of the Russian Government by the English and French Representatives at St. Petersburgh, and not by the Russian Representatives in London and Paris. In the first place, such a mode

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of proceeding had more of dignity and made more impression; in the next, the question of a rupture would not be left to subordinate officers, who were bound by instructions, and could not incur any great amount of responsibility. More time also would be afforded to the Russian Government for reflection.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was quite of this opinion, and with your Lordship's concurrence will adopt it.

Having thus explained himself, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that there was another point connected with our subject of conversation, on which he desired to say a word to me. The Emperor, he continued, had been much annoyed at hearing that the Emperor of Russia told all who approached him that if he had to do with the Emperor of the French alone, this matter would soon be settled, and that it was "les bureaux" which did all the mischief. The Emperor was resolved on undeceiving His Russian Majesty, and had determined on writing him a letter in which he would repeat what the official despatches of his Ministers stated.

The draft of this letter would also be submitted for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and Count Walewski would be instructed to ask whether it would be possible that the Queen should write a letter of the same tenor to the Emperor Nicholas.

The Emperor thought that the happiest results might ensue from this double declaration of the opinions of the Sovereigns of England and France, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys hinted, that as far as the Emperor was concerned, if ever His Majesty's good faith was called in question before the British Parliament, this would be a triumphant answer in the hands of the Ministers.

It would not have become me to presume to utter an opinion respecting what might be the Queen's decision in regard to the desire thus expressed. I merely remarked that I did not know of any precedent for such a proceeding. But with respect to the letter which the Emperor proposed writing, I thought I could not err in saying that the loyalty of His Majesty's conduct would be highly appreciated by Her Majesty's Government, and that I was certain no sort of objection could be entertained to His Majesty taking any step calculated to bring the Emperor of Russia to a true view of his own position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 32.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 85. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 26, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that the Turkish Ambassador had shown great depression of spirits within the last few days, and had declared that unless assistance both in money and men was shortly furnished to the Porte, the latter would be reduced to the necessity of treating directly with Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 33.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 26, 1854.*

THE propriety, indeed the necessity, of some distinct understanding between the British and French Governments in regard to their future proceedings, should war be unfortunately the result of the present political crisis, has been the theme of conversation more than once lately between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself. He undertook, some short time back, to make a proposition upon the subject, and he yesterday read to me a project which Count

Walewski will be instructed to submit for your Lordship's consideration. It is to consist in an exchange of notes between the two Governments, who would bind themselves, first, to adopt, as the objects of their united action, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Porte; secondly, to make peace whenever Russia declared herself ready to accept the Turkish propositions, agreed to by the Vienna Conference, as the basis of negotiation with Turkey, and, as a consequence, to evacuate the Principalities; thirdly, to employ the combined squadrons already in the Black Sea in the furtherance of these objects; to increase them, if necessary, after an understanding between the two Governments, and, as far as possible, in equal proportions,—and to divide any expenses that may be incurred in common; fourthly, to send a combined squadron into the Baltic whenever the state of the weather admitted of it,—and lastly, not to receive singly any propositions for an arrangement without communicating them directly to the other party.

This proposition appeared to me to be both vague and meagre, and as having rather for its object the prevention of any exercise of our superior naval force than a cordial cooperation for a given purpose. The last condition was particularly inconclusive. I was unwilling, at first, to make any observations to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on a matter of such importance, or to prejudge, in any way, the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, to whom alone it appertains to determine the extent to which they are desirous that their engagements with France should be carried. But, in a conversation which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning, he referred to this project as being particularly concise and clear; and I considered that it would not be right to let him augur from my further silence that I looked upon it in that light. I told him, therefore, that since I had seen him yesterday, I had naturally been turning over in my mind the different subjects which we had been treating, and that his project for a more definite understanding with Her Majesty's Government appeared to me to require reconsideration; in fact, it bound the two Governments to nothing; it recapitulated what we all knew to be the objects of the two Governments in the Eastern question, but it did not bind them to continue the war until those objects were attained. It stipulated that, if propositions were made to either of the two Governments singly, the Government to which the propositions were made should inform the other, but it did not bind that Government not to accept them without the concurrence of the other; and finally, it imposed obligations respecting the reinforcement of the two fleets, which had the appearance of a mutual jealousy instead of a cordial cooperation, and might prove exceedingly inconvenient, in case of any sudden emergency. It would be far better, in my opinion, to leave it to each Power to bring all the force they thought proper into the field, and to provide that, at the end of the war, the respective forces should be reduced to their usual complement.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the justice of some of my observations, and he expressed a willingness to abandon that part of his project which could be considered as putting any limitation on the amount of force which either Government might think fit to display; but he objected to anything like an engagement between the two Powers, in regard to a continuation of the war. No doubt, he said, the present proposition was vague to a certain extent, but it pledged the two Governments to employ their naval resources, both in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic, in the prosecution of the objects they had in view; something must be left to the honour of the two Governments. Neither, it was to be hoped, would abandon the other unfairly; but still a state of affairs might arise, which would induce the English Government to think that France continued the war in the East in order to favour her projects in the West, or France might suppose that England wished to occupy a Russian army in a war with Turkey, in order to turn Russian attention from India, and the two Governments ought not to be bound to continue a war under such eventualities.

I rejoined that such a case could hardly arrive; because the object of the war was specified, and, that attained, both Governments would become free by the fact of the attainment. I remarked further that at all events some addition should be made to the last paragraph of the projected note, and that the two Governments should bind themselves not only to communicate any propositions that might be made to either singly, but should engage positively not to enter into any negotiation upon them without inviting its co-belligerent to take part in the negotiation.

I said that I made these objections on my own responsibility, and that they might not be entertained by Her Majesty's Government; but that I could not help thinking that, if the note was published in its present form, Russia would be apt to suppose that there was nothing very formidable in the English and French alliance.

Finally, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that, before sending the note to London, he would endeavour to give it more tone and colour.

I am aware that I have taken upon myself more than perhaps I ought to have done, in holding this conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys; but, as it is in your Lordship's power to undo or to modify any alteration in the projected note which my remarks may have induced the French Minister to make, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will hold me excused for endeavouring to bring the French Government to as precise terms as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 34.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)

Paris, January 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship, in my despatch No. 74, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had addressed a despatch to Count Walewski, indicating the opinion of the French Government that the moment was approaching when it would behove France and England to take steps for ascertaining how far they could count on the cooperation of Austria and Prussia in the event of hostilities with Russia.

Reverting to this subject this afternoon, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that, judging from the information which had reached him from Germany and elsewhere, it would be imprudent, at the present moment, peremptorily to summon the Austrian and Prussian Governments to declare themselves; that our tactics should be, to endeavour to bring these Governments to us by degrees; that events would do more for us than exhortations; and that we might lead them on step by step until they could not escape from their own declarations and engagements. For this purpose he had imagined a Convention, which he should propose for the signature of the Four Powers, and to Her Majesty's Government of course in the first instance: he read me the draft of this Convention.

The preamble sets forth the objects which the Four Powers have in view, and which are to be found in the Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna.

Article I binds them to use all their efforts to obtain peace on the terms mentioned in the Protocol of the 13th of January, and on the assurance of equal protection to all the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Article II stipulates for the evacuation of the Principalities.

Article III stipulates for the revision of the Treaty of 1841, in such a manner as to give greater security to Turkey for the future.

Article IV obliges the Four Powers to name Plenipotentiaries without loss of time, who are to meet in Conference for the purpose of discussing the measures to be adopted for carrying out the objects mentioned in the first three Articles.

Ratifications to be exchanged within fifteen days.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to think that the two Northern Powers cannot refuse to consecrate by a Convention principles and opinions to which they have already assented in the Protocol of a Conference; and that, having signed a Convention, they will find themselves carried on in spite of themselves to defend *vi et armis* the principles thus doubly accepted. Should he be mistaken in his prevision, he should then think the moment arrived when a summary of a very different nature should be addressed to the recusant Governments.

A draft of the proposed Convention will be sent to Count Walewski to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 35.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 10. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, January 24, 1854.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had this morning with Baron Manteuffel, I requested his Excellency to let me see the two instructions addressed to Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff by Count Nesselrode on the 4th instant, the substance of which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 2 of the 21st instant, and he permitted me to bring them home.

I have taken copies of these documents, and as it is probable that Baron Brunnow may not have communicated to your Lordship the confidential despatch which he has received, I have the honour to forward it herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

It is right that I should add, that Baron Manteuffel requested me not to compromise him in this matter, and I have, therefore, to beg that the source from which this paper has been obtained may not be divulged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 4/16 Janvier, 1854.

LA dépêche précédente a été rédigée pour l'hypothèse où, suivant ce qui m'a été dit par le Ministre d'Angleterre, il est entendu que les deux Puissances maritimes, tout en protégeant les ports et les bâtiments Turcs dans la Mer Noire contre toute attaque de notre part, veilleront, d'un autre côté, à ce que la flotte Ottomane respecte également la sécurité de nos côtes et de notre pavillon. Mais, outre que les communications, qui m'ont été faites par le Ministre de France, ne renferment rien à ce sujet—réticence qui s'applique aussi aux déclarations que les deux Amiraux viennent d'adresser au Prince Menchikoff—votre Excellence sentira que, dans une question si grave et qui prête si aisément à de nombreux malentendus, une assurance purement verbale ne saurait suffire, et que pour nous mettre en garde contre toute ambiguité quelconque, nous devons désirer nécessairement de la posséder par écrit. Vous voudrez donc bien, M. , demander par note officielle au Gouvernement [Britannique / Français] dans quel sens précis sous ce rapport nous devons entendre le langage que l'on vient de nous tenir; si, dans la pensée des deux Cours, l'escadre Turque, protégée par les forces navales Anglo-Françaises, reste libre d'attaquer ou d'inquiéter nos vaisseaux et notre littoral, enfin si tandisque la Turquie conservernit la faculté de communiquer avec ses propres ports et côtes, on prétendrait nous interdire toute communication avec les nôtres. Si, d'après la réponse officielle qui vous sera faite, tel devait être le cas, il devient dès lors patent qu'une pareille position prise à notre égard ne serait plus qu'un véritable état de guerre déguisé sous le masque de la paix, et votre présence à [Londres / Paris] cesserait d'être conciliable avec les relations d'amitié que, tout en prenant leur position maritime actuelle, les deux Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de France prétendent vouloir conserver avec nous. Le fait une fois éclairci, et dans le cas où vous recevriez une réponse défavorable, il ne vous restera, M. , qu'à demander vos passeports et qu'à partir immédiatement de votre poste, en signifiant, d'ordre de l'Empereur, à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale résidents en [Angleterre / France] qu'ils aient à quitter également ce pays.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 36.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 11.)
Berlin, January 24, 1854.

My Lord,

BY the two telegraphic despatches which I have this day sent your Lordship you will have been informed of the mission of Count Orloff to Vienna. It was supposed last night by Baron Manteuffel that the Count would have passed through Berlin on his way to his ultimate destination, but a despatch which his Excellency received to-day from General Rochow dated St. Petersburgh, 19th instant, makes him believe that he will proceed direct to Vienna and be there about the 27th. He was to leave St. Petersburgh on the 20th.

Baron Manteuffel appears quite uninformed of the nature of the proposals of which Count Orloff is the bearer, and he only knows that he is charged to explain to the Austrian Cabinet the concessions which Russia is prepared to make, and the terms on which she will conclude peace with Turkey. I sought in vain to learn some further particulars from his Excellency, and I believe that he possessed no information beyond the simple fact above reported.

He, however, looked upon this mission as offering some slight prospect of success, but his hopes were based chiefly on the well-known conciliatory character of Count Orloff; and of his, perhaps, daring to take greater responsibility on himself than any other of the Emperor's servants, and not in any change which had come over the opinions of the Russian Government.

The messenger who had left Vienna for St. Petersburgh on the 13th instant with the terms of arrangement agreed to by the Porte and recommended by the Conference does not appear to have arrived; and on my inquiring of Baron Manteuffel whether he thought the Emperor would consent to them, he gave me to understand that General Rochow's impression was, that His Imperial Majesty would never be brought to treat collectively with the other Powers in a matter of this kind. This, I should add, is only an impression which had been received, but General Rochow would doubtless not have reported it unless it was a well-founded conviction on his part; still it must not be considered that any fixed decision has been taken to reject the last propositions, which had not yet even been formally communicated to the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 37.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 26.)
Vienna, January 24, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL is informed by M. de Hübner that the French Government does not recognise the despatch of Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has invited the English Government to ignore it also, and he would propose an identic note to be signed by the Conference and addressed to the Porte. Count Buol states that, having already declared to the Porte his non-acceptance of this despatch through the Internuncio, he could not repeat it as for his Government alone, but he proposes a short protocol which he would sign with the other members of the Conference, stating that they could not accept this second despatch of Reshid Pasha after having adopted the former one in their Acts of the 13th instant.

This protocol might be communicated to the Porte by the Four Powers in the way they should think fit. Count Buol would take charge of it if required, or each Government might direct their Minister to transmit it to their Representative at Constantinople, but he is anxious for a protocol of the Conference, as he thinks that, after its Acts of the 13th instant, it ought not to be silent upon a document which so directly bears upon them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 38.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, January 28, 1854.

ENGLAND and France are about to propose to Prussia and Austria a short Convention for better giving effect to the Protocols. It is most important that no engagement of any kind should be taken by Prussia to prevent her agreeing to this Convention, which we consider to be the only means now left of preserving peace.

No. 39.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 91.)
Paris, January 28, 1854.

My Lord,

THE accompanying despatches* from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, brought by the private steamer "La Ville de Persignan" to Marseilles, having reached me after the departure of the mail last night, and there being no regular mail to-night, I have thought it advisable to request Her Majesty's Consul at Calais to put any one of Her Majesty's steam-packets which may be in Calais harbour, in requisition for the conveyance of a messenger.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received his regular mail from Constantinople of the 15th instant. It would appear from General Baraguay d'Hilliers' despatches that the Admirals, after receiving the instructions from their Ambassadors dated the 9th instant, had referred back to them in consequence of a difference in the wording of the two instructions; those addressed to Admiral Dundas merely enjoining him to "require" the return to port of any Russian vessels which might be met, while those to Admiral Hamelin employ the word "contraindre." Admiral Hamelin asked at the same time what he was to do with ships that disobeyed the requisition, and against which his orders enjoined him to employ force. Was he to take them if he could, and bring them into the Bosphorus, or to sink them?

After consultation between Lord Stratford and General Baraguay d'Hilliers it was determined that orders should be transmitted to Admiral Dundas in the sense of those previously sent to Admiral Hamelin, and that the Admirals should be directed to capture, whenever it was possible, Russian vessels that were found at sea and would not obey the injunction to return to port, rather than cause an unnecessary loss of life by firing into them.

These fresh instructions were to have been sent from Constantinople on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 40.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 93. Confidential.)
Paris, January 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I MET M. de Hübner accidentally this afternoon; and he informed me that he had received instructions to make a proposition to the French Government, in regard to the answer to be returned by England and France to the demand of Russia for explanations respecting the intentions of the two Governments in sending their fleets into the Black Sea. He added, that a similar proposition would be made by Count Colloredo to your Lordship.

* See Nos. 43 to 47.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The proposition, as explained very cursorily by M. de Hübner, appears to resemble the proposition submitted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. The Austrian Government, if I understood M. de Hübner rightly, is of opinion that the two Governments should maintain their declarations to Russia, but that they should express a willingness to relax the severity of their measures in the Black Sea if Russia will agree to accept the basis of arrangement proposed by Turkey and approved by the Conference of Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 41.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

Vienna, January 29, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ORLOFF arrived last night. He has neither seen the Emperor nor Count Buol this day; he has appointed to see both to-morrow. Count Buol has promised that whatever he learns from him of interest he will let me know, that I may send it you by telegraph.

No. 42.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 37.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has this morning read to me a despatch from Count Buol, expressing an earnest hope that the answer to the inquiry which Baron Brunnow had been instructed to make of Her Majesty's Government, respecting the intentions with which the combined fleets had been sent into the Black Sea, might not be of a nature to produce a suspension of diplomatic relations between this country and Russia, and thus to endanger the success of the negotiations now pending; but, Count Buol added, if the answer of Russia to the proposals for peace made by the Porte was unsatisfactory, Austria would then offer no opinion upon any course of policy that Her Majesty's Government might think proper to adopt.

I told Count Colloredo that the object of Her Majesty's Government was to effect a just and honourable peace between the belligerent Powers, and that it was far from their wish to quarrel with Russia; but that the disastrous affair at Sinope having rendered the entrance of the fleets into the Black Sea indispensable, Her Majesty's Government had not lost a moment in making known to the Russian Government the instructions sent to the Admirals. A verbal communication had accordingly been made by Sir H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode; but the Russian Government having wished to receive it in more precise terms, and in writing, there could be no difficulty in complying with the request; and it was hardly necessary for me to add, that no change whatever would be made in the intentions we had announced, or the policy we were determined to pursue.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 43.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 11.)

Constantinople, January 10, 1854.

My Lord,

AS soon as I learnt that your Lordship was no less desirous than myself that the causes of the late calamitous event at Sinope should be duly investigated I addressed an instruction on the subject to M. Pisani for immediate communication to Reshid Pasha.

I learn from M. Pisani's report that the result of the inquiry is to be communicated to me as soon as the Ministerial Council shall have taken cognizance of the proceedings, and formed their opinion of the case.

Copies of my instructions to M. Pisani, and of his report in answer to it, are herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Pera, Monday, January 9, 1854.

Sir,

IMMEDIATELY after the disastrous affair at Sinope I directed you to express to Reshid Pasha my advice and expectation that an inquiry should be instituted into the causes of that calamity. An inquiry has been instituted; but, although a considerable time has elapsed, I hear of no official or legal report, and certainly nothing of the kind has been communicated to the Embassy.

Her Majesty's Government have written to me on this subject, approving the advice which I gave, and intimating the importance which they attach to the intended inquiry and its result.

You will, therefore, revert once more to this question in your communications to-day with the Ottoman Secretary of State, and you will call upon his Highness to inform me officially of the manner in which the Court of Inquiry was constituted, and of the sentence or opinion with which its proceedings were closed. The points of more immediate consequence are the following:

1. To what or to whom is attributable the defective state of the fortifications at Sinope?

2. By whose order and for what object the flotilla destroyed at Sinope was sent out?

3. By whose order the vessels composing that flotilla anchored in the port of Sinope?

For my own information and for that of Her Majesty's Government I request to be fully informed as to these points, and if Reshid Pasha is unable to afford me the required information at once, I have further to request that his Highness will lose no time in taking the necessary steps to procure it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P S.—You will leave a copy of this instruction with Reshid Pasha.
S. DE R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, January 9, 1854.

(Extract.)

HAVING communicated and left copy with Reshid Pasha of your Excellency's instruction of this day's date respecting the inquiry into the disastrous affair at Sinope, &c., his Highness requested me to say in reply, that the inquiry is nearly completed, and the report is to be read in the Ministerial Council the first time it will meet in order to come to some conclusion, and as soon as this is done, he will lose no time in informing you of the result.

No. 44.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 12.)

Constantinople, January 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in copy a report addressed to me to-day by M. Pisani, and conveying the Sultan's formal thanks for the entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 44.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, January 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM requested by Reshid Pasha to inform your Excellency that the Sultan has learnt with much pleasure the entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea, and ordered his Highness to express His Imperial satisfaction, both to your Excellency and to the French Ambassador, at this fresh and unequivocal proof of the friendly dispositions of his allies to protect efficiently his territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 45.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 13.)

Constantinople, January 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 27th ultimo, and I have lost no time in carrying the instructions which it conveyed to me into execution.

Having ascertained from the French Ambassador that his Excellency had received instructions similar to mine by the same express, I drew up, in concert with him, the letter (of which a copy is inclosed herewith) to Vice-Admiral Dundas, and also the draft annexed to it, in French, which is to be signed separately by the two Vice-Admirals, and addressed to the Russian Admiral commanding in Sevastopol.

Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Fury" was despatched this evening to Sinope with my instructions to Vice-Admiral Dundas, and with those of similar purport from General Baraguay d'Hilliers to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

At a later time of the evening I directed Mr. Pisani to make a communication to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, apprizing his Highness

of the extent to which the two Governments of England and France had resolved to carry their protection of the Ottoman territory and flag in the Black Sea, repeating their expectation that no Turkish ships would be sent thither without the consent of the two Embassies, and adding, in substance, that part of your Lordship's instructions, dated the 27th ultimo, which relates to the joint action of the Four Powers with respect to negotiation, and their right to reckon on a corresponding spirit of peace, moderation, and honourable consistency on the part of the Turkish Government.

For your Lordship's more complete information I forward herewith a copy of my instruction to Mr. Pisani.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, January 9, 1854.

Sir,

DESPATCHES, which arrived from London to-day, having put me in full possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding recent occurrences in the Black Sea, I lose no time in sending you such further instructions as on that account are necessary.

You are already authorized to employ the squadron under your command for the protection of the territory and flag of Turkey. It is now my duty, while confirming that instruction, to add that wherever you meet any Russian ship-of-war in the Black Sea, you will require it to return to Sevastopol, or to the most neighbouring port; and that in every case of aggression on the Ottoman territory or flag, you will repel force by force.

It is obvious that a notification to this effect should be made to the proper authority at Sevastopol; and, consequently, I inclose herewith the draft of a letter, in French, to be addressed, under your signature, to the Admiral commanding there in chief. The same letter is to be addressed by Vice-Admiral Hamelin to the same authority, in pursuance of instructions from the French Ambassador, who acts entirely in concert with me on this occasion.

The transmission of the letter must, however, depend in some degree on the manner in which your preceding letter has been received or answered, and, being ignorant of the circumstances, I must of necessity confide this point to your discretion.

You are to understand the present instruction as extending to all parts of the Black Sea, and also the release of Turkish vessels captured by any Russian force and met with at sea by your squadron.

Her Majesty's Government and that of France being resolved to prevent the recurrence of any such event as that which took place at Sinope, you are requested to maintain an adequate force in the Black Sea so long as the flag and territory of the Porte are exposed to danger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Draft of Letter to be addressed by the British and French Admirals to the Commander-in-chief at Sevastopol.

Monsieur,

PAR l'ordre exprès de mon Gouvernement je dois ajouter la notification suivante à celle que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence: Les Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de France étant résolus d'empêcher la répétition d'événements tels que celui qui a eu lieu à Sinope, tout bâtiment de guerre Russe sera dorénavant invité à retourner soit à Sevastopol, soit au port le plus voisin,

et toute aggression contre le pavillon ou le territoire Ottoman imposerait aux Amiraux respectifs la pénible nécessité de repousser la force par la force.

L'exécution du devoir que j'ai maintenant l'honneur de remplir ne change en rien les vœux pacifiques dont l'expression est consignée dans ma lettre précédente.

Je profite, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 45.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Pera, January 10, 1854.

Sir,

FRESH instructions from Her Majesty's Government enable me to confirm what I directed you to communicate a few days ago to Reshid Pasha respecting the squadrons. They will be employed with vigour to protect the flag as well as the territory of the Sultan in the Black Sea. In fact, a notification stating that, in consequence of the affair at Sinope, every Russian ship of war, when met at sea by the combined squadrons, will be required to return into port, has been directed to be made at Sevastopol by the two Vice-Admirals.

The Porte will of course understand that the existing agreement, namely, that no Turkish ships shall be sent into the Black Sea without the knowledge of the two Embassies, and the concurrence of the two Vice-Admirals, is expected to hold good.

It is also necessary that no room for misunderstanding should exist as to another point. Her Majesty's Government, in resolving to protect the Porte's just interests at every risk, are far from abandoning the wish for peace, and with that view they are deeply alive to the importance of keeping up the joint action of the Four Cabinets, and reckon with confidence on the Porte for carrying into any negotiation which may take place that corresponding spirit of good faith and moderation whereon is founded the best hope of maintaining a salutary union among them, and terminating the war with satisfaction and honour.

Your faithful servant, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—You will read the above to Reshid Pasha, with care, and report to me whatever answer his Highness may think proper to make.

S. DE R.

No. 46.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 14.)

Constantinople, January 11, 1854.

My Lord,

IT was not long after my despatches to Vice-Admiral Dundas had yesterday been sent to Her Majesty's ship "Fury," for conveyance to the squadron, that I had the satisfaction of hearing from the Admiral at Sinope. A copy of his letter is inclosed herewith.

Your Lordship will observe that Rear-Admiral Lyons and Rear-Admiral Tinan had proceeded eastward with three screw liners and several steam-frigates. As a large portion of the Sevastopol fleet is reported elsewhere to have been absent from that port, it is not altogether improbable that a rencontre may take place between the two detachments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," at Sinope, January* 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the combined squadrons arrived at Sinope on the 6th instant, and that Rear-Admirals Sir Edmund Lyons and De Tinan proceeded to the eastward this morning with three screw line-of-battle ships and five steam-frigates, having charge of five Turkish steam-vessels bound to Trebizond.

No Russian vessels of war have as yet been seen, and he only report we have heard of their being at sea has proved to be false.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 47.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 11, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, a letter which reached me yesterday from Vice-Admiral Dundas, communicating the Honourable Captain Drummond's statement of his arrival at Sevastopol, and delivery of the letters entrusted to his care.

On the contents of that statement I offer no remark. Your Lordship will find little difficulty in appreciating the regulations under which the Russian officer, who communicated with Captain Drummond, described himself as acting. It was my anticipation of what occurred that induced me to leave a certain degree of latitude to Vice-Admiral Dundas with respect to the transmission of the second notification prepared for Sevastopol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 47.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," at Sinope, January* 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the "Retribution" returned from Sevastopol at 1 A.M. this day, and I inclose for your Lordship's information a copy of the report I have received from Captain the Honourable J. A. Drummond.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 47.

The Hon. Captain Drummond to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

"Retribution," at Sea, Lat. 42° 50′ *N., Long.* 34° 23′ *E., January* 7, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to you, that in pursuance of your instructions of the 30th ultimo, I proceeded in Her Majesty's ship under my command to Sevastopol, taking with me M. Benic, lieutenant de vaisseau, sent by the French Admiral.

After parting company with your flag on the 5th instant, I fell in with no

ships or vessels until I made the lighthouse of Kersenese on the morning of the 6th instant, when I observed a brig-of-war cruizing.

I rounded the lighthouse about 9 A.M. of the 6th instant, the weather thick and very hazy over the land; I stood straight in towards the harbour's mouth, and owing to the fog, I was well in before a small steamer-of-war, the "Bessarabia," stood out and put herself across the entrance, hoisted a quarantine flag, and waved to me to stop. I continued on my course, and upon reaching the entrance between the two forts, three guns, blank cartridge, were fired from the principal fort. I anchored in ten fathoms water, and observed that men were running to man the several batteries.

Immediately I had anchored, an officer came to inform me that I must proceed out of gun-shot of the forts, or otherwise that the batteries were prepared to fire. I stated that I had letters to deliver to the Admiral in command, and to the Governor of the Crimea; the officer repeated that I must remove from under the batteries before he would receive my letters, that coming from Constantinople I was subject to a quarantine of fourteen days. I then weighed and stood about one mile out, where I remained until the return of the officer, who came attended by a health officer, and took the letters entrusted to me for delivery, those in charge of Lieutenant Benic, and a letter from me addressed to the Russian Admiral in command, relative to the detention of the two engineers, British subjects, a copy of which I inclose. He then informed me that Prince Menchikoff was absent at Kherson; that Vice-Admiral Nachimoff was absent, and that the squadron, as per margin,* at anchor in the harbour, was under the command of Rear-Admiral Stoemen (promoted for the affair of Sinope).

I saluted the Russian flag with twenty-one guns, and the flag of the Rear-Admiral with thirteen.

Having stated that I required an answer to my letters, one hour lapsed before the officer returned to say, that in the absence of Prince Menchikoff no answer could be given; that the letters would be forwarded immediately to Kherson; that the Rear-Admiral was not authorized to open letters; and that answers should be sent to Constantinople.

I replied that having been instructed to deliver the letters and to receive an answer, I must insist upon a document in writing to the effect that the letters had been received at Sevastopol. In about one hour and a half's time, the officer returned with a letter from the commandant of the port, a copy of which I beg to inclose.

Having received this answer, and finding that I could get nothing more, with a certainty of fourteen days' quarantine if I remained, I proceeded at 3 P.M. of the 6th instant to join your flag at Sinope.

I had sufficient time during my stay off Sevastopol, to observe that the harbour is very strongly fortified. The ships of the line were anchored with springs on their cables, broadside to the entrance of the harbour.

I shall forward to you my remarks upon the fortifications in a few days.

A large portion of the Russian squadron was absent from Sevastopol, probably out under Vice-Admiral Nachimoff, either at sea or perhaps at anchor in Kaffa Bay, which from its position is a more convenient anchorage for the coast of Circassia at this season of the year.

The harbour of Sevastopol, with westerly winds, is not easy for ships to move from without the assistance of steam.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. DRUMMOND.

Inclosure 3 in No. 47.

The Hon. Captain Drummond to the Russian Commander-in-chief.

"*Retribution*," *off Sevastopol, January* 6, 1854.

Sir,

HAVING been instructed by Vice-Admiral Dundas, Commander-in-chief, to demand the release of two British subjects, named in the margin,† who, whilst serving on board the "Medari Tidjaret," Turkish steamer, were captured

* 2 three-deckers, 3 two-deckers, 2 frigates, 1 corvette, 3 brigs.
† Alexander Cleland and Archibald Morrison, engineers.

on the 18th November in the said vessel by a Russian steamer-of-war, and who are now detained in Russia as prisoners of war; I have the honour to address you on the subject, and to request that you will give directions for the release of the engineers named Alexander Cleland and Archibald Morrison, taken prisoners as stated above, and for their delivery into my charge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. DRUMMOND.

Inclosure 4 in No. 47.

The Russian Harbour-Master to the Hon. Captain Drummond.

Sevastopol, le $\frac{25 \text{ December, } 1853}{6 \text{ January, } 1854}$.

JE reconnais avoir reçu trois lettres cachetées à l'adresse du Commandant-en-chef des forces navales à Sevastopol et deux à l'adresse du Gouverneur de la Crimée. N'ayant ni le droit de les ouvrir ni celui d'entrer en correspondence avec des bâtimens de guerre étrangers, je me suis empressé d'expédier les susdites lettres au Commandant-en-chef des forces militaires de cette contrée, absent de Sevastopol et actuellement à Kherson.

Je crois devoir prévenir en même temps M. le Capitaine Drummond que d'après les ordres précis qui défendent l'admission des navires de guerre étrangers à Sevastopol, je suis obligé de le prier de ne point en différer son départ.

(Signé) STANEE KINALETE,
Commandant de Port.

No. 48.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 29, 1854.

LETTERS received by M. Drouyn de Lhuys from St. Petersburgh represent the object of Count Orloff's mission to Vienna to be the discovery of the Emperor of Austria's real intentions, it being the Emperor Nicholas's opinion that Austria is playing a double game, and deceiving both Russia and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 49.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 29, 1854.

M. DE HUBNER informed me last night that the proposition which he had stated to me in the morning he had orders to make to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in regard to the answer to be returned by the French Government to the Russian demands for explanation respecting the presence of a French squadron in the Black Sea, had not elicited any other observation from M. Drouyn de Lhuys than that the Austrian Government, in its present position, was not in a condition to offer advice upon the subject to which his attention had been called.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 50.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 29, 1854.*

IN two conversations which I have held with M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday and to-day, his Excellency has made me acquainted with the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government, as to the answer which should be returned to the note presented to your Lordship by Baron Brunnow on the 23rd instant.

Yesterday he showed me the drafts of the note which your Lordship proposed to address to Baron Brunnow, and of the despatch which you destined for Sir Hamilton Seymour. He expressed his approbation of both, and he added that, having learnt from Count Walewski that some objections were entertained to parts of the projects emanating from the French Government (referred to in my despatch No. 86), he should wait until he was made acquainted with them in detail before taking any further step, either with respect to your Lordship's drafts or his own.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys again this afternoon, when he stated to me that he had received this morning, from Count Walewski, the information he had been expecting: that Her Majesty's Government did not approve the idea of transmitting the answers to St. Petersburgh (for which suggestion, as coming from me, I must express my regrets), but desired to have them placed in the hands of the Russian Representatives in London and Paris; that the project of his (M. Drouyn de Lhuys') despatch to General Castelbajac was approved, with the exception of the last paragraph, which Her Majesty's Government desired to see suppressed, and that, in rendering due homage to the sentiments contained in the letter of the Emperor to the Emperor Nicholas, Her Majesty's Government suggested two alterations: 1st, the introduction of the word "armistice," as explanatory of or supplementary to the words "cessation of hostilities;" 2ndly, the suppression of the proposal for direct negotiation at Vienna between a Russian and a Turkish Plenipotentiary. Her Majesty's Government desired to abide by the proposals transmitted from the Conference. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that, for reasons which he appreciated, Her Majesty's Government declined advising the Queen to address a similar letter to the Emperor of Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he had been with the Emperor, and that His Majesty had agreed to adopt the modifications and the mode of transmission suggested, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, by your Lordship to Count Walewski; and he added, that the suppression of the last paragraph in his despatch to General Castelbajac would necessitate a similar modification of the corresponding paragraph of the Emperor's letter to the Emperor Nicholas.

These points being settled, he proposed drawing up a draft of an answer to M. de Kisseleff, as nearly identic as possible with your Lordship's note to M. de Brunnow; but as he had understood from Count Walewski that your Lordship intended making some alteration in the latter, which alteration you had promised to communicate to Count Walewski to-morrow, he should wait to know what it was before putting the finishing stroke to his own note. The draft would then be sent to London for approval, and the note given to M. de Kisseleff, on the day on which your Lordship might state it to be your intention to place your note in M. de Brunnow's hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 51.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 101.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 29, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has learnt with great satisfaction that your Lordship has already instructed the Earl of Westmorland to propose to the Austrian Government the signature of the Convention, the project of which was laid before your Lordship by Count Walewski the day before yesterday. The text is not yet gone to Vienna, but it will be transmitted immediately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 52.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 29, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has no objection whatever to introduce into the notes which he desires to see exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor, for the regulation of their future proceedings in the Oriental question, a paragraph renouncing all intention on the part of the two Governments of profiting by the present state of things for their own individual advantage. He thinks that the introduction of such a paragraph may be of great use, as showing the disinterestedness of the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 53.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1854.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Baraguay d'Hilliers,* which has been given to me by Count Walewski, respecting a despatch communicated in copy to the French Government by the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, stating the intentions of the Porte in regard to its proposed negotiation with Russia.

A copy of the same despatch was placed in my hands by M. Musurus on the 20th instant, and I inclose a copy of it for your Excellency's information.†

I did not think it necessary to return the copy to M. Musurus, nor was I aware until yesterday that the French Government had adopted that course; but I informed him that I thought it inopportune and unnecessary, as all the elements of future negotiations were contained in the answer of the Porte to the notes of the Four Representatives, and which, therefore, does not admit of subsequent modifications with respect to matters of detail which may properly be discussed when the assent of Russia to the terms proposed by the Porte has been obtained.

I received a few days ago a despatch from the Earl of Westmorland giving an account of Count Buol's language, which had also been communicated to the Cabinet of Vienna. I inclose a copy of that despatch, and also a copy of my reply.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 82. † See Part III, No. 667. ‡ See Part III, Nos. 668, 669.

No. 54.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1854.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 13 of the 11th instant, reporting the arrival of the instructions for the protection of the Ottoman flag and territory, contained in my despatch No. 325 of the 27th December; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the instructions which, on the receipt of my despatch, you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas and to M. Pisani.

With reference to my despatch No. 332 of the 28th of December, inclosing copies of the instructions which I had addressed to Lord Cowley and Sir Hamilton Seymour; and with reference also to the assurance given by Reshid Pasha, as recorded in M. Pisani's letter of the 4th instant, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 10 of the 5th instant, that "the Capitan Pasha has been officially directed to abstain from any steps whatever without the previous knowledge of the Embassy, and without the concurrence of the British and French Admirals;" I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government expect the Porte clearly to understand that so long as this country remains at peace with Russia no aggression on the Russian territory by the naval forces of the Sultan can be permitted. Such aggression would only take place under the protection of the British and French flags, and England and France would thus be made to participate in acts of direct hostility against Russia, which without a previous declaration of war would not be justifiable.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 55.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication which his Excellency made to you, as reported in your despatch No. 100, respecting the answer to be returned by Great Britain and France to the Russian demand for explanations regarding the action of the combined fleets in the Black Sea.

You will at the same time state that Her Majesty's Government highly appreciate the friendly manner in which the Government of the Emperor of the French adopted the suggestions which Her Majesty's Government offered for more effectually carrying out the objects that both Governments have in view.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 56.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 101 of the 29th instant, that Count Walewski was mistaken in supposing that I had sent to Vienna the Convention of which a project was submitted to me by his Excellency. I merely addressed to Lord Bloomfield a telegraphic despatch, of which I herewith inclose a copy,* in consequence of having learned confidentially from Chevalier Bunsen, that the visit of Count Orloff, and the proposals with

* No. 38.

which he was supposed to be charged, might have a prejudicial effect upon the mind of the King of Prussia.

I have now, however, instructed Lords Westmorland and Bloomfield to sign the Convention that will be transmitted to M. de Bourqueney and M. de Moustier, and to use their best efforts to procure the adoption of that Convention by the Austrian and Prussian Governments.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 57.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 26, 1854.

A PERSON usually well informed having mentioned to me last night that General Rochow's last despatch, to which I alluded in my No. 11 of the 24th instant, stated that one of the objects of Count Orloff's mission to Vienna was to break up the Conference, I called to-day on Baron Manteuffel, and sought to discover whether this was stated in the above despatch. His Excellency assured me that it certainly did not contain any such expression, and he then repeated in nearly the same words as those which I have before reported, that Count Orloff was charged to explain the terms on which the Emperor of Russia would still continue to treat for peace with Turkey.

I remarked that these words almost implied as much as, and were tantamount to a rejection of the Porte's proposals, which were forwarded from Vienna on the 13th instant, the substance of which must certainly have been known at St. Petersburgh before Count Orloff's departure, though the communication of them by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires might not have taken place.

To this Baron Manteuffel replied that he did not think it likely that the Russian Government would be in any hurry to send their answer, particularly after their late communication to London and Paris.

We then conversed on the probability of Count Orloff being instructed to urge the Austrian Cabinet to enter into an alliance with Russia on the Eastern question, and if successful to invite Prussia to accede to it; and if Prussia should refuse to join in such an alliance, to call upon Austria to exert her influence with the small German States to declare themselves in favour of the desired arrangement; and he readily admitted that he greatly feared this would turn out to be the main object of Count Orloff's mission, but that he should be able to give me some details to-morrow, as he heard Baron Budberg was to receive a messenger in the course of the day.

His Excellency then alluded to the great danger to which this country would be exposed by entertaining any questions which savoured so much of the Holy Alliance, the principles of which he seemed to consider opposed to the true interests of Prussia at the present conjuncture, and he said to me in the most positive manner that he would never be a party to any such policy: that he knew that he should have the most serious difficulties to contend with, nay, dangers to encounter, but that he should not swerve from the line of independence for Prussia which he thought the only one befitting her position in Europe and in Germany. He said further, that circumstances might change, and that it was useless for him to assure me with whom his sympathies would be.

He finished by requesting that our conversation might be quite confidential.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 58.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 26, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just informed me, in the strictest confidence, that after he had communicated to the King the despatch from General Rochow relating to the mission of Count Orloff, he requested His Majesty's authority to direct Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, in the event of Count Orloff seeking to communicate with him and to exchange ideas on the object of his mission, to decline doing so, and further to take nothing from him for reference to his Court, for his Excellency is determined to close the door at once against any false interpretation being given to the intentions of the Prussian Government.

Baron Manteuffel observed to me that the King did not hesitate an instant in giving his orders to this effect, which were forthwith transmitted by telegraph, and that His Majesty shows no symptoms of wavering in his resolution to carry out the principles of an independent policy for this country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 59.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 17. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 27, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has told me, in the strictest confidence, that an important communication has been made to him by the Russian Minister. Baron Budberg has informed his Excellency that Count Orloff is not coming to Berlin as was reported, and that he, Baron Budberg, has been charged with a letter from the Emperor for the King of Prussia, which he desired to have an opportunity of delivering to His Majesty at a private audience.

After Baron Budberg had communicated this part of his instructions, he read to Baron Manteuffel a despatch from Count Nesselrode upon the present critical state of affairs, and the nature of the explanations which have been demanded in London and Paris as to the intended operations of the combined fleets in the Black Sea.

The probabilities of a rupture of amicable relations are then commented on, the position of Germany is discussed, and Prussia is informed that her refusal to agree to the Russian proposals, which are contained in a draft of Protocol that is forwarded, will be viewed in a hostile sense. By this Protocol Prussia is called upon to bind herself to be neutral in the event of war between Russia and the Western Powers, and she is invited further to unite with Austria and the States of the Confederation in one collective declaration of neutrality in a sense favourable to Russia.

Having asked Baron Manteuffel whether he had communicated these documents to the King, he said that he had done so, and that His Majesty will grant Baron Budberg an audience to-morrow at which he also is to be present; that these demands of Russia, the tone of which is peremptory, had been ill received by the King, and that His Majesty will not enter into any engagement whatever either with Russia or with Austria, but will maintain an entirely independent position.

I asked Baron Manteuffel if he had inquired of the Russian Minister whether Count Orloff was to communicate with the Conference at Vienna, and he replied that Baron Budberg knew nothing about the Conference, and made some observations which implied that its recommendations and labours

were only so much waste paper, and that Russia would agree to nothing but direct negotiation with the Porte and to no collective act.

Baron Manteuffel said further, that Baron Budberg gave him to understand that there is every prospect of the proposals of which Count Orloff was the bearer being favourably received at Vienna, adding some hints as to the isolation in which Prussia would be placed if she hesitated to agree to the proposal which he now communicated to him.

After telling me the foregoing, Baron Manteuffel said that he wished this conversation to be kept quite secret; that he knew Baron Budberg was watching for an opportunity of injuring him, and that anything that could be construed into a breach of confidence on his part might be attended with evil consequences at the present moment.

I availed myself of this opportunity to ask his Excellency if any communication from Her Majesty's Government would be likely to fortify his position, and he said he should like to have something to lay before the King; something, he added, which would be a contrast to the proposed Russian Protocol, and which would leave the King his independence, which he is resolved to maintain, but which it is absolutely essential should be left to him for some time yet, at all events until the end of May.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 60.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 18. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 27, 1854.

WITH reference to the last part of my preceding despatch No. 17, reporting the anxiety felt by Baron Manteuffel that Prussia should not be forced to compromise her neutral position before the end of May next, I have the honour to explain to your Lordship the reasons for this anxiety.

At the Conference of Olmütz in 1850, Prince Schwarzenburg used every exertion to obtain the assent of Prussia to the admission of the whole of Austria, including her Italian possessions, into the Germanic Confederation, and had actually persuaded the King of Prussia to agree to a secret Treaty which should bind his hands for ever by guaranteeing to Austria the integrity of all her dominions.

Baron Manteuffel said that he had always been opposed to this project, and, on learning how deeply the King had compromised himself in the matter, had proposed, with the object of saving the King's dignity and Germany from a permanent infliction of the kind, that the Treaty should be only for a term, which term expires, as his Excellency stated to me, on the 22nd of May next.

Your Lordship will perceive from the foregoing that Prussia would be bound, in the event of a general war extending into Italy before the above date, to defend Austria from any attack that might be directed against her, but that after that day she is free and completely released from her engagement.

The above requires no further comment, and proves how difficult Baron Manteuffel's position would be should he be suddenly called upon to act for the defence of the Austro-Italian States.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 61.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 28, 1854.*

I AM privately informed that the 6th corps d'armée stationed at Moscow has received orders to move towards the south. It is not known whether its destination is for the Caucasus or for the Crimea.

The moving of this corps into active cooperation with the Russian army of the south is somewhat significative of warlike determination, as it has hitherto served as the general depôt of the whole Russian army, from which the recruits when drilled were drafted into their respective corps.

This force represents on paper 50,000 men, but its effective cannot be estimated at more than 40,000.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in translation, an article from a Berlin journal, dated Krajova, January 15, reporting from thence intelligence as to the position and distribution of the forces on the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Extract from the "Speyersche Zeitung" of January 27, 1854.

Krajova, January 15, 1854.

THE Russian army of the Danube is to be augmented to 200,000 men, and the Commander-in-chief is directed not to weaken his forces by minor actions, but to remain on the defensive till the army of the Danube is completed, and in a position to bear losses which attend war, and which ought not to impede the principal operations. At present it is the plan of the Russian Commander-in-chief to place a corps of 30,000 men at Radovan to prevent if possible any aggressive movement of the Turks in Lesser Wallachia; 40,000 men are further to be posted in Wallachia as garrison-troops; and 130,000 men are to cross the Danube simultaneously on several points, viz., 40,000 men will cross at Braila, Reni, and Galatz; 50,000 at Giurgevo; 20,000 at Turnkai, and as many at Turnu.

No. 62.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 22. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 28, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just told me the substance of what occurred at the audience granted this day by the King of Prussia to the Russian Minister, when he delivered to His Majesty a private letter from the Emperor Nicholas.

The object of this audience, as your Lordship has been informed by my other despatches, was to engage the King to agree to some distinct declaration of neutrality, and Baron Budberg used the strongest arguments, amounting almost to menaces, on the part of Russia if they were not accepted.

The Emperor states that, as hostilities with the Western Powers appear to be inevitable, it will be difficult for Prussia to remain a quiet spectator of coming events; and that it is equally necessary for him with a view to his military arrangements to know what attitude she will assume; that, nevertheless, he relies on the good understanding which has existed between the two Governments for so many years, that Prussia will be disposed to enter into an engagement of neutrality, and that she can count on receiving any assistance that may

be required in the event of attack from the Western Powers; but that if she refuses Prussia must be prepared to lose all claim to his goodwill, and that he will consider the alliance which has bound the two countries together for so many years past, to be at an end.

The King appears to have been a good deal affected at the appeal to the long-standing friendship which has existed between Russia and Prussia, and to have answered in a much less decided tone than Baron Manteuffel had had reason to expect, but His Majesty declined finally to agree to make the written engagement which was proposed.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he was so dissatisfied with several of the answers made by His Majesty to the Russian Minister, that upon two occasions he felt it his duty to interrupt the conversation, and to offer some observations to Baron Budberg. The first was on his making use of the usual Russian offer of protection, that the Emperor would place all his disposable force at the King's service to defend him from attack; when Baron Manteuffel asked how the Emperor would prevent twelve hundred Prussian merchant-vessels, that were dispersed over the world, from being captured by British cruizers; and how Russia would prevent the destruction that would no doubt instantly fall on the Prussian ports in the Baltic, of which sea the English would soon be masters; and that instead of the Emperor's coming to the defence of Prussia, the probability would be that he would be unable to defend himself, and that his capital would, perhaps, not be safe from us.

The second point upon which Baron Manteuffel observed, was the means possessed by Russia, who was already engaged in a war with Turkey, to defend Prussia from an attack from France, which country in the event of war with Prussia would certainly endeavour to overrun the King's dominions, the result of which would inevitably lead to insurrection in Poland.

In combatting the Russian Minister's arguments, your Lordship will observe, I am sure with satisfaction, that Baron Manteuffel gave strong evidence of his predilection for an English rather than a Russian alliance, and has adopted a line of reasoning to prove that there was more danger to Prussia from the East than from the West.

The audience, as I have already had the honour to inform your Lordship, closed by the King declining to accede to the Emperor's proposal.

I regret, however, to add that the King has since had misgivings as to the wisdom of his decision, his mind having probably been worked upon by the Emperor's private letter, which I understand appealed strongly to his feelings, and to the attachment which has existed between the two Sovereigns for so many years; and that Baron Manteuffel received a letter from His Majesty this evening, remarking on some points on which he thought it might be possible to give written assurances to the Emperor.

His Excellency informed me that he trusted these misgivings would be overcome, but he is not without anxiety on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 63.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 28, 1854.*

I HAD the honour to receive this evening, at a late hour, your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of this date, informing me that a Convention was about to be proposed by England and France to Austria and Prussia, for giving effect to the Protocols which had been signed at Vienna, and expressing the great importance that Prussia should take no engagement of any kind to prevent her agreeing to this Convention, which offered the only remaining chance of preserving peace.

Your Lordship will learn by my several despatches of this date the extreme difficulties, not to say dangers, to which Baron Manteuffel has been exposed by the urgent appeal which has been addressed to His Prussian Majesty by the

Emperor of Russia, and which was further accompanied by a direct proposal submitted to His Majesty this day in a private audience, and pleaded for with great dexterity and pertinacity by Baron Budberg.

I cannot conceal from your Lordship my conviction that, under the present circumstances, any pressure exercised on this Court will not only be ineffectual, but that it may be attended with serious risk to the policy of independence and strict neutrality which Baron Manteuffel is so anxious to maintain at the present crisis.

With a mind so unstable, so actuated by passion and by fear, as that of the King, any invitation implying active cooperation may have the effect of throwing into the balance sufficient weight to decide His Majesty not to withdraw himself entirely from Russia; and it will thus serve to counteract rather than to consolidate the system so essential to Prussia at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 64.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 26 of the 24th instant, reporting the wish of Count Buol that the Conference at Vienna should sign a Protocol relative to the despatch addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador, I have already informed Count Colloredo that it appears to Her Majesty's Government inexpedient for the Conference to sign a Protocol respecting a note which has been returned to the Turkish Ambassador by Count Buol, and which cannot therefore be said to be before the Conference. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to make a communication to the Porte in accordance with my despatch No 24 to your Lordship of the 24th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 65.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 31.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 25, 1854.

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 22, and he begged me to express to you the satisfaction he experienced from the expressions contained in it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 66.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 32.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 25, 1854.

COUNT BUOL is anxious your Lordship should come to a decision as to the place in which the negotiation for peace, as proposed by the Porte, if it should be accepted by Russia, should take place.

Your Lordship will have observed that, by the letter of Reshid Pasha to the Representatives at Constantinople, the designation of this place is left to the decision of the Four Powers, and Count Buol has stated in his letter of the 13th

instant to Count Nesselrode that he would individually support the choice of any place the Emperor of Russia might point out.

Count Buol states that this proposal was an act of courtesy on the part of the Austrian Government towards the Emperor of Russia, which of course was not binding upon any other Government; but as it was necessary that a collective decision should be taken upon the subject, he wished the members of the Conference to be made acquainted, as early as possible, with the wishes with respect to it of their Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 67.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

A PROJECT of Convention will be transmitted to M. Bourqueney. You are authorized to sign it, and you will use your best efforts to procure its adoption by the Austrian Government.

No. 68.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

A PROJECT of Convention will be transmitted to M. de Moustier. You are authorised to sign it, and you will use your best efforts to procure its adoption by the Prussian Government.

No. 69.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 70.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 23, 1854.

I HAD the honour of stating to your Lordship in one of my last despatches that Count Orloff had set off for Vienna. This intelligence proved to be premature, his departure having only taken place on the morning of the 21st instant.

The greatest reserve has been observed here as to the object of Count Orloff's mission, no explanation, as I understand, having been offered even to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. It appears to me, however, easy to conjecture with what views it has been undertaken, particularly when it is seen that the departure of the Emperor's most confidential servant coincides with the arrival here of the Porte's answer to the last overture for a negotiation of peace.

The answer arrived from Vienna on the evening of the 20th instant, and on the following morning Count Orloff left St. Petersburgh.

It seems to me very clear that if the Emperor had intended to give in to the views of the Conference his acquiescence would not have been signified until after protracted deliberation, whilst the immediate despatch of a confidential negotiator confirms the suspicion which I have previously entertained.

My belief is, that it will be found that Count Orloff has been sent to explain and soften down the reluctance felt by his master to negotiate with Turkey under the auspices of the Great Powers, and that beyond this he will have been

instructed to use every effort to detach Austria from the Western Powers, and to retain her in her close and unnatural alliance with Russia.

Prussia, however, is likewise to be gained, and it is, accordingly, very probable that Count Orloff may have orders to negotiate at Berlin as well as at Vienna.

Your Lordship knows well what my feelings have long, very long, been as to the policy of the Russian Cabinet. I have long believed that a fixed purpose was entertained, and that appearances of moderation were but devices for gaining time and carrying on matters smoothly till early spring. At the same time I would remark that Count Orloff enjoys the friendship and confidence of his master in a degree possessed by no other person, that he is one of the most prudent of the Emperor's Councillors, and that he is well known to have disapproved of Prince Menchikoff's conduct at Constantinople.

If, then, Count Orloff can be made sensible of the dangers which the pursuance of an insane policy would bring upon his country, no so powerful instrument could be made use of for bringing the Emperor back to those paths of moderation from which he has so widely deviated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—It is believed by many persons that Count Orloff's mission may extend to London and Paris.

G. H. S.

No. 70.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1854.*

THE answer returned by the Porte to the last overtures was received here on the evening of the 20th instant in a despatch from Count Buol, which on the following day was communicated by Baron Lebzeltern to the Chancellor.

Unfortunately, at a moment when activity is so much required, I am unable to leave my room; Baron Lebzeltern has, however, called upon me for the purpose of stating that his communication had been made on the 21st instant to Count Nesselrode, and that his Excellency undertook to bring it under the Emperor's consideration.

I expressed my hope that everything which could be thought of to induce acceptance had been said by Baron Lebzeltern at his interview with the Chancellor; my colleague assured me that he had not been wanting in this respect, adding that the terms of Count Buol's despatch were so urgent that it would be difficult to render them more impressive.

I took the liberty of remarking to Baron Lebzeltern that, terms considered on all sides to be honourable being placed within the Emperor's reach, I was willing to hope that His Majesty would soon be made sensible that their refusal would expose him to the hostility of the whole of Europe; a system which recommended itself particularly to Austria, whose desire to maintain peace was so generally known.

I again reminded my Austrian colleague that a notable precedent for this line of conduct had been established in 1850, by the Emperor Nicholas himself, who had preserved peace between Austria and Prussia by declaring that the first of these Powers which moved against the other might count upon his hostility.

I will not conclude my despatch without remarking that, considering the importance of the moment and of the interests at stake, it might have been expected that all possible circumstance would have attended the communication to the Russian Cabinet of the Porte's reply; whereas adventitious aid has been so little called in, that Count Buol's despatch, after being brought here by a Russian courier, was delivered by the agent to whom the temporary direction of the temporary direction of Austrian Mission is confided.

I will further observe that Baron Lebzeltern let fall some few measured words as to the unlucky moment which had been chosen for the entry of the two fleets into the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 71.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship has been apprized that slow and reluctant as this Government is, and not unnaturally, in appealing to public opinion, writers have been employed to set forth in verse and in prose the atrocious conduct of those Powers which have come forward to the assistance of the infidel Turk, when attacked by an army fighting under the banner of the Cross.

It should appear that Russian statesmen must have very short memories, for the times are not far distant when they were professing warm interest in the preservation of the same infidel Power.

Upon referring to my archives, I read in a despatch dated 26th January, 1832: "The Emperor has sent agents to the Christian provinces of the Turkish Empire to prevent them from taking advantage of the present difficulties of the Sultan to throw off the Ottoman yoke, by assuring them that it is his intention to assist the Sultan, and that they must therefore look for anything but countenance from him."

In another despatch dated the 2nd of March of the same year, it appears that Count Nesselrode stated: "That a division of the Black Sea fleet had sailed on the 14th for Constantinople; that a fleet of transports escorted by two ships-of-the-line, and conveying 5,000 troops, would by this time have left Odessa for the same destination, and that the Emperor had dispatched orders for the advance into Turkey of 25,000 or 30,000 men; and further that the Emperor had determined upon publishing in the 'St. Petersburgh Journal' an exposition of the conduct of the Russian Government, and the motives which induced the Emperor to give that material succour to the Sultan which his position enabled him to send more speedily than the other Powers of Europe, who all appeared, like himself, to be actuated by a desire to prevent the subversion of the Ottoman Empire."

To these quotations, which might be multiplied *ad infinitum*, might be added the offer made last spring of putting the whole of the Emperor's forces at the disposal of the Sultan should they be required for resisting the encroachments of France; from all of which it may be deduced that assistance to Turkey is perfectly compatible with the interests of orthodoxy.

Negotiations which are probably still carried on by the Russian Cabinet would lead to the same conclusion, and would establish the fact of the infidels of Persia being looked to with no slight anxiety as the allies of a war undertaken against the Crescent in the interests of the true orthodox faith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 72.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1854.*

THE French messenger arrived here this morning, and General Castelbajac has had the kindness to send me a despatch dated the 15th instant, which he has received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in which are inclosed copies of several of the late important papers signed at Constantinople and Vienna.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys speaks of the present appeal to the Emperor of Russia as the last attempt which can be made towards a peaceful arrangement of difficulties, and expresses his hope that His Majesty's rejection of an honourable basis of negotiation will not place him in opposition to the views and interests of all Europe.

I had intended sending off the messenger to-day, but in the hope that either General Castelbajac or myself, or both of us, may succeed in seeing the Chancellor in the course of to-morrow, I have deferred Colonel Townley's departure for twenty-four hours.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 73.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 24, 1854.

A DISTINCT answer from the Russian Cabinet with regard to their intentions of coming to terms with the Porte seems to be the very "ignis fatuus" of diplomacy; it occasionally flickers in the distance, but becomes invisible and impalpable when approached, and is probably destined to appear for the last time in a Wallachian marsh well filled with Russian recruits.

For some time past the reception of the Porte's reply to the overtures of the Four Powers has been looked forward to as the moment when the most important question of the last half century was to receive its solution, but hardly had this anxiously-expected despatch reached St. Petersburgh when Count Orloff's travelling carriage, which had been prepared for the occasion, drove off carrying with it a negotiator whose precise destination is not known, and an answer the nature of which, if determined upon, is kept a secret from every one.

I am to see the Chancellor to-day, and as he had heard that I was confined to the house, he has been kind enough to promise to call upon me; I feel confident, however, that I shall only learn from him what he stated yesterday to the French Minister, namely, that nothing could be said as to the Emperor's intentions until the result of Count Orloff's mission should be known.

It is reported to me upon excellent authority, that the Emperor has been heard to say within the last few days, "Pourvu seulement que les Autrichiens ne tiennent pas le même langage aux autres qu'avec nous!"

These words prove at once that very friendly assurances have been given here, and that, nevertheless, misgivings exist as to their not being corresponded to by acts—misgivings which tend to throw some light upon Count Orloff's mission.

Meanwhile, the Austrian Government can hardly fail of being sensible that not only their interests but their honour are engaged on the side of England and France, and that having led these Powers to believe that they were authorized to speak in the name of Russia, they must either find means to make good their words, or take part against the Cabinet by which a deception has been practised upon themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—The French Minister, who has just left me, is more and more convinced that Count Orloff's instructions are extensive and "elastic," that, to use General Castelbajac's expression, the question of peace or war is in some measure in his hands.

G. H. S.

No. 74.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 24, 1854.

THE Chancellor, who has just left this room, was even less explicit with me than he had been with the French Minister, and had the appearance of entirely ignoring all the late proceedings at Vienna.

The sum of his observations was this: that the Emperor seeing that there were difficulties and misconceptions in the way had determined upon sending off Count Orloff as a negotiator, and that he was actually setting off when the Turkish reply arrived here; that in this reply there was great vagueness; that the great fault had been committed of putting forward the evacuation of Turkish territory as a first condition, whereas it should have been only mentioned at last and as the necessary consequence of an arrangement; that difficulties were made without a cause which a little conciliation (bon vouloir) on the part of the English and French Governments would immediately remove; that if Turkey desired peace all that was requisite was to send a Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburgh, where it might be obtained at once; finally, that the object in view was, he believed, a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey; that point once obtained, the Sultan was of course at liberty to make any arrangements which he thought proper with other Christian Powers as to the treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

In this, which was the sum of Count Nesselrode's conversation, there is nothing, as your Lordship will perceive, but that which has been repeated over and over again by the Russian Cabinet during the last six or eight months.

I took occasion to ask Count Nesselrode (begging him not to reply to my question if he had any hesitation), whether there were any truth in a report current here of the Emperor having said that he should leave things in their present state till the month of April, when, if no arrangement should have been made with Turkey, he should consider himself as freed from engagements and at liberty to march forward.

Count Nesselrode, with some slight uncertainty of manner, stated that the Emperor had not made this declaration, at all events had not made it in such positive terms (aussi crûment), but that if on the arrival of spring matters were still in their present unsettled state, His Imperial Majesty could not be expected to retain the attitude which he now maintained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 12, 1854.

I HAVE long urged the Porte to adopt some striking measure of relief for the Rayahs of this Empire at the present critical juncture, conceiving that their loyalty to the Sultan has need of some manifest proof of His Majesty's favour towards them in order to stand firm against their natural inclination to rely on the professions of Russia. No measure that I know of is better calculated to produce the desired effect, or more required by justice, than the removal of that cruel and odious distinction which throughout this country is systematically established between Christian and Mussulman evidence in courts of criminal jurisdiction. My representations on this subject to Reshid Pasha have had the effect of inducing him to bring forward the question in Council; and it is not long since he assured me that the preparations for its definitive adoption were

so far advanced as to promise an almost immediate completion of the firman destined to promulgate it. Finding, however, that his promises were not followed up with any visible symptoms of execution, I renewed my solicitations a few days ago, and have the mortification to learn that the Government was not disposed to incur the hazard of exciting discontent among their Mahometan subjects by placing the Christians on an equal footing with them in point of criminal justice. Reshid Pasha even implored me to be patient out of friendly consideration for him, the liberality of whose conduct had already marked him out as an object of popular indignation, and whose life, as he sent me word, might pay the price of an unseasonable demonstration in favour of the Rayahs.

To this view of the matter I could not in conscience assent. The ignorant and fanatical portion of the Mussulman people will, no doubt, be always opposed to any innovation upon a system with which their privileges and prejudices are habitually bound up; but the Government is strong enough to deal with them, and never so much so as now when the very existence of the Empire depends in great measure on the assistance of those Powers who naturally sympathize with the Sultan's Christian subjects, and whose squadrons are in a condition to overawe as well as to protect his capital. I therefore drew up a pressing instruction for M. Pisani, and directed him to read and explain it to Reshid Pasha with suitable earnestness. A copy of it is inclosed herewith, and it has so far produced the impression which I intended, that the Secretary of State no longer talks of indefinite postponement, but merely of delay, extending, perhaps, to a couple of weeks. He admits the truth of my arguments, advising at the same time that I should require him to communicate the instruction to his colleagues, and also rely on his management for engaging them to adopt the proposed measure. Willing to follow his advice in this respect for the present, I am not sanguine enough to expect quite so early a solution as the report of his language warrants; though I am satisfied that a strong impression has been made, and that the object of my exertions will in all probability be attained before long.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Pera, January 10, 1851.

Dear Sir,

I CANNOT conceal from you that I am greatly disappointed by the answer which Reshid Pasha has returned to my demands, again and again repeated, on the subject of Christian evidence. Sundry years have elapsed since this important question was first recommended by Her Majesty's Embassy to the serious consideration of the Porte. The extreme injustice and cruel consequences of a law, which in criminal and even in capital cases affords protection only to one class of subjects, and exposes another to false accusation and unpunished wrong, are too glaring to admit of any reasonable excuse; and assurances have, therefore, been repeatedly given of the Porte's disposition to remove the evil.

When, after much exertion, a firman was obtained for the establishment of criminal tribunals in Egypt, on fair and impartial principles, although that firman was granted on the special demand of Her Majesty's Embassy, and for the immediate protection of British subjects, the regulations which it comprised were understood to be available for other foreigners also, and a promise was given that they should be extended, after a while, to the Sultan's subjects throughout his Empire. This promise was founded no less on the Porte's own interest than on views of justice and humanity. Year has, nevertheless, succeeded to year, and still there is complaint without redress, and promise without execution. The Porte, meanwhile, has been drawn into serious difficulties by a neighbouring Power, and it has found in the necessities of a perilous situation cogent motives for satisfying its Christian subjects and conciliating its Christian allies. Nothing is better calculated to satisfy the one and to conciliate the other than the

removal of a wrong, which is no less humiliating than oppressive, and which strikes at the very root of all confidence between the Porte and a very large proportion of its subjects. Still, that fatality, which has long weighed on this enfeebled Empire, continues to preponderate, and more attention is paid to those who by ignorance and fanaticism have brought their country to the verge of ruin, than to those who by their faithful counsels and active support uphold and strengthen it in the hour of danger.

I am assured that the want of an improved system of justice is felt; that the utility of the proposed change is undeniable; and that the long-promised firman is actually prepared. But when I press, after long delays, for the formal adoption of the measure and the promulgation of the firman, I am told that the fanatics would be irritated, and that the life of one or other of the Ministers would be required to appease their wrath. I reply to this excuse that the alleged danger, if not a pretext, is at least a fancy. No doubt in Turkey, as elsewhere, the ignorant, the prejudiced, and the corrupt are averse to all changes which tend to correct long established abuses, and to restrain certain privileged classes from gratifying their pride and cupidity at the expense of their fellow subjects.

But the injury thus done to individuals, and to the societies of which they are part, is also a cause of weakness and dishonour to the State, and fortunate it is that the Sovereign and Government of the State have power enough to protect their own interests, and to enforce those measures of reform which can no longer be deferred with safety. Danger for danger, there is far more to apprehend from a denial of justice than from a cry for privilege. The enemy with whom Turkey, though unable to maintain successfully a protracted and single-handed contest, is now at war, makes his strongest appeal to the unjust and oppressive manner in which the Ottoman system of administration operates on the Rayahs; and those Powers which have sent their fleets to protect the territory and flag of Turkey, cannot but sympathize with the sentiment, while they oppose the aggressions, of Russia.

It is manifest, therefore, that the present juncture, so far from being an unseasonable time for abolishing the injustice, cruelty, and degradation which are inseparable from the criminal procedure now in practice, is emphatically the moment at which the corrective firman may be promulgated with the least amount of peril and the greatest amount of benefit to the Empire. If the Hodjas and Softas are to rule over the Sultan and the Divan, it is time for the Christian allies of the Porte to consider for whom and for what they are employing their squadrons and risking the peace of Europe. The best of causes may be lost for want of firmness and vigour. Let the Sultan's Ministers redeem the pledges which have been given, and exert their influence courageously on the side of justice and sound policy. All will then go well, and the fanatics themselves will ultimately feel grateful to the preservers of the Empire.

You will read and explain the whole of this letter to Reshid Pasha.

Yours sincerely, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 75*a*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 15, 1851.

SOME further correspondence having passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself, I take the present opportunity to forward copies of it herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

In what relates to the enforcement of my last instruction to the Admiral I have endeavoured to remove his doubt by using the expression consigned to your Lordship's correspondence with Sir Hamilton Seymour, who, as I have since had occasion to observe, is directed, under date of the 27th ultimo, to prepare Count Nesselrode for the orders given to the combined fleets, and authorising their respective commanders to "compel, if necessary," as well as to require, all Russian ships of war in the Black Sea to return into port.

On this subject, as well as on the accessory point of bringing into the Bosphorus such vessels as only yield to the employment of force, I have communicated with the French Ambassador, and we agree that, in the event of resistance, there is no other alternative consistent with a due execution of the instructions and a satisfactory accomplishment of their object.

It is evident that a resisting ship of war could not be forced back into port without the accompaniment of a combined force equal to contend with any number of ships which might be sent out from Sevastopol to its rescue, and that such an operation could not be repeated without endangering still more the efficiency of the squadron.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75*a*.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *at Sinope, January* 12, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive this morning by the "Fury" your Excellency's despatch dated the 9th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 75*a*.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *at Sinope, January* 11, 1854.

My Lord,

TO enable the combined squadrons of France and England to continue their operations in the Black Sea, I think it absolutely necessary that at least four Turkish transports, or small vessels of war, so converted as to be capable of carrying 400 to 500 tons of coals each, should accompany the squadrons, for the purpose of supplying the steam-vessels with fuel from time to time; the transports to be entirely at our disposal, and under our special protection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 75*a*.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *at Sinope, January* 12, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to that part of your Excellency's instructions to me, dated the 9th instant, that "wherever you meet any Russian ship-of-war in the Black Sea, you will require it to return to Sevastopol, or to the next neighbouring port," I beg to observe that the instructions from the French Ambassador to Vice-Admiral Hamelin are to the effect that he is to invite and constrain all Russian ships-of-war to return into port; and as Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself have some doubt, in the event of its being necessary to resort to force to carry out those orders, and the Russian ships should consequently strike their flags, whether we are to take possession of them, and bring them to the Bosphorus, or simply oblige them to re-enter their own ports; and again, in the latter case, should they, from hostile collision, be dismasted, or seriously damaged, whether we are to render every assistance in conveying them to their own ports. I have therefore to request your Excellency will be pleased to send instructions as to the course to be pursued under such circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 75*a*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, January 14, 1854.

Sir,

AGREEABLY to your request, I have applied for transports to accompany your squadron, and secure you a sufficient supply of coal. The Porte made no difficulty whatever; and the transports, four or five in number, will be sent out to you forthwith.

It was not clear from your despatch whether the transports were to be sent with coal on board in the first instance; but, in reply to an inquiry from the Captain Pasha, I have requested that the vessels may be laden at once with coal, which will at least have the effect of securing you from disappointment.

The Turkish Government is disposed, I believe, to send the coal without remuneration; but, presuming that Her Majesty's Government would not approve of throwing such a charge upon the Porte, I have directed a note of the quantity embarked on board each vessel to be conveyed to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 75*a*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, January 14, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your despatch of the 12th instant, relating to your doubts as to the enforcement, if necessary, of my last instructions requiring Russian ships of war to be sent back into port.

I thought I had expressed myself with sufficient clearness when I used the very words of Lord Clarendon's despatch; but I have no hesitation in stating that compliance with your requisition is to be enforced by compulsion, in failure of other means. I complete the explanation by adding, in reply to your inquiry, that every Russian ship complying with the requisition is to return to Sevastopol, or the most neighbouring port; and that every Russian ship declining to do so, and yielding only to the employment of force, is to be brought into the Bosphorus, and kept at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government and that of France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 15, 1854.

I HASTEN to transmit herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of two despatches, dated the 13th instant, from the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's squadron at Sinope.

I forward at the same time, in copy, my reply to one of the Admiral's despatches. The other despatch, with inclosures, I reserve for communication with the French Ambassador.

Your Lordship will observe that the Admirals have decided, in consequence of Captain Drummond's report (inclosed in copy elsewhere), not to forward the second notification to Sevastopol direct from the squadrons. The letter, prepared

here and sent to them, is returned for transmission to Sevastopol by the Embassies, if that course of proceeding should be deemed advisable by General Baraguay and myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," at Sinope, January* 13, 1854.

THE combined detachments under Rear-Admirals Sir E. Lyons and De Tinan, together with the Turkish steam-vessels, returned to Sinope this morning; and I inclose, for the information of your Excellency, a copy of Sir Edmund Lyon's letter to me reporting his proceedings.

The Turkish steam-vessels will sail again this evening for the Bosphorus, accompanied by two English and one French steam-frigate; the "Fury" also will keep with them part of the way.

Vice-Admiral Hamelin and I have decided on not sending the second letter to the naval Commander-in-Chief at Sevastopol at present, as we have not received any answer, nor are we aware whether any has been sent to the first letter to Constantinople. Should a reply have been sent to the latter place by the Russian Admiral, your Excellency would have a knowledge of its tenour, and as you are now acquainted with the nature of Captain Drummond's reception at Sevastopol, we have thought it advisable (their transmission having been left to our discretion) to send the second letters, signed by us, but open, to Constantinople, to enable your Excellency and the French Ambassador, should you deem it expedient, to send them forward without delay to Sevastopol by the "Fury," who has orders to proceed there on your expressing your wishes to that effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *"Agamemnon," off Sinope, January* 13, 1854.

WITH reference to your instruction of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report my return to this anchorage with the ships named in the margin* as comprising the combined squadrons of three sail-of-the-line and five powerful steam-frigates, which, with the concurrence of Vice-Admiral Hamelin, you placed under my orders for the purpose of protecting five Turkish steamers-of-war during their passage to Trebizond and Batoum with troops and ammunition, and then seeing them safely back to this anchorage.

We proceeded in the execution of your order on the 8th instant, and on the 10th we arrived at Trebizond, where we found the "Sampson" and "Mogador," which had been sent in advance to communicate with the British and French Consuls at Samsoon. In the evening we sailed with a sixth Turkish steamer under our convoy for Batoum, where we anchored early on the 11th, and in the afternoon we weighed with the Turkish steam-vessels on their return, and, before shaping our course for this place, we ran along the coast as far as the Turkish fortress of Tchuruk Soo, which is situated a few miles within the frontier.

The Pashas at Trebizond and Batoum spoke with much gratitude of our having been the means of their receiving supplies, and they attached great importance to so considerable a squadron of English and French ships having appeared in their neighbourhood.

Since we left Sinope we have not seen any strange vessel whatever, excepting

* Agamemnon (flag), Sanspareil, Sampson, Terrible; Gomer (Rear-Admiral De Tinan), Charlemagne, Descartes, Mogador.

the English steamer "Phœbe," which trades between Constantinople and Trebizond, and the Turkish steamer-of-war that joined us at Trebizond.

I have found in Admiral de Tinan an intelligent and friendly colleague; and I have witnessed with great pleasure the good effects of the satisfactory relations you have established between the English and French squadrons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

P.S.—I inclose a copy of a letter I addressed to the captains under my orders.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Despatch addressed by Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons to the Officers under his command.

Sir, *"Agamemnon," off Sinope, January* 8, 1854.

THE Commander-in-chief has already informed you that the Ottoman territories and flag are to be protected from aggression under all circumstances.

While separated from the Commander-in-chief and acting under my orders you will avoid rather than seek communication with any superior Russian force that you may fall in with, but you will, on the contrary, rather seek than avoid communication with any decidedly inferior Russian force; and, in either case, if any communication should take place you will cause to be delivered to the senior officer of the Russian force the inclosed copy of a letter* which has been addressed by Vice-Admiral Dundas to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.

You will bear in mind that we are at peace with Russia, and that all customary salutes and acts of courtesy are to be scrupulously observed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," at Sinope, January* 13, 1854.

WITH reference to my letter of this day inclosing a report from Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons of the proceedings of the combined detachments from the French and English squadrons in conveying the five Turkish steam-vessels to Batoom and back to Sinope, I consider it my duty to point out to your Excellency the extraordinary manner in which those vessels were sent from Constantinople and thrown upon our protection without proper notice having been given to Vice-Admiral Hamelin or myself of their destination, or of the purpose for which they were sent to sea.

It appears that in the five vessels there were not more than 1,000 soldiers and 500 cases of powder; these were all disembarked at Batoom in about an hour, and one or two vessels would have amply sufficed for their conveyance.

I have, &c.
Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1854.

CAPTAIN TATHAM arrived here half an hour ago from Sinope with your two despatches of the 13th instant.

The Turkish steam-vessels which proceeded to Batoom and returned to

* See Part III, Inclosure 4 in No. 664.

Sinope under convoy of Sir Edmund Lyons and Rear-Admiral Tinan regained the Bosphorus in company with the "Fury" to-day.

I shall make it a point of duty to communicate to the Ottoman Secretary of State your observations on the manner in which those vessels were sent from Constantinople.

In the meantime I am informed by M. Pisani that the number of troops to be embarked was diminished in compliance with your advice and that of Admiral Hamelin, as reported to the Captain Pasha by Vice-Admiral Mustafa Pasha, and, if that be correct, although something may have been defective in the form, that the intended departure of those vessels and its principal object were virtually or rather substantially signified to the commanders of the combined squadrons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 77.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1854.*

IN continuation of my report respecting the operations of the Turkish army in Asia Minor and along the Danube, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the advices which I continue to receive from Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum corroborate the accounts of the considerable reverses which the Sultan's troops in the former place appear to have suffered. The Ardahan division before Akhiska under the command of Ferik Ali Pasha was completely routed. The baggage, artillery, and stores all fell into the hands of the Russians. This division consisted of about 20,000 men with fourteen guns.

The advanced guard appear to have borne the brunt of the attack, and to have been put to flight. Ali Pasha, who commanded the main body, showed great want of skill in placing his troops, and seems to have been the first to run away when the attack was made. The defeated troops fled in every direction, but measures were in the course of adoption for collecting them. Four battalions had been sent to Kars, and six more are in quarters at Erzeroum. With the exception of the Irregulars, who had mostly all gone home, the greater part of the Ardahan division may, therefore, be said to be in quarters at Erzeroum and Kars, but in a state of complete demoralization.

By another account from Mr. Consul Brant of the 10th December it would appear that a body of 25,000 Turkish regular troops with some irregulars was defeated near the Arpatchai on the 1st ultimo by a Russian division consisting principally of Georgian levies, and amounting to about 15,000 men. Part of the defeated troops had fled to Kars.

The battle appears to have been lost in this instance also by the incompetency of the Turkish General, who chose his own position. Ahmed Pasha formed his troops so unskilfully in an extended line at the bottom of a ravine that they were at the mercy of the Russian artillery, which made great slaughter among them. The Irregulars fled early, carrying a regiment of cavalry with them; the officers from the Pashas to the lowest rank soon left the field, and the soldiers rushed on the enemy in a confused mass. A hand-to-hand contest ensued, which was very murderous on both sides, and was terminated by the approach of evening; the loss on each side appears to have been about 7,000 men.

The campaign may now be considered closed, as the snow appears to be too deep to admit of further operations, and there is no fear of the Russians attempting to follow up these successes.

The Turkish army, which consisted of about 100,000 men, although capable of being collected together, may be said to be dispersed, and the greatest disaffection prevails among the troops against their commanders. They loudly express their want of confidence in them, and their conviction that they can only be led successfully against the Russians under the direction of European officers, among whom General Guyon seems to have distinguished himself.

I beg to refer your Lordship for the details of these disasters to Mr. Consul Brant's correspondence, sent direct to the Foreign Office.

On the Danube the Turkish arms have been more successful. Your Lordship will see from the inclosed report the second defeated attempt on the part of the Russians to fortify the island opposite Ibraila.

Inclosures 2 and 3 contain the latest intelligence from the Danube in a brief account of a signal victory obtained over the Russian troops advancing upon Kalafat. The Turks, on this occasion, appear to have left their entrenchments and to have routed them completely in the open field, although inferior in numbers as the day advanced. Three thousand men are reported to have been killed on the Russian side.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 77.

Substance of Report from Colonel Ali Bey, at Matchin, 23 Rebi-ul-evvel, 1270.

IN consequence of a design on the part of the Russians to construct a new battery in place of the guard-house which was situated in front of the outworks of the strong fortifications upon the large island opposite Ibraila, and in pursuance of this design to make an attempt upon the island with two battalions of infantry, and take up a position in front of the burnt guard-house; at half-past five o'clock Mehemet Bey was dispatched with four battalions and two pieces of flying artillery upon the interior of the island; two companies of regulars and a sufficient number of militia were also moved forward. The action commenced, our troops being supported by a fire from the guns, and the Russians retreated, in consequence of our occupation of the guard-house. An hour afterwards a sharp attack was made to recover the guard-house; the regulars and artillery moved up, and an action commenced which lasted five hours; at the close of which the Russians retired in confusion upon the battery opposite Bonbasni. In this action the Russians sustained heavy loss in killed and wounded; two were taken with their arms. On our side no loss was sustained but three men wounded.

Inclosure 2 in No. 77.

Account of an Engagement between the Turkish and Russian Troops near Kalafat.

(Translation.)

INTELLIGENCE having come in that the advanced body of the Russian troops, which had come to Krajova, were fortifying themselves at the village of Tchetané, about ten miles from Kalafat, it was deemed advisable to dislodge the enemy, in order to prevent its occupying a fortified position close to the Imperial camp.

Feriks Ismail and Mustapha Pashas, with three battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and twenty-eight guns, marched and attacked the enemy, Feriz Ahmed Pasha following with the reserve. The Russians were defeated with the loss of upwards of 3000 in killed, a number of muskets, some ammunition, and horses.

The loss of the Sultan's army in killed and wounded is trifling compared with the briskness of the engagement. Ismail Pasha was wounded slightly in the arm.

Such is the substance of the despatches received. The Tatar who comes from the field of battle, reports that four guns were captured; that a Russian General was slain; and that on the part of the Sublime Porte two colonels, a lieutenant-colonel, and several majors and other officers, fell.

Inclosure 3 in No. 77.

Supplement to the "Journal de Constantinople" of January 14, 1854.

OPERATIONS DE L'ARMÉE DE ROUMELIE.

HIER matin, un Tatar expédié au Grand Vézir par Sami Pasha, Gouverneur de Vidin, lui a apporté la nouvelle d'une bataille livrée aux Russes par Ismail Pasha, Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales à Kalafat. Ismail Pasha, ayant appris la concentration des troupes Russes dans la Petite Valachie et informé de l'approche d'un corps de 15,000 hommes venu de Crayova jusqu'au village de Tchétané, à trois heures et demie de marche de Kalafat, et où il avait commencé à se retrancher, voulut, par un coup hardi, empêcher l'ennemi de s'y fortifier.

Les dispositions stratégiques prises par Ismail Pasha ont été couronnées d'un plein succès, et ont en même temps empêché la concentration de l'armée Russe dans une position aussi voisine de Kalafat. Afin de ne pas donner aux Russes le temps de réunir à Tchétané toutes les forces qui devaient agir contre Kalafat, ainsi qu'ils en avaient l'intention, Ismail Pasha, laissant une petite garnison dans son quartier-général, sortit avec Mustapha Pasha, Général de Division, et Osman Pasha, Général de Brigade, à la tête de t eize bataillons d'infanterie, de de trois régimens de cavalerie, et de vingt-huit pi ces de canon, pendant une des dernières nuits de la semaine passée, et tomba, à 6 heures du matin, à l'improviste, sur les troupes Russes. Les retranchemens furent enlevés en un clin-d'œil, et les premiers bataillons Russes culbutés. En même temps, Mustapha Pasha, commandant l'aile gauche, qui avait occupé à l'avance un mamelon dominant les retranchemens Russes, prit l'ennemi en flanc et le rejeta dans les bois situés à la droite de Tchétané, où avaient pris également position, pendant la nuit, les tirailleurs et carabiniers Ottomans.

Les Russes firent de grands efforts pour résister à l'impétuosité de ces attaques simultanées, mais décimés par les tirailleurs embusqués dans le bois, ils furent mis en complète déroute à onze heures du matin, et poursuivis pendant six heures l'épée dans les reins. La réserve Russe, forté de 8,000 hommes et qui n'était pas arrivée à temps sur le théâtre du combat, fut également culbutée par l'armée Impériale, dont la réserve, commandée par le Général de Division Ahmed Pasha, en donnant à l'instant voulu, assura la déroute de ce renfort important.

C'est au moment même où la déroute des Russes était complète, que Sami Pasha a expédié le Tatar avec les nouvelles que nous relatons. La perte des Russes a été immense, mais on n'en connait pas encore le chiffre exact; les troupes Impériales ont beaucoup moins souffert.

Aussitôt que des détails plus complets, attendus d'un moment à l'autre, seront arrivés, nous nous empresserons de les publier.

No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1854.

HAVING learnt from Mr. Fonblanque, as your Lordship will also have learnt, that according to general belief, M. de Moukhine had not only had a conference with the Prince of Servia and his foreign Minister, but that he had also announced the approaching arrival of Russian troops in Servia, I conveyed the intelligence to Reshid Pasha, and requested to be informed whether his Highness had received any information to the same effect.

The Pasha replied that he had not previously received such intelligence; but at the same time he signified his belief in the correctness of Mr. Fonblanque's statement; and added that an intimation of similar purport, in so far as Russian troops were concerned, had been conveyed to him from the Austrian Legation. He added that he now understood the motive of the advance lately made towards

Kalafat by the Russians, and saw reason to appreciate even more highly than before the service rendered to the Porte by Ismail Pasha's successful attack on their position at Csetati, which is close upon the Danube at some distance above Kalafat, and in the vicinity of Servia.

Circumstances are thus concurring to revive the suspicion of connivance between Russia and the Servian authorities. The language of the Servian agent to me has of late been less satisfactory than I could have wished, though by no means deficient in protestations of fidelity to the Porte.

Edhem Pasha, who is on his way to Belgrade with the Sultan's firman respecting the privileges of Servia, will perhaps be able to ascertain the true state of affairs in that quarter. He is supposed to have talent for the purpose, and he will make some stay in Belgrade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 79.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1854.

THERE is some reason to hope that the loss of life on the side of Turkey in the disastrous action at Sinope was not quite so great as the first reports declared it to have been.

The accompanying extract of a despatch from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Samsoon states that about 300 of the Turkish sailors, who escaped, had arrived there, and that many others were expected to follow them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Samsoon, December* 12, 1853.

UP to this date about 300 of the Turkish sailors, who escaped from the Sinope catastrophe, have arrived here, and I hear that many others are on the way hither. Among those already here there are upwards of thirty wounded. I am told that many of these fugitive seamen have retired to their native villages, and others are on the roads to Trebizond and the interior, in order to escape further service if possible. Some of them have managed to arm themselves with muskets, which they procured at Sinope from their ships; the roads are, in consequence, insecure for travellers.

All the natives have armed themselves, and appear to have abandoned their usual occupations.

I am of opinion that it will require some time, under any circumstances, to re-establish order in the country, and, if further reverses are sustained by the Government, it is impossible to predict what excesses the people may give themselves up to.

The seamen who arrived here from Sinope are likely to remain here for some time, unless some man-of-war steamer come up from the capital to take them away.

No. 80.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 16, 1854.*

THE two Vice-Admirals at Sinope not having received from Sevastopol any answer to their first notification, have returned their second letters to the French Ambassador and myself, placing Her Majesty's steam-ship "Fury" at our disposal for the conveyance of those communications to such point of the Russian territory as we may find reason to prefer.

As the expected answer has not been received at Constantinople more than at Sinope, I have decided, after taking into consideration the reception experienced by Captain Drummond, to transmit Admiral Dundas's notification to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa, with an instruction to deliver it to the principal local authority for conveyance to Prince Menchikoff. I have reason to suppose that General Baraguay d'Hilliers will adopt a similar course of proceeding, which will afford us a safe opportunity of communicating on other subjects with our respective Consuls, an opportunity of which I shall be glad to avail myself at a juncture so full of interest to our trade in the Black Sea.

The "Fury," after leaving Odessa, will proceed to Varna, in order to supersede the French steam-frigate "Promethée," which has been stationed between that place and Bourgas during the last fortnight.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 81.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 26. Secret.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 16, 1854.*

I HAVE received information, from a secret source, that an individual styled Baron Elsenau, known to have been, if not still, in the employment of Russia, and suspected of acting as a spy for that Power, was yesterday arrested, together with his servant, by order of the Porte. A deposition, bearing the signature of N. Anca, a doctor in the Turkish quarantine service, has been shown privately to me, and among the allegations which it contains against the prisoner are: that he has endeavoured, by intrigue and corruption, to spread disaffection to the Sultan's Government in Bulgaria; that he wormed himself into the confidence of Omar Pasha, and thereby obtained permission to visit the Turkish fortresses in that Province; that here he has, in concert with other secret emissaries, endeavoured to prepare the elements of a revolution in favour of Russia; and that he is secretly in communication with M. Mahanowitz, the Austrian Consul-General, and Count Metaxa, the Greek Envoy at this Court.

As a part of the Baron's papers have been seized, it is presumable that further light will soon be thrown upon the truth or falsehood of these allegations. Meanwhile, it is not unworthy of notice that the suspicions of Servia's connivance with Russia appear to gather strength simultaneously with the detection, if such it prove to be, of revolutionary intrigues in Bulgaria and here in favour of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 82.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, January .)

Paris, le 26 Janvier, 1854.

Général,

L'AMBASSADEUR de la Sublime Porte est venu me communiquer une dépêche de son Gouvernement dont j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-jointe la traduction. Vous verrez qu'elle ne fait guère que reproduire celle qui vous avait été adressé, à titre confidentiel, en même temps que la réponse identique de la Porte à la note des Quatre Représentants, et dont vous vous étiez avec raison abstenu d'accuser réception. Je n'ai pas dissimulé à Vely Pasha l'impression de regret que me causait cette communication inopportune et d'un effet aussi fâcheux, à certains égards, que le commentaire donné par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à la note de Vienne. Je l'ai donc prié de reprendre l'original de la pièce qu'il m'avait remise, afin que son acceptation officielle ne devînt pas pour le Cabinet de Saint Pétersbourg un motif de rejeter les offres qui lui ont été faites. A nos yeux, Général, les élémens des futures négociations se trouvent tout entiers dans la réponse de la Porte aux ouvertures des Quatre Représentants. Ils ne sauraient plus être modifiés par une interprétation isolée, et le Gouvernement Ottoman, rassuré par l'adhésion que leur a donnée la Conférence de Vienne, doit remettre au moment où ils auront aussi reçu celle de la Russie le soin de discuter des questions de détail qui, soulevées prématurément et sous une forme péremptoire, feraient douter de la sincérité de ses désirs de paix dont nous nous sommes portés garants. Il est entendu que la note passée à la Russie sera rédigée dans les mêmes termes que celles données à la France, à l'Angleterre, à l'Autriche, et à la Prusse; le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne saurait donc en aucun cas s'en faire une arme particulière, et, par cela seul que les firmans qui doivent l'accompagner ont été délivrés au Patriarche de Constantinople, on ne comprendrait guère pour quel motif, au lieu de désigner sous une dénomination générique la religion Chrétienne, on ne ferait pas une énumération de ses différentes branches, parmi lesquelles le rit Grec occupe dans l'Empire Ottoman une place trop considérable pour pouvoir être raisonnablement laissé à l'écart. Veuillez, Général, faire valoir ces considérations auprès de Reshid Pasha, et lui déclarer que c'est dans l'intérêt de la Porte elle-même que nous nous sommes décidés à ne pas donner suite à sa dernière communication.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 83.

Note proposed to be addressed by M. de Lhuys to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, January 30.)

Paris, le Janvier, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères, s'est empressé de placer sous les yeux de Sa Majesté l'Empereur la note que M. de Kisseleff, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 26 de ce mois.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale avait pensé que la communication dont M. le Général Marquis de Castelbajac s'était rendu l'organe auprès de son Excellence M. le Comte Nesselrode ne devait pas laisser de doute sur ses intentions; mais, puisque le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a jugé nécessaire de provoquer à ce sujet de nouvelles explications, l'Empereur mon auguste Souverain m'a ordonné de les lui fournir avec la plus entière loyauté.

L'escadre Française n'est entrée dans la Mer Noire que lorsque des faits sur la gravité desquels il n'y avait malheureusement plus à se méprendre ont révélé les dangers que courait l'existence d'un Empire dont la conservation est nécessaire à celle de l'équilibre Européen. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a, en conséquence, voulu, par l'interposition de ses forces navales,

arrêter, autant qu'il dépendait de lui, le cours d'une guerre qu'il n'avait vu éclater qu'avec le plus profond regret et que ses efforts les plus sincères avaient vainement tenté de conjurer.

M. le Vice-Amiral Hamelin a reçu, dans ce but tout pacifique, l'ordre de mettre le territoire et le pavillon Ottomans à l'abri des attaques dont ils pourraient encore devenir l'objet, en faisant rentrer les navires Russes rencontrés à mer dans le port le plus voisin, et d'empêcher en même temps que les vaisseaux Turcs dirigent aucune agression contre le littoral de l'Empire Russe. Ces bâtiments ne doivent être employés qu'au ravitaillement des côtes de la Roumélie et de l'Anatolie, c'est-à-dire, contribuer seulement à la défense de la Turquie menacée dans l'intégrité de son territoire et dans ses droits de souveraineté par l'occupation de deux de ses provinces, et par le déploiement d'un appareil maritime et militaire hors de proportion avec les ressources dont elle dispose elle-même.

C'est de cette différence caractéristique dans les positions respectives que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a tenu compte lorsqu'il a transmis au Commandant-en-chef de ses forces navales les instructions au sujet desquelles de plus amples informations lui sont demandées, et il n'aurait pu interdire d'une façon absolue au pavillon Ottoman la navigation de la Mer Noire, sans affaiblir encore les moyens de défense déjà insuffisans de la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné ne voit pas qu'une telle attitude soit en contradiction avec les sentiments d'amitié que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale professe pour la Russie, et il déclare hautement qu'elle ne lui a été inspirée que par le vif désir de coopérer au rétablissement de la paix entre les deux parties belligérantes à des conditions proposées par l'une d'elles et soumises à l'autre après avoir reçu la sanction des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Le Soussigné profite, &c.

No. 84.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Castelbajac.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, January .)

Paris, le Janvier, 1854.

Général,

M. LE MINISTRE de Russie est venu me lire une dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, dont il avait reçu l'ordre de me laisser copie, et que j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-jointe.

Je ne veux pas entrer dans des détails superflus, encore moins ouvrir une discussion irritante; mais je n'ai pu qu'éprouver une sérieuse impression de regret en voyant attribuer à l'attitude du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, dans les phases successives du différend survenu entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Sublime Porte, un caractère qui serait en contradiction avec la loyauté et la modération constante de sa politique.

M. le Comte de Nesselrode rattache à ce qu'il appelle un système de pression exercé à l'égard de la Russie par les Puissances maritimes, des actes qui n'ont pas été la cause, mais seulement la conséquence, des mesures que la Russie elle-même avait adoptées la première, et qui, sans ralentir le zèle que nous avons mis à rechercher des moyens de pacification, nous imposaient simultanément le devoir de prendre en sérieuse considération un autre intérêt, celui de la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, menacé par des forces dont la disproportion avec les siennes légitimait nos inquiétudes. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a la consciencieuse conviction d'avoir fait ce qui dépendait de lui pour concilier, dans le rôle que les circonstances l'appelaient à remplir, les sentiments d'amitié qu'il professe pour la Russie, ainsi que son amour de la paix, avec les exigences de ses traditions et de sa dignité.

Que les démonstrations successives qu'il s'est trouvé dans la nécessité d'accomplir aient été des avertissements, je le reconnais, si l'on veut; mais ce que je suis, Général, en droit de contester c'est quelles aient été des menaces et encore moins des provocations.

Quelle était, en effet, la nature des relations du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avec la Sublime Porte jusqu'au jour où les armées Russes ont passé le Pruth? M. le Prince Menchikoff avait quitté Constantinople; les négociations, cependant, se poursuivaient encore par une autre voie; et, si tendue que fût la situation, elle était toujours purement diplomatique; elle n'a changé d'aspect qu'à la suite de l'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie par des troupes étrangères. S'il est un acte de guerre incontestable, c'est assurément l'invasion armée d'un territoire malgré la volonté expresse de son légitime Souverain; en droit, comme en fait, la Russie déclarait donc la guerre à la Turquie en prenant possession de deux de ses provinces.

Au lieu d'exciter la Porte, comme M. le Comte de Nesselrode lui en fait aujourd'hui le reproche, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a mis tous ses soins à la calmer; et si, fidèle à la conduite qu'il s'était tracée, et dont, je ne saurais trop le répéter, les deux motifs étaient la conservation de la paix et celle de l'Empire Ottoman, il envoyait une escadre dans la Baie de Besika, il ne profitait, en même temps, de son influence à Constantinople que pour déterminer le Divan, bien que l'intégrité du territoire Turc fût violée et la souveraineté du Sultan méconnue, à reculer autant que possible le moment de repousser la force par la force. Une négociation à laquelle la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Prusse avaient pris part, se suivait activement; une note avait été présentée à la Porte par les soins des Quatre Puissances, et il est permis de croire qu'elle eût fini par devenir la base d'une transaction générale, si un commentaire inopportun n'en eût rendu l'acceptation impossible pour tout le monde.

Dans l'intervalle, de nouveaux faits s'étaient produits: l'armée Russe se fortifiait dans les Principautés; tout rapport avec l'autorité suzeraine demeurait interdit aux Hospodars; l'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie aboutissait forcément à la guerre: et les évènements qui se passaient sur le Danube amenaient à Constantinople les escadres de France et d'Angleterre. Si compromise que parût dès-lors la situation, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale n'en joignit pas moins ses efforts à ceux de ses alliés pour trouver enfin un moyen honorable de terminer un incident qu'il ne regrettait pas moins qu'eux-mêmes, et c'est au milieu de ce travail de pacification que le combat de Sinope l'a surpris. Sans renoncer à l'espoir de la paix, il a dû ouvrir les yeux sur les dangers que cette agression inattendue faisait courir à la Turquie, et son escadre est entrée dans la Mer Noire.

L'appareil militaire déployé quelques mois auparavant par la Russie dans les Principautés, voilà donc, Général, la première cause de celui que nous déployons à notre tour dans l'Euxin; et le retard que nous avons mis à le faire, joint au rappel des circonstances qui nous y ont contraints, sous peine d'abandonner un des intérêts que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, depuis l'origine de la crise, savait que nous avions en vue, indique suffisamment de quelle modération s'inspirait notre politique.

Si la Russie domine aujourd'hui en Moldavie et en Valachie, si elle y interdit à la Porte jusqu'au moindre exercice de sa souveraineté, nous venons, nous, occuper la Mer Noire avec nos forces navales pour contrebalancer l'envahissement des Provinces du Danube. Notre but est d'empêcher que cette mer qui baigne les côtes de la Turquie, en même temps que celles de l'Empire Russe, ne devienne encore une autre route pour atteindre un pays dont l'existence importe à l'Europe entière. Il n'y aura pas, dit-on, d'égalité entre les positions, si la flotte Russe est retenue dans les bassins de Sévastopol, et si la flotte Turque sort librement du Bosphore. La remarque est vraie: mais il n'y a pas non plus d'égalité entre les moyens généraux de l'attaque et de la défense; et si, par un sentiment qui a dû être apprécié à sa valeur, nous nous opposons à ce que les vaisseaux Turcs dirigent des agressions contre le littoral de la Russie, nous ne saurions leur interdire, dans les conditions que nous avions le droit de mettre à notre appui, la navigation d'une mer où nous ne sommes entrés que parceque la Porte y a consenti. Ce n'est donc pas un armistice naval que nous nous proposons d'établir, bien qu'on fait il doive exister, c'est d'un armistice plus complet que nous avons eu l'intention de poser les bases. Nous avons agi dans la pensée d'arrêter une guerre funeste, une effusion de sang inutile. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, en effet, connait aujourd'hui les conditions assurément honorables auxquelles la paix peut être rétablie; notre présence dans l'Euxin lui est également expliquée avec assez de loyauté et de franchise pour qu'il comprenne qu'il est le maître de la faire cesser: ce serait s'il faisait évacuer les Principautés et les autres points du territoire Ottoman occupés par les troupes Russes, et s'il négociait avec un Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte une Convention qui serait soumise à une conférence des Quatre Puissances réunie dans le même lieu. La responsabilité des évènements, Général, lui appartient

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donc tout entière ; et nous voulons encore croire que sa sagesse saura conjurer le développement d'une crise qui n'a déjà que trop duré.

Vous voudrez bien, Général, donner à M. le Comte de Nesselrode lecture et copie de cette dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

No. 85.

The Earl of Clarendon to Baron Brunnow.

Foreign Office, January 31, 1854.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note dated the 25th instant, from Baron Brunnow, &c., stating that he has been ordered to inquire of the Undersigned the precise meaning of a verbal communication recently made by Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh to the Chancellor of the Empire.

Baron Brunnow adverts to certain arrangements which being agreed upon, and strictly executed, would suspend hostilities by sea between the belligerent parties; and he requests that the Undersigned will inform him whether the intentions of Her Majesty's Government are in accordance with those of the Imperial Cabinet upon the principles of perfect reciprocity established in the note of Baron Brunnow.

In replying to Baron Brunnow the Undersigned thinks it right to state that the communication made by Sir H. Seymour was to the following effect: that Her Majesty's fleet had been sent to Constantinople not for the purpose of attacking of Russia, but with the firm intention to defend Turkey, and Her Majesty's Government would, therefore, have been well pleased if the necessity for thus employing the fleet had not arisen; but that the destruction of a Turkish fleet anchored peaceably in a Turkish harbour proved that the conciliatory dispositions of Her Majesty's Government, and the notice of their intentions given in an amicable spirit on the 27th October to Count Nesselrode, had been mistaken or disregarded, and that Her Majesty's Government had determined to take measures to guard against the recurrence of disasters such as those of which Sinope had been the theatre. That Her Majesty's ships therefore, and those of the Emperor of the French, would enter the Black Sea, and require every Russian ship-of-war which they might meet to return to a Russian port, and that if the summons were not attended to it would be enforced; but that Her Majesty's Government, being not less anxious than they were before to effect a peaceful settlement of difficulties, would take measures for preventing any aggressive operation by sea on the part of the Turkish fleet against the Russian territory.

The Undersigned has thus stated the terms of the communication verbally made by Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh, in order to prevent misunderstanding, and it can hardly be necessary for him to inform Baron Brunnow that they will be strictly adhered to. The Undersigned at the same time begs to add that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia is earnestly desired by Her Majesty's Government, whose best efforts will continue to be exerted to secure a just and honourable solution of the differences between Russia and the Porte; but a duty has been imposed upon Her Majesty's Government by Russia from the performance of which they will not shrink. Turkey is the aggrieved and the weaker Power; a portion of her territory has been forcibly occupied and retained, while military preparations upon a scale of the greatest magnitude are made by Russia; and in defending Turkey from the imminent danger that threatens her, Her Majesty's Government uphold that fundamental principle of European policy involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that has been repeatedly proclaimed by the Five Great Powers of Europe.

The extent to which this defence may be carried, and the nature of the operations it may entail, must depend on the course which may be pursued by Russia; but Her Majesty's Government indulge a hope that peace may yet be negotiated upon the reasonable terms proposed by the Porte for the acceptance of Russia, and in the case of that acceptance an armistice both by sea and land

would stop the effusion of blood, and put an end to embarrassment regarding naval operations, and differences which now endanger the general peace of Europe might then be speedily terminated.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 86.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1854.

I HEREWITH inclose the copy of a note addressed to me by Baron Brunnow, together with the copy of my answer.*

I inclose also the copy of a despatch† from Count Nesselrode which Baron Brunnow, by orders of his Government, placed in my hands, the purport of which is so extraordinary that I am compelled to desire you to communicate to the Chancellor the impression that it has produced on Her Majesty's Government.

This despatch ends by saying: "Un hasard suffit aujourd'hui pour produire une collision d'où naîtrait une conflagration générale, et l'Empereur repousse d'avance la responsabilité de l'initiative qui en aura donné le signal." Hence it would seem that the Russian Government has entirely forgotten the origin of this unhappy quarrel. They would seem to have forgotten that, so soon as the only cause of difference between Russia and the Porte had been satisfactorily terminated, Prince Menchikoff required, in peremptory terms, the assent of the Sultan to a certain large and new interpretation of the Treaty of Kainardji; that upon the offer of the Turkish Government to substitute other conciliatory assurances for those proposed by Prince Menchikoff, the Russian Ambassador at once quitted Constantinople; that, immediately afterwards, Count Nesselrode required the Porte, within the space of eight days, to send back, signed, the note which the Sultan had previously declared it would be fatal to his independence to accept, under a threat that if His Highness did not comply, Russian armies would occupy the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; that when the Sultan refused to submit, under compulsion, to so degrading a demand, the previous threat was at once carried into execution, and Provinces of the Sultan, containing 4,000,000 of his subjects, were invaded in time of profound peace by Russian forces; that the territory of the Sultan has since been occupied as a conquered country, the Russian Government thus violating the *status quo* of Europe, contradicting the intentions proclaimed by the Great Powers of Europe in 1840 and 1841, and stamping Russia as the disturber of the general peace.

Not content with this aggression, which at first was announced as a temporary occupation and as a material pledge held only until the demands of Russia upon the Porte should be satisfied, the Emperor of Russia has prepared great armies at vast expense, apparently with the object of crossing the Danube, and attempting the conquest of Constantinople.

Nor is it to be overlooked, frequently as I have urged the topic, that no injury to the Christian subjects of the Porte afforded even a pretext for such acts. On the contrary, with the introduction of new laws for their protection, their own gradual progress in wealth and intelligence, and by general advance in the arts of peace, the condition of the Christians was manifestly improving.

All the serious events that have since arisen—the deplorable effusion of human blood, the oppression of the people of the Principalities, the aggression upon the Russian territory in Asia, the disaster at Sinope, and the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea—are the direct consequences of the unprovoked conduct of the Russian Government; and if unhappily a chance encounter should produce a collision from which a general conflagration should arise, the Emperor of Russia will in vain attempt to throw off a responsibility which must attach to him who in time of profound peace first invaded the territory of his unoffending neighbour.

You will read, and give a copy of this despatch to Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 14 and 85. † No. 2.

No. 87.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 24, 1854.

COUNT VALENTIN ESTERHAZY has proceeded this day to St. Petersburgh to take charge of the mission to which he has been appointed at the Court of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor Nicholas.

Count Esterhazy has been instructed by his Government to make every exertion to obtain the acceptance on the part of the Russian Cabinet of the propositions of peace which were transmitted by Count Buol in his despatch to Baron Lebzeltern of the 13th instant, the substance of which I have already reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 18.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 88.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 25, 1854.

M. DE BOURQUENEY has received a letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys stating that he entirely ignores the despatch of Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador, and that he has recommended to your Lordship to take the same course. He also mentions that General Baraguay d'Hilliers and Lord Stratford both objected strongly to this document.

I saw Count Buol after M. de Bourqueney had communicated to him this information, with which he was very much satisfied; he still, however, is of opinion that the best mode of dealing with this document is to allow the Conference to state their opinion with regard to it in a short Protocol, which would not otherwise be made use of than to prove, if reference should be made to it, that the Conference had not considered that document as interfering with the original despatch of Reshid Pasha which they had agreed to adopt.

Count Buol adheres, therefore, to the recommendation of this Protocol as stated in my despatch to your Lordship No. 26 of yesterday's date, and he hopes for an early decision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 89.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 105. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 30, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS showed me this morning a despatch, dated the 26th instant, received yesterday from M. de Bourqueney, giving an account of a conversation which the latter had held with Count Buol, respecting the proposition lately made by the Austrian Cabinet to that of Berlin, to declare themselves, together with the whole of Germany, neutral in the struggle which was too likely to take place between the Western Powers and Russia. M. de Buol denied most emphatically and warmly that any such proposition had been made, and said that Prussia must either unwittingly or wilfully have misunderstood the language of Austria. That language was to the effect that in the present state of affairs, which were looking blacker every day, it was of the utmost importance that the two great German Powers should understand each other, and the Austrian Cabinet wished to know how far the Prussian Cabinet

was willing to go. Count Buol insinuated that Prussia had given that version to the proposition which she thought would be most pleasing to Russia; meaning, I presume, that Prussia would not declare herself neutral, supposing such a proposal to have been made, in order that she might hereafter assist Russia.

M. de Bourqueney adds that he took this opportunity of telling Count Buol that matters were assuming an aspect which would necessitate a declaration from Austria as to what would be her future policy, and that Count Buol had rejoined that "when the proper moment arrived, Austria would be judged by her acts; but that, in the meantime, he trusted that she would not be called upon to do anything that might compromise the last chance of peace."

Count Orloff's mission had been announced, and it was surmised that he had been sent, in order that the Emperor of Russia might have the appearance of having spontaneously named a Plenipotentiary to treat for peace with Turkey, the Turkish propositions sent from Vienna not having reached St. Petersburgh before Count Orloff set out, though they were probably known through the electric telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 90.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 49.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a project of a Convention to be signed by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia at Vienna, setting forth the terms on which those Powers engage themselves to employ all their efforts to bring about the re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government attach great importance to this Convention as the means of carrying out the object of the Protocols, and of preventing future embarrassments with respect to Turkey; and your Lordship is accordingly instructed to use your best efforts to procure its adoption by the Austrian Government, and you are authorized to sign it in conjunction with the Ministers of the other three Powers.

There is not sufficient time to prepare a full power under the Great Seal so as to send it to your Lordship by this opportunity, but it will be forwarded in a day or two.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Projet de Convention.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, et le Roi de Prusse, dans leur légitime préoccupation du préjudice que les complications survenues en Orient sont de nature à causer aux intérêts de leurs propres Etats, et dans leur vif désir de mettre un terme aux hostilités qui ont si malheureusement éclaté entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte, ont jugé qu'il était nécessaire de constater plus solennellement l'entente que les Protocoles signés à Vienne, par leurs Représentants respectifs, le 5 Décembre, 1853, et le 13 Janvier de l'année courante, ont déjà établie entre leurs couronnes. Leurs susdites Majestés ont en conséquence résolu de conclure entre elles une Convention, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires: savoir, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, M. ; Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, M. ; Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, M. ; et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, M. ; lesquels s'étant réciproquement

communiqué leurs pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

Art. I. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à employer tous leurs efforts pour opérer le rétablissement de la paix entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte sur les bases indiquées dans le Protocole du 13 Janvier dernier, et dont l'acceptation implique, de la part de Sa Hautesse le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, la ferme intention de protéger avec efficacité les intérêts religieux de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Art. II. L'évacuation des Provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie, ainsi que de tous les points du territoire Ottoman qui sont ou seraient occupés par les troupes Russes, devra être opérée le plus tôt possible.

Art. III. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, avant d'être remis en vigueur, sera révisé et formulé de façon à rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe.

Art. IV. Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, et le Roi de Prusse, désigneront immédiatement des Plénipotentiaires chargés de discuter dans des conférences, et déterminer d'un commun accord, la nature ainsi que l'emploi des moyens les plus convenables pour atteindre le but de l'alliance.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées dans l'espace de quinze jours.

No. 91.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 31, 1854, 12½ P.M.

I HAVE just received the following note from Count Buol:

This morning Count Orloff has received answer to the Turkish propositions. I shall not see him till the afternoon. The original instructions brought by him might be considered as a counter-proposition, but I thought them unlikely to produce a favourable result. We must now wait to see what the last courier has brought.

No. 92.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 31, 1854, 9 P.M.

SINCE I wrote by telegraph I learn from Count Buol that he is dissatisfied with an answer brought from St. Petersburgh by a courier this morning. He will decide, after consideration, in what form to submit it to the Conference; it has created a very unfavourable [ei (? impression)].

The idea of a Turkish Plenipotentiary being sent to St. Petersburgh is stated in the Russian despatch.

No. 93.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a project of a Convention* to be signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia, at Vienna, setting forth the terms on which those Powers engage themselves to employ all their efforts to bring about the re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Porte. Her Majesty's Government attach great importance to this Convention as the means of carrying out the object of the Protocols, and of preventing future embarrassments with respect to Turkey; and I have accordingly

* Inclosure in No. 90.

to instruct your Lordship to use your utmost endeavours to procure its adoption by the Prussian Government, and to urge that Government to furnish their Representative at Vienna with full powers to sign the Convention.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 94.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 43.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 2, 1854.

I RECEIVED on the 31st ultimo, and I have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches from No. 13 to No. 26 both inclusive, the last of the 16th ultimo.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the instructions which you gave to Vice-Admiral Dundas on the 14th of January, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 19, for the guidance of his proceedings in regard to Russian ships-of-war which may be met with in the Black Sea.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 95.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 44.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 2, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which, as reported in your despatch No. 25 of the 16th ultimo, you propose to pursue for forwarding to the Russian naval authorities the further communication to be addressed to them respecting the measures to be taken by the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, under the instructions of the 27th of December.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 96.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 1, 1854.

I HAVE seen Count Buol; he will beg the Conference to meet to-morrow, when he will submit the substance of the Russian communication presented by Count Orloff. Count Buol does not disguise from himself the difference of these communications from the proposals of the 13th of last month. The expressions of his Excellency persuade me that the object of the mission of Count Orloff will not have any success. Baron Bourqueney expresses to his Government the extreme importance he attaches to deferring the presentation of the Convention, the arrival here of which has been announced to him. He feels that by an act of apparent distrust, the sentiments of this Court or Government (which events are bringing still more in unison with the allied Governments) might be unfavourably affected. The delay would be only of a few days.

I have received your Lordship's despatch with regard to this Convention; I agree with the French Minister's opinion concerning it.

No. 97.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 2, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has communicated to the Conference the Russian counter propositions, expressly declaring that he did not support them. Having examined them, we declared by Protocol that the essential differences between these propositions and those of the 13th of January made it impossible for us [to send?] them to Constantinople. Nothing therefore remained but to transmit them to our Governments, and wait till they should have taken their ulterior decision.

I send you by the post copy of the Protocol, with its Annex.* Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the unanimity with which the above-mentioned resolution was come to.

No. 98.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 110.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 1, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received in the course of last night two telegraphic despatches from Vienna, the one dated in the afternoon, and the other at half-past eight in the evening.

M. de Bourqueney informs the French Government in the first that the Russian answer to the propositions of the 13th ultimo was arrived, and that as soon as he (Count Buol) was in possession of it, he intended to summon the Conference, and to lay it before them; that Count Orloff had made something in the shape of a counter-proposition to Count Buol, which the latter did not seem to approve, but which did not exclude all hope of an arrangement.

In the second, M. de Bourqueney states that Count Buol is not at all satisfied with the Russian answer, which had been communicated to him, and that he requires time for reflection before laying it before the Conference. The Russian Government demands that a Turkish Plenipotentiary shall be sent to St. Petersburgh, and that negotiations shall be pursued there.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, founded on what reasons I am not able to say, is that Count Orloff's mission was intended to pave the way to this proposition, and that failing in procuring its acceptance, he will endeavour to obtain of the Austrian Government terms favourable to Russia, such as the passage of Russian troops across Austrian territory, the provisioning of those troops from Austria, &c.; and should he not succeed in either of these objects, that his last efforts will be made to obtain a declaration of neutrality.

When M. de Bourqueney wrote yesterday, he added that he had no reason to suppose that Count Orloff had met with any success.

General Castelbajac, in announcing Count Orloff's mission, adds that he has reason to believe that the Count has full powers to terminate the Eastern question, and that he does not abandon all hope of an arrangement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 99.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 1, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS was to see M. de Kisseleff at 2 o'clock to-day, for the purpose of putting into that Minister's hands the answer to the note which he had given to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 25th ultimo.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that he should commence his interview

* See Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 106.

with M. de Kisseleff by reading to him the Emperor's letter to the Emperor of Russia, and his own despatch to General Castelbajac, both of which documents have been communicated to your Lordship, and were, I believe, transmitted to St. Petersburgh on the 29th ultimo, and that he should then read and place in his hands the note agreed upon between the two Governments.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has promised to let me know in case M. de Kisseleff announces anything respecting his future intentions during this interview.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—6½ P.M.—M. Drouyn de Lhuys has just sent in a note to say, that M. de Kisseleff stated that he would send a written answer to-morrow, and that he has reason to think that the Russian Minister will ask for his passports.

C.

No. 100.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 1, 1854.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government is desirous that the future action of the two Governments in the Eastern question should be regulated by a Convention rather than by an exchange of notes.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys in giving me this information, observed that the Emperor's Government has no positive objection to this alteration of their proposal, but that he thinks it would be inconvenient to have recourse to a Convention, if the Austrian and Prussian Governments accept the proposal which has been made to them of signing a quadruple instrument of the same kind. He appears to wish to let the question remain in abeyance until the success of the last scheme is ascertained.

With regard to the extra stipulations proposed by your Lordship, he had no objection to them, and he had accordingly sent to London an amended draft of note embracing the two points suggested, namely, the abnegation of all direct benefit from the impending struggle, and a possible cooperation with the Turks by land as well as by sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 101.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 2, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me yesterday that he could not but look with suspicion at the conduct of the Austrian and Prussian Governments in the Eastern question. Each accused the other of duplicity and of playing a game of its own, while the language of their agents at foreign Courts, according to the reports received by the French Government, was entirely in a Russian sense. He instanced particularly the conduct of the Austrian and Prussian Consuls in the Principalities, which he described as imbued with a spirit of partisanship in favour of Russia, though latterly the Prussian Consul appeared to have received hints to be more on his guard. He alluded with still greater severity of tone to the behaviour of Count Lebzeltern, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, who had not only assisted at a *Te Deum* for Russian victories, (though some excuse might be made for that, as it had been celebrated on the Emperor Nicholas' fête-day,) but had been present in the

Imperial box at a spectacle in the course of which the destruction of the Turkish flotilla at Sinope had been represented.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his determination to address the French Ministers at Vienna and Berlin on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 102.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)

Paris, February 2, 1854.

My Lord,

TWO telegraphic despatches of importance have reached the French Government since I had the honour of addressing your Lordship yesterday.

The first is dated Berlin, at 5 P.M. yesterday. It announces that a messenger was gone to St. Petersburgh with a refusal of Count Orloff's propositions.

The second is dated Vienna, 3·30 P.M. yesterday. It announces that Count Buol had summoned the Conference to meet at 1 o'clock this day, but without any idea that the Russian answer could be approved or accepted. M. de Bourqueney says that all the Conference can do will be to put on record the divergence which exists between the propositions of the Porte and the Russian answer, and to ask for fresh instructions. No details are given. He considers Count Orloff's mission, whatever may have been its object, to have failed. He states further, that both he and Lord Westmorland are of opinion that this is not the moment to put forward the project of Convention proposed by the French Government with any chance of success, and that it will be more prudent to wait. He promises to give his reasons by a messenger. In the meantime he solicits permission to leave the project in abeyance. He refers to the departure of Count Orloff as near, as if he connected the presence of the Count at Vienna with the difficulty of putting the Convention forward. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was about to reply by telegraph that he approved this reserve, not doubting that your Lordship would have the same opinion.

Besides these despatches, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received another from M. de Bourqueney, conveyed in the usual way, and consequently antecedent to them in date. M. de Bourqueney relates in it that he had again spoken to Count Buol on the subject of the proposal of neutrality made at Berlin, that Count Buol had again denied the fact, and that this had led M. de Bourqueney to demand in a friendly but in a more categorical manner, what would be the conduct of Austria if nothing came of the present negotiation. Count Buol had replied evasively at first; but urged to declare what he would do, for instance, if the Russians crossed the Danube, he had declared with warmth, that Austria would never permit it, and that if she did not permit it, Russia could not undertake it.

From this and other circumstances which have come to his knowledge, and more particularly from intelligence which he has received of what transpired at Count Orloff's passage through Warsaw, M. Drouyn de Lhuys is inclined to think that when the Turkish propositions were sent to St. Petersburgh, Austria and Prussia declared that if the propositions were refused, they would not permit the passage of the Danube by the Russians, and that this declaration is the cause of Count Orloff's mission to Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 103.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

Vienna, February 4, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has announced to the French Ambassador and to me that Count Orloff's proposition to the Emperor of Austria was, that His Majesty should engage himself to a strict neutrality in the event of the war between

Turkey and Russia, in which it appeared that England and France were about to take a part. The Emperor of Austria replied to Orloff, asking if the Emperor of Russia would confirm His Majesty's engagements not to pass the Danube; to evacuate the Principalities after the war; and not to disturb the general arrangement at present existing of the Turkish Provinces. Orloff replied, that the Emperor of Russia could take no engagement.

The Emperor of Austria answered, that in that case he could take no engagement as was proposed to him. He should remain faithful to the principles he had adopted in concert with the other three Powers, and should be guided in his conduct by the interests and the dignity of his Empire.

Your Lordship will not be surprised, after learning this termination of Orloff's mission, and after having received the Protocol of the Conference signed yesterday, to hear that the Austrian Government have decided immediately to increase the cordon they have upon the frontier of Transylvania to 30,000 men.

Count Buol expected that Count Orloff would have left Vienna to-morrow; but he learns with surprise that he had written that he intends to prolong his stay for some days.

No. 104.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

Londres, le $\frac{13 \text{ Janvier}}{1 \text{ Février}}$ 1854.

LE Soussigné, &c., a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que son Excellence M. le Comte de Clarendon, &c., a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 31 Janvier.

Elle ne satisfait point aux conditions de juste réciprocité sur lesquelles le Soussigné a reçu l'ordre d'insister, au nom de sa Cour, par sa note du $\frac{13}{25}$ Janvier.

Cette communication, si elle avait été appréciée comme elle meritait de l'être, aurait eu pour effet, d'une part, de restreindre les calamités de la guerre dans des limites acceptables pour les deux parties belligérantes; tandisque de l'autre, elle offrait à la Grande Bretagne une nouvelle preuve du désir constant de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'éloigner de ses relations avec elle tout motif de mésintelligence.

Le Soussigné regrette que l'esprit de bienveillance, qui a dicté cette démarche, n'ait pas rencontré des intentions également conciliantes. Dès lors, sa ligne de conduite était tracée par un sentiment profond de respect pour la dignité du Souverain qu'il a l'honneur de représenter.

Fidèle à ses devoirs, il ne saurait admettre que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, en paix avec la Russie, prétende entraver la liberté des communications que la Marine Impériale est chargée d'entretenir entre les ports Russes, tandisque les navires Turcs transportent des troupes d'un port Ottoman à l'autre sous la protection de l'escadre Anglaise.

Cette distinction étant contraire aux règles du droit public, comme aux égards mutuellement observés entre Puissances amies, le Soussigné se trouve placé par là dans l'impossibilité de continuer l'exercice de ses fonctions, tant que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'aura pas repris envers la Russie une attitude conforme aux rapports de bonne intelligence et d'amitié qui ont si heureusement subsisté jusqu'ici entre les deux Pays.

Plus le Soussigné attachait de prix à entretenir ces rapports, plus il regrette l'obligation où il se trouve de les suspendre.

Il a l'honneur de notifier à M. le Comte de Clarendon, &c., qu'il va quitter Londres, accompagné du personnel de l'Ambassade, et se rendre en Allemagne jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 105.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)

Paris, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

DURING a conversation which I had lately with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, when the difficulties which the combined fleets would naturally encounter in the Black Sea at this season of the year came under notice, his Excellency said that he had written, by the Emperor's orders, to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to recall to his recollection that the movements of the French squadron must be regulated by the opinion of Admiral Hamelin; that the Ambassador's duty ended when he had signified to the Admiral what duty the squadron was to perform; but that the time and manner of the execution of that duty must be left to the Admiral's superior nautical knowledge.

These instructions have been sent in consequence of the French squadron having been ordered into the Black Sea in despite of the remonstrances of Admiral Hamelin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 106.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 39.)

Vienna, February 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I FORWARD to your Lordship, herewith inclosed, the Protocol which at the Conference called this day by Count Buol has been signed by himself, by Baron Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, and to which are annexed the Russian counterpositions which were communicated by Count Buol, together with a memorandum which accompanied them.

Count Buol, upon our meeting, stated that he considered himself bound to lay these propositions before the Conference, but that he could in no way take upon himself to recommend them.

After reading the document Count Buol stated, that it remained with the Conference to take a decision with regard to them, and that in his opinion they differed so essentially from those which, emanating from the Turkish Government, he had transmitted with the sanction of the Conference to St. Petersburgh, that he did not think they could or ought to be forwarded to Constantinople.

The other members of the Conference having agreed to that opinion, the Protocol which I inclose was immediately drawn up and signed.

Count Buol considered this as likely to be the closing scene of the negotiation which under better promise had been undertaken for the re-establishment of peace, and he did not disguise the opinion he entertained that the Emperor of Russia was losing a great opportunity of bringing to a favourable termination a complicated state of things, as menacing to himself as it was to every other Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 106.

Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, February 2, 1854.

Présens: Les Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse.

LES Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, se sont réunis en Conférence pour entendre la communication que M. le Plénipotentiaire Autrichien a bien voulu leur faire des propositions pré-

sentées par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg en réponse à celles qu'il s'était chargé le 13 Janvier de faire parvenir au Gouvernement Impérial, révêtues de l'approbation des Puissances représentées dans la Conférence de Vienne. La pièce qui les contient est annexée au présent Protocole.

Les Soussignés, après avoir soumis à l'examen le plus attentif les propositions susdites, ont constaté dans leur ensemble et dans leurs détails des différences tellement essentielles avec les bases de négociations arrêtées le 31 Décembre à Constantinople, et approuvées le 13 Janvier à Vienne, qu'ils ne les ont pas jugées de nature à être transmises au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Il ne reste en conséquence aux Soussignés qu'à faire parvenir le document ci-annexé à leurs Cours respectives, et d'attendre qu'elles aient arrêté leurs résolutions ultérieures.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 106.

Annex to the Protocol of the Conference held at Vienna, February 2, 1854.

EN réponse aux propositions de la Porte transmises à St. Pétersbourg à la suite du Protocole du 13 Janvier, la Russie nous a fait connaître que, fidèle aux déclarations qu'elle avait faites dès le début du conflit, elle ne veut ni aggraver les dangers auxquels la Turquie s'est livrée, ni lui imposer une paix incompatible avec son intégrité et son indépendance.

La Russie est persuadée que jamais Traité n'aura été moins difficile à négocier et à mener à bonne fin que celui que la Porte viendrait à proposer avec le désir sincère de rétablir ses relations avec la Russie sur l'ancien pied, et d'écarter à tout jamais les motifs de dissentiment qui se sont élevés, par une franche entente sur le sens et la portée de ses transactions antérieures et des intentions réciproques actuelles.

La Russie établit qu'il y a une distinction à faire entre le fond, c'est à dire les conditions, de la paix, et la forme, c'est à dire le mode, de la négociation.

Quant à la question de la forme, le Cabinet de Vienne se trouve autorisé, d'accord avec les autres membres de la Conférence, à préparer le terrain à la négociation directe, en faisant adopter à la Porte au préalable les bases que lui offre la Russie.

Le Cabinet Impérial y met la condition essentielle et irrévocable que les négociations définitives de la signature du Traité de Paix aient lieu directement entre la Russie et la Porte, soit au quartier-général, soit à St. Pétersbourg, moyennant un Plénipotentiaire que la Porte enverrait dans l'un ou l'autre de ces endroits.

Le Cabinet Russe fait observer que pour le cas où ces négociations s'ouvrissent à St. Pétersbourg, les Représentants des Quatre Puissances pourraient se trouver munis d'instructions nécessaires pour diriger, assister, et appuyer de leurs Conseils le Plénipotentiaire Turc, sans qu'il soit besoin d'une Conférence ostensible, et, cette forme écartée, on peut être sûr que les dispositions de la Russie n'en seront que plus accommodantes.

En ce qui concerne le fond des négociations, l'Empereur, fidèle à ses sentiments désintéressés, propose comme bases de pacification, en autant qu'il est possible de les définir au milieu de circonstances qui varient chaque jour, et dans le cas où une négociation directe entre la Russie et la Porte viendrait à s'ouvrir prochainement:

1. Confirmation pleine et entière des Traités antérieurs conclus entre la Russie et la Porte, à dater de celui de Kainardji, et des Conventions spéciales d'Andrinople, relatives aux Principautés Danubiennes et à la Servie.

2. Des éclaircissements à consigner par les Plénipotentiaires respectifs chargés de la négociation de la paix dans un Acte séparé sous forme de Protocole ou d'Article additionnel, et dont le projet se trouve ci-joint, concernant le sens et l'application pratique des firmans antérieurs et récents des Sultans relatifs à la

liberté religieuse, et aux immunités accordées aux églises du culte orthodoxe d'Orient.

3. Evacuation dans le plus bref délai des Principautés Danubiennes et des autres territoires et villes faisant partie des Etats du Sultan qui se trouveraient occupés par les armées Russes à la suite des évènements de la guerre, dès que l'arrangement sera effectué.

4. Rétablissement de l'ordre de choses et des Gouvernements des Principautés tels qu'ils avaient été établis par les stipulations d'Andrinople.

5. Régularisation du droits d'asile et des conditions auxquelles il serait accordé à l'avenir dans les Etats respectifs aux agitateurs et aux révolutionnaires, qui, sous le marque de refugiés politiques, viendraient susciter des embarras et de la mésintelligence entre des Gouvernements amis et voisins.

Quant au Traité du 31 Juillet, 1841, la Russie le regarde comme n'ayant point cessé d'être en vigueur, puisqu'il a été conclu pour la paix comme pour la guerre; par conséquent, il n'aurait pas besoin d'être renouvelé ni d'être complété par une garantie.

Inclosure 3 in No. 106.

Projet de Protocole.

APRES avoir signé les Articles du Traité destiné à rétablir la paix entre les deux Empires et à faire succéder à un différend passager les relations d'amitié entretenues jusque là par leurs deux Souverains dans un intérêt réciproque, les Plénipotentiaires se sont occupés de prendre en considération plus particulière la cause originelle de ce différend, et dans le but d'en faire disparaître à l'avenir toutes traces, l'un et l'autre ont consigné dans le présent Protocole les assurances, déclarations et dispositions suivantes:

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a d'abord protesté, au nom du Sultan, de la constante sollicitude qui anime ce Souverain pour la sécurité dans ses Etats du clergé, des églises et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient, exprimant le regret sincère qu'il ait pu s'élever un moment quelques doutes à cet égard dans l'esprit de Sa Majesté Impériale. Il a déclaré que Sa Majesté le Sultan n'avait pas un seul instant pu songer à perdre de vue le principe général posé dans le Traité de Kainardji, comme dans ceux qui le confirment, et que sa ferme intention était d'y rester invariablement fidèle. A l'appui de cette intention, et comme preuve de la résolution du Sultan d'assurer dans ses Etats au culte orthodoxe d'Orient les droits, immunités, privilèges, et avantages religieux qui ont été accordés au dit culte et à ses églises par les augustes prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté, et même d'étendre encore en leur faveur les effets de sa bienveillance Impériale, le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman se trouvait chargé de communiquer officiellement à la Cour de Russie l'Irade Suprême que, de son propre mouvement, le Sultan a donné en date du au patriarche et au clergé Grecs. La remise formelle de cet Acte entre les mains du Cabinet Impérial, et, de plus, la proclamation qui en avait été faite publiquement, attesteraient aux yeux du monde que le Sultan regarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement soit dans l'avenir, les privilèges confirmés ou nouvellement accordés par Sa Majesté. Elle promettait, en outre, de faire, dans un esprit de haute équité, participer le rit Grec aux avantages qu'elle accorderait à l'avenir aux autres rits Chrétiens.

En retour de ces assurances, le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a déclaré que si divers actes de la Porte, et notamment à l'égard des lieux saints, ayant paru à l'Empereur indiquer des dispositions peu favorables au culte qu'il professe, avaient engagé Sa Majesté à demander en même temps que l'arrangement de l'affaire plus spéciale des dits lieux, une garantie générale des droits, privilèges, et immunités religieuses accordées à l'Eglise Orthodoxe, d'un autre côté il n'était jamais entré dans la pensée de Sa Majesté d'attacher à cette garantie un caractère autre que celui qui ressort naturellement du principe posé dans le Traité de Kainardji, et confirmé dans les transactions subséquentes—par conséquent rien de contraire à l'indépendance et aux droits du Sultan; qu'en demandant que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuassent à jouir de ces immunités et privilèges sous

l'égide de leur Souverain le Sultan, l'Empereur en avait suffisamment déterminé le caractère.

En recevant des mains du Plénipotentiaire Ottoman l'Iradé Suprême susmentionné, le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a déclaré, au nom de son auguste maître, qu'il accueillait cette manifestation comme un nouveau gage de la bonne et sincère amitié si désirable aux deux Empires, et dans l'esprit d'une confiance entière. Il a pris acte avec la même satisfaction de la promesse qu'y joignait le Sultan d'étendre au culte Grec les avantages qui pourraient être concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens en Turquie.

Ces préliminaires une fois réglés, et la question générale ainsi résolue, les Soussignés ont procédé à constater, en les arrêtant définitivement, les résultats déjà acquis à la négociation antérieure à Constantinople.

En conséquence le firman souverain, émané de Sa Majesté le Sultan, le , pour expliquer et corroborer celui du Janvier 1852, ainsi qu'un autre firman, en date du , relatif à la réparation de la grand coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ont été portés officiellement par le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman à la connaissance de la Cour Impériale de Russie, et il a été convenu que ces ordonnances souveraines destinées, dans leur stricte exécution, à garantir le *status quo* des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs orthodoxes, soit exclusivement, soit en commun avec d'autres cultes, sont regardés par les deux Cabinets comme mutuellement satisfaisantes, sans qu'elles puissent à l'avenir donner lieu à de nouvelles discussions. La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet que si quelque cas imprévu nécessitait une modification quelconque à l'état actuel des choses, elle aurait soin d'en informer préalablement la Cour de Russie, se réservant d'en faire également notification à celles des Cours Européennes envers lesquelles elle se trouve liée par des stipulations particulières.

Egalement, comme les sujets de l'Empire de Russie, tant séculiers qu'ecclésiastiques, auxquels il est permis, suivant les Traités, de visiter la Sainte Ville de Jérusalem et autres lieux de dévotion, doivent être considérés à l'égal des sujets des nations les plus favorisées, et comme celles-ci, tant Catholiques que Protestantes, ont leurs prélats et établissements ecclésiastiques particuliers, il a été arrêté que pour le cas où le Cabinet Impérial de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera accordé une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigens ou malades, lesquelles fondations pieuses seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Le présent Acte, ayant ainsi réglé les objets restés en litige et confirmé décidément les résultats déjà obtenus, les Plénipotentiaires l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

No. 107.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 47.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 6, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instruction which you gave to M. Pisani, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 18 of the 12th ultimo, on the question of the admission of Christian evidence in the Turkish courts of law. That instruction explains, in clear and convincing language, the magnitude of the grievance complained of, and the absolute necessity of redress.

It is perfectly monstrous that a man should be exposed to the utmost wrong—should actually see those who are nearest and dearest to him suffering death, or worse than death—and yet that his evidence as to the facts should be rejected, and the offenders escape with impunity, because he is a Christian.

On the very first day of the meeting of Parliament, the people of England were reminded by a speech in the House of Lords that this unjustifiable abuse of power still existed in Turkey; and the Porte must clearly understand that if England and France are about to incur all the risks and dangers of an European

war in the defence of the Ottoman Empire against the unjust aggression of a Christian Power, they have a right to demand that the brand of inferiority and degradation shall no longer be fixed upon the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

If upon the receipt of this despatch no satisfactory answer has been received from Reshid Pasha, your Excellency will give that Minister a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 108.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 123.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 4, 1854.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 55, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government highly appreciate the friendly manner in which the Government of the Emperor of the French adopted the suggestions which Her Majesty's Government offered, respecting the answer to be returned by Great Britain and France to the Russian demand for explanations regarding the action of the combined fleets in the Black Sea. I remarked, at the same time, that I had not seen the documents which the French Government had sent to St. Petersburgh, since the promised alterations had been introduced into them, meaning to give him an opportunity of showing them to me. M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not seem inclined to do so; but as he stated that the papers had not been transmitted to their destination until after your Lordship had seen and approved the alterations to which I alluded, I did not press the matter further.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 109.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 129.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 5, 1854.*

M. DE KISSELEFF called on M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday afternoon and placed in his hands a note, in which he states, that in consequence of the unsatisfactory answer made by the French Government to the Russian demand for explanations respecting the presence of the French fleet in the Black Sea, it would not comport with the dignity of his Government that he should remain any longer at his post, and he therefore announced his intention of leaving Paris. Your Lordship will of course have received a similar note from M. de Brunnow, and I need not enter into further details, nor expose the fallacies, both of facts and reasoning, with which this document abounds.

M. de Kisseleff, on taking leave of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked for passports for Belgium and Germany, and presented to his Excellency the Russian Consul-General.

After M. de Kisseleff had taken the determination to quit Paris, he told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had received so much personal kindness from the Emperor, that he should be sorry to go away without taking leave of His Majesty,—that he did not ask for an interview as Russian Minister, but as a private individual. The Emperor was pleased to grant the interview the day before yesterday, and I am informed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys that His Majesty took occasion to pass the whole Eastern question in review, with the intention of showing how completely Russia had put herself in the wrong. M. de Kisseleff appears to have dwelt more particularly on the inequality displayed in the treatment of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, an inequality which the Emperor justified by the example set by Russia in the Principalities. "Russia,"

said His Majesty, "excludes all Turks from the Principalities, and we on our part exclude all Russians from the Black Sea."

I should add, that I have reason to believe that M. de Kisseleff, in asking for this interview, had it at heart to justify his own conduct, during the progress of the Eastern question—conduct which has been much criticised and blamed by no one more than the Emperor. There seems to be but little doubt that he gave his Government to understand that any cordial action between Great Britain and France was impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 110.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 130.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 5, 1854.*

DURING a conversation which I had yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, he alluded again to the wish expressed by your Lordship that the future relations of Great Britain and France, in regard to the Eastern question, should be regulated by a Convention rather than an exchange of notes.

He said that he had no objection to the principle of a Convention, but that he was unwilling to risk the chance of the quadruple Treaty, which the two Governments were desirous of signing with Austria and Prussia, by entering into a separate Convention of a more stringent nature with Her Majesty's Government. Such a proceeding, if divulged, might disincline Austria and Prussia to bind themselves by any formal Act. He wished, therefore, to put aside your Lordship's proposition for the moment, but he was ready to proceed at once to an exchange of notes, leaving it to the two Governments to sign a Convention in the same sense hereafter, if it were judged advisable.

I venture to remark that, if your Lordship is anxious for a Convention, it will be more prudent to avoid at this moment an exchange of notes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 111.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 131.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 5, 1854.*

THE French Government has received from Vienna a telegraphic despatch, dated the 3rd instant, of considerable importance.

M. de Bourqueney states that Count Buol had informed him that the object of Count Orloff's mission was to obtain a declaration of neutrality on the part of Austria, in case of war being declared between Russia and the Western Powers.

Count Buol, before replying, inquired of Count Orloff whether Russia was prepared to abide by the assurances already given to the Russian Cabinet, that she would not pass the Danube, that she would respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the present political condition (l'état politique actuel) of its provinces, and that her occupation of the Principalities was but a temporary measure.

Count Orloff having declared himself unable to reply affirmatively, Count Buol informed him, by order of the Emperor, that not only Austria would not give the desired assurance of neutrality, but that if the Russian troops crossed the Danube, the Emperor would be forced to consider what would be the line of conduct which the interests of his Empire and his subjects would require him to take.

Count Buol informed M. de Bourqueney at the same time, that the Austrian army on the Turkish frontier would be augmented immediately.

Count Orloff, who it appears had intended leaving Vienna immediately, had put off his departure for some days. M. de Bourqueney could not explain the reason of this change of plan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

Count Walewski to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

Londres, le 6 Février, 1854.

LE SOUSSIGNE, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, a l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence le Comte de Clarendon, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique au Département des Affaires Etrangères, qu'il a paru au Gouvernement de son auguste Souverain qu'en présence des éventualités qui préoccupent, à si juste titre, les deux Gouvernements, il était devenu opportun de déterminer l'objet de leur alliance, et de désigner les moyens à employer en commun pour le remplir:

1. Les démonstrations déjà faites par la France et l'Angleterre, et les signatures apposées par les Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande aux Actes émanés de la Conférence réunie à Vienne le 5 Décembre, 1853, et le 13 Janvier de cette année, indiquent déjà que le but des deux Gouvernements est le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman et de l'indépendance souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

2. Ce but serait atteint si la paix pouvait être rétablie entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte aux conditions parfaitement honorables qui ont été offertes au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; et dans le cas où, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, la guerre deviendrait nécessaire, la cause en serait naturellement supprimée du jour où la paix pourrait être rétablie avec la Russie sur les bases indiquées ci-dessus, et où ses troupes auraient évacué les Provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie, ainsi que tout autre point du territoire Ottoman.

3. Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer que, jusqu'à ce que le but ainsi spécifié soit atteint, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale s'engage à y coopérer par l'escadre qu'il entretient, en ce moment, dans la Mer Noire, en la fortifiant si les circonstances l'exigent; et de donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale serait disposé à joindre une escadre Française à celle que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique enverrait dans la Mer du Nord et dans la Mer Baltique, lorsque les deux Gouvernements auraient, l'un et l'autre, reconnu la nécessité de recourir à cette nouvelle démonstration.

4. Si les moyens dont il s'agit n'étaient pas jugés suffisans pour décider la Russie à évacuer le territoire Ottoman et à conclure la paix, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale examinerait, de concert avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, s'il ne conviendrait pas de seconder les opérations de leurs forces navales par l'adjonction d'un corps de troupes.

5. Le Soussigné n'a pas besoin de dire que, tant que durerait la guerre, le Gouvernement Français ne recevrait aucune ouverture, ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités, sans mettre, à l'instant même, le Gouvernement Britannique en mesure d'en discuter, de concert avec lui, la valeur ainsi que l'opportunité; et il proclame également que sa Cour, uniquement animée du désir de préserver l'équilibre Européen d'une grave atteinte, renonce d'avance à retirer aucun avantage particulier des évènements qui peuvent se produire.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 113.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 135.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 6*, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received this morning a copy of the Protocol signed at Vienna on the 2nd instant, together with copies of the papers which Count Buol laid before the Conference. He said that he had not had time to consider attentively all the bearings of the Russian answer, but he was disposed to consider it inadmissible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 114.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 136.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 6*, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received, late last night, a telegraphic despatch from Count Walewski, stating that, if it met with the concurrence of the French Government, your Lordship proposed sending instructions to Sir Hamilton Seymour, by Tuesday's messenger, to quit St. Petersburgh with all the members of Her Majesty's Legation, leaving Her Majesty's Consul to look after commercial business, and that you intended to ground this measure simply on the fact that Baron Brunnow had been ordered to leave London.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he would prepare instructions of a similar nature for General Castelbajac, and that, to prevent mistakes, he would send from hence a draft of the note which that Minister was to address to the Russian Government. He intended to transmit these papers to-night to Count Walewski, in order that they may be forwarded to St. Petersburgh by your Lordship's messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 115.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 74.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 7*, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government concur in the opinion which your Excellency states, in your despatch No. 135, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys seemed inclined to form upon the Russian answer to the Porte's offers of reconciliation.

That answer appears to Her Majesty's Government to be utterly inadmissible, and to leave no doubt of the determination of Russia to pursue her own objects with reckless disregard of the consequences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 116.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 7*, 1854.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 136 I have to acquaint you that Count Walewski has this day read to me the despatch which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has addressed to General Castelbajac ordering him to withdraw from

St. Petersburgh, and I have to instruct your Excellency to read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys my despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, recalling Her Majesty's Mission from Russia, which despatch will be sent off to-night, and of which a copy is forwarded to your Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 117.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.*

ON the evening of the 4th instant Baron Brunnow placed in my hands a note, the copy of which is herewith inclosed,* announcing that the diplomatic relations between this country and Russia were suspended, and that he was about to leave England with the members of the Russian Mission. You will, therefore, immediately on the receipt of this despatch, inform Count Nesselrode that you are instructed to withdraw from St. Petersburgh, together with every member of Her Majesty's Mission.

You will return to England, and avoid all unnecessary delay in quitting the Russian dominions.

Similar instructions will this day be addressed to M. de Castelbajac by the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 118.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35 of this day's date I have to inform you that Baron Brunnow stated to me that it was not the wish or intention of his Government that the commercial relations between the two countries should be interrupted, and that the Consul-General and Consuls of Russia would have orders to remain at their posts.

Accordingly Her Majesty's Government do not propose at present to withdraw Her Majesty's Consuls from Russia. You will, however, obtain from Count Nesselrode a written assurance that the official representations which it may be the duty of Her Majesty's Consul at St. Petersburgh to make in behalf of British subjects in Russia will be duly received by the Imperial Government. If such an assurance is given to you, you will use the best means at your disposal for making it known to Her Majesty's subjects.

It will also be proper to assure Count Nesselrode of the disposition of Her Majesty's Government to attend to similar representations made by the Russian Consul on behalf of Russian subjects in this country. But in the event of Count Nesselrode declining to receive official communications from Her Majesty's Consul, it will be necessary to take other measures for the security of the persons and property of British residents in Russia; and you are accordingly instructed to place them under the protection of the Danish Minister, whom you will at the same time inform that I shall make the necessary communication upon the subject to his Government through Her Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen.

You will make the best arrangements in your power for the safe custody of the archives and plate belonging to the Mission. Her Majesty's Government would approve of their being left in charge of the chaplain of the British factory.

* No. 104.

I can give you no precise instructions with regard to the British merchants domiciled at St. Petersburgh, not having sufficient information as to the position they occupy under the Russian Government in consequence of their being so domiciled, nor as to the naturalization in Russia which many of them are understood to have acquired. Their numbers, their wealth, and their high respectability demand, however, at your hands, all the consideration and assistance you can afford; and I have, therefore, to desire that you will consult them and learn their wishes, and before quitting St. Petersburgh that you will take such measures as they may think most conducive to their interests.

In the event of war it is of the utmost importance that all British subjects in the service of Russia should at once withdraw from it, and you will use your best endeavours to induce them to do so; taking care at the same time to inform them that if made prisoners while in arms against their lawful Sovereign they will be guilty of the crime of high treason, and will be dealt with accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 119.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.*

WITH reference to that part of my despatch No. 36 of this day's date, in which I state that Her Majesty's Government would approve of the archives and plate being left in charge of the chaplain of the British factory, I have to inform you that this direction is given in anticipation of the British Consul being obliged to leave St. Petersburgh simultaneously with yourself, and of its not being practicable at this season of the year to remove such bulky cases as those which might be required for the articles in question.

If however the Consul should remain, the archives, sealed up, and the plate should both be left in his custody in the first instance, supposing the removal of the former cannot at once be effected. But it would certainly be better, if it were possible, to provide for the extreme contingency referred to in my despatch, and send the archives home simultaneously with your own departure, giving the Consul directions, on his own withdrawal, to place the plate in the custody of the British chaplain, or of some respectable banking or mercantile establishment.

No. 120.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 13. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government have learned with the most sincere satisfaction the result of the audience given to the Russian Minister at Berlin by His Majesty the King of Prussia, a report of which is contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 22 of the 28th ultimo; and Her Majesty's Government again desire to congratulate Baron Manteuffel upon the firmness and decision his Excellency exhibits at a time when events of the most momentous gravity may turn upon the position assumed by Prussia. A bold course now, a fixed determination to be neither intimidated nor cajoled by Russia, but to resist her aggressive policy, which, if successful, would render not alone the East but all Germany subservient to her will, cannot but have a salutary influence on Austria; and the united action of the two Great German Powers must render Russia comparatively impotent.

England and France can make war upon Russia, and are prepared, if necessary, to do so; but with Prussia and Austria it rests to prevent war, or to render it of short duration. Her Majesty's Government accordingly look upon the complete independence of Prussia as a question of which it is impossible to

over-estimate the importance; for it may be the basis of the future tranquillity of Europe, and a guarantee for those mighty interests involved in the maintenance of social order.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 121.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

AS it is my duty to report to your Lordship such facts of interest as come under my observation, so I am desirous of submitting to you the opinions to which they give rise.

I have no hesitation, then, in stating to your Lordship my firm conviction that, under existing circumstances, one of the greatest misfortunes which could befall us would be that war with Russia should be averted by some hollow and insincere arrangement of difficulties.

If I know anything of my feelings, no one more than myself appreciates the blessings of peace, or more earnestly deprecates the horrors of war; but as I conscientiously believe the latter are only to be avoided for a short season, it is better that they should be encountered at the moment most favourable to England, than at the time and under the circumstances which would best suit the convenience of Russia.

I am told constantly (the statement was repeated to me half-an-hour ago by a person in whose opinion I have great reliance) that Russia is very desirous of avoiding war, and I feel confident that the fact is so, but the wish applies only to the present juncture.

The Russian Government have had by degrees many unpalatable truths forced upon them. They are at length convinced that England will strike as well as remonstrate; that the alliance between England and France is not to be broken up by a few honied words and a little more activity of intrigue; above all, that the blows to which they are exposing their country will be of such a nature as will leave strong traces for the next half-century. All this is felt, and the folly and danger of having listened to supple diplomatists and cringing courtiers may possibly be at length appreciated.

Meanwhile, however, whilst the designs of Russia have been made apparent, nothing has occurred of a nature to modify them; so far from this being the case, ambitious plans, which were concealed in the Sovereign's breast, have been publicly identified with the religious wants of his people; engagements have been taken for their being attained, and during this laboured process the public mind has been excited against the opponents of the Emperor (against England more especially) to a degree such as never prevailed in Russia with regard to foreigners since the campaign of 1812.

My conviction, my firm conviction, then is, that the carrying out of these schemes and the gratification of the public feeling may be looked for as soon as England may chance to find herself engaged in war with France or with the United States. At this moment Russia has nearly the whole continent opposed to her: under the altered circumstances to which I advert, Russia may have resumed her favourite position of belonging to the majority of the European Governments.

In the Black Sea the naval men of Russia consider themselves already as nearly able to cope with the forces which can be brought against them; the confidence will be better founded if, at the end of two or three years, they have to try conclusions with the English fleet alone, and if, in the meantime, twelve or twenty-four first-class steamers be added to the fleet anchored at Sevastopol.

I am told that the Emperor cannot extend his warlike resources to this amount without ruining the resources of his country; that, my Lord, is very possible, but the hopes which are built upon the assumption would nevertheless be perfectly fallacious; the Emperor looks to his army and his navy, and cares as little for other material interests when placed in competition with them as he does for those of his neighbours.

His pride is unbounded, and it has received a severe wound. He will attempt, when occasion serves, to avenge this imaginary affront; of this I am as convinced as if His Majesty had told me so. I may, indeed, say more sure, and, not having the slightest confidence in his pacific intentions, I will not conceal from your Lordship my anxiety that Her Majesty's Government should obtain that security through the destruction of his means of offence.

If this judgment be severe and erroneous I can only say that it is that which is passed by many of His Majesty's own subjects. They understand perfectly that their master insists upon playing a leading part, they are aware that he can no longer hope to graduate in moderation or magnanimity, and they expect that the latter part of his reign will be directed to the acquirement of such pre-eminence as is to be obtained in the cause of orthodox encroachment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 122.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 89.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

A CIRCUMSTANCE has come to my knowledge which from the evidence which it appears to give of the disposition of a person upon whose conduct so much may depend, I think it right to report to your Lordship.

A letter was addressed some short time ago to Count Orloff by Prince Menchikoff, who took occasion to express his regret that the Count had not been charged with the Mission to Constantinople: "Vous auriez montré," he writes, "plus d'esprit, vous auriez eu, sans doute, plus de succès que moi."

No, Count Orloff replied, "non, je n'aurais pas montré plus d'esprit, mais probablement j'aurais été plus heureux parceque j'aurais été plus conciliant et que j'aurais pris plus sur moi."

It is to these latter words that I am desirous of calling your Lordship's attention: Count Orloff knows his master's inward thoughts better perhaps than any one; he is not a man who is afraid of responsibility, and if he is convinced of the Emperor's real desire to be freed from a position of great embarrassment and danger, it is not impossible that he may render him a service which none of the other Russian diplomatists would venture upon.

I will only remark that Count Orloff's observation to Prince Menchikoff was substantially the same as he had made to me two or three months since in speaking of the Prince's untoward mission to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 123.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 90.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

ALL that I hear, as well of this place as of the interior, confirms what I have had the honour of stating to your Lordship as to the paralyzing effects already produced upon trade and industry by the preparations which are making in every direction of the country for an insane war.

I learn that at Riga the merchants, both English and others, are availing themselves of the snow roads for the purpose of sending their goods to Memel. They hope that it may be possible to make shipments from that port, when the blockade which they are expecting shall be established higher up the coast.

Three days ago I saw a gentleman newly arrived from the interior who spoke to me of an English manufactory established at some hundreds of versts from St. Petersburgh at which almost all the workmen had been just discharged.

The proprietor manufactures sail cloth, of which he commonly sells

annually to the amount of about 300,000 roubles silver (48,000*l.*) to American houses; with the prospect of having these markets closed against him, he is preparing to suspend his business.

The same thing will happen with the greater number of leading landed proprietors of Russia who will be, it may be observed, among the principal losers by the military operations in which the Government has engaged.

These persons derive their incomes from the sale of their agricultural produce, which will shortly become unsaleable, and from the manufactories which they have very generally established upon their estates, and which will now in many instances be closed, whilst they will have to provide for the maintenance of their serfs, whom they have made use of as workmen, besides having to provide their large quotas of the soldiers who will be called for in case of the continuance of war.

I apprehend that a war of two years' continuance would drive almost every landowner in Russia to seek the assistance of the Mortgage Bank, an institution which has already been the means of transferring a great part of the estates in the country from the gentry to the Crown.

Colonial produce continues to rise in price, sugars more particularly; as regards this commodity the house of Stieglitz may command their own prices, for they have purchased all that was in the market, and will realise an enormous profit upon the operation.

On the other hand, native produce continues to fall in value; as, for instance, tallow, which fetched 150 and 160 roubles ——— the 10 poods in the autumn is now to be purchased for 115 roubles ———.

Bristles, I believe, to keep their price; but as regards this one article, Russia appears to enjoy a natural monopoly, the bristles used by brushmakers and shoemakers being found of good quality only in the Southern Governments of this country.

The bristle trade the Russians will therefore keep under all circumstances, whilst a war is likely enough to cost them definitively their export trade in tallow.

I am not aware of having ever taken occasion to remark to your Lordship upon the beneficial effects, as regards commercial interests, of the delays which have occurred between the offence committed against Europe by Russia, and that violent solution which appears now to be approaching.

Independently of the vast amount of human food, so much wanted after a season of scarcity, which has been exported from Odessa during the autumn and winter, British property not far short of the value of 1,000,000*l.* sterling has been got off during the same period from Riga, Archangel, and Cronstadt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since my despatch was written, I have heard of 400 tons of tallow having been sent in sledges from St. Petersburgh to Memel for shipment.

My informant states (which I have some difficulty in believing) that the cost of transport is 1½ roubles silver (4*s.* 9*d.*) per pood.

G. H. S.

No. 124.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 91.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will have some difficulty in believing (although the fact admits, I apprehend, of no doubt), that the first resolution of the Emperor upon the arrival of the very honourable overtures which were received from Count Buol was to return no answer to the communication.

At a moment when the whole of Europe supposed the Imperial Cabinet to be engaged in weighing the enormous dangers of refusing against the advantage of closing with the conditions offered for an honourable peace, the Cabinet had almost if not altogether decided that such overtures were to be left unnoticed,

and that England and France, Austria and Prussia, speaking through the Conference, should be left to infer from silence that the terms which it had cost them so much labour to obtain from the Sultan were beneath the attention of the Sovereign by whom he had been so grossly insulted and so deeply injured.

I will not indulge in the reflections which are suggested by the course which it was for a short time intended to follow, and will only say that wiser counsels prevailed, and that an answer of some kind will be returned to Count Buol as the mouthpiece of the Conference.

The answer, I apprehend, will be of an evasive nature; because, if I mistake not, it is determined that the resolution of the Government shall depend in great measure upon the decision taken by Count Orloff, after he has had an opportunity of learning the state of affairs at Vienna.

No efforts will, I am convinced, be spared to induce Austria and Prussia to cast in their lots with those of Russia. Fresh attempts will probably be made to disunite the Governments of England and France; but, supposing all this to fail, it may well be that Count Orloff will be the man who will take upon himself the responsibility of admitting a Turkish Plenipotentiary to the Council Board at which he and the Representatives of the Four Powers will take their places.

All that I hear convinces me and more that Count Orloff's powers are extensive and elastic.

I will only add, that I have some slight grounds for believing that the Russian Government would be found prepared to allow her Plenipotentiary to meet the other five for the arrangement of a basis of negotiation, provided that it were understood that the Treaty to be superposed should be negotiated by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Turkey alone.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 125.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

DURING the last week the Emperor has been suffering from a slight attack of gout, which confined him for two or three days to his bed.

His Majesty was able to quit his room on the 28th instant, and may I believe now be considered as completely convalescent.

The health of the Hereditary Grand Duke is, I am sorry to say, not in a satisfactory state. His Imperial Highness is still suffering from a cough which came on last summer, and he occasionally spits blood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 126.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 94.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1854.

THE language of the naval and military men here, as I hear from some of my diplomatic colleagues, confirms the observations which I have taken the liberty of submitting to your Lordship respecting the spirit of the sailors of the Sevastopol ships.

These men are represented as being desirous of engaging the combined fleets, and as being very sanguine as to the result, particularly if permitted to engage at close quarters.

I am positively assured that the Emperor has taken the wise course of moderating this ardour, by causing it to be intimated to the naval officers at Sevastopol, that while he is gratified by the spirit which animates his navy, he

desires to impress upon all that they will be engaged, if hostilities should break out, with men who have more experience in maritime affairs than themselves.

The sum appears to be, that it is well that the Russian sailors should have less confidence in their prowess, and that those against whom they may be shortly pitched should not be too strongly impressed with the inferiority of their adversaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 127.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1854.*

I AM still unable to state to your Lordship, with certainty, what has been decided respecting the expected levy of fourteen men upon the thousand.

Many persons assert that an order to this effect has been given, but the ukase by which it will be promulgated appears not to have been sent to the Senate.

Information worthy of confidence leaves me little or no doubt as to the attacks upon Kalafat having proceeded from the impatience manifested by the Emperor at any portion of the Turkish army being allowed to hold its ground on the left bank of the Danube.

This impatience is still constantly expressed; and, as I expect daily to hear, will have led to a desperate attack upon a point which is likely to be defended with the same obstinacy.

I only hope that those seductive means which were so successfully employed by Peter the Great, and which were found equally efficacious in 1829, may not again be brought to bear upon the cupidity of Turkish Generals.

At St. Petersburgh, where the severe criticism of an active army is a favourite occupation of the military men who are unemployed, Prince Gortchakoff is now as much blamed for his rashness as he was two months ago for his inactivity. This present fault—if fault it be—is probably to be ascribed to the impatience to which I have above alluded.

The want of success which has attended Prince Gortchakoff's operation is, however, variously explained, and is stated to me by a retired officer of long standing to proceed from the fact of the Russian Commander-in-chief having none but German lieutenants under him. General Dannenberg, General Lüders, General Fischback, and General Anrep, and Baron Sacken, are all Livonians and Esthonians; and it is almost invariably observed that men of these races do not cooperate cordially with a Russian chief.

The newspapers report General Anrep (whose name is improperly given as Aurep) as having been severely wounded in one of the late affairs. Nothing is known here upon the subject, and the report is not believed.

I would here remark incidentally that some of the accounts which I have read lately in the English papers, and which profess to have been written by St. Petersburgh correspondents, must have been prepared in London, and by persons unacquainted with this country. I observe in them a series of statements for which there is no sort of foundation.

I may take this opportunity for stating to your Lordship that General Castelbajac has read me a despatch which he has addressed to his Government in which he gives an account of his last conversation with Count Nesselrode.

He represents himself as having laid before the Chancellor the various difficulties of a military nature which will attend the prosecution of the war with Turkey, and of having particularly insisted upon the impossibility of the army in European Turkey being provisioned, and of the necessary communication being kept open with the army in Asia as long as the combined fleets have the superiority in the Black Sea.

General Castelbajac states further, that some months or weeks ago he had taken an opportunity for submitting these considerations to the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I hear upon tolerably good authority that, in the event of the war assuming more formidable proportions, the Russians, with a view to concentrating their forces, contemplate abandoning their detached forts on the coast of Abasia and Mingrelia.

G. H. S.

No. 128.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 96.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1854.*

I HAVE ventured to state to the Danish Envoy that I had reason for believing that, in the event of war breaking out between Great Britain and Russia, Her Majesty's Government would be well pleased that British subjects remaining in Russia should be placed under the protection of the Mission of the King of Denmark.

Baron Plessen professed his entire readiness to accept of a charge so honourable to him, but observed that he was unable to accede definitively to the proposal until it should receive the sanction of his Court.

He intends writing immediately upon the subject to his Government, and suggested the propriety of a corresponding proposal being made by Her Majesty's Government through the Queen's Minister at Copenhagen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 129.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 1, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 25, and to the statement contained in it, "that you nowhere find in the correspondence of Lord Stratford any trace of the reports contained in my despatch that the step taken by the Internuncio was in consequence of a note from Reshid Pasha, stating that the fleets had sailed with the approbation of the Four Representatives;" I beg to observe that in that despatch I mentioned a communication, not a note, which M. de Wildenbruch had received from Reshid Pasha. This circumstance was stated to the Conference by Count Arnim, and was given by him as the reason why M. de Wildenbruch had thought it necessary to correct the erroneous impression entertained by Reshid Pasha by the note which he had addressed to him.

Count Buol stated that the same information had been received by the Internuncio; and that he had also addressed to Reshid Pasha a note to the same effect as the one which had been written by M. de Wildenbruch.

Since I have received your Lordship's despatch above alluded to, I have been to Count Arnim, and upon my inquiry as to the statement he had made to the Conference, he entirely confirms the report made of it in my despatch; I can therefore have no doubt that my statement was entirely correct.

With respect to the measure taken by the Internuncio, Count Buol, to whom I communicated the substance of your Lordship's despatch, states that he has explained to Count Colloredo, for your Lordship's information, the grounds upon which he has approved the conduct of the Internuncio in this business, and also his concurrence in your Lordship's desire that the same cordiality of feeling which exists between England and Austria should be maintained by their Representatives at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 130.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 35.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 1, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch addressed to me, No. 24, I communicated to Count Buol your Lordship's sentiments as to the mode of proceeding with respect to the letter of Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador, a copy of which had been communicated to you by M. Musurus.

Count Buol stated that he adopted your Lordship's views upon this question, and that he had already written to the Internuncio, stating that the grounds upon which the negotiation between Russia and the Porte would be carried on were comprised in the answer which the Porte had made to the overtures of the Four Representatives at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 131.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 1, 1854.*

COUNT ORLOFF arrived here late on the evening of the 26th ultimo. He was unwell, and stated that he should be unable, on the following day, to wait upon the Emperor or to leave his room, and he did not appear in the evening at the ball given by Baron Meyendorff in the house where he was residing. The next day, Monday, he waited upon the Emperor, and, after a long interview with His Majesty, he saw Count Buol for a few moments only, as the latter was called by the Emperor. Count Orloff on that day dined with the Emperor, only a few persons, amongst them Count Buol, being present.

In the course of the morning I had seen Count Buol, who stated, as he had done the previous evening, that he had not seen Count Orloff, who was first to have his audience of the Emperor, which he was glad of, as he would learn from His Majesty how decided he was to maintain the engagements he had taken with the allied Powers for the re-establishment of peace; and Count Buol promised me that as soon as he learnt anything decisive from Count Orloff he would inform me in order that I might announce it to your Lordship by telegraph.

On Tuesday, not having received any communication from Count Buol, I wrote to him begging that he would let me know whatever communication had been made to him by Count Orloff, and I received from him a reply which I transmitted to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of yesterday dated half-past twelve o'clock; according to which the first communications from Count Orloff had been unsatisfactory, but it was expected that, by a Russian messenger who had arrived in the morning, Count Orloff would have received instructions to reply to the proposals for negotiation which had been transmitted from Vienna on the 13th ultimo, and that Count Buol was appointed to see him in the course of the afternoon.

I met Count Buol at dinner, when he informed M. de Bourqueney and myself that he was very much dissatisfied with the communications he had received; that he was to see Count Orloff later in the evening and discuss more fully these communications, after which he should better be able to appreciate them and to bring them before the Conference; but he feared they were not of a character to forward the objects of peace, and that they contained a proposal that a Turkish negotiator should repair to St. Petersburgh. I transmitted to your Lordship the substance of this information by telegraph last night.

Since writing the above I have seen Count Buol, who has appointed the Conference to meet to-morrow, when he will lay before it a résumé of Count Orloff's communications. He wished not to enter previously upon any discussion with regard to them, but I have communicated to your Lordship by my telegraphic despatch of this day (written after my interview with Count Buol), the general feelings with which he was impressed.

I inclose a copy of that telegraphic despatch, in case it should not have been correctly transmitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 131.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, February 1, 1854.

[See No. 96.]

No. 132.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 30, 1854.*

AT an interview which I have had to-day with Baron Manteuffel I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe No. 28 of the 17th instant, a copy of which was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 28 to Lord Augustus Loftus; for I thought it important to let the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs know how entirely Her Majesty's Government approved of the conduct of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople during the late difficult negotiations, and of the high approbation entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the success of his labours in obtaining from the Porte an answer to the proposals of the Four Representatives, which, whilst it maintains the dignity of the Sultan, meets every demand that Russia is entitled to make.

His Excellency seemed highly to approve of the despatch, and joins his hope to that of Her Majesty's Government that Russia will yet agree to the reasonable terms offered for her acceptance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 133.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 30, 1854.*

I READ to-day to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 30 of the 24th instant to Lord Augustus Loftus, inclosing copies of a correspondence between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Prussian Minister at Constantinople on the subject of the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea.

When I had done so his Excellency said that he had directed Baron de Wildenbruch to let the affair drop, and that he was most desirous that the good feeling which existed between England and Prussia should be maintained by their Representatives at Constantinople, for he considered it essential for the interests of both countries, and for the cause of peace, that there should be no misunderstanding between them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 134.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 33. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, February 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of the draft of Protocol lately presented by the Russian Minister for the adoption of the Prussian Government, and which, as your Lordship already knows, has been rejected.

I have obtained this document from a private source, and beg leave to request that it may never appear to have reached Her Majesty's Government from this Mission.

I avail myself of the occasion of forwarding this important paper to observe, that Baron Manteuffel seems more and more satisfied with the policy which he has advised the King to pursue at the present crisis; and in proof of the good it may have already produced, his Excellency has just told me that Baron Budberg states that his instructions are very elastic, and that he does not yet give up all hope of coming to an understanding with him upon the Eastern question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Protocol presented by the Russian Minister to the Prussian Government for their adoption.

Art. I. POUR le cas où les Cours de Londres et de Paris prendront une part active à la guerre contre la Russie, les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, résolues d'agir de concert entres elles et de combiner la marche politique commune avec celle du reste de l'Allemagne, s'engagent formellement à observer à l'égard des parties belligérantes la plus stricte neutralité, et à declarer en cas d'insistance ou de menace renouvelée de la part de l'Angleterre ou de la France qu'elles sont décidées à défendre cette neutralité au besoin les armes à la main contre tous ceux qui voudraient l'enfreindre.

Art. II. Pour le cas où les Cours de Londres et de Paris voudront porter atteinte à cette résolution par une agression sur le territoire soit de l'Autriche, soit de la Prusse, soit d'un autre État de l'Allemagne, les Trois Souverains envisageront ce fait comme une agression sur leur propre territoire, et s'engagent à se prêter, pour la repousser, leur appui mutuel dans la mesure qu'exigeraient les circonstances, et dont les commissaires militaires nommés *ad hoc* conviendraient ultérieurement.

Art. III. Fidèle aux déclarations qu'il a données, et dans un désir de satisfaire à ses alliés, l'Empereur de Russie est toujours fermément résolu de mettre fin à la guerre aussitôt que sa dignité et l'intérêt bien entendu de son Empire le permettent. Cependant, prenant en considération que la co-opération active des deux Cours maritimes peut imprimer aux événements ainsi qu'aux opérations militaires un développement propre à apporter une altération dans l'état de choses existant en Turquie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engage à n'adopter, dans les transactions qui pourraient survenir avec les Cour maritimes, aucune résolution à cet égard sans une entente préalable avec ses alliés.

No. 135.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 35.)

Berlin, February 4, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Minister at this Court received from his Government on the 1st instant the draft of a Convention to be signed by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia at Vienna, setting forth the terms on

which these Powers engage themselves to employ all their efforts to bring about the re-establishment of peace. The Marquis de Moustier immediately spoke to me on the subject, and as his Government appeared anxious that no time should be lost in making this communication, I accompanied my French colleague to Baron Manteuffel, where he delivered the draft in question to his Excellency, and we both urged him to advise the King to adopt it and to transmit instructions accordingly to Count Arnim at Vienna.

I received yesterday your Lordship's despatch No. 10, and have spoken in a more formal manner to the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs than I could do upon the previous instructions which I had received from your Lordship by telegraph.

Baron Manteuffel made at the time but few observations on the proposed Convention, and said he should lay it before the King and take His Majesty's orders on the subject.

I have just seen Baron Manteuffel, and he has informed me that he had embodied the remarks he wished to offer on this Convention in a memorandum, and forwarded a copy of this paper to Chevalier Bunsen, who would relate the substance of these objections to your Lordship.

His Excellency added that this proceeding on his part must not be viewed in the light of a rejection of the Convention, for he felt that at a future time it could be again brought forward, but he thought the present moment inopportune for the negotiation.

I replied that we had no desire to press this Treaty for his immediate acceptance, but that I hoped his Excellency would bear in mind the advantage of some such formal Act being completed by the Four Powers in the event of the Emperor of Russia's refusing to agree to the Vienna propositions of the 13th ultimo.

I may add that Baron Manteuffel is not himself indisposed to agree to this Convention, and that the difficulties are raised elsewhere.

M. de Moustier quite agrees with me that it will be advisable to wait for a while before taking a further step in the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 136.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 36.)

Berlin, February 4, 1854

My Lord,

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening his Excellency assured me that he was still without any accurate information as to Count Orloff's mission to Vienna, but that he had good reason for supposing that the proposals, probably of the same character as those received by the Prussian Government, which he had made to the Austrian Government were not considered satisfactory at Vienna; that, moreover, he believed these propositions would be rejected by Count Buol, though perhaps not in such decided language as had been used here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 137.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 37.)

Berlin, February 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph, that the Prussian Government have addressed despatches to their Minister at St. Petersburgh, explaining their reasons for refusing to agree to the Protocol which had

been prepared by the Russian Government, and which, if accepted, would have handed over to Russia the destinies of Prussia, in the event of war.

Copies of these despatches to General Rochow have been sent to Chevalier Bunsen, who will communicate them confidentially to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 138.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 4, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a paper which has been furnished to me, giving some interesting remarks on the military operations likely to be undertaken by the Russian army on the Danube on the opening of the campaign.

I have reason to believe that the views therein explained have been generally approved of by the military authorities here, and have, therefore, judged that the information therein contained might not be without some interest to your Lordship at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 138.

Memorandum on Russian Military Operations in the ensuing Campaign.

DES organes militaires Russes répandent qu'au printems 180,000 Russes franchiraient le Danube. D'autres ajoutent, d'un ton confidentiel, que l'on pourrait profiter de la saison où les chevaux et les bêtes de train trouveraient encore des fourages verts, pour pousser jusqu'à Constantinople.

La valeur de ces propos se réduit probablement à ce que la Russie réunira, pour le printems, le montant de trois corps d'armée avec leurs divisions de réserves dans les Principautés et la Bessarabie; qu'après avoir laissé en arrière les troupes nécessaires pour occuper les Principautés et les courir surtout du côté de la Petite Valachie, les Russes passeront le Danube avec 100 bataillons, ou, toutes les armes comprises, avec 100,000 hommes effectifs; et que si les Turcs avaient la complaisance de leur livrer aussitôt entre le Danube et le Balkan une bataille général en rase campagne, et de s'y laisser battre à fond, les Russes pourraient être tentés de pousser une pointe sur Constantinople.

Cependant, quelques soient les plans et les efforts des Russes, le problème restera toujours à résoudre "de nourrir une armée Russe nombreuse en Bulgarie, ou si cette armée n'est pas nombreuse, de faire avec elle des opérations d'invasion foncière." Aujourd'hui la solution de ce problème se compliquera parceque l'armée Turque est numériquement du double plus forte, et en outre plus efficiente qu'elle ne l'était lors des grandes invasions Russes de 1810 et 1828 en Bulgarie, sans compter qu'aujourd'hui la Mer Noire n'appartient plus aux Russes, comme en 1810 et 1828, mais aux Turcs. Aussi, les généraux-en-chef Russes de 1810 et 1828 étaient incontestablement au-dessus de celui d'aujourd'hui.

Nous pensons donc que si les Turcs ne commettent pas des imprudences trop graves, mais que les choses du reste se passent très favorablement pour les Russes, ceux-ci parviendront à assurer leur passage sur la rive droite du Danube; à faire d'abord, en poussant une armée d'observation vers le Balkan, le siége d'une des grandes places Turques sur ce fleuve, probablement de Roustchouk ou de Silistrie, qui toutes les deux sont aujourd'hui beaucoup mieux fortifiées qu'elles ne l'ont jamais été auparavant, à prendre une de ces places, et peut-être avec un comble de bonheur toutes les deux. Après quoi, y compris les garnisons laissées dans les places conquises, environ 40,000 Russes, restes de l'armée d'invasion, retourneraient hiverner dans les Principautés. Mais aussi

les choses peuvent-elles se passer différemment. Le passage du Danube par les Russes peut manquer, d'abord. Les places assiégées par eux, peuvent être débloquées, et toute la campagne finir sans aucun gain matériel pour les Russes en échange du délabrement de leur armée.

Si les Puissances Occidentales veulent faire jouer aux Turcs un jeu tout-à-fait sûr, elles n'ont à envoyer en Turquie un corps expéditionnaire de 30,000 à 40,000 hommes: le corps devrait être sur les lieux au commencement de Juin, et être stationné sur le Bosphore (l'essentiel serait d'y choisir un terrain non fiévreux, peut-être la position de Hunkiar-Skelessi en Asie, où campaient les Russes il y a vingt-ans). De cette position le corps expéditionnaire ménagerait à la fois, avec la Crimée, tout le littoral Russe sur la Mer Noire, et les derrières de l'armée Russe sur le Danube. Serait-il peut-être à croire que cette armée resterait tranquillement en observation devant Choumla, ou à continuer la siége de Roustchouk ou de Silistrie, quand elle apprenait que 35,000 hommes d'élite avaient débarqué près d'Odessa, pris cette ville avec les dépôts de l'armée, et se disposaient à couper les communications de l'armée en Bulgarie avec la Russie?

Dans la supposition que les Russes voulûssent jouer le tout pour le tout, et marcher sur Constantinople sans régarder en arrière, l'armée Turque n'aurait qu'à rester ferme dans Choumla et Varna et dans la position de Widdin-Kalefat, laissant tranquillement les Russes s'avancer par telle route du Balkan, qu'ils auraient surprise. L'armée Turque se bornerait alors à couper toutes les communications de l'armée d'invasion et de serrer de loin ses derrières. En même temps elle détacherait, par Varna, à Constantinople telle masse d'infanterie qu'on jugerait nécessaire pour la défense de la capitale. Sur cette même capitale se serait replié sans combattre (pour rester intacte) la réserve Turque stationnée à Andrinople. On réunirait également à Constantinople toutes les autres troupes à portée; et tout ce monde réuni occuperait la position si éminemment forte qui couvre cette capitale du côté de la terre. Le corps expéditionnaire d'alliance occidentale, si un tel corps avait été envoyé, s'y établirait également.

Nous pensons que les Russes n'aurait aucune chance de forcer cette position, ni n'auraient les moyens de se maintenir, au-delà de l'espace d'une semaine, en face d'elle. L'existence de l'armée d'invasion trouverait ainsi probablement son terme dans le Delta de Thrace,* qu'en tout cas les Turcs auraient eû soin de devaster à fond à l'approche des Russes: comme le fut, dans le temps, le terrain en avant des lignes de Torres Vedras, lesquelles, soit dit en passant, étaient beaucoup moins fortes que la position en avant de Constantinople.

Nous pensons qu'une armée Russe, n'étant pas maîtresse ni de la Mer Noire, ni de la partie orientale de Balkan avec ses deux bastions de Choumla et de Varna, mais poussant une pointe sur Constantinople, aurait sur cent chances à peine une de reussité, à moins que les Turcs ne perdissent pas complétement la tête. Au lieu de décourager les Russes, il faudrait donc plutôt les encourager à hasarder une telle entreprise. Il faudrait donc remettre à retrancher la position qui couvre Constantinople du côté de la terre qu'à ce que le mouvement d'invasion des Russes fut démasqué. Les quatre semaines qui s'écouleraient depuis cette époque jusqu'à leur apparition sous Constantinople, suffiraient bien pour achever les rétranchements nécessaires. Seulement le plan devrait en être tout dressé d'avance, afin qu'au signal donné les 50,000 travailleurs que pourrait fournir Constantinople n'eussent plus qu'à y mettre la main. Et surtout l'artillerie nombreuse nécessaire pour garnir les rétranchements, devrait être tenue toute préparée avec les artilleurs et les munitions y appartenant, de sorte qu'on n'eut plus besoin que de la transporter dans les batteries. Nous observons que la position qui couvre Constantinople, est de nature à donner surtout une grande action à l'artillerie de défense.

Les Turcs ne devraient pas aussi négliger de fortifier Silivrie, comme ils avaient fait en 1829. Cette place, située sur la Mer de Marmora, génerait singulièrement les communications de l'armée d'invasion enfoncée dans le Delta, et favoriserait des débarquements à opérer sur ses derrières. Elle flanquerait

* On appelle "Delta de Thrace" la langue de terre dont Constantinople occupe l'extrémité orientale, et dont la base est formée par une ligne tirée de Midjeh sur la Mer Noire à Silivrie au bord de la Mer de Marmora. Ce Delta est traversé dans toute sa longueur par la chaine boisée du Strandgha, et offre généralement un terrain fort coupé. Une seule route carossable le traverse dans le sens longitudinal, en longeant le bord de la Mer de Marmora. Trois ou quatre positions très fortes s'y trouvent successivement, qui pourraient être utilisées pour retarder la marche d'une armée s'avançant sur Constantinople.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

encore la marche de la colonne que les Russes voudraient détacher contre les Dardanelles. Au reste une occupation momentanée de la rive Européenne du canal des Dardanelles, serait sans aucune conséquence bien grave. Il faudrait seulement, à l'approche des Russes, transporter non seulement tous les bateaux, mais encore l'artillerie des batteries de la rive Européenne sur la rive Asiatique, et se borner à tenir sur la rive Européenne le chateau de Kilid Bahar, le plus essential et qui est susceptible d'une longue défense. Les Russes ne pourraient alors armer que de leur artillerie de campagne les autres batteries de la rive Européenne, et n'interdiraient ainsi pas le passage à aucun vaisseau de guerre qui tiendrait son cours le long du rivage Asiatique. La même observation s'appliquerait à la rive Européenne du Bosphore, où il serait encore bien difficile aux Russes de pénétrer, si même ils étaient arrivés par terre en vue de Constantinople. Il s'agit seulement de ne pas se laisser effrayer par la fantasmagorie de la clôture des Dardanelles et du Bosphore par les Russes. Ceux qui, dans la combinaison actuelle des choses, pénétreraient jusque là, n'y arriveraient que pour être bientôt prisonniers de guerre.

Janvier, 1854.

No. 139.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon:—(Received February 7.)

(No. 39.)

Berlin, February 4, 1854.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I have had to-day with Baron Manteuffel, I read to his Excellency the copy of your Lordship's note to Baron Brunnow relative to the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and also the copy of your despatch on the same subject to Sir Hamilton Seymour, which were transmitted to me in your Lordship's No. 7 of the 1st instant.

As Baron Manteuffel was on the point of going to the King, I left these papers with his Excellency, thinking it might be interesting and useful to His Majesty to know the exact terms in which these communications were drawn up, and I trust your Lordship will approve of my having done so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 140.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 48.)

Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn with much regret, but without surprise, the defeat of the Turks in Asia, reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 21 of the 15th of January, as the unfitness of Ali Pasha to command, and the want of confidence of the troops in such a commander, must long have been known to the Porte.

Although no mention of it is made in your Excellency's despatch, Her Majesty's Government hope that the cowardice and incapacity of Ali Pasha will not be allowed to go unpunished, and that he will be replaced by an officer who understands and is prepared to do his duty. The deficiency of good officers throughout the Turkish army is notorious; the troops are brave, enduring and obedient, and there is reason to believe that they are willing to be commanded by Christians; yet numerous officers are at Constantinople anxious to engage in the Sultan's service, and more would come if employment were given to them, and confidence were placed in their knowledge and experience.

If Her Majesty's Government are to give effectual aid to Turkey, and to engage in active operations, it is absolutely necessary that we should know upon what we can depend, and that we should not be spectators or sharers in defeats caused by imbecility and cowardice.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 141.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 78.)

Foreign Office, February 7, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH a view to placing on record matters which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of France, with reference to the departure of the Russian Ministers from London and Paris, I have to instruct your Excellency to exchange with M. Drouyn de Lhuys copies of the despatches which were addressed by Her Majesty's Government to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh for copies of those addressed to the French Envoy at that Court on the subject of the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea: copies of the communications addressed thereupon by the Russian Government to England, for those addressed to France, including Count Nesselrode's notes to Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff, as well as those Ministers' notes to the British and French Governments: copy of the reply sent to M. Brunnow for that sent to M. Kisseleff: copy of the final note from Baron Brunnow on leaving this country, for that of M. Kisseleff on quitting Paris: and copy of my despatch to Sir H. Seymour, for copy of M. Drouyn de Lhuys despatch to General Castelbajac, announcing the departure of the Russian Ministers from England and France, and the recall of the British and French Ministers from St. Petersburgh.

The papers which your Excelleney will thus have to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys have already been forwarded to you.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 142.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 80.)

Foreign Office, February 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Ambassador has addressed to me a note, a copy of which is herewith inclosed,* in which his Excellency states that it has appeared to the French Government that, with reference to the eventualities which so justly engage the attention of the two Governments, the time has now come for defining the object of their alliance, and for denoting the means for carrying out that object.

To this end Count Walewski proposes that Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French should agree:

1. That the demonstration already made by Great Britain and France, and the signature by their Representatives of the documents agreed to by the Conference at Vienna on the 5th of December, 1853, and on the 13th of January, 1854, prove that the object of the two Governments is to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereign independence of His Majesty the Sultan.

2. That this object would be attained if peace could be re-established between Russia and the Sublime Porte on the perfectly honourable conditions which have been proposed to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. In the event, which may God avert, of war becoming necessary, its cause would naturally cease from the day on which peace should be re-established with Russia on the bases above mentioned, and when the Russian troops should have evacuated the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as every other part of the Ottoman dominions.

3. That until the end thus specified shall have been attained, the Government of the Emperor of the French engages to cooperate towards it by means of the fleet now acting in the Black Sea, by augmenting it in case of necessity; and to give an assurance that the Government of His Imperial Majesty would be disposed to unite a French squadron to that which Her Britannic Majesty may

* No. 112.

send into the North Sea or the Baltic whenever the two Governments shall have agreed upon the necessity of making this further demonstration.

4. That if the proposed measures should not be held sufficient to cause Russia to evacuate the Ottoman territory and to conclude peace, the Government of His Imperial Majesty, in concert with that of Her Britannic Majesty, would consider the expediency of supporting their naval operations by means of a body of troops.

5. That so long as war may continue, the Government of France would not receive any proposal or overture for a cessation of hostilities without instantly putting the British Government in a position conjointly to discuss its expediency and opportuneness; and that the French Government, being solely animated with a desire to preserve the territorial integrity of Europe from serious danger, renounces beforehand the acquisition of any special advantage from events which may occur.

To all the proposals thus stated Her Majesty's Government give their unqualified assent, and adopt the obligations which that assent imposes; and to none of them do Her Majesty's Government agee with greater cordiality and satisfaction than to that in which the honourable and disinterested motives of the two Governments are clearly defined.

Your Excellency will address a note to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the exact words of this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 143.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 55.)

Foreign Office, February 8, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the propriety of defining, with greater exactness, the degree of responsibility which should be imposed upon your Excellency in regard to the movements of Her Majesty's naval forces. They are of opinion that there must necessarily be many circumstances of a professional nature on which your Excellency might find it difficult to form an opinion, while at the same time you might, under your existing instructions, feel called upon decidedly to point out to Vice-Admiral Dundas not only the course he should in any given circumstances pursue, but also the manner in which he should give effect to your requisitions.

To relieve your Excellency, therefore, from any doubt on this point I think it advisable to state that all that Her Majesty's Government expect of you is to inform the Admiral of the service which you require him to perform, leaving to the Admiral to determine, with reference to professional considerations alone, in what manner it may be most advisable to give effect to your requisitions.

I inclose a copy of a despatch from Lord Cowley,* by which your Excellency will perceive that instructions to the same effect will be sent to the French Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 144.

Count Walewski to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

Londres, le 7 Février, 1854.

M. le Comte,

J'AI l'honneur d'envoyer ci-jointe à votre Excellence les pièces dont Lord Cowley avait exprimé de votre part à M. Drouyn de Lhuys le désir d'avoir communication.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

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* No. 105.

Inclosure 1 in No. 144.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

Paris, le 13 *Décembre*, 1853.

Général,

LA dépêche télégraphique que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 3 de ce moi, m'est parvenue hier soir; mais je connaissais déjà par une autre voie la destruction de la flotille Ottomane mouillée dans la rade de Sinope. Cet événement a causé une pénible impression au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale. Nos alliés ont subi un échec dans des circonstances et sur un élément où la démonstration commune de la France et de l'Angleterre avait précisément pour objet de les protéger, et nous ne saurions nous dissimuler que le coup hardi et heureux que la Russie vient de frapper n'atteint pas seulement la Turquie.

Vous m'annoncez, Général, que, d'accord avec Lord Stratford, vous vous êtes empressé d'envoyer en reconnaissance deux bâtiments-à-vapeur jusqu'à hauteur de Sinope. Vous avez jugé avec raison que notre pavillon ne pouvait pas tarder davantage à paraître dans la Mer Noire, et je vous invite, en vous inspirant de vos instructions, à user de toute la latitude qu'elles vous donnent pour autoriser M. l'Amiral Hamelin à combiner, sans retard, les mouvements de notre escadre de façon à rendre impossible le retour d'un événement semblable à celui que nous déplorons, et à détruire l'effet moral qu'il n'aura pas manqué de produire.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur s'en remet avec confiance à vos inspirations personnelles; il est néanmoins une opération qui me semble toute indiquée—c'est celle qui aurait pour but de ravitailler, soit en hommes, soit en vivres, l'armée d'Anatolie et les places du littoral; or l'assistance que nous prêterions à la flotte Turque, aujourd'hui qu'une escadre de Sébastopol a pris l'offensive contre le territoire Ottoman, ne serait plus qu'un acte entièrement conforme aux devoirs que nous avons acceptés en faisant arriver nos forces navales jusqu'à Constantinople.

L'adhésion de la Porte aux ouvertures de la Conférence de Vienne ne devrait pas, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, suspendre l'entrée de tout ou partie de notre escadre dans la Mer Noire; le danger d'une nouvelle attaque subsiste tant qu'un armistice n'aura pas été conclu, et cette appréhension suffit pour expliquer de notre part une surveillance qui est devenue nécessaire dans le double intérêt de la Turquie et de notre propre dignité.

Je transmets à M. le Comte Walewski une copie de cette dépêche pour qu'il la communique à Lord Clarendon.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 144.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

Paris, le 28 *Décembre*, 1853.

Général,

LA dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire sous le No. 62 vous a fait connaître la première impression du Gouvernement de l'Empereur à la nouvelle de la destruction de la flotille Ottomane dans la rade de Sinope; je vous ai dit également que nous désirions, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, que nos Représentants à Constantinople, usant de toute la latitude de leurs pouvoirs, combinassent les mouvements des deux escadres de façon à empêcher le retour d'un si déplorable événement. Depuis lors, un examen approfondi de la situation nous a convaincus qu'il était indispensable d'imprimer à notre attitude un caractère plus décidé.

L'expédition dirigée contre Sinope a, en effet, dépassé toutes nos prévisions. Nos plus récentes informations de St. Pétersbourg nous représentaient encore la Russie comme disposée à traiter et résolu à ne prendre nulle part l'offensive. Cette confiance expliquera l'immobilité de nos flottes. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain, et nous ne voulions pas que son apparition prématurée dans des parages plus rapprochés du

territoire Russe risquât d'être prise pour une provocation. L'état de guerre rendait sans doute une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre, entre les parties belligérantes; mais nous avions été autorisés à inférer des déclarations réitérées de la Russie que notre réserve serait imitée par elle, et que, ne se méprenant pas sur le véritable but de notre démonstration, elle éviterait avec le même soin que nous les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures agressives dans les limites où, si nous avions pu la croire animée d'intentions différentes, notre action aurait naturellement dû s'exercer concurremment avec la sienne.

L'événement de Sinope modifie donc le rôle que la France et l'Angleterre auraient voulu garder jusqu'au bout. A l'usage qu'on lui laissait de la mer, dans l'intérêt de sa défense, la Russie a substitué comme une sorte d'abus de sa position pour attaquer la Turquie dans ses ports, et, non contente d'exercer une souveraineté illégale dans les Principautés du Danube, elle semble vouloir encore étendre, avec toutes les horreurs de la guerre, sa domination absolue sur l'Euxin. Assister à une pareille lutte sans chercher à en restreindre les effets, ce serait exposer l'Empire Ottoman à des épreuves que l'intérêt général de l'Europe commande de lui épargner. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ont, en conséquence, décidé, puisque leurs ménagements n'ont, en définitive, servi qu'à empirer la situation, que MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas ne devraient plus tarder davantage à informer de l'objet de leur mission M. le Commandant-en-chef des forces navales Russes. Vous veillerez, Général, à ce que cette démarche s'accomplisse dans les formes les plus convenables, mais avec assez de netteté pour qu'aucune méprise ne soit possible. Nos Amiraux annonceront à qui de droit qu'ils ont reçu l'ordre de déclarer que les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre sont résolus à prévenir la répétition de l'événement de Sinope; que tout bâtiment de guerre Russe rencontré en mer par les nôtres, sera dorénavant invité et contraint à rentrer à Sévastopol ou dans le port le plus voisin; et que toute agression tentée contre le territoire ou le pavillon Ottoman, leur imposerait la pénible obligation de repousser la force par la force.

En arrêtant de si graves mesures, en prêtant à la Turquie un appui qui témoigne si hautement de leur bienveillant intérêt pour elle, la France et l'Angleterre ne veulent pas abandonner le terrain où l'Autriche et la Prusse se sont placés avec elles. Loin de là, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique ont le ferme espoir que leur nouvelles résolutions, dans le cas où la Porte n'aurait pas complétement accédé aux propositions des Quatre Puissances, serviront à vaincre toutes ses hésitations. Du moment où nous protégeons la Turquie, où nous voulons empêcher qu'elle ne soit, au détriment de l'Europe entière, accomblée par des forces supérieures, nous avons le droit et le devoir de lui demander d'adhérer à des conditions qui nous paraissent faites pour sauvegarder sa dignité et son indépendance. Agir autrement, ce serait rompre l'accord que s'est établi si heureusement entre les Grandes Puissances et que nous voulons maintenir; ce serait compromettre nous-mêmes le repos du monde, et encourager la continuation d'une guerre dont nous aurions cessé de reconnaître la légitimité.

En résumé, si la France et l'Angleterre, à raison des moyens dont elles disposent, acceptent dès à présent la nécessité d'agir avec plus d'énergie, elles demeurent, quant au but à atteindre, étroitement liées à l'Autriche et à la Prusse; et le rétablissement de la paix, sur les bases posées dans les Conférences de Vienne, demeure le vœu le plus ardent des Quatre Puissances. La Porte comprendra, qu'en retour de nos sacrifices, elle nous doit l'assurance que nous la trouverons toujours prête, à quelque moment que des négociations puissent s'ouvrir, à contribuer à leur succès par ses loyaux efforts, et qu'elle n'éluctera pas de nouvelles prétentions de nature à changer le caractère du débat qui a surgi entre elle et le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Dans ces limites, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique ont la conviction de soutenir le bon droit, et la présence de leur flotte dans la Mer Noire devient pour l'Europe une garantie du maintien de l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman sous des conditions qu'elle a proclamées nécessaires à son équilibre politique.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 144.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Castelbajac.

Paris, le Décembre, 1853.

Général,

LES affaires d'Orient prennent une tournure trop grave pour que je ne veuille pas, au moment même où les circonstances imposent de nouveaux devoirs au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, vous rappeler les efforts que nous n'avons cessé de faire dans le but de prévenir les complications dont l'Europe est si sérieusement menacée. La question des lieux saints, mal présentée ou mal comprise, avait excité les alarmes du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; nous avons essayé de calmer ces inquiétudes par de loyales et complètes explications. Il nous avait paru que, tout en réservant les droits de la Porte, un débat de cette nature gagnerait à être échairci loin du théâtre où il était né. Notre opinion n'a pas été partagée par la Russie, et M. le Prince Menchikoff a reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Constantinople. Je me bornerai à dire que si nous avions eu les vues exclusives que l'on nous supposait, que si la revendication de nos anciens et incontestables privilèges n'eût pas été soutenue avec autant de modération, la mission de cet Ambassadeur Extraordinaire serait tout de suite devenue l'objet d'un conflit que nous avons su éviter. L'affaire des sanctuaires de Jérusalem assoupie et, d'après le témoignage de M. le Comte de Nesselrode lui-même, réglée d'une manière satisfaisante, une autre difficulté s'est élevée. M. le Prince Menchikoff a réclamé des garanties pour le maintien des privilèges l'Eglise Grecque. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'établissait, par aucun fait particulier, que ces privilèges eussent été violés, et la Porte, au contraire, confirmait solennellement les immunités religieuses de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Animé du désir d'apaiser un différend qui, s'il concernait d'un côté les droits souverains du Sultan, de l'autre touchait à la conscience de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a recherché avec soin le moyen de concilier les intérêts, à la fois si délicats et si complexes, qui s'y trouvaient engagés. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne peut avoir oublié le zèle et la loyauté que nous avons mis à remplir cette tâche difficile; il ne saurait davantage disconvenir que la résistance de la Porte à accéder à un premier plan de transaction, émané de la Conférence de Vienne, n'a pas été la seule cause de notre insuccès.

Pendant le cours de ces diverses négociations, des faits graves s'étaient produits; une armée Russe avait franchi le Pruth et envahi en pleine paix deux Provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. L'escadre Française avait du se rapprocher des Dardanelles, et, dès cette époque, si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale l'eût voulu, ses forces navales auraient mouillé dans les eaux de Constantinople; et, à cet égard, cependant, s'il a jugé nécessaire d'établir son droit, ce n'a été, en quelque sorte, que pour faire ressortir davantage sa modération. La nature des rapports de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte était devenue trop anormale pour que l'état de guerre ne succédât point à l'état de paix, ou, pour mieux dire, il fallait que les choses reprissent leur véritable nom et que l'agression dont le territoire Turc avait été l'objet produisît ses conséquences. Ce changement dans la situation a nécessité un nouveau mouvement de notre escadre, et, à la demande du Sultan, le pavillon Français a paru dans le Bosphore en même temps que le pavillon Britannique.

Toutefois, Général, nous n'avions pas renoncé à l'espoir d'un arrangement, et, d'accord avec l'Autriche et la Prusse, aussi bien qu'avec l'Angleterre, nous poursuivons encore un but pacifique. Des propositions nouvelles au succès desquelles nous ne cesserons d'employer nos efforts ont été adressées à la Porte par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances.

Aucun Traité conclu avec la Russie n'interdisait à nos vaisseaux de guerre la navigation de la Mer Noire. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, en fermant en temps de paix les passages des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, réservait au Sultan la faculté de les ouvrir en temps de guerre, et, du jour où sa Hautesse nous avait laissé le libre accès des Détroits, celui de l'Euxin nous était légalement acquis. Les mêmes motifs qui nous avaient retenus si longtemps dans la Baie de Besica arrêtaient notre escadre dans la rade de Béicos. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale avait à cœur de témoigner jusqu'au bout des sentiments d'amitié qu'il professe pour la Russie, et de rejeter aux yeux du monde la responsabilité d'une

aggravation dans un état de choses que tous ses ménagements n'étaient point parvenus à modifier. Il se plaisait à penser, d'ailleurs, d'après le contenu de vos dépêches les plus récentes, que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, satisfait d'une prise de possession qu'il considérait comme un gage, ne prendrait nulle part l'offensive dans la lutte qu'il a si malheureusement commencée avec la Turquie. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain, et nous ne voulions pas que son apparition prématurée dans des parages plus rapprochés du territoire Russe risquât d'être prise pour une provocation. L'état de guerre rendait sans doute une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre entre les parties belligérantes, mais nous avions été autorisés à croire que notre réserve serait imitée par la Russie et que ses amiraux éviteraient avec le même soin que les nôtres les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures d'agression dans des limites où, si nous avions pu supposer le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg animé d'intentions différentes, notre escadre aurait certainement exercée une surveillance plus active.

L'événement de Sinope, Général, s'est donc produit en dehors de toutes nos prévisions, et ce fait déplorable modifie également l'attitude que nous aurions désiré garder.

L'accord qui s'est opéré récemment à Vienne entre la France, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre et la Prusse a établi le caractère Européen du différend qui existe entre la Russie et la Porte. Les Quatre Cours ont solennellement reconnu que l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman était une des conditions de leur équilibre politique.

L'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie constitue une première atteinte à cette intégrité, et il n'est pas douteux que les chances de la guerre ne puissent encore l'entamer davantage.

M. le Comte de Nesselrode, il y a quelques mois, représentait comme une compensation nécessaire à ce qu'il appelait dès lors notre occupation maritime l'envahissement des Principautés du Danube. A notre tour, Général, nous croyons qu'il est devenu indispensable de mesurer nous-mêmes l'étendue de la compensation à laquelle nous donnent droit et notre titre de Puissance intéressée à l'existence de la Turquie et les positions militaires déjà prises par l'armée Russe. Il nous faut un gage qui nous assure le rétablissement de la paix en Orient à des conditions qui ne changent pas la distribution des forces respectives des Grands Etats de l'Europe.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ont, en conséquence, décidé que leurs escadres entreraient dans la Mer Noire et combineraient leurs mouvements de façon à empêcher le territoire ou le pavillon Ottoman d'être en but à une nouvelle attaque de la part des forces navales de la Russie. MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas vont recevoir l'ordre de communiquer à qui de droit l'objet de leur mission, et nous nous plaisons à espérer que cette démarche loyale préviendra des conflits que nous verrions éclater qu'avec le plus vif regret. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, je le répète, n'a qu'un but—celui de contribuer à opérer, à des conditions honorables, un rapprochement entre les deux parties belligérantes; et, si les circonstances l'obligent à se prémunir contre des éventualités redoutables, il conserve la confiance que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, qui a donné de si nombreux exemples de sa sagesse, ne voudra pas exposer l'Europe, à peine remise de ses secousses, à des épreuves que la haute raison des souverains a su lui épargner depuis de si longues années. Cette confiance est d'autant plus grande que les dernières nouvelles de Constantinople nous apprennent que le Divan est autorisé à traiter du rétablissement de la paix, et que l'intervention de notre marine peut être considérée comme une sorte de préliminaire de l'armistice dont les dispositions de la Porte, si elles sont partagées par la Russie, annoncent la prochaine conclusion.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 144.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff, January $\frac{5}{17}$, 1854.

[See Inclosure in No. 35.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 144.

M. de Kisseleff to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Paris, le $\frac{14}{26}$ *Janvier*, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, a reçu l'ordre de s'expliquer et de s'entendre avec son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, sur le sens précis d'une communication dont M. le Ministre de France à St. Pétersbourg vient de s'acquitter verbalement auprès de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire.

Si elle a été motivée par le désir d'éloigner l'éventualité d'une collision entre les forces navales Russes et Ottomanes, ce résultat ne pourrait être obtenu que par l'observation d'un principe de juste réciprocité.

A cet effet, il faudrait d'abord qu'il fût expressément entendu que l'escadre Ottomane eût désormais à s'abstenir de toute agression contre le pavillon et contre le territoire Russes sur la côte d'Europe et d'Asie.

Sous cette condition, une égale sécurité serait acquise en faveur de pavillon et du littoral Ottomans.

En second lieu, pour qu'il fût permis aux navires Turcs de continuer sans obstacle à entretenir les communications d'un port Ottoman à l'autre, afin d'y envoyer des vivres, des munitions et des troupes, il faudrait que la même condition demeurât assurée aux navires de la Marine Impériale, pour maintenir librement les communications d'un port Russe à l'autre sur le littoral d'Europe et d'Asie.

Ces dispositions, ainsi convenues et strictement mises à exécution, auraient pour résultat de suspendre, de fait, les hostilités par mer entre les parties belligérantes.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur d'inviter son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à vouloir bien l'informer, en réponse à cette note, si les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français sont d'accord avec celles du Cabinet Impérial sur les principes de parfaite réciprocité établis par la présente communication.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) KISSELEFF.

Inclosure 6 in No. 144.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Kisseleff, February 1, 1854.

[See No. 83.]

Inclosure 7 in No. 144.

M. de Kisseleff to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Paris, le $\frac{31 \text{ Janvier}}{12 \text{ Février}}$, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que son Excellence, M. le Ministre Secrétaire au Département des Affaires Etrangères, a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 1 Février.

Elle ne satisfait point aux conditions de juste réciprocité sur lesquelles le Soussigné a reçu l'ordre d'insister, au nom de sa Cour, par sa note du $\frac{14}{26}$ Février.

Cette communication, si elle avait été appréciée comme elle méritait de

l'être, aurait eu pour effet, d'une part de restreindre les calamités de la guerre dans des limites acceptables pour les deux parties belligérantes; tandis que, de l'autre, elle offrait à la France une nouvelle preuve du désir constant de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'éloigner de ses relations avec elle tout motif de mésintelligence.

Le Soussigné regrette que l'esprit de bienveillance qui a dicté cette démarche n'ait pas rencontré des intentions également conciliantes. Dès lors, sa ligne de conduit était tracée par un sentiment profond de respect pour la dignité du Souverain qu'il a l'honneur de représenter.

Fidèle à ses devoirs, il ne saurait admettre que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, en paix avec la Russie, prétende entraver la liberté des communications que la Marine Impériale est chargée d'entretenir entre les ports Russes, tandis que les navires Turcs transportent des troupes d'un port Ottoman à l'autre sous la protection de l'escadre Française.

Cette distinction étant contraire aux règles du droit public, comme aux égards mutuellement observés entre Puissances amies, le Soussigné se trouve placé par là dans l'impossibilité de continuer l'exercice de ses fonctions tant que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français n'aura pas repris envers la Russie une attitude conforme aux rapports de bonne intelligence et d'amitié qui ont si heureusement subsisté jusqu'ici entre les deux pays.

Plus le Soussigné attachait de prix à entretenir ces rapports, plus il regrette l'obligation où il se trouve de les suspendre.

Il a l'honneur de notifier à M. le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères qu'il va quitter Paris, accompagné du personnel de l'Ambassade, et se rendre en Allemagne jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) KISSELEFF.

No. 145.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1854.

IN the course of yesterday I received, not without surprise, a letter from Vice-Admiral Dundas intimating that he meant to return with the squadrons into the Bosphorus as soon as wind and weather would permit. I lost no time in communicating to the French Ambassador my opinion respecting this intended movement, and we agreed to write to the two Admirals in the hope of preventing its execution. His Excellency having no steam-vessel conveniently at his disposal, I requested the commanding officer of Her Majesty's ships on the station to forward our despatches immediately by express. Captain Goldsmith having complied with this invitation, I am not without hopes that the despatches may reach the two Admirals in time. But the report of their intended return has already taken wind, and the impression produced by it is by no means such as I could wish.

Inclosed herewith are copies of my correspondence with Admiral Dundas on this occasion.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers informed me that he did not feel himself at liberty under his instructions to order the French squadron to remain in the Black Sea, as there might be nautical reasons for its return. In his reply to Admiral Hamelin he assumes the exclusive right of judging as to political reasons, and throws the responsibility upon that officer. In framing my despatch to Admiral Dundas I have endeavoured to prevent the return of the squadron at present, without diverging to any marked degree from the line taken by my colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 145.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, "*Britannia*," *at Sinope, January* 15, 1854.

I AVAIL myself of the departure of the "Caton" to inform your Excellency that Admiral Hamelin and myself, after consulting together on the events that have occurred and the different letters received the last few days, have arrived at the conclusion that the best mode of proceeding is to return to the Bosphorus with the ships under our command, as soon as the wind and weather will permit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 145.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1854.

YOUR letter apprising me of your intention and that of Vice-Admiral Hamelin to return with the combined squadrons to the Bosphorus, as soon as wind and weather permitted, reached me a few hours ago, and I should have replied to it without a moment's delay had I not thought it desirable to communicate previously with the French Ambassador.

As you allege no reason for your return beyond an impression derived from "events that have occurred," and "different letters received the last few days," I think it my duty to remind you that the last instruction which I had the honour to address to you on the subject, terminated in these words, "You are expected to maintain an adequate force in the Black Sea, so long as the flag and territory of the Porte are exposed to danger."

Now, as I am wholly ignorant of what is meant by the events and letters to which you have alluded, I remain of opinion that the territory and flag of Turkey are still exposed to danger from Russian aggression, beside that it is the declared resolution of Her Majesty's Government to have the command of the Black Sea, and consequently to require, under compulsion if necessary, every Russian ship of war encountered on its waters to return into port. Such circumstances as are known to me, tend to confirm that opinion. It appears both from Captain Drummond's report to you and from the latest commercial letters received here from Odessa, that a considerable portion of the Russian fleet may be presumed to be at sea; and I have reason to believe that the Porte finds it necessary to send more troops and ammunition by sea in aid of the defences of its Asiatic frontier. Moreover, it still remains for us to know the effect produced by the late notifications at Sevastopol and St. Petersburgh.

Such being the state of the case I must beg to decline all share in the responsibility of your immediate return; and I lose no time in requesting the senior officer in command of Her Majesty's ships on this station to forward my present despatch to you by an express steam-vessel.

General Baraguay's reply to Vice-Admiral Hamelin will be forwarded by the same conveyance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 145.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1854.

ARRANGEMENTS had been made between the senior officer commanding Her Majesty's ships on this station and myself, for the conveyance of Captain Simmons, R.E., with two other Turkish officers, in the "Terrible" to Sinope,

with the ulterior purpose of going on to Batoum, for the important object of strengthening the fortifications in those places. The "Terrible" was to sail to-morrow, giving convoy to two Turkish corvettes laden with 600 tons of coal each, for the use of your squadron, as granted by the Porte on my application in pursuance of your wish to have several transports sent out to you for that purpose.

The receipt of your despatch dated the 15th instant makes it necessary to detain the corvettes, and I have learnt, moreover, from Captain Goldsmith that he is directed to send no vessel into the Black Sea without further orders from you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 24, 1854.*

THE combined squadrons returned to their former anchorage in the Bosphorus on the 22nd instant. The steamer which I sent out to prevent their return did not fall in with them till they were close to the entrance of the Strait.

The French Ambassador is greatly dissatisfied with the return of Vice-Admiral Hamelin under existing circumstances, and in virtue of considerations which appear to him defective. My sentiments on the same subject are consigned to a despatch, which I have thought it my duty to address to Admiral Dundas, and of which a copy is herewith inclosed.

The general impression created by the return of the squadrons is by no means favourable, either to our credit or to our influence.

The Admirals are at the same time ready to comply with any demand of convoy for vessels laden with troops or ammunition, and bound for Turkish ports in the Black Sea.

What I understand from your Lordship's No. 11 of this year, is that unnecessary exposure of the squadrons to loss or damage is to be avoided; but that whatever risks are unavoidable in carrying out the stated instructions of Her Majesty's Government are to be frankly incurred without reference to the season.

This was, in substance, the view of the question which I took when the affair of Sinope occurred; and when, on the return of the "Retribution" from that place, I called upon Admiral Dundas to go into the Black Sea with an adequate force.

The remainder of my correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas is inclosed herewith in copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 146.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 22, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the squadron under my command has this day anchored in the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 146.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 22, 1854.*

I HAVE this moment received your Excellency's letters of the 17th instant, and, as soon as the steam-vessels of the squadron are completed with coals, and ready for sea, I will make the necessary arrangements for convoying the Turkish supplies to the coast of Anatolia and carrying out the orders of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 146.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 22, 1854.*

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 17th instant, received this day, I have the honour to acquaint you that Admiral Hamelin and I came into the Bosphorus because the experience we have had has convinced us that if the Emperor of Russia had to choose where the combined squadrons should pass the next two months, he would decidedly keep them "cruising in the Black Sea," so as to render them inefficient for operations in the spring, and thus giving the preponderance to his ships that are husbanding their resources in their own ports.

The port of Sinope can never become the rendezvous of the squadrons from its many disadvantages arising from its leeward and distant position; for the necessary supplies for eighteen sail-of-the-line besides numerous steam-vessels cannot be safely obtained in the casual manner mentioned by your Excellency.

We adhere to the opinion we have so clearly and often expressed, and which we hoped had been agreed to, that the command of the Black Sea and protection of the Turkish territory would be best maintained by the rapid movements of a steam-squadron as pointed out to your Excellency in my minute of the 29th of December, and which the late service, performed by Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral de Tinan, fully proves.

The necessity of making the Bosphorus the chief rendezvous is clearly exemplified by the fact that, during the last eighteen days, accidents have occurred (which no foresight could have prevented) that would have obliged us to send two ships-of-the-line to the Bosphorus to refit, thus proving that we could not reasonably expect to continue operations in the Black Sea without gradually reducing our force, so as ultimately to give up the command of the Black Sea to Russia.

All these considerations make it desirable that the Bosphorus should be the main rendezvous of our squadrons, keeping our larger ships in reserve, and as many as possible together, and the screw and steam squadrons always moving about when the weather will permit.

Among the events and letters alluded to in my letter of the 15th instant, I think it right to draw the attention of your Excellency to a very important one—the letter that your Lordship recommended Admiral Hamelin and myself to write to Sevastopol; and I beg to call to your notice that your Excellency has not done me the honour of informing me whether the letters signed by Admiral Hamelin and myself have been forwarded or not, a measure on which our operations so materially depend, especially in the delicate and critical position in which we are at this moment placed with respect to Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 146.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 23, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the fourth paragraph of your Excellency's letter of the 15th instant, I beg to acquaint you that M. Pisani has not been correctly informed as to the diminished number of troops lately embarked in the Turkish steamers for the coast of Anatolia. In a conversation that took place between the Turkish Admirals and Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons and myself, Vice-Admiral Mustapha Pasha said that he had orders to proceed to sea under convoy of the British flag, and that his steamers were so crowded with men (1000 each) and stores, that the guns were not clear, and the vessels' progress would be impeded. To which I replied that I had no instructions whatever on the subject, and that if his steamers were overloaded, he might remedy that evil by reducing the number of men in each vessel to about 800.

Further than this conversation I gave no advice, nor did I receive any other intimation on the subject until I felt myself bound to interfere for the protection of the steam-vessels on their unexpectedly joining the combined squadrons on the morning of the 5th January, when more than a hundred miles to the eastward of the Bosphorus; and I must own that I was greatly surprised to find after all, that less than 1000 men were landed from the Turkish steam-vessels at Batoom.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, January 24, 1854.

Sir,

THE vast importance of the service in which we are respectively engaged, imposes upon me the duty of expressing, without reserve or circumlocution, the opinion I entertain as to the return of the combined squadrons under present circumstances to the Bosphorus.

I have read with attention your statement of the motives which decided your conduct in that respect, and I cannot conceal from you that the impression remaining on my mind is one of dissatisfaction and regret.

It is not for me to determine the value of your reasons, in so far as they are strictly nautical; but as you wrote to me for transports to supply you with coal on the 13th instant, and announced your intention of returning to the Bosphorus on the 15th, I naturally expected to learn that your reasons for doing so were derived from the "events" and the "letters" to which you alluded in the latter despatch, and not from such nautical considerations as you had already set forth in your memorandum of the 29th ultimo. The only events of which I perceive any mention in your despatch are the operation conducted by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons between Trebizond and Batoom, and the damage sustained by two ships belonging to one or other of the squadrons.

On these I have to remark, that the detachment under Sir Edmund Lyons did not happen to fall in with any Russian squadron, and that the two vessels stated to have been damaged might have returned without impairing the effective power of the combined squadrons.

With respect to the second notification addressed under your signature and that of Admiral Hamelin to the superior naval authority at Sevastopol, it never was understood that you were to suspend your operations until it had been delivered, and still less until an answer had been received. From any such necessity, had it ever existed, you would have been released by the delivery of the first notification, and the kind of reception given at Sevastopol to Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Retribution."

Looking to the instructions under which, by order of Her Majesty's Government, you are called upon to act, I am at a loss to understand how

they can be effectively carried out by squadrons stationed in the Bosphorus, which, with the prevailing wind, is notoriously under the disadvantage of being more or less to leeward of almost every thing in the Black Sea.

After the declarations made by order of Her Majesty's Government, both here and at St. Petersburgh, we are bound to maintain the command of the Black Sea, protecting therein the flag and territory of the Porte.

You are the best judge of what amount of force is necessary for these purposes in the present forward condition of the Russian fleet. On this point the responsibility rests of necessity with you. But in the exercise of a paramount duty, I must adhere to my former instructions as to the above-mentioned objects being secured, if that be possible, by the employment of the forces under your command.

At this moment I know but of two vessels in the Black Sea belonging to the combined squadrons, namely, the "Prométhée" at Varna, and the "Fury" despatched to Odessa. According also to such information as I have received, a considerable portion of the Russian fleet is absent from Sevastopol, either at sea, or in some other port or roadstead. Such being the case, it is evident that the protection of the Turkish flag and territory depends at present upon the discretion of Russia, and not upon our command of the Black Sea.

I perfectly understand what risk the service involves at this season to the shipping employed on it; and doubtless if the service can be efficiently performed without such risks the advantage is great. But I have no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government contemplated the postponement of the service until a fair season and more settled weather shall set in.

I have only therefore in conclusion to confirm my previous instructions on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, January 24, 1854.

Sir,

INCLOSED herewith, for your information, are copies of the letter which in your absence I addressed to the Commander of Her Majesty's steam-ship "Fury," placed by you at my disposal for the conveyance of your second joint notification to the Russian Admiral, and also of my letter to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa.

The uncertainty into which I was thrown as to your movements by the sudden announcement of your intended return, and by my communication to you by the "Niger," made it impossible for me to apprise you of the course which I had taken before your arrival in the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Commander Tatham.

British Embassy, January 18, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE to request that you will convey with all convenient expedition the accompanying packet to Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa. You will be careful not to allow it to pass through the quarantine without the presence of Mr. Yeames, or of some one duly authorized on his part to receive it.

I have further to request that you will wait a few hours at Odessa, weather and circumstances allowing of it, to receive any despatches for me which Mr. Yeames may choose to consign to your care.

It is desirable, with the same proviso, that you should visit Varna and communicate with Her Majesty's Consul there on your way back to this station.

I inclose herewith a packet for Lieutenant-Colonel Neale.

If, on your way from Odessa to Varna, you can, without too much risk, inconvenience of a serious nature, or loss of time, approach the mouths of the Danube so nearly as to communicate with the shipping there, you may have an opportunity of which, no doubt, you would cheerfully avail yourself, to succour any British vessels which, being prevented from passing the bar, may be placed in a dangerous situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 8 in No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Yeames.

Constantinople, January 18, 1854.

Sir,

I SEND you herewith a letter addressed by Vice-Admiral Dundas to the superior naval authority in the Crimea.* You will deliver it to the Governor of Odessa with a request that it may be forwarded to its destination.

The accompanying packet addressed to the French Consul at Odessa contains a letter of the same purport from Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

Inclosed herewith is copy of a circular† which I have lately addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant. Appearances of war have strengthened so considerably since, that, although I am not in a position to issue any distinct notice of the danger, I should be glad to hear that all commercial vessels in the Black Sea had secured their respective cargoes, and started on their return to the Bosphorus.

I have received, but rarely without some delay, the letters which you have occasionally addressed to me under the respective dates noted in the margin.

The "Fury," by which vessel I dispatch this letter to you, will take charge of any communication which you may have received for conveyance to me; but I wish her not to be detained at Odessa longer than a few hours.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 9 in No. 146.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, January 24, 1854.

Sir,

SINCE I replied to your despatch remarking on the inconvenience of having to escort Turkish vessels containing so small a number of troops as those which were embarked for Batoom early in the present month, I have received from M. Pisani, on the authority of the Turkish Pasha, a confirmation of the explanatory statement which I then transmitted to you.

Not doubting the correctness of your recollection of what passed on the subject with Vice-Admiral Mustapha Pasha, and seeing no reason to suspect any intended prevarication on the part of the Turkish authorities, I presume that some inexact impression was taken from the verbal communications which were interchanged at the time; and this is the more probable, from the imperfect manner in which the Turkish Vice-Admiral expresses himself in English.

As to the want of instructions which you mention in your despatch dated yesterday, with respect to the vessels convoyed by the combined squadrons, I have to remind you that, when the intention of sending out those vessels was first made known, I had no authority from home to extend your protection to the flag as well as to the territory of Turkey, and that the instructions giving me that additional authority did not reach my hands till the 3rd instant, when I had reason to believe, during the greater part of the day, that the squadrons had left the Bosphorus.

I attach so much importance to the principle of your acting upon no communications relating to matters of joint operation between the Turks and the

* Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

† Not printed.

squadrons but such as pass through the Embassy and the Porte, that nothing but want of instructions from home, and want of time when they arrived, could have prevented my obtaining and transmitting to you in more specific terms the ultimate arrangements of the Porte respecting the vessels in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 147.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—*(Received February* 9.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 25, 1854.

HER Majesty's steam-ship "Fury," by which I sent the Admiral's second notification to Odessa, for overland conveyance to the Crimea, has returned to-day without accomplishing the object of its voyage.

I inclose herewith a copy of Captain Tatham's report to the Admiral. Your Lordship will learn from its contents with what insurmountable difficulties Captain Tatham had to contend in consequence of the masses of ice which were brought down by the Dnieper, and rendered all access to the shore impracticable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—My letters to Captain Tatham and Mr. Yeames are among the inclosures to the preceding number.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 147.

Commander Tatham to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *"Fury," Beikos Bay, January* 25, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived at Odessa at 11·30 A.M. on Saturday, the 21st instant, and found the harbour frozen over (thermometer 13°). I anchored outside, in clear water, and attempted to force my gig through the ice without success.

At 1 P.M. a large boat was launched from the lazaretto outside the port; she came alongside and returned immediately, the health-officer saying the Consul would be informed I desired to meet him; he also offered refreshments, and added, that in three hours the Consul would probably be there, and that, on his hoisting a flag, I should attempt to land in my largest boat.

At about 4 P.M. the flag was hoisted, and I shoved off in the paddle-box boat. In the meantime the ice had much increased, and, on forcing the boat through it, the drift and heavy swell drove us near some rocks (the coast being inaccessible from piles 20 feet high being covered with ice).

Some English masters of ships and the quarantine-officer hailed us of our danger, and advised us to get off as quick as possible, as they could not assist us.

The boat was for some time immoveable, through lifting with the swell over the rocks; but by manning the oars with all the crew on each side alternately, I regained the ship before dark with loss of anchor and cable.

Sunday: thermometer 11°, ice much increased. Weighed, and took a laden English brig (the "Danube") from it, towed her six miles out, and returned to an anchorage.

Attempted to land with boats and a skiff, taking two men who had been in the Polar expedition; found it, from the state of the ice, impossible.

People passing from their ships in the roads to the shore. Weighed, and forced the ship by steam through the ice to five fathoms water. Perceived no attempt to reach the ship from the shore; and large floes near us rendering it dangerous for men, and impassable by other means, at sunset backed out and anchored in seven fathoms. Ship surrounded with drift-ice.

At 8 P.M., finding the ship set firm, weighed, and steamed out to clear water. Anchored in twelve fathoms (thermometer 13°).

Midnight. Ship surrounded with large floes rapidly passing from the Dnieper.

Monday, at 3 A.M. (thermometer 8°), ice stationary; ship set hard in; weighed and with difficulty steamed out. At 4·45 cleared the ice. Fontana light, south-west-by-west; Odessa, north-west-by-north.

Being desired by his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe not to deliver the despatches unless in presence of the Consul, with the quarantine ground our only place of communication, and ice extending five miles from Odessa, I hesitated forcing the ship in and probably wintering there (which I cannot think contemplated); but considered the public service more forwarded by my proceeding to execute the remaining part of my orders, which I hope, Sir, will meet with approval.

The "Danube" was the last laden ship in the roads. Her master stated that about 150 English vessels still remained; and that several under Russian colours had returned to port on hearing the combined fleets had entered the Black Sea.

One Russian corvette (dismantled) was stated to be in the Imperial port.

On the afternoon of the 23rd I neared the Danube, and stood close in to the Sulina mouth. Outside there were no vessels anchored; within the twelve-feet bar, we counted about eighty.

No colours were hoisted except on board a Russian man-of-war schooner. We saw five wrecks near the entrance, and some ice off it. Perceiving no disposition to communicate, I steamed out: when distant three or four miles guns were heard, and the smoke was seen near the lighthouse.

On Tuesday, at 10 A.M., I anchored at Varna, and with Her Majesty's Consul visited the civil and military Pashas.

On referring to the means of defence, it appeared that about 20,000*l.* had been just received for paying troops and erecting sea batteries.

Sufficient, however, transpired to clearly show that no one considers himself responsible for the latter being executed; and unless some active steps are taken, the money destined for this important national object will be directed to other purposes.

It remains for me to report my arrival, having left Varna last evening; and to inform you that on examination while there, I find that about a dozen sheets of copper on the ship's bows have been damaged by the ice, and must be replaced at a favourable opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD TATHAM.

No. 148.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 37.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 25, 1854.

THE divisions which have long existed, with more or less inconvenience, in the Turkish Ministry, continue to produce delays and inconsistencies which threaten serious consequences in the end.

The individual who is chiefly responsible for this state of things is Mehemet Ali, the Seraskier, who, besides being at the head of the army, is the Sultan's brother-in-law. He is by no means deficient in energy; and in quiet times his administration of more than one department has done him credit. At present he acts with too much independence and obstinacy for a Minister who has more resolution than discernment, and more self-confidence than knowledge. His removal from office is greatly desired by more than one of his colleagues, and I have reason to know that the Sultan, aware of his intrigues with the war party and fanatics, is only restrained from dismissing him by an apprehension, not well grounded, of his influence with the army.

But Mehemet Ali is not the only member of the Cabinet whose retirement would be likely to prove advantageous to the conduct of public affairs. The Sheik-ul-Islam and the President of the Council might also be superseded with

an equal prospect of benefit to the State. In proportion as the likelihood of war assumes a stronger colouring, and we approach more nearly to the period of active operations, the importance of having a vigorous and united administration increases. If the present causes of weakness and vacillation continue, we must expect the reverse of everything which is necessary for bringing the contest to a prompt and satisfactory issue.

Under this conviction I have made known my sentiments to the Sultan, and I am warranted to hope that His Majesty, far from turning a deaf ear to my arguments, will endeavour seriously to overcome his objections, and to make before long the change which I have earnestly recommended.

As soon as this first indispensable step towards improvement is taken, I hope to effect some understanding with the Ministry as to the future plan of proceeding, on the supposition that war, as I fear is but too likely, shall continue on a larger scale and on a wider field. Reshid Pasha is well disposed in this respect, and he has already shown that his wishes extend to the formation of a conventional agreement between the Porte and its two maritime allies. It will be an object of my early solicitude to ascertain precisely the nature and extent of his views, for the eventual consideration of Her Majesty's Government. In less than three months, if not sooner, it is reasonable to expect that the Emperor of Russia, supposing that he rejects the propositions accepted by the Porte, will cross the Danube with the view of striking a decisive blow before the Sultan's allies have matured their plans of auxiliary cooperation. I endeavour, without ceasing, to bring this danger so strongly before the Sultan and his Ministers, as to prevail on them to complete their measures of preparation with the least possible waste of time. Hitherto they show no want of inclination to heed my counsels; but the very foundation stone of successful progress is still to be laid in a partial change of Ministry, and until that preliminary step be taken, I despair of obtaining any results more important than partial additions to the army, and, in less degree, to the fortifications and military supplies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 149.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 148.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 9, 1854.

THE Earl of Westmorland will, without doubt, have made your Lordship a communication similar to that received here by telegraph last night from M. de Bourqueney; but in a matter of so much importance I think it right that your Lordship should be made acquainted with the exact words of M. de Bourqueney's despatch.

He says that M. de Buol had summoned the Conference to meet yesterday morning, and that he had communicated to them confidentially the substance of a conversation which he had held the previous evening with Count Orloff, who had returned to St. Petersburgh on that morning, respecting the means of settling the Eastern question.

The plan sketched out was this: "That Russia should send from St. Petersburgh the preliminaries of a peace, based on the propositions of the 13th of January; that M. de Meyendorff should be authorized to introduce into them any modifications thought necessary by the Conference, to whose consideration they would be submitted; that these preliminaries should be sent without delay to Constantinople, and their acceptance followed by an armistice. When accepted by the Porte, the Principalities to be evacuated and the fleets to be withdrawn. A place to be fixed upon for the signature of the Treaty of Peace."

M. de Buol, in making this communication to the Conference, added, that it was not to be looked upon in the light of a Russian proposition, but as an idea that Count Orloff had promised to recommend to His Imperial Master to adopt. He wished the members of the Conference to submit it to the consideration of their respective Governments, in order that they might be prepared to enter upon the subject, should Count Orloff succeed in his endeavours.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not appear to attach much importance to this communication, and as, when I saw him, he had just come from the Emperor, I presume that His Majesty is not inclined either to hope much from it. His Excellency observed that, if Count Orloff's proposal was accepted by the Russian Government, the question was in his opinion settled, because every point of consequence was guarded by the propositions of January 13; there was no longer any question of sending a Turkish Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburgh, and the evacuation of the Principalities would be effected before the signature of peace. But he could not help fearing, he said, that this was another attempt to gain time, and to detach Austria from her alliance with the Western Powers. He was of opinion that France and England should answer that if Count Orloff's suggestions were adopted by the Russian Government and fairly carried out, the question might be considered as settled; but that the two Governments should not desist in the meantime from any of their warlike prepartions, whether by sea or land, or from their diplomatic action upon the Governments of Austria and Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 150.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)
Paris, February 9, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY has informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Austrian Government has already commenced moving reinforcements towards Transylvania and the Banat, and that Count Buol had stated to him that the Austrian finances could support this demand upon them, but that if Austria was to be engaged in more extensive operations she had not the funds to meet the expense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 151.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, February 10, 1854.

WHAT is the precise object of the movement of Austrian troops towards Transylvania and the Banat?

Is it in consequence of the apprehended passage of the Danube by the Russians?

No. 152.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 18.)
Foreign Office, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve your communication to Baron Manteuffel of my despatch No. 28 to Lord Stratford on the Eastern question, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 27 of the 30th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 153.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 19.)
Foreign Office, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 39 of the 4th instant, reporting that you had left with Baron Mantouffel my note to Baron Brunnow, and my despatch to Sir H. Seymour relative to the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your having done so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 154.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, February 9, 1854, 5 P.M.

IN my letter of yesterday I announced a private suggestion by Buol to Orloff, if the Emperor of Russia send here preliminaries of peace based on the acceptance of the Turkish propositions, and such as shall be approved by the Conference, they will be transmitted to Constantinople. At the same time an order should be sent to Gortchakoff to agree to a suspension of hostilities, in case it was proposed by the Turks.

If the preliminaries are agreed to by Turkey and returned to Vienna, they might be sent by an Austrian Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburgh, and an armistice proclaimed, the Russians evacuating the Principalities and the fleets the Black Sea. Peace might be then signed by the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries at any place agreed upon. This idea was only thrown out verbally by Buol, and as such mentioned to the Conference by him.

No. 155.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 62.)
Foreign Office, February 11, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch which he has received from Count Buol, stating that the Conference had assembled at Vienna on the 2nd instant to take into consideration the Russian propositions which had been communicated to Count Buol by Count Orloff. As these propositions differed essentially from the basis of pacification recommended by the Conference for the adoption of the Imperial Government, Count Buol did not conceal from Count Orloff and Baron Meyendorff that he could not support them, but would lay them before the Conference for their consideration.

Count Buol transmits a copy of the Protocol which was agreed to at the Conference, recording the fact that these propositions were not of a nature to be forwarded to Constantinople, but must be reserved for the decision of the respective Governments.

Count Buol intends to furnish Count Colloredo with a more detailed account of Count Orloff's mission, and signifies the intention of the Austrian Government to abide by the course taken in signing the Protocol of December 5th.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 156.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of an order which appeared in the official Vienna "Gazette" of last night, by which the concentration of a corps d'armée of 25,000 men is ordered on the frontiers of Wallachia for the protection of the Austrian frontier during the hostilities now going on between the Russian and Turkish forces in the Danubian Principalities which have extended into the immediate neighbourhood of the Austrian frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 156.

Extract from the "Wiener Zeitung" of February 6, 1854.

(Translation.)

DURING the conflict which has been going on for some months past in Wallachia between Russia and Turkey, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, in consideration of the terms of friendly alliance existing between Austria and both the belligerent Powers equally, has not hitherto felt himself called upon to increase the number of his troops in the Woivodina or the Temeswar Banat.

These unfortunate hostilities having however now extended into Lesser Wallachia, and consequently into the neighbourhood of our frontiers, His Imperial Majesty, anxious for the peace of his dominions and subjects, and their preservation from even unintentional molestations, has commanded the concentration of a corps d'armée of 25,000 men in the Government of the abovementioned Provinces, in consequence of which a portion of the garrison of this city will shortly be removed hence and replaced by reinforcements to the regiments remaining here.

No. 157.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 102. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2, 1854.*

NOTHING can be more contradictory than the indications observable here as to the feelings of the Court with regard to the present alternative of peace or war.

One of the chief persons about the Emperor, and one who has been remarkable for the moderation of his language, now says that he considers affairs to have advanced so far that the interests of the country, and even the dignity of the Crown, render war inevitable: an opinion to the same effect has been expressed by some other persons more closely belonging to the Court. I hear of more than one of these persons who express their opinions in the following language: That it is perhaps unfortunate that the Oriental question should have been prematurely raised; but that taking things as they are, considering the immense outlay in preparations which has been made, and looking to the slight probability which would exist at the Emperor's age of his being able, after the requisite interval, to recommence and carry through the great work, it is desirable that the undertaking should not now be abandoned.

On the other hand, I am convinced that the more enlightened of the Russians feel that their position is a bad one, and that it is not likely to be improved by an advance in the face of European feeling.

These more moderate councils, chiefly advocated by the Chancellor here, if I not mistaken, led to the dispatch of Count Orloff to Vienna.

Count Nesselrode feels that his powers of resistance to violent measures cannot be carried further. He is aware of the odium which attaches to his German name and his anti-Sclavonic views, and he is desirous of putting upon another, and that other a favorite of the Emperor, a Greek as to faith and a Russian by birth, the responsibility of acceding, if needs must, to such terms as may be in some degree acceptable to Europe in the great question between her and Russia.

That every effort will be made by Count Orloff to bring back Austria to what is here regarded as her allegiance, and to confirm in a Russian sense the always somewhat uncertain policy of the Prussian Cabinet, I do not doubt; it may be, as well, that he will make a last effort to separate France and England: but supposing all this to be resisted, and only ordinary firmness and (which in this case is the same thing) prudence to be exhibited by the two German Powers, I feel sanguine as to the event proving that Count Orloff will have some conciliatory proposal to make.

I will go further, and will venture to remark that if his first overtures shall not be found such as can be acceded to, a second or third examination of his portfolio may not improbably bring to light some proposition which is better calculated to meet the views of the Conference.

I will not close my despatch without observing that the influence which the female portion of the Imperial family have exercised or endeavoured to exercise upon the policy of the Government has been anything but of a salutary kind. It seldom happens that Her Imperial Majesty or the Grand Duchesses interfere in State affairs; but by accident I have learned, and this upon undoubted authority, that before leaving Galetina the Empress, the Grand Duchess Mary, and the Grand Duchess Olga entreated the Emperor to come to a private understanding with the French Court, and to settle the business without the participation of England.

Of this fact, which has surprised me considerably, I am certain.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 158.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2, 1854.*

PREPARATIONS for war upon the most extensive scale continue to be made in every direction by this Government, in profession so desirous of peace, so solicitous to maintain the independent rights of all other countries!

For some days past, from 800 to 1000 recruits have arrived here daily by the Moscow railway; the greater number of them are intended for the Guards and Grenadiers, some however being drafted into regiments of the line.

The want of rapid means of communication is sensibly felt at a moment when such extensive military operations are in contemplation; and there is now question of establishing electric telegraphs between St. Petersburgh, Warsaw, Moscow, and even Odessa.

The public papers, which have been so constantly in error lately with regard to what is passing in Russia, are correct in the motive which they assign to Marshal Paskewitch's visit to St. Petersburgh. He has been sent for, as I know upon the best authority, for the purpose of expressing his opinion upon the plan of campaign which has been prepared here.

Some of the persons who have access to the Emperor have been representing to him that with the immense bodies of troops to be provisioned, it will be desirable to prohibit the exportation of grain from Odessa and the other southern ports. I understand the notion to have been resisted, and hitherto

successfully, by the Finance Minister and Baron Stieglitz, these gentlemen representing, what is indeed very notorious, that soldiers abound in Russia, but that money is likely to become soon very scarce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 159.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 107. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2, 1854.*

THE departure of a French courier gives me an opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatches, which reached me yesterday by the messenger Drury.

I am now in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 25 of the 25th ultimo inclusive.

It is no longer in my power to offer your Lordship as many details as heretofore of what is passing here, my limits of observation being extremely narrowed. I continue to wait upon the Chancellor occasionally; but as regards the Russian society, I and my family are completely excluded from its pale. In this country, as your Lordship is aware, every one, without waiting for the orders of the master, follows the slightest indication that is given of his will; that will being that foreign public servants who, from conviction and duty, do not share his opinions, should be treated as having been wanting in respect to his person.

At all events, His Imperial Majesty has not often to make complaints of the kind, and I cannot better instance the readiness even of foreign Ministers to adopt the language of the Court, than by stating to your Lordship that General de Rochow assured me yesterday in the most solemn manner that he was convinced that the Emperor was as much intent upon peace and upon the preservation of the Sultan's authority as the Queen's Government can possibly be.

I am bound to believe, and do believe, that such is the conviction of my Prussian colleague; but this is but a fresh proof of the influence exercised by the atmosphere of the Russian Court upon even a sound judgment.

Count Valentin Esterhazy arrived here last night. I am not acquainted with him; but hope, for the sake of his Government, and for the sake of such remote chances of peace as may yet remain, that he may prove a man of sufficient independence of character to look to Austrian interests, and not to swell the number of those who in this contest between Russia and Europe are so well disposed to consider Europe in the wrong.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 160.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 111. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1854.*

I FEEL it to be my duty, both as a public servant and as an Englishman, to observe to your Lordship, that among the evil consequences arising from the actual outbreak of Russian ambition none is likely to be more permanently injurious than the impulse which it has given to the desire felt here of largely increasing the naval resources of the Empire.

The wish prevailed—as I had the honour of observing to your Lordship—before the commencement of this odious attempt at extended domination, and it has increased very much since the arrival of the combined fleets in the Levant has set the naval men of Russia upon instituting comparisons which bring with them the painful conviction that a want of steam-power establishes an infe-

riority, which renders it expedient that the Russians should avoid a trial of strength with the English and French fleets.

A conversation which I held a few days since with a Russian Admiral—a man who served in our navy, and who is very kindly disposed towards England —satisfies me that it is only the actual want of steamers which condemns the Sevastopol fleet to inaction.

But if felt now the want will not be long to be deplored by the Russians, who, as your Lordship is aware, are fully prepared to add a number of screw ships to their fleets, both of the Baltic and the Black Sea.

It is needless to repeat that this increase of naval power can be intended only for offensive purposes on the part of a country which possesses neither foreign trade nor colonies, and which from the amount of its military force and its enormous extent is more than any other secure against foreign invasion.

The existence, indeed, of two enormous fleets in the Baltic and in the Black Sea closely affects the security of Turkey and of the North of Europe.

It happens unfortunately that a German diplomatist is occasionally at the same time a Russian courtier, or it would hardly escape the notice of the Prussian Government that His Prussian Majesty's tenure of his Baltic Provinces becomes infinitely more precarious from the moment that a fleet of Russian line-of-battle ships afford a ready conveyance for legions of invading troops to East Prussia and Pomerania.

The same thing applies to Mecklenburgh, Denmark, and Sweden: they all are brought into dangerous proximity with Russia as soon as Cronstadt Harbour is filled with war steamers.

But, my Lord, the security even of the English coasts will be to a degree affected by the establishment of a force such as that I am speaking of, as by the help of steam they might at any time during the summer months be reached in the course of seven or eight days.

An Englishman has some reluctance in admitting that danger can approach him on that which he considers his own peculiar element, but it is to be remembered that, although possessing ships in abundance, England, happily for her, does not keep on foot large standing armies, and that even if not obliged to increase the number of her troops, the existence of a larger Baltic steam fleet will compel her to augment considerably her annual naval expenditure.

To another possible contingency, that of a junction of the Russian and French navies in hostility to England, I will not do more than allude.

These considerations, which are too obvious to require being insisted upon, appear to me to lead to the conclusion, either that such precautions should be adopted as may offer some security against the abuse of Russia's extending means of offence; or (and this plan is more easily realized) that efforts should be made for crushing a Power which, if allowed to expand at its ease, will become intolerable to the rest of Europe.

The abatement of the "Russian nuisance" may yet be the object to which European energies may be generally directed, and the cry one that may very beneficially supersede that of "War against existing Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H SEYMOUR.

No. 161.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 4, 1854.

I HELD some conversation with the Chancellor on the 3rd instant, with regard to the Danish protection, under which it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government that British subjects should be placed in the event of war between England and Russia. His Excellency was of opinion that no other protection than that of the Emperor was requisite. Upon my remarking, however, that even in peace the good offices of such an advocate as a diplomatic agent was frequently of importance to foreigners, Count Nesselrode stated explicitly that no objection would be raised to the proposed arrangement. The choice of

Denmark as the protecting Government appeared, moreover, to be agreeable to him.

We spoke of the dispositions to be made with regard to Consuls.

The Russian Government, Count Nesselrode said, desired that their Consul should remain in England, in the event of the withdrawal of the Russian Mission: the same course would of course be followed, if it suited their views, by Her Majesty's Government.

Indeed, even in the event of war, there would be no objection on the part of Russia to the two Consuls retaining their posts, if such an arrangement should meet the views of Her Majesty's Government.

The conversation was of a perfectly amicable nature, and Count Nesselrode spoke in terms of warm feeling of the decision which might convert two ancient allies into open enemies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 162.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 114. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 4, 1854.

I LEARN through a somewhat obscure, but I believe certain channel, that the Grand Duke Hereditary, who has been perhaps the most consistent supporter of a peaceful policy, is beginning to despair of the success of his efforts.

This His Imperial Highness expressed only three or four days ago to one of the officers who is admitted to his familiarity, saying at the same time, "You will see that Count Orloff will return here in a short time, without having been able to effect anything. You then, General, may expect to be sent very shortly to join the army, and I suppose I shall be sent in the same direction."

The policy of the Austrian Government was likewise alluded to by the Grand Duke. Austria, he said, was becoming more and more alarmed at the close alliance formed between England and France, and proportionably disinclined to take part in measures which might estrange her from Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 163.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 4, 1854.

I HAVE already held some conversation with my new Austrian colleague whose language upon the great question of the day is more that which I had expected than what I could have desired to have found it.

Count Valentin Esterhazy assures me positively that he has no propositions to make to the Russian Government, but that he is to state His Imperial master's firm intention of observing neutrality, and his eager desire that some means should be devised for settling affairs amicably, due regard being taken at once to the dignity of the Emperor of Russia and to the sovereign rights of Turkey. I, of course, considered that the arrangements sketched out in the late proceedings in Vienna rested precisely upon this basis.

Count Esterhazy adverted lightly, but with concern, to the entry of the Black Sea, and to the partial line which he feared would be taken there by the allied fleets; there had been, he said, great faults committed on all sides.

I observed that I feared that I should be considered as prejudiced when I asserted that all the faults had been on the side of Russia, and all the moderation on the other; that as regarded France and England, the only fault which

could be imputed to them was that of having been too confiding and too enduring.

After some little argumentation on this point, I said, "M. le Comte, as you are just come here, and as I know this ground tolerably well, you shall allow me to speak frankly to you; you are very eager for peace; so am I. You are intent upon keeping your neutral position; do so—only let me explain to you in a very few words how alone the two objects may be attained. Do not draw your swords, but be good enough, you and your Prussian colleague, to raise the pitch of your voices for a few days: keep saying, We have the greatest friendship for Russia, and the most firm resolution to adhere to the system of neutrality we have adopted; but to be enabled to do so we must lay the greatest stress upon the acceptance by the Emperor of a basis of negotiation which the Four Courts have recorded to be fair and honourable for all parties; this declaration we make as much in the interests of Russia as in our own. These," I said, "M. le Comte, are a few words which, if repeated several times in a resolute tone, will ward off the war which all unite in deprecating, and will settle the business in a few days: temporize, and be afraid of giving momentary offence, and we shall have a war against which no neutrality will be proof."

It may be that precautions against such uncourtierlike language are already considered expedient, and consequently the system of seduction, so well understood here, is already set in motion with regard to Count Esterhazy.

He had not been forty-eight hours in the town when the pate so successfully employed in fencing out foreign Ministers was thrown down, and he was invited to sup with one of the favourites of the Court, at the Winter Palace, at whose apartment it was expected that some of the members of the Imperial Family would accidentally make their appearance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 164.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1854.*

WHEN I waited upon Count Nesselrode on the 3rd instant, I read to his Excellency the inclosed extract of a letter which I had received from Mr. Consul Whitehead, remarking that my answer to Mr. Whitehead would depend in a great measure upon the information which I might receive from his Excellency.

The Chancellor said that the wish of the Russian Government to press as lightly as possible upon foreign traders in the event of war was known to me. That in that case so many days would be assigned, during which the merchant-vessels of the belligerent Powers would be at liberty to depart.

I replied that the case was one which ought not to be left open to any doubt, and that it was clear that a measure which appeared at first sight fair and impartial, might in practice be unjust and one-sided.

That, for instance, if England assigned ten or twenty days for the free departure of Russian vessels, these ten or twenty days were available all the year round, whereas in Russia the expiration of a like term might find English vessels blocked in the ice. The proper course would be so many days to count from the opening of the navigation.

Count Nesselrode's answer was less explicit than I could have desired; he repeated, however, his assurance of the desire felt by the Government to deal liberally with English shipping, adding that everything would depend upon the treatment of Russian vessels in the ports of Great Britain.

His Excellency then alluded to vessels belonging to Russia which were now building in England, and which in the event of war being declared would, he feared, be detained or confiscated.

I replied that the cases were nowise similar, as the ships in question were ships of war; that I had no instructions by which to guide my answer, but although I could not for a moment believe that Her Majesty's Government would permit the completion or departure of vessels built for war purposes, that

I could not take upon myself to say whether such unfinished vessels would be confiscated.

After thinking over my conversation with the Chancellor, I addressed to Mr. Whitehead the reply of which I beg to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 164.

Consul Whitehead to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Extract.) *Archangel, January 13/25, 1854.*

LATE last autumn two British vessels returned to this port in distress, after having been out at sea, homeward bound, the one twenty-eight the other sixty-six days; they are now wintering here with their crews, not, however, at the expense of Her Majesty's Government. I trust I shall not be considered too intrusive in asking your advice how I am to proceed with the crews in case of a rupture between the two countries.

I presume time would be given for British subjects to quit this country; if the seamen wintering in Cronstadt should be sent home, those here, the two crews, fifteen in number (besides two foreigners, Dutchmen), might also be sent down to St. Petersburgh.

As these vessels returned in distress, it is, perhaps, not too much to expect that the Imperial Government may allow them to leave in the spring, even in the event of war being proclaimed; here, the authorities will only act on directions from St. Petersburgh.

Inclosure 2 in No. 164.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Consul Whitehead.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 31/February 12, 1854.*

I HAVE delayed replying to your letter of the 13th ultimo, until I should have had an opportunity of conversing with the Chancellor; but having done so, I am still unable to return a very direct answer to your inquiries.

It appears consonant to justice and equity that in the event of war breaking out, the Russian Government, mindful of its declaration, should allow sufficient time for the departure of all English vessels with their cargoes; but such may not be the case if suddenly a general term for the departure of such vessels should be announced. It may happen, for instance, that the navigation may be free in one port and still closed in another.

Under these circumstances, and the explanations which I have received not being entirely distinct, I am unable to express a decided opinion with regard to the vessels detained at Archangel, or respecting the course to be followed as to their crews. My hope and belief is that the justice and the humanity of the Imperial Government will be such as to insure the unimpeded departure of their vessels and their crews; but I am bound again to remark that I express a belief and not a conviction.

It is desirable that you should send me the names of the two English vessels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 165.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 123. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6, 1854.*

A VERY strange circumstance has occurred to me; a stranger, an Englishman by birth, but a man who has been living entirely among Russians for the last twenty or thirty years, desired to see me on business.

I found I had to do with an intelligent man, and soon perceived that there were other subjects than that which formed the ostensible object of his visit, upon which he desired to converse.

He proceeded to state that he is convinced that the seizure of Turkey is the object which the Emperor has in view, and that nothing will induce His Majesty to forego his purpose. That as to armaments, I must be aware upon what scale they have been prepared: that as to finance, from being intimately acquainted with a secret employé of the Government, he is positive as to the metallic deposits in the fortress having been most extensively tampered with; and equally positive that the enormous sum of 50,000,000 of silver rouble notes of 50 roubles each (about 60,000,000*l.* sterling) have been secretly printed, and will be brought gradually into circulation, under cover of the ukases lately issued authorising the fresh emission of paper.

I am unable to contradict or affirm this startling intelligence, which, however, is to a degree reconcileable with statements which I have already had the honour of making to your Lordship. I can only say that my informant observed that he was stating not what he believed, but what he knew and was sure of; and that he asked for no reward or favour, present or future, beyond that of my employing such discretion with regard to his communications as should prevent the possibility of its author being ever suspected.

Before leaving me, this person further acquainted me that he knows of three landed proprietors who are endeavouring to sell their estates, with the intention of vesting the proceeds in land in Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 166.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 124. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6, 1854.*

IT is to be regretted that Count Esterhazy's recovery did not take place a few days sooner, and that he was not the bearer of the communication to the Court of St. Petersburgh made by Count Buol in the despatch which accompanied the Protocol of the 13th ultimo.

Count Esterhazy's official rank, and the knowledge of the feelings of his Government, might possibly have given an importance to a paper which it neither possesses in itself, nor by the influence of the diplomatic agent to whom it was addressed.

The despatch will have been communicated by Count Colloredo to your Lordship, and I shall be much surprised if it has met with your approbation.

From my knowledge of the feelings and prejudices of this Court I have no hesitation in stating my conviction that it was drawn up in language very ill calculated to attain its supposed object.

Had Count Buol informed the Russian Government that his Imperial master, being intent upon preserving the most friendly terms with Russia, and of remaining neutral in case of war, had obtained an unexceptionable basis of negotiation between the Emperor and the Sultan, but that the rejection of this basis might have the effect of affecting his ardent desire to keep clear of hostilities: the dignity of one Emperor would have been asserted, and the

obstinacy of the other would probably have been overcome; whereas the deprecatory and almost humble tone of the Austrian despatch only serves to encourage the notions unhappily entertained here, of the Russian Government being the great centre round which such satellites as the German monarchies revolve; and of its being optional with the Czar to deal with unbelieving Turkey as in his magnanimity it may seem fitting to him.

Your Lordship may be assured that appeals such as those contained in the despatch to Baron Lebzeltern are more than useless.

In the pursuit of his own objects, and for the consolation of wounded vanity, the Emperor of Russia is utterly regardless of the interests of his own country; still less solicitude can he be expected, then, willingly to bestow upon the subjects of Governments whose existence he believes to depend upon the protection which they may meet with at his hands.

It has been said that fear is apt to incur the precise danger which it seeks to avoid; and the truth of the apothegm will very certainly be experienced by the Governments of Austria and Prussia if they fail to make the Emperor of Russia sensible that their much-desired neutrality must be contingent upon His Imperial Majesty's disposition to keep within the limits which the Four Cabinets have laid down as being those of fairness and of moderation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 167.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6, 1854.*

AS your Lordship is aware, my incredulity with regard to the declarations so constantly repeated here has exposed me to some reproach and odium.

I regret that it should be so; but a man is not master of his convictions, and it has not been and is not yet in my power to reconcile the warm interest taken by the Emperor in the preservation of Turkey with the acts of Russian violence which have succeeded one another with such rapidity during the last eight months.

My incredulity might possibly have been less intractable, if the war forced upon the Turk, besides having some sort of pretext, had not been undertaken in the name of religion; but when an attempt is made to resort to means employed in the dark ages—when hermits exhort their fellow-believers to hasten to the protection of the Cross, and the largest armies in the world march against infidels with sentences of Scripture as their battle-cry—it is difficult not to suspect that independently of hoping to gain by their spoil, there must be a very settled purpose of driving these followers of Mahomet far beyond the pale of Christendom.

A slight circumstance which has lately occurred tends to strengthen these misgivings.

I had heard in vague terms of some celestial vision which had appeared in the East to encourage the orthodox forces, and to complete the dismay of the Turks; but had paid little attention to the tale. It appears, however, to have acquired considerable consistency; and I take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship the statement now current, as it will be found in the inclosed extract of a letter addressed by the Exarch of Georgia to the Metropolitan of Moscow, one of the great promoters of the actual crusade.

The picture which this so-called Eastern question offers is truly not a pleasing one for the nineteenth century; it is simply ambition making use of fanaticism as its instrument, fanaticism again leaning upon imposture for its support.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 167.

The Exarch of Georgia to the Metropolitan of Moscow.

(Traduction.)

Le 24 Décembre, 1853.

(Extrait.)

LE Général-Major Prince Bagration Moukrausky m'informe d'un fait extraordinaire. Comme il ne vous sera peut-être pas communiqué officiellement, je me suis décidé à le porter à votre connaissance.

Les prisonniers Turcs ont declaré qu'au plus fort de la bataille d'Alexandropol, et au moment où toutes les troupes y prenaient part, les Turcs ont vue une femme entourée d'une grande lumière descendre du ciel un vapeau à la main, ayant de chaque côté un guerrier. Les rayons qui partaient de cette étrange image étaient si vifs qu'ils en furent éblouis comme de ceux du soleil.

Cette apparition terrifia tellement les Mussulmans que c'est de cet instant qu'ils ont pris la fuite et perdu la bataille.

Les Russes n'ont rien vu, mais les prisonniers attestaient que dans l'armée Russe tout le monde a connaissance de ce fait et l'a vu.

Après la bataille nos soldats ont félicité leurs chefs à l'occasion de cette éclatante victoire remportée avec l'appui du ciel, et à laquelle on était loin de s'attendre.

No. 168.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6*, 1854.

THE accounts of the public feeling which prevails in Russia are so extremely contradictory, that it is with some reluctance that I advert to the subject.

An English gentleman who arrived here on the 4th instant from a long journey in the interior, states that he found the peasantry in general greatly exasperated, and clamorous for war.

These poor people are profoundly ignorant, have nothing to lose, and withal have been led to believe by the village priests and vagrant monks that their religion is in danger, and that the Turks are massacring the Greeks in all directions.

The merchants and traders in general this same gentleman regards as being much disinclined to war; while as respects the landed proprietors, many of them are represented as deeply regretting the appeal which has been made to folly and fanaticism, and as apprehensive that a spirit has been aroused among the lower orders which may lead very possibly to such scenes as those by which a few years ago Gallicia was desolated.

This opinion, I may remark, is held by one of the principal persons of the Emperor's Court.

In a general way, I would observe that it is much easier to state what is not to be believed with regard to Russia, than to point out what may be safely admitted.

As regards the Russian articles which appear in the English papers, they are very commonly suggestive of the idea of their being written by persons who have not the remotest knowledge of the country; an observation which applies especially to occasional articles supposed to be written by private correspondents at St. Petersburgh.

The Russian papers are still more deceptive; they are filled with garbled articles from foreign papers, and with most incorrect statements of what is passing in this country.

I will take the case of the so-termed voluntary contributions.

In a few days it will be announced that, with that patriotic feeling which animates the burghers of Moscow, they have come forward to offer 600,000 silver roubles for the expenses of the war; and it is quite true that such a sum is coming in from Moscow.

This subscription will make a certain sensation; the Governor of Moscow will probably receive a new decoration or an autograph Imperial letter; and my French colleague will have a fresh opportunity afforded him of descanting to me upon the folly of going to war with a people so devoted to their Sovereign.

Neither General Castelbajac, however, nor the public of France and England, will be aware of the means which have been employed to produce this patriotic movement. The operation is a very simple one: the Governor, Count Sagrewski, has informed one merchant that he is expected to pay 400 roubles for the holy war now waging; another, that being richer, he ought to contribute 600; and so on, until the sum considered sufficient is made up. The merchants repine, but they know very well that an appeal to their patriotism means an order upon their purses; their money is paid in; and—not the Russian—but the European public is deluded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 169.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 128. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6*, 1854.

AN autograph letter, of which Count Reiset was the bearer, to General Castelbajac from the Emperor Napoleon, has given rise to some speculation here, and has been supposed by many persons to have contained directions which serve to explain the very wavering conduct of the French Envoy.

I am enabled to state to your Lordship in the strictest confidence, but very positively, that these rumours are unfounded.

The letter, which I may observe General Castelbajac has been careful not to show to any one, is written in the best spirit, and would have ensured an entire alteration in the proceedings if the hold obtained upon him by the Russian Government were less tenacious.

"Employ," the Emperor of the French writes, "employ all your means, and amongst them the affection which the Emperor Nicholas is believed to entertain for you, for the purpose of bringing him over to moderate counsels. Faites lui surtout comprendre qu'un pas de plus en avant c'est la guerre."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 170.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon —(Received February 13.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 6*, 1854.

A FRENCH courier arrived here yesterday, the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor of the French to the Emperor Nicholas, and of a short despatch to General Castelbajac.

My colleague called upon me last night, when I learned from M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch, which he placed in my hands, that the Emperor Napoleon being of opinion that a last effort might be attempted in the interests of peace, had resolved to open himself to his brother Emperor upon the subject, after communicating with Her Majesty's Government, and receiving their full sanction of the plan.

The despatch further stated, that to guard against misapprehension on the part of the Queen's Envoy, the despatch was to be communicated to him.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

General Castelbajac waited upon Count Nesselrode yesterday evening, and requested him to take the Emperor's orders as to the time when he might be pleased to receive him and the Imperial letter, the contents of which are as yet not known to any one here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 171.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 28, 1854.*

APPEARANCES having lately created some doubt as to the intention of the Turkish Government to wait on the defensive, either for the expected answer from St. Petersburgh, or for the return of a more favourable season, I directed M. Pisani to ask Reshid Pasha what I was to understand the real intentions of the Porte to be on that score; and I forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of the report which I have now received from M. Pisani in reply to my inquiry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 171.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Sublime Porte, January 28, 1854.*

RESHID PASHA, to whom I applied officially to ascertain the attitude of the Turkish armies both on the Danube and in Asia, told me most positively that their respective commanders are instructed at present to abstain from advancing, and to keep on the defensive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 172.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 44.)
My Lord. *Constantinople, January 29, 1854.*

I LEARN from Reshid Pasha that he has expressed dissatisfaction to the Austrian Legation respecting the manner in which M. Mouchine, the late Consul-General in Servia, is allowed to cross over from Semlin to Belgrade with the apparent purpose of intriguing with the Servian authorities against the rights and interests of the Porte. His Highness expressed a hope that the Austrian Government would not give facilities to M. Mouchine for carrying on this sort of operation.

The Austrian interpreter appears to have given a temporizing answer. He said that the Austrian Consul at Belgrade had written for instructions on the representation of the Turkish Pasha commanding there, and that he had been directed to find some means of satisfying the Porte without committing the Austrian authorities to any overt act which might give umbrage to Russia. He inquired whether the Prince also could not be induced to make an official application on the subject? The Pasha replied that Prince Alexander was also

unwilling to commit himself towards Russia, and although Servia enjoyed a separate Administration, he insisted upon the Sultan's right to expect that as that Province was part of his Empire, the irregular communications complained of should be made to cease.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 173.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

No. 48.)
My Lord. *Constantinople, February 2, 1854.*

THE copy inclosed herewith of a despatch which I have just now received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond will serve to show that on the Asiatic frontier, as on the Danube, the Russians continue to employ active measures for the expulsion of the Sultan's troops from territory either possessed or occupied by them.

The copies of some correspondence which has passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself are also transmitted herewith as bearing on the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 173.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, January 12, 1854.*

A LETTER reached our Pasha to-day from the Commander-in-chief at Churuksoo, informing him that on Friday the 30th ultimo five Russian steamers appeared off Shefketil (St. Nicolai). One of these vessels remained in the offing, the other four approached a small battery situated midway between Shefketil and Churuksoo, and commenced bombarding same. Some thirty shots were fired from the steamers without much effect. The Turks returned the fire, and the result was, that one of the vessels got crippled and was compelled to retire under canvas; the other three, more or less damaged, soon followed. Selim Pasha says the number of shots fired from his side amounted to sixty from heavy guns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRAS. J. STEVENS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 173.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, January 26, 1854.*

YESTERDAY news reached our Pasha from Selim Pasha's camp. On Thursday the 19th instant, 3,000 Russians issued from the fort of Arzoghetta and concealed themselves in some brushwood at a short distance from St. Nicolai, with a view of surprising the Turkish garrison in the dead of night; the latter receiving timely warning sallied out and drove the Russians back to their fort, killing, it is calculated, half their number, while the Turks suffered very little. Your Lordship may rely on this intelligence; it has been communicated to me by Ismed Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRAS. J. STEVENS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 173.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, January 26, 1854.

Sir,

INCLOSED herewith in copy, for your information, is a letter* addressed to me by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond, respecting the appearance of some Russian ships-of-war on the coast beyond Batoum, and another abortive attempt to regain possession of the port of Nicolayeff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 173.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 29, 1854.

My Lord,

ADVERTING to your Lordship's letter No. 13 dated the 26th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch addressed to you by Mr. Stevens, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond, I beg to transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, the copy of a letter I have received from Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons in reference to the subject of that despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 173.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

"Agamemnon," in the Bosphorus, January 29, 1854

Sir,

I HAVE read Mr. Vice-Consul Stevens' letter of the 12th instant, addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, informing his Excellency that the Pasha at Trebizond had learnt from the Turkish Commander-in-chief at Churuksoo, that five Russian steamers had appeared off Shefketil on the 30th ultimo, and that four of these vessels had exchanged shots with a small battery.

This is one of many versions of the same story that was told to Admiral de Tinan and myself when we were in that neighbourhood on the 11th instant—versions which differed to so ludicrous a decree as to leave doubts upon Admiral de Tinan's mind and mine whether anything of the kind had occurred, or whether it might not have been a circumstance similar to one which had just taken place under our own eyes, when one of the forts at Batoum fired several shots at a Turkish steamer-of-war under our convoy with her colours flying, and accounted to us for so strange a proceeding by saying that they took her for a Russian steamer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

No. 174.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 49.)

Constantinople, February 2, 1854.

My Lord,

THE inclosed copy of a despatch from Selim Pasha dated the 21st January, confirms the intelligence reported in the inclosure of my despatch No. 48, of the fresh defeat of the Russians in an attack upon the fort of Shekvetil.

* Inclosure 1 in No. 173.

Your Lordship will perceive by the Inclosure No. 2, that two Russian steamers attempted to enter the Turkish port of Surmeneh in the Black Sea in the night of the 18th January.

Both these papers were communicated to me from the Porte to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 174.

Despatch from Selim Pasha.

(Translation.) 21 *Rebi-ul-Akhir*, 1270. (*January* 21, 1854.)

ON Saturday, the 14th instant, at about 8 o'clock, four battalions of Russian infantry, accompanied 1000 Georgian levies and two pieces of artillery, marched upon Shekvetil from up the country. On their emerging from the woods, some battalions of the army of Arabia, under Colonel Ismael Bey, together with a sufficient portion of infantry and redif from the garrison at Shekvetil, charged them. After an engagement of more than an hour, the enemy, unable to support the fire of our artillery and musketry, or to reply with a counter-fire, and having lost many soldiers and Georgians, were completely routed and put to flight. Praise be to God, on the side of the Mussulman soldiers, no accident occurred, while the enemy suffered great loss from the crowded state in which they came on, and were completely repulsed, taking away their dead upon litters and their wounded. This circumstance is another of the glorious events attending the fortunate destiny of the Sultan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 174.

Despatch recently received from the Mudir of Surmeneh, in the Province of Trebizond.

(Translation.) 22 *Rebi-ul-Akhir*, 1270. (*January* 22, 1854.)

LAST Wednesday night, about 5 o'clock, two Russian steamers appeared off the port of Surmeneh. Though beacons and fire-signals were displayed three times from the batteries of the town, no regard was paid to them; and the steamers were preparing to enter the harbour when a shotted gun was fired at them; they then put off to sea again.

No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 50.)

Constantinople, February 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE already forwarded to your Lordship Captain Tatham's report of the circumstances which prevented his delivering the packet of letters with which he was charged for Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa. I subsequently came to the decision that it was not advisable, under the circumstances, to incur the risk and cost of another attempt. On communicating this opinion to the French Ambassador, his Excellency acquiesced. The accompanying copy of a despatch which I wrote to Admiral Dundas on this subject, is inclosed for your Lordship's information. It contains a statement of the reasons by which I was guided in coming to the above-mentioned conclusion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, January* 26, 1854.

HAVING read Captain Tatham's report of his unsuccessful endeavour to communicate with Odessa, and taking other circumstances into consideration, I do not perceive any sufficient motive for making another attempt to convey your second notification to the Russian Admiral in chief command at Sebastopol. There is little reason to presume that a second attempt at this season would be more successful than the first; and I have no doubt that the instructions under which you are called upon to act in the Black Sea with Vice-Admiral Hamelin, were duly notified at St. Petersburgh three weeks ago.

On the return of my colleague the French Ambassador, who is absent for two or three days for purposes of a most useful and important kind, I may, perhaps, think it advisable to address you again on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 176.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 2, 1854.

AS it is but too probable that the Emperor of Russia will reject the proposals for peace recommended to him by the Four Powers, I am naturally anxious, considering the probable consequences of such an event, that the remainder of the inactive season should be employed in providing strenuously against those dangers to which, on the resumption of hostilities, the Turkish Empire will be exposed.

As nothing efficient can be expected from a disunited Cabinet, my first object has been to procure a change in the Ministry sufficient to obviate that evil. Some little time has elapsed since I first expressed my opinion on this subject to the Sultan. His Majesty acquiesced in my reason, but appeared to require time for consideration. I renewed my representations in private a few days ago; and I am happy to state that, after consulting with Reshid Pasha, the Sultan has taken the first decisive step towards the object by dismissing the Seraskier, his brother-in-law. Riza Pasha is transferred from the command of the arsenal to that of the army, and his place is to be filled by Mehemet Pasha, formerly Ambassador in London, and now Mouchir at Adrianople. Other Ministerial changes will probably ensue; and I entertain a sanguine hope that the completion of the new arrangement will greatly facilitate the adoption of sound measures, and a more complete understanding with Her Majesty's Embassy

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 2, 1854.

I AVAIL myself of the departure of Her Majesty's steam-ship "Triton" for Malta, to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copies of several despatches which have passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself since the return of the combined squadrons to the Bosphorus.

Being confined to my bed by indisposition, I must reserve for another occasion any remarks which I may feel it my duty to make in addition to those contained in my portion of the correspondence. I beg to inclose in this reservation your Lordship's instruction No. 29 relative to the operations of Her Majesty's squadron.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 177.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January* 26, 1854.

I HAD the honour to receive at 5 P. M. on the 25th instant, your Excellency's letter dated the 24th, conveying to me without reserve or circumlocution the opinion you entertain, and the impression on your mind of dissatisfaction and regret at the return of the combined squadrons under present circumstances to the Bosphorus.

I have carefully perused the observations your Excellency has offered in support of the opinion you have thus been pleased to express, and I have no hesitation in saying that I see no reason to doubt the advantage of employing the combined squadrons in the Black Sea at this season, as proposed in the minute of the 29th ultimo to which your Excellency refers, and in which my colleague Vice-Admiral Hamelin so fully concurs.

With reference to my letter to your Excellency of the 11th January, stating the necessity of four Turkish transports being attached to the squadrons as colliers, it was neither my intention that they should be sent to Sinope nor loaded with the country coals, which could only be used by our steam-vessels in case of absolute necessity; but my wish was to have such vessels ready to be loaded to accompany the squadrons in the event of war rendering continuous operations in the Black Sea necessary.

I share equally with your Excellency in anxiety to maintain and promote the honour and welfare of our country, and to carry fully into execution the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, but I feel obliged to observe to your Excellency that the performance of my duty is much impeded and rendered very difficult by the apparent want of concert between your Excellency and the Ambassador of France. This has been exemplified in several instances in the difference of the instructions received by Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself, and it was only yesterday that I was invited by Vice-Hamelin to a conference in consequence of a letter from the French Ambassador acquainting him that the Ottoman Government had called for an escort for six frigates and eleven other vessels loaded with troops and munitions for Trebizond and Batoom, and had also asked for 5000 or 6000 Turks to be embarked on board the French squadron for conveyance to those ports.

I need hardly tell your Excellency that Vice-Admiral Hamelin was deeply surprised that I had not received any communication on the subject, nor point out to your Excellency that this dissimilarity in our instructions renders it really impossible to carry out with success the combined operations of the two squadrons.

As I do not think that the public service would be benefited by my replying at length to your Excellency's expression of "dissatisfaction and regret," I shall refrain from doing so and follow the course pursued by your Excellency on a former occasion with regard to one of my communications, and submit your Excellency's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty with such observations as I may consider necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, January 27, 1854.*

IN the despatch dated yesterday, which I had the honour of receiving from you this morning, there is a paragraph which I cannot possibly leave unnoticed. You complain of an "apparent want of concert" between me and the French Ambassador; you state that "this has been exemplified in several instances;" you specify a more recent one respecting certain Turkish vessels to be escorted with troops and ammunition, and "5000 or 6000 Turks to be embarked on board the French squadron;" you tell me that "Vice-Admiral Hamelin is deeply surprised" that you had not received any communication on the subject; and finally you point out that such "dissimilarity in the instructions renders it nearly impossible to carry out with success the combined operations of the two squadrons."

On these passages I have to remark that both the circumstances and the allegations stated therein would leave, if unchallenged and unanswered, a strong impression to the prejudice of the two Ambassadors from whom respectively you and Vice-Admiral Hamelin are directed by the two Governments to receive instructions.

First as to the circumstances. Not having yet received any official application from the Porte for convoy or transport of troops and ammunition, I cannot address any instructions to you on the subject. I have been led to expect such an application, and I am still waiting for it. This is the only instance of an "apparent want of concert" between the French Ambassador and myself which you have specified; other instances are merely alluded to, and I have no time to waste in conjecture. Admiral Hamelin's "deep surprise" concerns the French Ambassador more than myself.

Now for the allegations. They are common to both of us, charged by you with a want of concert shown by dissimilar instructions, and with making it "nearly impossible" for you "to carry out with success the combined operations."

These are heavy charges, considering the object of the instructions and of the operations. To me they are unexpected. It remains with Her Majesty's Government to determine how far they are warranted by fact or by propriety.

The instructions, it is true, have not been identical. The difference of language alone creates a difficulty in that respect. But in meaning and spirit I am not aware of any real dissimilarity.

How under these circumstances your operations can be impeded by us I am at a loss to imagine.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, January 28, 1854.*

IT is with much reluctance that I write again upon the subject of Mustapha Pasha's communication, but you seem to desire that nothing should be left in doubt, and in your own letter there is room for misapprehension.

With respect to the Turkish vessels intended to carry troops into the Black Sea, what I instructed M. Pisani to tell Reshid Pasha was this: "The combined squadrons are going into the Black Sea; if you mean to send any vessels in the same direction, I advise you to have them kept within three miles of the coast."

Not having received any notice from me of the supposed convoy, beyond what was signified generally in the protection of Turkish vessels within the territorial jurisdiction of the Porte, you could hardly have erred in concluding that I had been equally silent to the Turkish Pashas.

In my preceding letters the question was not as to the number of troops intended for the Turkish vessels, but whether the Turkish officers had received your advice to diminish the number originally intended.

Regarding what is "due to Her Majesty's flag," I cannot for a moment suppose that you mean to attribute to Her Majesty's Embassy any deficiency of right feeling in that respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 177.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, January 30, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the "Banshee" has arrived to-day, having on board the undermentioned officers of the Royal Engineers, viz.:

Captain Frederick Chapman.
Lieutenant the Honourable G. Wrottesley.
Lieutenant James F. Burke.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vicars having been landed sick at Gibraltar on the 20th instant.

As I propose to send these officers on Wednesday next in the "Spitfire" to survey the Dardanelles and forts, I should feel obliged by your Excellency arranging with the Ottoman authorities the necessary firman to enable them to carry out the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

Captain Chapman will wait on your Excellency with this letter, and afford any information he can.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 177.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," Bosphorus, January 30, 1854.*

THE "Banshee" having sprung a serious leak, rendering it absolutely necessary she should be docked, I have the honour to request your Excellency will be pleased to make an application to the Ottoman Minister to permit her to be docked in the Imperial Arsenal at Constantinople.

I have sent the "Banshee" to the Golden Horn to be ready the moment this request may be granted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, February 1, 1854.*

I SEND you herewith the translation of a note from the Ottoman Secretary of State, announcing the Porte's intention to send troops and ammunition to Varna and Batoom, and requesting that convoy may be given to them by the combined squadrons. The note is accompanied with two papers stating the particulars.

In consequence of this application I have to request that, in concert with Admiral Hamelin, you will take the necessary steps for carrying out its objects.

Should you have any remarks to offer or suggestion to make on the subject, I beg you will let me have them at your earliest convenience.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 177.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.) *January* 31, 1854.

THE steamers of the Imperial navy and the merchant ships which are to convey troops, guns, and ammunition to the army in Roumelia and Anatolia, are ready to start for Trebizond, Batoum, and Varna. If, as in the former instance, any appointed number of vessels from the allied squadrons should be charged with the convoy of our ships, I beg that your Excellency will do what is requisite for that purpose.

The same communication and request has been made also to your collegue the French Ambassador.

I inclose two lists of the Government steamers and of the transports about to start.

Inclosure 8 in No. 177.

List of Turkish Transports bound for Ports in the Black Sea.

(Translation.)

FOUR steam-vessels of the Imperial navy are going with troops to Trebizond.

Four steam-vessels are going with troops to Batoum.

One merchant steam-vessel is going with troops to Sinope, Trebizond, and to Batoum.

Eight merchant sailing-vessels, loaded with ammunition, to Trebizond.

Three merchant-transports, sailing-vessels, loaded with ammunition, to Batoum.

Seven merchant sailing-vessels, loaded with ammunition, to Varna.

Five merchant sailing-vessels, loaded with coals, to Sinope.

Inclosure 9 in No. 177.

List of Turkish Transports bound for the Black Sea, with names of their Captains.

Defences for Batoum.

THE vessel of Captain Duvis oglou Mehemed is in the Bosphorus.
Ditto of Captain Laz oglou Yeglim Moustapha is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Hadgi Yaioub oglou Mehemed is ditto.

Defences to send to Trebizond for Lazioom.

The vessel of Captain Carà Ahmed oglou Ahmed is in the Bosphorus.
Ditto of Captain Ghisghiur oglou is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Suliman Reis oglou is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Mouha oglou Mustapha is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Kintzuk Ali oglou Hassan is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Naquib oglou Nouman is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Mehemed Veli Uddin is at Topanà.
Ditto of Captain Calafat oglou Hafil is ditto.

Defences to send to Varna.

The vessel of Captain Fereq oglou Mehemed is in the Bosphorus.
Ditto of Captain Cara Kaitzuk oglou Hassan is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Tzalik Hassan is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Amarrali Ali is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Talgi oglou Mehemed is at Topanà.
Ditto of Captain Fil oglou Costandi is ditto.
Ditto of Captain Temel Ahmed is ditto.

Inclosure 10 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 1, 1854.

REFERRING to my letter of this day's date respecting some Turkish vessels destined for the Black Sea, I wish to draw your attention to the inclosed extract of Mr. Pisani's report to me on that subject, and I venture to hope that you will feel yourself at liberty to meet the wishes of the Porte, as therein expressed, without any inconvenience of a serious kind.

You will oblige me by returning an answer on this point.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 11 in No. 177.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *January* 31, 1854.

ALTHOUGH in the Porte's note addressed to the British and French Embassies on the subject of the Turkish steamers and transports going into the Black Sea, no mention is made about the transports, yet, if your Excellency could manage to induce the Admiral to allow his steamers to tow the transports, you would render a great service to the Porte.

Inclosure 12 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 1, 1854.

CAPTAIN SIMMONDS, of the Royal Engineers, has been prepared for some days with my assent, and under instructions from the Turkish Department of Ordnance to proceed to Sinope and Batoum, accompanied by Turkish officers appointed by the same office, to ascertain by local inspection the most advisable means of fortifying those places respectively in a durable and efficient manner.

I have consequently to request, in case you see no objection, that Captain Simmonds and his party may be received on board any one of Her Majesty's steamers under your command which you now have occasion to send to the place of their destination.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 13 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, February 1, 1854.

Sir,

HAVING heard some short time ago that piratical attempts had been made in the waters near Samos, and the pirates being supposed to belong to that island, I wrote down for information to Mr. Skene, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul here, but now for the moment at Samos, on public business. The accompanying extract of a letter which I received from him yesterday will serve to convey to you the whole of the intelligence which he has transmitted to me on that subject.

You will be the best judge as to the probable utility of sending a vessel for the repression of their criminal proceedings. If you decide on doing so, I shall readily avail myself of the opportunity to communicate with Mr. Skene, and, for reasons connected with the present state of affairs in Samos, I think that the appearance of one of one of Her Majesty's vessels in its principal port (which, I believe, is Vathic) would be productive of good effects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 14 in No. 177.

Vice-Consul Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Samos, January 21, 1854.

(Extract.)

I HAVE only to-day received your Excellency's note of the 6th instant relative to pirates.

I am told that the small islands called Fournes, off the south-western point of Samos, are the rendezvous of a band of pirates, whose chief's name is Rudinis. They attacked a schooner from Crete about a month ago, but were beaten off. They are supposed to be at present at Fournes.

Since I forwarded my report on the 14th instant, I have also learnt that Moros' band took a boat from the mainland, and boarded a vessel belonging to Scio, from which they carried off 3,000 piastres without maltreating the crew.

Inclosure 15 in No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, February 1, 1854.

Sir,

I SEND you an extract of a letter sent to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Varna respecting the importance of establishing signals intelligible to the local authorities for any vessels which you may have occasion to send to that port.

If you will have the goodness to suggest a proper mode of carrying this idea into effect, I shall have much pleasure in conveying it to the knowledge of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 16 in No. 177.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, January 29, 1854.

(Extract.)

I WAITED upon Omer Fais Pasha this morning, and in the course of conversation his Excellency observed that it appeared to him essential that some private signals should be established between the Admirals of the British and French fleets and the Turkish authorities of Varna, in the event of there being the probability of the contingency arising of any vessels of the combined fleets, or even one single vessel, being under the necessity of entering this port at night.

Inclosure 17 in No. 177.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *February* 1, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE this moment received your Excellency's letters numbered from 16 to 20 inclusive. I will consult with Vice-Admiral Hamelin to-morrow, as to the best mode of carrying out the wishes of your Excellency conveyed in the letters Nos. 16 and 17; and the matters referred to in the others shall have my immediate attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 178.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 158.)

Paris, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that the last accounts received by the French Government from Greece represent so much excitement to prevail against the Turks—excitement which had already led to a collision in the neighbourhood of Arta—that he had at once written to the French Envoy at Athens, directing him to call the immediate attention of the Greek Government to this state of things. The French Government, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, offered the Greek Government the choice between the advantages which must follow by the observation of a strict neutrality, throwing into her hands the commerce of the Levant, or the disasters which would be the consequence of any acts of aggression on Turkey; for France would not permit Greece to enjoy the advantages of neutrality and to be a belligerent at the same time, and she would employ the means at her disposal to prevent it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he had reason to know that the Austrian Government had pronounced itself in the same sense at Athens.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 179.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 161.)

Paris, February 11, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this afternoon an extract of a despatch from General Castelbajac, dated the 2nd instant. The General speaks of the immense preparations making by Russia to carry on war, should war be the ultimate result of the present crisis; but he still asserts his conviction that the Emperor Nicholas, whatever may be said to the contrary, is sincerely anxious for peace, and fully alive to the dangers which war must entail upon him, and he maintains that His Majesty will accept any solution which would not be dishonourable to himself and to his army.

General Castelbajac adds that he does not think that it would be impossible to obtain the Czar's consent to the propositions transmitted from Vienna on the 13th of January, with the exception of that which relates to sending a Plenipotentiary to some neutral town, to attend a congress at which the Four Powers would assist; and even here he is of opinion that Russia would not object to settling the preliminaries of peace in a conference of the Six Powers, provided

that the Treaty of Peace itself was signed between Russia and the Porte at St. Petersburgh or at Bucharest, or even at some neutral town that might be fixed upon.

Your Lordship will not fail to observe that there is some analogy between this language and the scheme which Count Orloff promised Count Buol he would endeavour to persuade the Emperor Nicholas to accept.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 180.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 164.)

Paris, February 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE addressed an official note to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as desired by your Lordship's despatch No. 80. Although I have employed the exact words of that despatch, the importance of the subject of which it treats induces me to inclose a copy of the note itself.

With regard to the communication of this note, as of that addressed to your Lordship by Count Walewski on the 6th instant, to the Austrian and Prussian Governments as suggested by your Lordship, I have had more than one conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He quite agrees in the propriety of this step, and the following appeared to us an eligible manner of carrying out your Lordship's proposition.

The Governments of Great Britain and France may say that the answer of the Russian Government to the propositions of the 13th of January having been deemed such as the Conference could not transmit to Constantinople, while it appeared at the same time that Russia refused to give any explanation or guarantees respecting her future proceedings in regard to Turkey, it became the duty of the Four Powers to consider in what way they could give effect to their recorded declaration not to permit any alteration of the territorial limits of the Turkish Empire. That the Governments of Great Britain and France had exchanged notes upon this subject, defining their future action as well as the objects which they had in view, and that feeling that the Governments of Austria and Prussia had an equal interest with themselves in the settlement of this question, they at once communicated to them the correspondence which had passed between Paris and London, being desirous that, before any more binding engagement was concluded, the Cabinets of Vienna and of Berlin might have an opportunity of considering whether and in what measure they could adopt the views and language of the British and French Governments.

With respect to any direct propositions either to the Austrian or Prussian Governments to sign a Convention, or to enter into any sort of engagement, M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion that the utmost latitude must be left to the French and English Representatives at Vienna and at Berlin. They would be the best judges how far it may be prudent to urge so important a step, as also of the proper moment for so doing; and too precise instructions would injure rather than promote the object at which the two Governments aimed. At all events M. Drouyn de Lhuys considered that the time was not yet arrived to ask the German Powers to engage themselves in an armed interference. Such a demand might alarm them, and our object would be to lead them insensibly on until they found themselves obliged to enforce their own deliberate declarations.

Such had been the object of the Convention which he had proposed should be signed by the Four Powers; but even the furtherance of this, at Vienna and Berlin, had not been judged advisable at the present moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 180.

Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Paris, February 9, 1854.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of the French, has the honour to inform his Excellency M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, that the Earl of Clarendon has received the note which Count Walewski addressed to him under date of the 6th instant, and in which that Ambassador states that it has appeared to the French Government that, with reference to the eventualities which do justly engage the attention of the two Governments, the time has now come for defining the object of their alliance and for denoting the means for carrying out that object.

To this end Count Walewski proposes that Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French should agree:

1st. That the demonstration already made by Great Britain and France, and the signature by their Representatives of the documents agreed to by the Conference at Vienna on the 5th of December, 1853, and on the 13th of January, 1854, prove that the object of the two Governments is to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereign independence of His Majesty the Sultan.

2ndly. That this object would be attained if peace could be re-established between Russia and the Sublime Porte on the perfectly honourable conditions which have been proposed to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. In the event, which may God avert, of war becoming necessary, its cause would naturally cease from the day on which peace should be re-established with Russia on the basis above-mentioned, and when the Russian troops shall have evacuated the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia as well as every other part of the Ottoman dominions.

3rdly. That until the end thus specified shall have been attained the Government of the Emperor of the French engages to cooperate towards it by means of the fleet now acting in the Black Sea, by augmenting it in case of necessity, and to give an assurance that the Government of His Imperial Majesty would be disposed to unite a French squadron to that which Her Britannic Majesty may send into the North Sea or the Baltic whenever the two Governments shall have agreed upon the necessity of making this further demonstration.

4thly. That if the proposed measures should not be held sufficient to cause Russia to evacuate the Ottoman territory, and to conclude peace, the Government of His Imperial Majesty, in concert with that of Her Britannic Majesty, would consider the expediency of supporting their naval operations by means of a body of troops.

5thly. That so long as war may continue, the Government of France would not receive any proposal or overture for a cessation of hostilities without instantly putting the British Government in a position conjointly to discuss its expediency and opportuneness; and that the French Government being solely animated with a desire to preserve the territorial integrity of Europe from serious danger, renounces beforehand the acquisition of any special advantage from events which may occur.

The Undersigned has received orders from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to declare that to all the proposals thus stated Her Majesty's Government give their unqualified assent, and fully adopt the obligations which that assent imposes; and to none of them do Her Majesty's Government agree with greater cordiality and satisfaction than to that in which the honourable and disinterested motives of the two Governments are clearly defined.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) COWLEY.

No. 181.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 165.)

Paris, February 12, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER had an interview yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, for the purpose of communicating to his Excellency the answer which the Austrian Government had returned to the proposition of which Count Orloff was the bearer. Count Colloredo will have made a similar communication to your Lordship.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not conceal from M. de Hübner the disappointment, and to a certain extent the apprehensions, with which his answer inspired him, and he is about to write more fully to M. de Bourquency upon the subject.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that the Austrian despatch implied that, provided the other assurances given by Russia were satisfactory, the continued occupation of the Danubian Provinces by that Power would not prevent a declaration of neutrality on the part of Austria. He intended to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the dangers which might arise from this temporizing policy. While Austria maintained the doctrine of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, she would hold one language for the right and another for the left bank of the Danube, and she would give Russia a fair pretext for drawing the same distinction. Moreover, if Russia gave the Austrian Government the promise required by the latter not to pass the Danube, she would never keep that promise, though the Turks might be deceived by it, and, thinking themselves safe in that quarter, might transfer the greater part of their army where it would apparently be more wanted in Asia. But in fact the Russian troops would soon be unable to maintain themselves in the Principalities for want of provisions, and must return or cross the Danube. The very presence of an Austrian army on the frontier, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed further, would be an embarrassment instead of an assistance, since it would tend to prove that Austria permitted the continuance of an aggression against which the Western Powers had protested, and on account of which they were in arms. "Finally, I told M. de Hübner," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "to beware; for if Austria shewed so little care about the fate of the Principalities, the day might come when France and England would say that they were not forced to defend a cause which Austria, who ought to take the greatest interest in it, abandoned; and as their special interest was to be looked for in the possession of Constantinople and the Black Sea, they would confine themselves to obtain guarantees for the future security of those important positions."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 182.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 166.)

Paris, February 12, 1854.

My Lord,

THE publicity which is at length given to the Emperor's intentions of aiding the Turkish cause by land as well as by sea, absolves me from the secrecy in which my correspondence with your Lordship on this subject has of necessity been enveloped, since I first placed before His Majesty the opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government, that the cooperation of an army was necessary if any decisive blow was to be struck at the aggressive action of Russia in the East.

The Emperor, while admitting that the fleets could do little more than prevent any further naval attack on the part of Russia, was unwilling to expose a small land expedition, and a large one he could not send, to the risks to which it would be unavoidably exposed.

Putting aside the difficulty of transporting an army of 50,000 men, with

all their material, from France to Turkey, His Majesty could not, he said, risk the honour of his flag at such a distance from all his resources, when the army in case of a reverse could have no reserves on which to fall back, and no safety but in a hasty and perhaps an ignominious retreat.

The uncertainty, moreover, of the attitude which Austria and Prussia would eventually assume, naturally influenced the Emperor's intentions. For while defending the Turkish cause in the East he might find those Powers suddenly threatening him in the West.

Another motive for caution, though not avowed, must be traced to the apprehensions of a Republican outbreak in France, should the employment of her armies abroad give the enemies of order a chance of success at home.

Such, no doubt, were the reasons which caused the Emperor to discountenance the suggestions of Her Majesty's Government in favour of a land expedition, though I have since had reason to think that if Austria could have been brought to declare her readiness to act on the Russian flank, all hesitation on the part of His Majesty to cooperate in front would at once have disappeared.

It was not until Sir John Burgoyne passed through Paris, and during an audience with which the Emperor honoured him, showed the possibility of defending Constantinople and the Dardanelles with a comparatively small army, and with but little risk, that His Majesty appeared willing to cooperate in the manner suggested by Her Majesty's Government.

My more confidential communications have since made your Lordship aware that the Emperor is prepared to send an expedition of 20,000 men to the assistance of the Turks, leaving it to Her Majesty's Government to afford a like aid in whatever numbers they choose to contribute.

Before, however, taking this decisive step, His Majesty will await the result of his last appeal to the Emperor of Russia. Should that appeal prove abortive, or even unsatisfactory, the Emperor will no longer hesitate, but will employ all the means at his disposal to render the war, provoked by Russian aggression, as short and decisive as possible.

The troops that will be sent by France will be drawn chiefly, if not entirely, from the Zouaves of the army of Africa, the Emperor thinking that troops inured to the African sun and climate will be less likely to suffer when employed in the East than troops drawn from France.

As soon as the engineer officers employed to examine the localities make their report, and the place of debarkation for the troops is settled, it is proposed to send the first detachment of about 10,000 men from Africa.

These will be followed by others, as the necessities of the service or the extent of operations may require. By the end of March 20,000 French soldiers can be landed in Turkey.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes sending a messenger to Constantinople at an early day, either by a special steamer or overland, with instructions to General Baraguay to prepare the Porte for the arrival of these and English troops on Turkish territory.

This notification, which might otherwise be a delicate one, is rendered comparatively easy in consequence of the Ottoman Ambassador at Paris having, on more than one occasion, made an official demand for the assistance of some French troops, as I had the honour to mention to your Lordship at the time; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes instructing General Baraguay d'Hilliers to say, that the French Government, after mature consideration, and after consultation with Her Majesty's Government, have determined to accede to the request which has been made to them, and that an expedition of British and French troops will shortly sail for the Levant. General Baraguay d'Hilliers will be directed to state further that the exact point of disembarkation will depend upon the reports of the English and French officers sent to examine the localities, and that it is probable that it may be thought necessary to disembark the first detachments in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, as a sure basis of operation, either to prevent a Russian army descending on Constantinople or to succour that city if a descent is operated.

More private instructions will empower General Baraguay d'Hilliers to hold far more positive language if necessary, or even to assert the right of the two Governments to conduct a war in which they are engaged out of friendship for Turkey, in such a manner as they may judge advisable.

2 [illegible]

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it might be found necessary to give some sort of written declaration to the Porte that we intended no permanent occupation of her territory. He replied that he had no objection.

As soon as I know how the French despatches are to be sent, I will inform your Lordship by telegraph, in case you desire to profit by the occasion. You may think it advisable to prepare your despatches in the mean time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Your Lordship will learn from Count Walewski that a French messenger will be dispatched on the night of the 16th. C.

No. 182*a*.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February* 8, 1853.

I HAVE just left the Conference to which Count Buol had this morning invited me, in conjunction with my colleagues. Upon our assembling, he stated that he had no proposal to make to us; but, in consideration of the perfect union existing amongst us upon the Eastern question, he thought he was forwarding our common objects by communicating the despatches he had addressed to Count Esterhazy, for the purpose of being submitted to Count Nesselrode.

Count Buol then read to us these despatches. The first gave an account of the proposal brought forward by Count Orloff, that the Emperor of Austria should, in conjunction with Prussia, take an engagement with the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of a strict neutrality in the war now existing with the Porte, and in which the Maritime Powers seemed likely to take part. Count Buol, in his despatch, developes in the clearest and most distinct language the impossibility of the adoption by the Emperor of any such engagement. He states, with all courtesy to the Emperor Nicholas, the obligations by which the Austrian Government is bound to watch over the strict maintenance of the principle of the independence and integrity of Turkey—a principle proclaimed by the Emperor Nicholas himself, but which the passage of the Danube by his troops might, by the encouragement of insurrections in the Turkish Provinces, endanger. Count Buol, therefore, states that he cannot take the engagement proposed to him. The second despatch to Count Esterhazy relates to the answer which has been returned to the proposals for negotiations transmitted by Count Buol with the sanction of the Conference on the 13th ultimo.

In this despatch, Count Buol states with considerable force the disappointment felt by the Emperor at the want of success which had attended his recommendation in favour of the Turkish propositions. He enters very fully into the subject, and renews the expression of the Emperor's most anxious desire that the Emperor Nicholas may still adopt the proposals which had been submitted to him.

The last despatch is one in which Count Buol replies to the reproach which was addressed to the Imperial Government, that by its present conduct it was abandoning the principles upon which the three Governments of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had hitherto acted for the maintenance of the established interests and independence of the different States of Europe, and that, by so doing, it was endangering the established order of things in Europe, and the security at present existing.

The answer of Count Buol to this reproach is very firmly and clearly stated.

It is impossible for me to give your Lordship a more detailed account, before the departure of the messenger, of these despatches; but I must add, that they met with the entire approbation of the members of the Conference, that they were looked upon as most ably drawn up, and that while using every courteous and friendly expression towards the Emperor Nicholas, they most clearly pointed out the present position which the Austrian Government would maintain with the view of upholding the principles they had proclaimed, and the engagements which they had taken for their support.

After these communications, Count Buol stated that the Emperor, in speaking of the departure of Count Orloff, had inquired whether any suggestion could be made to him, in a confidential manner, by which the negotiations for peace might still be continued. Count Buol had consequently given this subject his best consideration. He had gone to Count Orloff before his departure, which had taken place this morning, and, as a private suggestion of his own, and only verbally, had stated that if the Emperor Nicholas would accept the Turkish proposals, and, upon their general import, send to Vienna the form of preliminaries for peace which he would agree to, and which might be discussed by the Conference with Baron Meyendorff, who should be instructed to that effect, these preliminaries, if approved by the Conference, might be sent to Constantinople with the recommendation of the Four Powers. In the meantime, Baron Meyendorff should be instructed to announce to Prince Gortchakoff that if the Turkish Commander-in-chief proposed to him a suspension of hostilities, upon the ground of the acceptance by Turkey of these preliminaries, he was to agree to it. That when that acceptance arrived at Vienna, from that moment the war should be considered as at an end, and that the Russian troops should immediately receive orders to evacuate the Principalities, and the combined fleets to quit the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. That the Emperor of Austria would then depute a Plenipotentiary of his own to return these preliminaries (approved by His Majesty) to the Emperor Nicholas, and to request him to appoint a person to proceed to any place which might be fixed upon for the signature of the Peace. In stating this plan to the Conference, Count Buol repeated that it was a mere informal suggestion; that he had refused even to put pen to paper with regard to it; but that Count Orloff had taken down the heads of it, and had said that he should submit them to his Emperor. Count Buol stated, that under these circumstances he had thought it right to communicate to us what had passed, although it might be doubtful if it ever again would be brought under discussion. He thought, however, that we might make our Governments acquainted with the general outline of his idea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 183.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 10, 1854.

A PERSON lately arrived from Paris has mentioned to me the substance of a long and interesting conversation with Prince Adam Czartoryski relative to the military operations which his Highness conceives Russia is likely to pursue against Turkey. The Prince expressed his belief that the Russians will not face the Balkan, but that they will attempt to turn the Turkish position at Widdin by crossing the Danube higher up, and that they will then advance through the flat country by Sophia to Adrianople; and the Prince added his conviction that the Russian army is now much more formidable and better prepared for the campaign than it ever has been, and that the disasters experienced in the last war with Turkey are not liable to recur, for that their commissariat and all other arrangements have undergone immense improvement.

Prince Czartoryski not only considers this plan to be feasible, but he seemed to have faith in its adoption, and further, that it would be attended with success; and he seems to fear that, should these operations be carried out, considerable danger for the Dardanelles would result, as he conceives that a corps d'armée might be easily detached to take possession of those forts, simultaneously with the advance of the main body of the army on the Turkish capital.

Your Lordship will be enabled to form a more correct opinion of the practicability or probability of these designs than it is in my power to offer; but I have thought the opinions of Prince Czartoryski on this subject deserving of consideration, and have thus ventured to convey them to your Lordship's knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 184.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

THERE is perhaps no Court in Europe at the present moment where such a maze of intrigue is being carried on as at Berlin.

The success which has lately attended the efforts made by the Government to establish an independent policy for this country, and to liberate it from all engagement with Russia in the approaching contest between that Empire and the maritime Powers, have rendered the Court party rabid.

No means are left untried by them to thwart Baron Manteuffel's management of the Foreign Department, and to support the attempts of the Russian Minister to get his case listened to by the King; and the following incident will serve to elucidate the nature of the influence against which Baron Manteuffel has to contend, and the difficulties which surround his position.

Baron Budberg, having failed in drawing Prussia into the alliance with Russia which he was charged to propose, and finding the King's confidence in General Gerlach so shaken that no communications made through that channel were likely to be favourably received, succeeded in enlisting General Count Stolberg, the Master of the Royal Household, in his interest, and actually forwarded through that person a fresh proposal to His Majesty for an arrangement with Russia. Hitherto Count Stolberg, though belonging to the Kreuz Zeitung party has kept aloof from intrigues, but has been worked upon by his son and others of the more violent partisans.

This attempt, however, of Baron Budberg has, I am happy to say, completely failed, and his new propositions were at once rejected; but your Lordship may judge of the position here when you are informed that the King made no observations to Baron Manteuffel on a communication which had reached him in so singular a manner, until his Excellency produced a copy of Baron Budberg's proposal, which had been subsequently left with him by that Minister. The King, in fact, cares nothing for the feelings of his Ministers, and has been used to find them so subservient to his will, that things are continually occurring here which are happily almost unknown in any other country; and His Majesty, instead of showing that confidence in Baron Manteuffel to which his position and services entitle him, persists in refusing, and has not the courage, to remove from his immediate entourage any of those persons who are working against his present avowed policy; whereas there can be no doubt if, as an example, one or two of the leaders were to get honourable appointments elsewhere than at Berlin, the position of the Government would be completely changed, and its foreign policy receive an impulse which would tend to great good; but the King thinks, by not avowing his partiality for any particular party, by playing fast and loose with all, that he maintains his own independence and freedom of action, and though he pleases none he also quarrels with none.

I have thought it right to send your Lordship this but too true account of the working of the Camarilla here. I must, however, also add, that a person who sees the King almost daily, and who is at the present moment playing an important part in directing the Oriental policy of this Government, has just informed me that His Majesty continues firm, and that he sees no change or vacillation in his opinions on this question.

At the same time that he has received this assurance, an appointment has been talked of at the Prussian Foreign Office which does not satisfy those who are working for the independent policy of Prussia. It is believed that Baron Werther, at present Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Copenhagen, is to be the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the place of M. de le Coq.

Baron Werther is said to be imbued with Holy-Alliance principles, inherited from his father, who was formerly Minister at Paris, and for a short time Minister for Foreign Affairs; but Baron Manteuffel, to whom I have spoken of the nomination, says that he is not so, and he evidently expects to mould him in the way that will suit him, and advance his present policy. I, however, told his Excellency that Baron Werther was probably uninitiated in the Eastern

question; that he had for the present the assistance of Count Albert Pourtales, who was willing to continue to serve in his present irresponsible position; and that I hoped that as the moment was critical, he would do nothing to discourage this able and independent public servant; and that if the appointment of Baron Werther was decided on, that his Excellency would allow him at all events to remain at Copenhagen for some time to come, and make use of the services of Count Pourtales in carrying on the correspondence on the Eastern question, which at the present moment was the only one of importance; for it required all the watchfulness of Count Pourtales, or of some one equally capable of conducting it under his Excellency's superior directions.

Baron Manteuffel told me that the appointment of Baron Werther was not definitively settled, and I have some reason to hope that he will suspend it. But at the same time I regret to say that his Excellency is not, I fear, disposed to make any arrangement which will insure the continuance for any length of time of Count Pourtales' services at Berlin, as he is jealous of his influence with the King; he is glad, however, to make use of him at the present crisis, and he is therefore likely to remain here for some months to come, when it is probable that he will be appointed to a mission at one of the Great Courts, possibly to Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 185.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

In obedience with your Lordship's instructions I read to Baron Manteuffel this day your Lordship's despatch No. 13 of the 7th instant, marked Secret and Confidential, conveying to his Excellency the sincere satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the result of the audience given by the King to the Russian Minister at this Court, and congratulating his Excellency on the firmness and decision which he had displayed on that occasion.

His Excellency received this communication with marked satisfaction, and requested me to convey his sincere thanks to your Lordship.

At his request I have since supplied his Excellency, for confidential communication to the King, with an extract of that portion of this despatch which refers to the position and policy of Prussia at this crisis. I have done so under the conviction that much good may be derived from placing before His Majesty this clear and forcible statement of the danger to which Europe and Germany will be exposed by Russian ascendancy and aggression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 186.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 57.)

Berlin, February 10, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will receive so full an account from the Earl of Westmorland of the circumstances which attended Count Orloff's mission to Vienna that it would be useless to take up your Lordship's time with an account of the reports which have reached this Government on the same subject, as they entirely coincide with those sent by Her Majesty's Minister at that Imperial Court.

Baron Manteuffel is well satisfied with these communications, and seems to think that the position in which the Russian Government will now find themselves may perhaps make them hesitate before proceeding further. At the same time he fears that there is little expectation of the negotiations for peace being renewed, as he thinks it unlikely that the verbal proposals made by Count Buol

to Count Orloff the morning he left Vienna, as detailed in Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 44, will be acceptable at St. Petersburgh.

The Austrian Minister at this Court has communicated to Baron Manteuffel the despatches which have been addressed to Count Esterhazy. His Excellency has mentioned the substance of them to me, observing that though Austria has rejected the Russian propositions, she has not done so in such decided language as Prussia had used in her last communication to St. Petersburgh. Upon the whole, however, he is well pleased with them, and he informed me that Count Buol had thanked him, through Count Arnim, for the communication of the instructions to General Rochow, and had said that they arrived most opportunely, and would be of great assistance to him in drawing out those which he was preparing for the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 187.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)

Paris, February 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE had some conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the delicate subject of the rights of neutral Powers. It appears that some of the smaller maritime States, possibly prompted by Russia, who knows the differences of opinion which exist between Great Britain and France on the subject of those rights, have either intimated to the French Government their intention to remain neutral, or have asked advice of the French Government whether they should declare themselves neutral or not.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me with great frankness and friendliness of manner of the language which he had held, and which he had since introduced into a circular sent to the French Missions abroad. He had strongly dissuaded, he said, any of those States from making any declaration of neutrality. In the first place they could remain neutral, he observed, without declaring themselves to be so. Nine times out of ten a declaration of neutrality implied partiality for, and was intended to be favourable to, one of the belligerents. Secondly, he argued that it would be a dangerous proceeding for the smaller States to put forth declarations which might provoke counter-declarations on the part of any one of the belligerents. If it was hoped to sow dissensions between France and England by raising questions on which it was known they were not agreed, the plotters would be disappointed; for both nations would know how to regulate their conduct in respect to this matter, so as not to impede the prosecution of the common object which they had in view. Thirdly, the less the smaller Powers put forward their opinions in this respect, the more likely was the war to be confined to the East. If dissensions became apparent among the European Powers; if some were tacitly neutral, and others declared themselves to be so; if some put forward one doctrine, and others another, the revolutionary party would profit by these dissensions to advance their own schemes, and a war would be kindled of which no one could foresee the end; whereas unanimity on the part of the Western States would confine the seat of war to the East. Lastly, it would be impolitic in neutral Powers to make declarations, when France, the great champion of the rights of neutrals, could not and would not take part with them.

It might be argued, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, that this language had not been held to Sweden and Denmark, but the case was not the same. England and France now knew that that declaration had been made, partly from a desire to escape from the pressure of Russia in a different sense upon those two Governments; and it could not be denied further that, if war broke out, it was more than likely that some of the principal operations would be carried on in the Baltic, and consequently in the immediate neighbourhood of those countries.

Nothing could be more amicable than the language with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys treated this very delicate question with me, particularly the points on which he thought I might take umbrage. He said that the two countries must be mutually forbearing: that France would abstain from asserting any principles

to which we could not assent, and that he was sure that we would not have recourse to measures calculated to provoke discussion. He had no doubt that Russia counted upon setting the two Governments at variance upon this point, and he had as little doubt that she would be disappointed.

I said that I was sure that your Lordship would do full justice to the frank and loyal manner in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had expressed himself, and that every precaution would be taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent the question of the rights of neutrals becoming a source of embarrassment to any future operations undertaken by the Governments in common.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 188.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 167.)

Paris, February 12, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS proposes writing to M. de Bourqueney, with respect to the confidential communication made to the Conference on the 2nd instant by M. de Buol, that if a *bonâ fide* acceptation of the bases of negotiation transmitted to St. Petersburgh on the 13th of January, is meant, and is accepted by Russia, and if an armistice is offered, the Eastern question will not require a long time to settle; but that, until Russia has spoken out more clearly, the French Government does not intend relaxing in the preparations which they are making to meet a state of war.

M. de Bourqueney will be desired, at the same time, to exhort the Austrian Government not to relax the tone which it has assumed towards Russia. The benefit of it has been already experienced in the altered demeanour of Count Orloff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 189.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 87. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, February 14, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt, with extreme satisfaction, from your Excellency's despatch No. 150, the frank and friendly manner in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has discussed with you a question upon which so much difference has existed between the two countries, and upon which no doubt, in various quarters, the hope of future dissension is founded; but nothing will more tend to frustrate such expectations than the wise and judicious advice given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to those States which have sought the opinion of the French Government respecting their neutrality.

Her Majesty's Government approve and confirm the assurances which your Excellency gave to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who may rely that upon this particular question, as in all others, no effort on the part of Her Majesty's Government will ever be wanting to preserve the perfect harmony that now exists between France and England.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 190.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 92.)

Foreign Office, February 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 164, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the note which you addressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the British and French alliance; and

that they concur in the proposals made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in regard to the communications which should be made by the two Governments to Austria and Prussia.

I shall accordingly address despatches in that sense to Her Majesty's Ministers at Berlin and Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 191.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 173.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 14, 1854.*

THE Austrian Minister had a long conversation yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the confidential communication made to the Vienna Conference by Count Buol on the 8th instant, the apparent object of M. de Hübner being to obtain from M. Drouyn de Lhuys an expression of opinion on the possibility of an arrangement of the Eastern question on the terms which Count Orloff had at the last moment undertaken to recommend to the favourable consideration of his Imperial master.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in telling me this conversation, said that he had stated to M. de Hübner that the French Government had no official knowledge of any other propositions for the re-establishment of peace than those forwarded to St. Petersburgh on the 13th of January; that these propositions, it must be recollected, had been suggested to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers, had been adopted by the Sultan and his Ministers, and recommended by the Vienna Conference to the Emperor of Russia as a fair and equitable settlement of his differences with the Porte. The Conference was therefore bound in honour to abide by its declared opinions; and Russia having refused the terms thus deliberately recommended, had, to say the least, rendered herself liable to the comminatory language which Count Buol had himself proposed should be employed against whichever party might refuse to enter into the conciliatory course proposed by the Conference.

Such was the exact state of the case; and the French Government could not be called upon to give an official opinion upon any other scheme of arrangement, particularly on one which Count Buol himself announced to the Conference was not a formal proposition, but one which the Emperor of Russia might be induced to entertain.

"Having said this," continued M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Hübner, "officially, I have no objection to discuss with you confidentially the means of converting the propositions of the Conference into a Treaty of Peace. If the terms suggested to us by Count Orloff, and communicated confidentially to the Conference by Count Buol, mean that preliminaries of peace based on, and consequently including, all the stipulations contained in the propositions of the 13th January, are to be discussed in a Conference of the Four Powers, at which a Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiary are to assist, the object being to settle the exact form of words in which the Treaty of Peace is to be drawn up, and that the preliminaries thus settled are to be sent to Constantinople for the acceptance of the Porte, and when accepted to be followed by an armistice, the evacuation of the Principalities, and the withdrawal of the combined fleets from the Black Sea; and that further a Treaty of Peace, thus discussed and settled, is to be signed in some neutral place by a Russian and a Turkish Plenipotentiary alone—to such terms the French Government could have no objection, for they have never required more. But if, on the other hand, it is intended to discuss the propositions of the 13th of January with a view of modifying or altering them, to such a course the French Government would not lend themselves, because they are bound in honour to support the propositions which they themselves, together with the other members of the Conference, suggested to the Porte and recommended to St. Petersburgh."

Neither, added M. Drouyn de Lhuys, would France desist from the prosecution of such coercive measures as she may judge advisable, until matters had assumed a shape which would guarantee the Ottoman Empire from all further

danger from Russia; and he must repeat the advice which he had already given to the Austrian Government to persist in its intercourse with the Russian Government in that firm and resolute language which, to judge from what had occurred immediately before Count Orloff's departure, had already produced some good effect, and which, if persevered in, would no doubt produce much more.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 192.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 174.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 14, 1854.*

THE Austrian Government, it appears, has taken serious alarm at the insurrectionary movement which seems to be spreading among the Christian population of Turkey, and which is fomented, if not by the Greek Government, by partisans subjects of the King of Greece.

M. de Hübner has been desired to speak to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on this subject, and to express a wish that the French and English Governments should check this movement both by land and by sea, promising to cooperate on her own frontier for the suppression in that neighbourhood of any outbreak against the legitimate authority of the Porte.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied to M. de Hübner, that it was upon the banks of the Danube that this insurrectionary spirit must be combatted, for that it was the work of Russian agents, and encouraged by the presence of a Russian force in the Principalities; and he warned Austria that a longer hesitation on her part would be taken for weakness, and that she risked the spreading of the evil of which she complained into her own territories, and of her own Slavonic population being drawn towards Russia as the stronger Power.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it was lamentable to observe the gigantic proportions which the question was assuming, when a few words of friendly advice, but of firm determination, if that advice had not been listened to, spoken by Austria at its commencement, must have prevented the catastrophe to which we are too probably hastening.

I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 168, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had written to Athens on the subject to which this despatch relates, and he appears to be of opinion that some more active interference on the part of the two Governments may become necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 193.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 175.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 14, 1854.*

THE French Government has received intelligence that Russia is making great efforts to obtain the consent of the United States Government to the issue of Russian letters of marque to subjects of the United States; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys is about to address that Government, to state the prevalence of these reports, and to express his conviction that they will not countenance so inimical a proceeding towards France and England, with whom the United States are in relations of peace and amity.

He hopes that your Lordship will take the same course.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys mentioned, at the same time, that this intelligence gave him some alarm for the safety of the numerous French vessels engaged in the cod fishery on the banks of Newfoundland; and he hoped that Her Majesty's Government would not object to extend the protection of the British flag to

French vessels who might be in need of it, under a promise of reciprocity on the part of France. Indeed, it would give him sincere pleasure if some engagement of the kind could be made for all parts of the world.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that he should write to-day or to-morrow on this subject to Count Walewski; and in the meantime he should be glad if I would bring it under the notice of Her Majesty's Government.

I promised to do so, observing that the proposal was of too important a nature to permit my saying more than that I was certain it would be received by Her Majesty's Government with an anxious desire to meet the wishes of the Government of the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 194.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 176.)

Paris, February 14, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Emperor has thought fit to publish the letter which he addressed on the 29th ultimo to the Emperor of Russia, and to which allusion was made in my despatches Nos. 100 and 123. I have the honour to inclose a copy of it as it appeared this morning in the official part of the "Moniteur," together with the Article which states the Emperor's reasons for giving publicity to his letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 194.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of February 13, 1854.

DES journaux ayant rapporté inexactement quelques passages de la lettre que l'Empereur Napoléon a adressée, le 29 Janvier dernier, à l'Empereur Nicolas, il est nécessaire de rétablir l'exactitude des faits allégués en publiant le texte original :

Palais des Tuileries, le 29 Janvier, 1854.

Sire,

Le différend qui s'est élevé entre votre Majesté et la Porte Ottomane en est venu à un tel point de gravité, que je crois devoir expliquer moi-même directement à votre Majesté la part que la France a prise dans cette question et les moyens que j'entrevois d'écarter les dangers qui menacent le repos de l'Europe.

La note que votre Majesté vient de faire remettre à mon Gouvernement et à celui de la Reine Victoria tend à établir que le système de pression adopté dès le début par les deux Puissances Maritimes a seul envenimé la question. Elle aurait, au contraire, ce me semble, continué à demeurer une question de Cabinet, si l'occupation des Principautés ne l'avait transportée tout à coup du domaine de la discussion dans celui des faits. Cependant les troupes de votre Majesté une fois entrée en Valachie, nous n'en avons pas moins engagé la Porte à ne pas considérer cette occupation comme un cas de guerre, témoignant ainsi notre extrême désir de conciliation. Après m'être concerté avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Prusse, j'ai proposé à votre Majesté une note destinée à donner une satisfaction commune; votre Majesté l'a acceptée. Mais à peine étions-nous avertis de cette bonne nouvelle, que son Ministre, par des commentaires explicatifs, en détruisait tout l'effet conciliant et nous empêchait par là d'insister à Constantinople sur son adoption pure et simple. De son côté, la Porte avait proposé un projet de note des modifications que les quatre Puissances représentées à Vienne ne trouvèrent pas inacceptables. Elles n'ont pas eu l'agrément de votre Majesté. Alors la Porte, blessée dans sa dignité, menacée dans son indépendance, obérée par les efforts déjà faits pour opposer une armée à celle de votre Majesté, a mieux aimé déclarer la guerre que de rester dans cet état d'incertitude et d'abaissement. Elle avait réclamé notre appui; sa cause nous paraissait

juste; les escadres Anglaise et Française reçurent l'ordre de mouiller dans le Bosphore.

Notre attitude vis-à-vis de la Turquie était protectrice, mais passive. Nous ne l'encouragions pas à la guerre. Nous faisions sans cesse parvenir aux oreilles du Sultan des conseils de paix et de modération, persuadés que c'était le moyen d'arriver à un accord, et les quatre Puissances s'entendirent de nouveau pour soumettre à votre Majesté d'autres propositions. Votre Majesté, de son côté, montrant le calme qui naît de la conscience de sa force, s'était bornée à repousser, sur la rive gauche du Danube comme en Asie, les attaques des Turcs, et avec la modération digne du chef d'un grand empire, elle avait déclaré qu'elle se tiendrait sur la défensive. Jusque là nous étions donc, je dois le dire, spectateurs intéressés, mais simples spectateurs de la lutte, lorsque l'affaire de Sinope vint nous forcer à prendre une position plus tranchée. La France et l'Angleterre n'avaient pas cru utile d'envoyer des troupes de débarquement au secours de la Turquie. Leur drapeau n'était donc pas engagé dans les conflits qui avaient lieu sur terre. Mais sur mer, c'était bien différent. Il y avait à l'entrée du Bosphore 3,000 bouches à feu dont la présence disait assez haut à la Turquie que les deux premières Puissances Maritimes ne permettraient pas de l'attaquer sur mer. L'événement de Sinope fut pour nous aussi blessant qu'inattendu; car peu importe que les Turcs aient voulu ou non faire passer des munitions de guerre sur le territoire Russe. En fait, des vaisseaux Russes sont venus attaquer des bâtiments Turcs dans les eaux de la Turquie et mouillés tranquillement dans un port Turc; ils les ont détruits, malgré l'assurance de ne pas faire une guerre agressive, malgré le voisinage de nos escadres. Ce n'était plus notre politique qui recevait là un échec, c'était notre honneur militaire. Les coups de canon de Sinope ont retenti douloureusement dans le cœur de tous ceux qui en Angleterre et en France ont un vif sentiment de la dignité nationale. On s'est écrié d'un commun accord: partout où nos canons peuvent atteindre, nos alliés doivent être respectés. De là l'ordre donnée à nos escadres d'entrer dans la Mer Noire, et d'empêcher par la force, s'il le fallait, le retour d'un semblable événement. De là la notification collective envoyée au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pour lui annoncer que, si nous empêchions les Turcs de porter une guerre agressive sur les côtes appartenant à la Russie, nous protégerions le ravitaillement de leurs troupes sur leur propre territoire. Quant à la flotte Russe, en lui interdisant la navigation de la Mer Noire, nous la placions dans des conditions différentes, parce qu'il importait, pendant la durée de la guerre, de conserver un gage qui pût être l'équivalent des parties occupées du territoire Turc et faciliter la conclusion de la paix en devenant le titre d'un échange désirable.

Voilà, Sire, la suite réelle et l'enchaînement des faits. Ils est clair qu'arrivés à ce point, ils doivent amener promptement ou une entente définitive, ou une rupture décidée.

Votre Majesté a donné tant de preuves de sa sollicitude pour le repos de l'Europe, elle y a contribué si puissamment par son influence bienfaisante contre l'esprit de désordre, que je ne saurais douter de sa résolution dans l'alternative qui se présente à son choix. Si votre Majesté désire autant que moi une conclusion pacifique, quoi de plus simple que de déclarer qu'un armistice sera signé aujourd'hui, que les choses reprendront leur cours diplomatique, que toute hostilité cessera, et que toutes les forces belligérantes se retireront des lieux où des motifs de guerre les ont appelées?

Ainsi les troupes Russes abandonneraient les Principautés et nos escadres la Mer Noire. Votre Majesté préférant traiter directement avec la Turquie, elle nommerait un Ambassadeur qui négocierait avec un Plénipotentiaire du Sultan une Convention qui serait soumise à la Conférence des quatre Puissances. Que votre Majesté adopte ce plan, sur lequel la Reine d'Angleterre et moi sommes parfaitement d'accord, la tranquillité est rétablie et le monde satisfait. Rien, en effet, dans ce plan qui ne soit digne de votre Majesté, rien qui puisse blesser son honneur. Mais si, par un motif difficile à comprendre, votre Majesté opposait un refus, alors la France, comme l'Angleterre, serait obligée de laisser au sort des armes et aux hasards de la guerre ce qui pourrait être décidé aujourd'hui par la raison et par la justice.

Que votre Majesté ne pense pas que la moindre animosité puisse entrer dans mon cœur; il n'éprouve d'autres sentiments que ceux exprimés par votre Majesté elle-même dans sa lettre du 17 Janvier, 1853, lorsqu'elle m'écrivait: "Nos

relations doivent être sincèrement amicales, reposer sur les mêmes intentions: maintien de l'ordre, amour de la paix, respect aux Traités et bienveillance réciproque." Ce programme est digne du Souverain qui le traçait, et, je n'hésite pas à l'affirmer, j'y suis resté fidèle.

I pray, &c.
(Signed) NAPOLEON.

No. 195.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 23. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 33 of the 4th instant, marked Secret and Confidential, inclosing a copy of the Protocol which has recently been presented by the Russian Minister for the adoption of the Prussian Government, and which has been rejected, I have to state to your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have read with astonishment this Protocol, in which the Emperor of Russia appears altogether to have lost sight of the dignity and independence of Prussia, and not to be aware of the state of public opinion in Germany upon the reckless course he is pursuing.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the manner in which this proposal has been received at Berlin will prevent its being renewed by His Imperial Majesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 196.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 24.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 35 of the 4th instant, reporting the course pursued by you, in conjunction with your French colleague, on the occasion of your communication to Baron Manteuffel of the draft of the proposed Convention, to be signed by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria and Prussia, setting forth the terms on which these Powers engage themselves to employ all their efforts to bring about the re-establishment of peace, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion, and I have to instruct you to assure Baron Manteuffel that there is no wish on the part of England and France unduly to press upon the Prussian Government, although in the present sate of things the importance of coming to a clear understanding with reference to the future cannot be overestimated.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 197.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 93.)

Foreign Office, February 16, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 148, reporting the terms of the communication received by the French Government from Vienna, relative to a proposal made to Count Orloff by Count Buol that preliminaries of a peace should be sent from St. Petersburgh to Vienna, and from thence to Constantinople, I have to state to your Excellency that I have received a similar communication from Lord Westmorland, and that Her Majesty's Government concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys in thinking that this proposal, which it appears Count Orloff has engaged to recommend to the Emperor of Russia, can only lead to delay, and may tend to set Austria at variance with France and England; and Her Majesty's Government will instruct Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna to inform Count Buol that no further demands can be made upon the Porte, and that Her Majesty's Government can be no party to a modification of the Turkish terms, which have been declared by the Conference to be just and reasonable, and such as ought to be accepted by Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 198.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 96.)

Foreign Office, February 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a project of a Convention which has been drafted with a view of carrying into effect the resolution of the Governments of Great Britain and France, to be prepared for whatever contingencies may grow out of the prosecution of active hostilities by Russia against Turkey, which may be looked for in the coming spring.

Your Excellency will propose to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that this project should be sent to the Ambassadors of France and England at Constantinople, with instructions to obtain the assent of the Turkish Government to the signature of a Convention by the Plenipotentiaries of the Queen, of the Emperor of the French, and of the Sultan; and if his Excellency should agree to the project and to the proposed course, you will request him to forward it to Constantinople, and you will, by the same opportunity, acquaint Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe with the result of your communications on this subject with the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 198.

Draft of Convention between Great Britain, France, and Turkey.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, having been invited by His Highness the Sultan to assist His Highness in repelling the aggression directed by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias against the territories of the Sublime Ottoman Porte; an aggression whereby the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the throne of the Sultan are placed in peril; and their said Majesties being fully persuaded that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present limits is essential to the maintenance of the balance of power among the States of Europe, and having therefore consented to afford His Highness the Sultan the assistance which he has applied for with a view to that object; it has seemed good to their said Majesties and to His Highness the Sultan to conclude a Treaty for the purpose of recording their intentions as aforesaid, and of regulating the manner in which the assistance shall be given by their said Majesties to His Highness.

For this purpose their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c.

And His Highness the Sultan, &c.

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full-powers,

formed in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles:—

Art. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, having already, at the request of His Highness the Sultan, appointed powerful divisions of their naval forces to proceed to Constantinople and to afford such protection as circumstances will permit to the Ottoman territory and flag; their said Majesties undertake by the present Treaty still further to cooperate with His Highness the Sultan for the protection of the Ottoman territory in Europe and in Asia against Russian aggression, by the employment for that purpose of such an amount of their land forces as may appear necessary to effect that object, which land forces their said Majesties will forthwith send to such place or places in the Ottoman territory as may be deemed advisable; and His Highness the Sultan agrees that the British and French land forces thus sent for the protection of the Ottoman territory shall meet with the same friendly reception and be treated with the same consideration in the Ottoman territories as the British and French naval forces for some time employed in the Turkish waters.

II. The high contracting parties severally engage to communicate to each other, without loss of time, any proposals which either of them may receive from the Emperor of Russia, or on behalf of the Emperor of Russia, with a view to the cessation of hostilities, to an armistice, or to a peace; and His Highness the Sultan further engages not to conclude any armistice, or to enter into negotiations for peace, or conclude any preliminaries for peace, or any treaty of peace with the Emperor of Russia, unless with the knowledge and consent of the high contracting parties.

III. As soon as the objects of the present Treaty shall have been secured by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, will forthwith make arrangements for immediately withdrawing their naval and military forces employed in giving effect to the objects of the present Treaty; and all fortresses or strongholds within the Ottoman territory which may have been temporarily occupied by the military forces of England and France shall be made over to the authorities of the Sublime Ottoman Porte within days after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty by which the present war shall be terminated.

IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at as soon as possible within weeks from the day of its signature.

In witness whereof, &c.

No. 199.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 60.)

Foreign Office, February 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government, after communication with that of France, have come to the conclusion that the time has now arrived when it is necessary to be prepared for whatever contingencies may grow out of the prosecution of active hostilities by Russia against Turkey, which may be looked for in the coming spring.

Her Majesty's Government have accordingly determined, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, without loss of time to send to Turkey a considerable military force, and the first portion of the British force will in the course of a few days proceed to Malta, on its way to Constantinople. The direction to be given to the combined forces on their arrival at that point will

necessarily depend on the reports of the English and French officers who have been sent to examine the country; but it is not unlikely that a portion of them will be disembarked in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, with the view of obtaining a sure basis of operations against any Russian force which may hereafter move upon Constantinople, or against any direct attack on that city.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that this intelligence will prove highly agreeable to the Sultan and his Government, as affording an additional proof of the final determination of the British and French Governments to carry into effect the assurances which they have given to the Porte, that it might count on their assistance in upholding the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire. And although the very fact that England and France appear together on the scene of action must be sufficient of itself to reassure the Porte against any apprehensions that a permanent occupation of any portion of the Turkish territory could be in the contemplation of the two Governments, they will not hesitate distinctly to abjure any such intention.

But it will be apparent to the Porte that the two Governments, having undertaken to assist Turkey, and having consequently staked their honour that their assistance shall be effectual, must be free to decide what means are best calculated to carry that object into effect; and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the Porte will appreciate the great advantage which the proposed military expedition to the shores of Turkey is calculated to afford by encouraging its own troops, and discouraging those of its enemy, and will cordially accept the proffered aid, and give such orders to the Turkish Generals as may insure unity of action in combined operations which the British and French Commanders may propose to undertake.

Her Majesty's Government are the more confirmed in this conviction by the fact of the Turkish Ambassador at Paris having more than once officially demanded from the Government of France the assistance of French troops; and they cannot doubt that the Porte will be glad to see a British army associated with that of France, as the fleets of the two Powers already are, for the defence of the Turkish Empire against the aggressions of Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 200.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Wyse.

(No. 9.)

Foreign Office, February 16, 1854.

Sir,

M. TRICOUPI called here yesterday, for the purpose of giving me the most recent accounts he had received of the insurrectionary movements at Arta, and in the neighbourhood of that place. He read to me some extracts from the despatches of M. Paicos, who admitted that a lieutenant and some soldiers on the frontier had deserted from the Greek service, and had joined the insurgents; but M. Tricoupi assured me that the efforts of his Government were unceasing to calm excitement, as they felt they had nothing to gain by promoting disaffection to the Porte, whereas, by perfect neutrality, they might earn for themselves the goodwill of the Great Powers.

I told M. Tricoupi that although his Government might not openly promote insurrection, yet they in fact did nothing to discourage it, nor even to make known that it would be regarded unfavourably by the King or his Government; that the Russian organ in the press was calling the people to arms, and announcing the speedy downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the triumph of Russia, and that no sign of disapprobation was ever given by the organs of the Government: nor, I said, were other proofs wanting to justify the belief, now general throughout Greece, that the insurrectionary movement was viewed with favour by the Government; and I distinctly warned M. Tricoupi that his Government had now to choose between the goodwill of England and France and the blockade of Athens, as the two Governments, while engaged in defending the Ottoman territory from Russian aggression, would certainly not tolerate that the Greek subjects of the Sultan should be excited to rebel against his authority, in consequence of measures sanctioned by the Greek Government.

M. Tricoupi expressed much alarm at the thought of a blockade, which, he said, would be fatal to the commerce and mercantile navy of Greece, and would not be deserved, as the Greek Government had made itself unpopular by carrying out the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in opposition to the popular sentiment, which was most bitter to the Turks.

I replied that I was well aware of the unpopularity of the Government, but that it was not attributable to the cause assigned by M. Tricoupi; and that, if the Government desired to avoid the evils that a blockade would entail, they must lose no time in adopting an entirely different line of conduct upon the great question now at issue.

I requested M. Tricoupi to report what I had said to M. Paicos, and he promised to do so.

You will inform M. Paicos that Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French are entirely agreed in opinion as to the imprudent course which the Greek Government is pursuing, and are concerting together the measures which that conduct now appears to render necessary.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 201.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government have had under consideration the statements contained in Captain Peel's despatch of the 7th instant, of which a copy was transmitted to this office in your Secretary's letter of yesterday, in regard to an application made to him by the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands to assist the Turkish authorities in Albania in putting down an insurrection by which the towns of Arta and Prevesa were threatened. Sir Henry Ward's application appears to have been founded on the policy which Her Majesty's Government are engaged in carrying out for the support of the Sultan against Russian aggression, and on the suspicions which he entertained that the insurrectionary movement to which he referred might be traced to foreign intrigue, having for its object to weaken or overthrow the authority of the Sultan, and thereby to counteract the views of Her Majesty's Government.

The presence of the Russian squadron at Trieste, with which your Lordships are already acquainted, cannot be overlooked in considering the course which should be taken in the matter in question. That squadron, if not fomenting, cannot but be considered as in some degree influencing the insurrectionary movements; and the active intrigues, accompanied in some instances by overt acts, which are carried on against the peace of Turkey in the neighbouring kingdom of Greece, must needs be taken into account when endeavouring to form a just estimate of the character of the Albanian movement.

Under all these circumstances Her Majesty's Government, although doing full justice to the prudence shown by Captain Peel in hesitating to act, in so delicate a matter, without specific instructions, are disposed to a certain extent to coincide in Sir Henry Ward's views; and I have therefore to suggest to your Lordships that Captain Peel should be instructed to visit the coasts of Albania and Epirus with the ships under his orders, and to employ all the influence which the presence of his ships can give him to uphold the constituted authorities against insurrectionary movements originating with and carried on by the inhabitants of the disturbed districts.

If Captain Peel should have good reason to suppose that the insurrection has its origin or is supported from without, the position of affairs would be changed. It might then become virtually a foreign aggression against the territory of the Sultan; and against any such aggression at the present time Her Majesty's Government are prepared to assist the Porte. Captain Peel would therefore be justified in declaring to the insurgents that the prosecution of their insurrectionary movements may bring them into collision with the British forces; but unless Captain Peel should be persuaded of the foreign character of

the insurrection, he would not be justified in employing Her Majesty's forces in supporting the Turkish authorities against the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Of course if the Russian squadron should take any part with a view of supporting or encouraging insurrection, or should commit any act of aggression on the Turkish territory or flag, it will be the duty of Captain Peel to protect them both to the utmost of his power; and in any case Captain Peel, after explaining the duty with which he is charged, will warn any Russian ships of war which he may fall in with on his station that they cannot be allowed to hover on the Turkish coasts, but must proceed in some other direction; and Captain Peel will see that the warning thus given is attended to by the Russian ships, by keeping sight of them until he shall consider the Ottoman coasts as secure from aggression on their part; or even by using force to compel them to bear away from those coasts if they refuse to attend to his warning.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 202.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government entirely concur in the language held by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Hübner upon the course that Austria should follow in order to suppress the insurrectionary movements of Greek subjects of the Porte, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 174; and Her Majesty's Government agree with M. Drouyn de Lhuys as to the necessity of convincing the Greek Government that France and England will not tolerate the aid given by it, both directly and indirectly, to insurrection against the authority of the Sultan.

I have had a conversation upon this subject with M. Tricoupi, which is recorded in a despatch to Mr. Wyse, of which I herewith inclose a copy,* and which your Excellency will communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 203.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 103.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I APPROVE of the reply which your Excellency states, in your despatch No 175, that you gave to M. Drouyn de Lhuys when he spoke to you about Russian efforts to gain the consent of the United States Government to American citizens using Russian letters of marque; and when his Excellency expressed his anxiety that an agreement should be come to between the British and French Governments for mutual protection to the merchant shipping of both countries.

Her Majesty's Government will be desirous to meet the wishes of the French Government in this matter, upon which Count Walewski has spoken to me; and I shall shortly write to your Excellency more in detail upon the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No 200.

No. 204.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter* which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty requesting their Lordships to instruct the officers commanding Her Majesty's ships off the coast of Greece to take such steps as may be necessary for preventing insurrectionary movements on the part of the Greek subjects of the Sultan, and for putting a stop to any interference with Turkey or Greece on the part of the Russian flotilla now at Trieste.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 205.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter* which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with reference to the attempts to excite insurrection against the authority of the Porte in Albania; and with reference also to the Russian squadron in the Adriatic.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 206.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch† which I have addressed to Mr. Wyse respecting the unfriendly conduct of the Greek Government towards that of Turkey.

I am, &c,

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 207.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 51 of the 2nd of February, that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction that the late changes in the Turkish Ministry are likely to be attended with greater efficiency in the administration of affairs, and an improved understanding between the Porte and Her Majesty's Embassy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 201. † No. 200.

No. 208.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 44 of the 29th of January, that I propose to instruct the Earl of Westmorland to take an opportunity of advising the Austrian Government not to allow any facilities to be given for carrying on the intrigues which M. Mouchine, the late Russian Consul-General in Servia, who is now residing at Semlin, is alleged to be carrying on against the rights and interests of the Porte in Servia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 209.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 50 of the 2nd instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having decided, under the circumstances of the case, to take no further steps for forwarding to Sevastopol the second communication from the British and French Admirals to the Russian naval authorities at that port, which Captain Tatham failed in landing at Odessa.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 210.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 181. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 16, 1854.

COUNT HATZFELDT has shown M. Drouyn de Lhuys confidentially the despatch addressed on the 31st ultimo by M. de Manteuffel to General Rochow, explaining the reasons why the Prussian Government could not enter into an engagement to remain neutral in the event of war between Russia and the Western Powers; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys has expressed himself to be much satisfied with the attitude taken by the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 211.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 182. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 16, 1854.

I CANNOT exaggerate to your Lordship the bad impression produced on all persons with whom I have conversed by the publication of the Emperor's letter to the Emperor of Russia. I have met with no one who has attempted to defend it. Those, including the Ministers, who do not blame it, take refuge in silence.

It is in vain to seek for the motives which have led to this step. They are

locked up in the Emperor's own breast. The official reason given is, as your Lordship will have seen by the few lines which accompanied the publication, that the sense and meaning of the letter had been perverted in foreign journals, and that it was necessary to rectify them. Explanations of another nature have been given from one source or another to some of my colleagues, the principal being that the Emperor wished that a declaration of his policy should precede the debates which were about to take place in the British Parliament, and that His Majesty did not like the idea that if peace with Russia was preserved, the honour of it should be given to Count Orloff and to Count Buol rather than to himself. Finally, your Lordship will find, in the inclosed article from the "Constitutionnel" of this morning, the semi-official defence of the Emperor.

I should add that when the letter first appeared, people were so convinced that the answer to it must have been received and was unfavourable, or that the letter could not have been published, that the funds fell 3 per cent. There are not wanting those who declare that the Emperor was persuaded to give his letter publicity by those who expected its appearance to have a very different effect upon the public securities, and who have suffered severe losses in consequence.

Your Lordship will recollect that when M. Drouyn de Lhuys first mentioned the subject of the letter to me, he stated that the Emperor's object in writing it was to prove to the Emperor Nicholas, who doubted the fact, that His Majesty's policy coincided entirely with that of his Ministers. Whenever the Emperor has alluded to the letter in the conversations with which His Majesty has honoured me, he has looked upon it as a last effort in the cause of peace, as containing a simple proposition to which the Emperor of Russia must answer "yes" or "no;" that that "yes" or "no" would determine the question of peace or war; and that, whether peace or war ensued, the letter contained the vindication of His Majesty's conduct. I felt, therefore, from the beginning, that the letter was eventually destined for publication, but I could not conceive that it would be published before the answer to it was received, nor can I attempt, as yet, an explanation of this unforeseen, and it must be added irregular, occurrence.

Leaving, therefore, this part of the subject, which, if pursued, would but lead me into useless speculations, I proceed to another yet more disagreeable. I allude to the use of the Queen's name as approving the propositions submitted by the Emperor to the Emperor Nicholas.

Feeling it more than probable that Her Majesty's Ministers would be questioned in Parliament as to the truth of this assertion, I went yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and inquired of him what explanation I was to give to your Lordship of the connection of Her Majesty's name with a project which I was certain could not have received the assent of Her Majesty's Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that I was mistaken; that the Emperor's letter had been, as I knew, sent to London for the approbation of Her Majesty's Government; that your Lordship had suggested certain modifications; that the Emperor had agreed to them; and that the letter had not been transmitted to St. Petersburgh until your Lordship had seen the changes introduced by the Emperor and approved them.

I observed that there must be a great mistake somewhere. The Emperor's sanction to the proposed modifications was obtained on Sunday, the 29th ultimo, and could not have been in Count Walewski's hand before the morning of the 30th, while the letter itself was dispatched on the 29th.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejoined, that he could not be certain about dates, but that Count Walewski had reported your Lordship as having agreed to the changes introduced by the Emperor; and that, had you not done so, the letter would have been recalled (I presume by telegraph) even if it had gone.

On my still pressing for an explanation of the use of the Queen's name in connection with a project sanctioning a direct negotiation between Russia and the Porte, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he thought I exaggerated the sense of the Emperor's words; that what His Majesty had intended to convey was this: that it was shocking to let peace or war depend upon the precise manner of commencing a negotiation; that the Emperor of Russia had objected to the mediation of the Conference, and that he (the Emperor of the French) had thought that this objection might be removed if Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries were to meet in the same town in which the Conference was assembled, and negotiate a Treaty of Peace, which Treaty, however, would have no

force or value until it had been seen and approved by the Conference, and that the French word "soumettre" could not be interpreted in any other way. The Emperor, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, had never intended that the negotiation between Russia and the Porte should be secret or private. His Majesty had always maintained, and still maintained, that the question at issue between Russia and the Porte was of European interest, and could not be settled without the sanction of the great Cabinets of Europe. The word "direct" had only been used to facilitate the commencement of negotiations. I might, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, give your Lordship the most positive assurances to this effect.

With regard to the introduction of the Queen's name into the Emperor's letter, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that His Majesty had certainly understood that his letter had the sanction of the Queen's Government, and that His Majesty had no doubt forgotten that it is not the custom in England to speak of the Sovereign when alluding to political questions, but of the Sovereign's Government. He could assure me, however, that the great object which the Emperor had at heart was to prove to the Emperor Nicholas that there was not a shade of difference in opinion between his own Government and that of Her Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 211.

Extract from the "Constitutionnel" of February 15, 1854.

CE serait négliger le fait le plus considérable de la situation présente, que de ne pas constater, ne fût-ce que par un mot, la sensation profonde causée, à Paris et dans les Départements, par la lettre de l'Empereur des Français à l'Empereur de Russie. Cette sensation se prolongera d'un bout à l'autre de l'Europe.

Au résumé le plus lumineux et le plus saisissant de cette longue et complexe question d'Orient, à ce don de la généralisation élevée et majestueuse qui caractérise la parole et la plume de l'Empereur, cette lettre réunit l'expression de ces sentiments de nationalité et d'honneur militaire, que parmi nous nul ne blesse ou n'invoque jamais en vain. En parcourant la série des atteintes portées par le Czar aux Traités les plus solennels, tout le monde a compris que la question d'Orient est devenue Européenne; en lisant le récit du massacre de Sinope, accompli si près du mouillage des flottes alliées, tout le monde a compris que la question d'Orient est devenue Française.

Mais ce qui aura particulièrement l'adhésion de la France entière, c'est que l'Empereur, en livrant à la publicité le texte authentique de sa lettre au Czar, ait cru devoir se départir, en des circonstances toutes nouvelles, de l'usage ancien et consacré, qui faisait de ces sortes de lettres des documents mystérieux, soustraits aux yeux du vulgaire. Quand la politique était concentrée dans le giron des familles dynastiques, les nations n'avaient pas grand'chose à dire, après que les rois avaient parlé; mais, dans la crise présente de l'Europe, ce ne sont pas seulement les Souverains qui sont en présence, ce sont encore les peuples. Il faut donc aussi qu'ils lisent et qu'ils jugent.

Si tant de loyaux efforts, tentés en vue de conserver la paix, restent à la fin inutiles, l'Europe entière saura désormais contre quel inflexible orgueil devra s'élever le cri du sang versé et des ruines accumulées.

(Signé) A. GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC.

No. 212.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 18, 1854.*

AS the answer of the Russian Government to the propositions which were submitted to that Government by the Representatives of the Four Powers, on the 13th of January, have been such as the Conference at Vienna could not

transmit to Constantinople; and as the Cabinet of Russia has refused to offer any explanation, or to afford any guarantees with respect to the future proceedings of Russia towards Turkey, the time appears to have arrived for the Four Powers to consider in what manner they can give effect to their recorded declaration not to permit any alteration of the territorial limits of the Turkish Empire. The Governments of Great Britain and France have already exchanged notes defining their future action, as well as the objects which they have in view; and feeling that the Governments of Austria and Prussia have an equal interest with them in the settlement of this question, Her Majesty's Government do not hesitate to transmit to your Lordship for communication to the Prussian Government copies of the correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, in order that before any more binding engagement shall have been concluded, the Cabinet of Berlin may have an opportunity of considering whether and to what extent it can adopt the views and aid in carrying out the objects of the British and French Governments.

Your Lordship will state to Baron Manteuffel, that Her Majesty's Government invite the Government of Prussia to accede to arrangements similar in their objects and their spirit to those agreed upon between Great Britain and France.

The instrument might afterwards take the form of a Convention between the Four Powers, framed with a view to put an end to a war which now disturbs and threatens to convulse Europe.

Circumstances fully justify Her Majesty's Government in asking for this explanation. Proposals for peace, sanctioned by the Four Powers, and assented to beforehand by Turkey, have been put aside without a serious reply from the Emperor of Russia, whose preparations are on a vast scale; and no one can doubt that, if victorious on the Danube, he will no longer think himself bound by his declarations of respecting the integrity and independence of Turkey. The expense of his armaments will serve as an excuse for demands of indemnity to be secured by prolonged occupation of the Principalities, or for terms destructive of the sovereign rights of the Sultan as one of the independent Powers of Europe.

Thus, the Declaration of the 6th December, to which engagement Prussia is a party, must either be enforced by arms or become a dead letter; and it is obviously therefore the duty of Her Majesty's Government, in justice to Great Britain and her allies, and to Europe, to ask for a clear declaration of the intention of Prussia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 213.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol on the subject of Count Orloff's mission to Vienna.

Count Buol says, in this despatch, that the identity of the objects pursued by Austria in common with the other three Powers which was established by the Protocol of December 5th, imposes upon the Austrian Government the duty of entire frankness towards them with regard to this mission.

He states that Count Orloff was instructed to urge in the strongest manner upon the Emperor of Austria to enter into an engagement, simultaneously with the Court of Berlin, to observe the strictest neutrality in the case of the maritime Powers taking an active part in the war between Turkey and Russia; and as a proof of the entire confidence subsisting between the Cabinets of Vienna and London, the despatch to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, giving the reasons which have induced the Emperor of Austria to decline this proposal of Russia, is communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

In this despatch to Count Esterhazy, Count Buol observes with reference

to the grave proportions which the war between Russia and Turkey appears to be on the eve of assuming, the Court of Russia proposes to Austria and Prussia to enter into an agreement by which the position of the three Courts will be clearly defined, as well in their relations with each other as towards the Western Powers who are about to engage in the conflict.

The Emperor of Russia proposes the strictest neutrality as the attitude to be assumed by the two principal German Powers and their confederates, and an armed defence of this neutrality against any who might threaten to infringe it. Russia would engage to assist them, for this purpose, with all her forces, to an extent which should hereafter be determined by a joint arrangement to be concluded by military commissioners. She would further undertake, in case the events of the war should lead to a modification of the state of things existing in Turkey, not to adopt any resolution on this subject without a previous understanding with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin.

Such is in substance the plan of conduct traced out by the Court of St. Petersburgh, on which Count Buol, after mature examination, has arrived at the following conclusions.

The King of Prussia, as is already known, has declined the Russian propositions; this fact alone would be sufficient to remove every chance of the practical application of the project, since it is founded on the agreement of the three Powers.

But setting aside this circumstance, which would in fact relieve Austria from any further action, the frankness which she has prescribed to herself in her confidential communications with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, does not allow her to leave that Cabinet in ignorance of the grave objections which under all circumstances she would have entertained to this plan.

With reference to events the consequences of which cannot be foreseen, the Emperor of Austria could not bind himself by an engagement of this nature, at any rate unless the Emperor of Russia would limit the field of his action (l'étendue de son action). The results of a prolonged war between Russia and Turkey would be so uncertain, that Austria, so directly interested in the Eastern question, could not engage on her part to follow out a policy of absolute neutrality.

The success of the Russian arms, joined with the wishes of the populations subjects of Turkey, might bring on a state of affairs so detrimental to the interests of Austria, that the Emperor of Austria might find himself placed between the necessity of a military intervention, or an inaction incompatible with his dignity and the most vital interests of his Empire.

Originally, the dispute might be considered as an affair between Russia and Turkey alone, and so long as Russia declared and maintained a defensive attitude Austria was able on her side to preserve an attitude of expectancy. But this question unfortunately has since assumed a European character, and has become of such intense importance that Austria could not do otherwise than reserve to herself entire freedom of action with respect to it.

If the Emperor Nicholas would engage not to extend further his military operations in European Turkey, to seek no territorial aggrandisement, no right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, nor any new rights not resulting from the ancient Treaties between Russia and Turkey—engagements which appear to Count Buol to be in conformity with Russian interests—Austria would be ready in return to give the assurances that have been demanded of her; but otherwise the Russian Cabinet must perceive the difficulties which Austria would encounter in tracing out, at present, the line of conduct which future circumstances may impose upon her. Moreover, the Russian Government must be aware that the inevitable effect of an engagement so positive as the one proposed would be to cripple Austria in her conciliatory efforts; to cause a pressure adverse to her on the part of some of the contending parties.

The prevailing idea of the plan proposed by Russia consists in maintaining intact during the present crisis the conservative alliance which has so long existed between the three Courts, to the advantage of the party of social order.

But is the question one of preservation, or, on the contrary, of entering into new combinations, of which it would be impossible to define the nature, or to foresee the consequences?

It is not on this ground that the question had been placed by the Protocols

of Vienna, which have made so painful an impression at St. Petersburgh. The mutual agreement of the Four Powers as set forth in these Acts, rests on the importance which they attach to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as an element of the balance of Europe. In this principle the special interest of Austria and that of Europe in general are united. Count Buol has therefore learnt, with deep regret, that the Emperor of Russia appears ready to renounce the firm intention he had previously declared, of maintaining a defensive position on this side the Danube. The graver the consequences which are connected with the passage of the Danube, the more Count Buol conceives that Austria fulfils a friendly duty in conjuring the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in its wisdom once more to consider them before taking a decisive step.

If Count Buol does not conceal from the Russian Cabinet the painful feelings caused to the Cabinet of Vienna by the differences of opinion existing between them as to the best course to be pursued at the present juncture, the latter harbour no thought which can be considered hostile to Russia.

Count Buol has considered it a duty to state, with entire frankness, the attitude which Austria is compelled to reserve to herself for the eventuality, which she still hopes may be averted, of the conflict assuming greater dimensions; he trusts, however, that these observations, which Count Esterhazy is directed to offer to Count Nesselrode, may contribute to put an end to a state of tension alarming to Europe and detrimental to so many interests. Austria, he declares, has faithfully applied herself to trace out the path of peace, and her efforts will constantly be directed to the same end.

Count Buol states that he has nothing to add to this despatch to Count Esterhazy, which clearly defines the attitude of Austria in the present situation of affairs.

The Emperor of Austria will not tie his hands by a Convention of absolute neutrality as long as he is not in possession of satisfactory guarantees that the interests of his Empire will not be compromised by a dissolution of European Turkey. These guarantees Count Orloff was not authorised to give; besides, adds Count Buol, how could Russia reassure Austria as to the incalculable consequences of a rising of the Christian population from the moment that the Emperor of Russia should determine to push the war vigorously beyond the Danube?

Whilst, therefore, renewing its serious representations against the extension of the war beyond the Danube, the Austrian Government has not concealed from Russia, that in the presence of the dangers with which she is threatened by the continuance of the struggle, Austria must reserve to herself entire liberty of action.

With this view a body of troops has been concentrated in the Austrian provinces which border on the theatre of war, and their numbers will be augmented as the course of events may require.

This measure, on the subject of which tranquillizing assurances have been given to the Porte, is not to be considered as of a hostile nature towards either of the belligerents; its object is solely to preserve the Austrian frontiers from insult, and, if necessary, from the contagion of insurrection in the adjoining Turkish provinces, and even if an armed intervention on the part of Austria should become indispensable, it would be with the firm intention of preserving intact in all respects the *status quo* established by Treaties—an intention which Count Buol is confident will be shared by the other Powers who are represented at the Conference of Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 214.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the intrigues of the late Russian Agent in Servia, against the rights and interests of the Porte; and I have to instruct your Lordship to take an opportunity of suggesting to Count Buol that no facilities should be given to such intrigues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 215.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

AS the answer of the Russian Government to the propositions which were submitted to that Government by the Representatives of the four Powers on the 13th of January has been such as the Conference at Vienna could not transmit to Constantinople, and as the Cabinet of Russia has refused to offer any explanation, or to afford any guarantees with respect to the future proceedings of Russia towards Turkey, the time appears to have arrived for the Four Powers to consider in what manner they can give effect to their recorded declaration not to permit any alteration of the territorial limits of the Turkish Empire.

The Governments of Great Britain and France have already exchanged notes defining their future action, as well as the objects which they have in view; and feeling that the Governments of Austria and Prussia have an equal interest with them in the settlement of this question, Her Majesty's Government do not hesitate to transmit to your Lordship, for communication to the Austrian Government, copies of the correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, in order that before any more binding engagement shall have been concluded the Cabinet of Vienna may have an opportunity of considering whether, and to what extent it can adopt the views and aid in carrying out the objects of the British and French Governments.

Your Lordship will state to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government invite the Government of Austria to accede to arrangements similar in their objects and their spirit to those agreed upon between Great Britain and France. The instrument might afterwards take the form of a Convention between the four Powers, framed with a view to put an end to a war which now disturbs and threatens to convulse Europe.

Circumstances fully justify Her Majesty's Government in asking for this explanation; proposals for peace, sanctioned by the four Powers and assented to beforehand by Turkey, have been put aside without a serious reply from the Emperor of Russia, whose preparations are on a vast scale; and no one can doubt that, if victorious on the Danube, he will no longer think himself bound by his declarations of respecting the integrity and independence of Turkey. The expense of his armaments will serve as an excuse for demands of indemnity, to be secured by prolonged occupation of the Principalities, or for terms destructive of the sovereign rights of the Sultan as one of the independent Powers of Europe.

Thus the declaration of the 5th of December, to which engagement Austria is a party, must either be enforced by arms or become a dead letter: and it is

* No. 172.

obviously, therefore, the duty of Her Majesty's Government, in justice to Great Britain and her allies, and to Europe, to ask for a clear declaration of the intention of Austria.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 216.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, in which his Excellency states that Count Esterhazy has been instructed to inform the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the decision of the Conference with respect to the counter-propositions brought forward by Count Orloff. Count Buol adds that this opportunity has been taken again to urge in the strongest manner the arguments in favour of the adhesion of Russia to the bases of peace approved by the Conference. He has especially pointed out that the most essential difference between the project of the Conference, and that of which Count Orloff was the bearer, consists in the place at which the negotiations are to be carried on; and he has strongly impressed upon the Russian Cabinet how much an understanding would be facilitated by their yielding in this respect.

The Austrian Government will continue to make every effort in favour of peace, although it cannot keep altogether out of view the consideration of what may result from their failure; and Count Buol concludes by asking to be informed of the opinion of the Maritime Powers with regard to the Russian counter-propositions, which he hopes will be considered by them in the same spirit as they have been by Austria.

I told Count Colloredo that I could hardly look upon them in the light of counter-propositions, as the Emperor of Russia had not even condescended to notice the terms offered by the Porte, and that so far from reducing he had added to his original demands; that he required the Porte to send a Plenipotentiary either to St. Petersburgh or to the head-quarters of the Russian army which was now in forcible occupation of the Sultan's territory, and that the Representatives of the four Powers might there give prudent advice to the Turkish negotiator; that His Imperial Majesty appeared thus to have ignored the existence of the Conference, to have disregarded the offers which were thought just and honourable by Austria, England, France, and Prussia; to have determined not to admit of European intervention in the settlement of his quarrel with Turkey; and advisedly to have adopted a course as offensive to the dignity of the four Powers as it was to that of the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 217.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 75.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 39 has been received and laid before the Queen.

Your Lordship says that Count Buol, having called together the Conference and communicated to them the counter-propositions of Russia, had stated that he could in no way take upon himself to recommend those propositions, and that he did not think they could or ought to be forwarded to Constantinople. Your Lordship will inform Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in this opinion, and that they approve the protocol which was signed by your Lordship and your colleagues on the 2nd instant.

It is useless to comment upon propositions that necessarily put an end to negotiation, and it only remains for Her Majesty's Government to express their astonishment and deep concern that the Emperor of Russia should thus throw away an opportunity of effecting a just and honourable peace upon terms that would have secured to him all that he has a right to demand, and all that he has professed to require from the Porte; and that, regardless alike of the wishes of his allies and of the great interests which are at stake, His Imperial Majesty should still appear determined upon involving Europe in war.

Your Lordship will give a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 218.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol referring to the previous communications he had made to Count Colloredo on the subject of Count Orloff's mission, and the rejection by the Conference at Vienna of the counter-propositions made by the Cabinet at St. Petersburgh, and pointing out the gravity of the situation which this determination has created and the complications which rapidly approaching events appear to lead to.

Count Orloff, although limited to his instructions, could not deceive himself as to the danger of the situation, and appeared to Count Buol to be animated with the desire of being enabled to carry to St. Petersburgh an expedient calculated to lead to an honourable issue.

Perceiving this disposition on the part of Count Orloff, and impressed by the fact that the difference which exists between the bases of pacification proposed by either party, seems to have reference rather to their form than to their substance, Count Buol turned his attention to some means of restoring peace, which might be suggested to the Court of St. Petersburgh; and having received the authority of the Emperor of Austria, introduced such a plan in his conversation with Count Orloff, on the understanding that Count Orloff must not attribute to Count Buol's idea the character of an overture on the part of the Court of Austria, or of a desire on their part to assume an intermediate position between Russia and the maritime Powers, as it was simply an attempt made in goodwill towards conciliation. On this understanding Count Buol proceeded to develop his idea in the following manner, which was:

First. That, in answer to the last communications of Austria, inviting the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to re-examine the propositions of the Porte, of which the Conference had been the organ, the Court of Russia should transmit to the Austrian Cabinet preliminaries of peace, drawn up in accordance with the above-mentioned propositions, and should leave it to Count Buol to arrange with the Conference to cause such preliminaries to be agreed upon and signed by the Porte.

Secondly. That the Russian Envoy at Vienna should be authorized to convert in a confidential manner with the members of the Conference on the alterations which might still be judged necessary to render them such as the Porte could accept.

Thirdly. The preliminaries thus arranged would be sent to Constantinople by the Conference, which would undertake to insure their adoption by the Porte, and to obtain for them the signature of the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to arrange with the Porte a temporary suspension of hostilities.

Fourthly. The preliminaries of peace thus signed should be sent to Vienna, and from thence transmitted to St. Petersburgh by an Envoy Extraordinary from His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, who should, in the name of the Emperor and in that of the other Powers, obtain from the Emperor of Russia, in exchange for the Turkish document, one bearing the signature of the Chancellor of the Russian Empire to be sent to the Porte.

Fifthly. After this formality shall have been accomplished, the Emperor of

Russia should give orders to his troops to evacuate the Turkish territory, and on their part the Cabinets of London and Paris would direct their fleets to leave the Black Sea, as well as the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Sixthly. The two measures being thus set on foot the Plenipotentiaries named by the belligerent parties would meet in a place to be arranged between them, to negotiate and sign the definitive instrument in conformity with the preliminaries already signed. And,

Seventhly. The six Powers would afterwards proceed to a renewal of the Treaty of 1841.

Count Buol left it Count Orloff to make use of these ideas if he judged proper. Count Orloff appeared disposed to submit them to the Emperor of Russia, and requested Count Buol at the same time to pave the way so as to insure for them a favourable reception by the three Courts in the event of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh deciding to adopt them.

With this object, Count Buol has instructed Count Colloredo to ascertain the feelings of Her Majesty's Government on this matter, and states that in these proceedings he has had in view, first, to secure to the Conference the participation he wishes to have in the work of peace; secondly, to conciliate the self-love which has been brought into play, by setting aside any questions of form likely to offend it; and thirdly, to obtain as soon as possible the evacuation of the Turkish territories and the cessation of hostilities. I told Count Colloredo that without analysing all the grave objections to which these propositions were liable, they would entail a most inconvenient delay, and that although they were said to have been made in an informal manner, yet if they were accepted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, Count Buol would find himself bound by them, and the great object of the Emperor of Russia, viz, that of creating disunion between the Four Powers, might thus be effectually attained.

I added that Her Majesty's Government would recognize no propositions but those which were transmitted to St. Petersburgh on the 13th ultimo, and could consent to no modification of terms that had been declared by the Conference to be just and reasonable; and that in the meanwhile they would not relax in those preparations which were now actively making for bringing to a speedy conclusion the war in which Europe was about to be involved by the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 219.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith the draft of a Tripartite Convention* between Great Britain, France, and Turkey, which Her Majesty's Government desire to conclude, without loss of time, in order that they may be prepared, together with the French Government, for contingencies that are likely to arise out of the war between Russia and Turkey.

I have directed Lord Cowley to communicate this draft to the French Government, in order that if it should meet with their concurrence, instructions may be sent to General Baraguay d'Hilliers to cooperate with your Excellency in proposing the Convention to the Turkish Government, and urging the Porte to its being signed by a Turkish Plenipotentiary without delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosure in No. 196.

No. 220.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1854.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 11 of the 10th ultimo, in which you state that the result of the inquiry respecting the affair at Sinope would be transmitted to this office, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are desirous to receive your report on this subject as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 221.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 78.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1854.

I HAVE received from Mr. Consul James Brant copies of his despatches to your Excellency Nos. 89 and 90, of the 23rd and 24th of December, and other despatches addressed to myself of the 20th of December and 9th of January, giving an account of the reverses which had been sustained by the Sultan's forces in Asia, of the incapacity and misconduct of the Porte's Mussulman officers, of the disgraceful outrages committed by the irregular troops, and of the efforts of Khoorshid Pasha (General Guyon) to reorganize, and infuse confidence into, the Turkish army in that quarter.

Her Majesty's Government have read the accounts given by Mr. Brant with indignation as regards the misconduct of the Turkish Pashas, and the revolting atrocities of the irregular troops, and with the deepest concern as regards the apathy exhibited by the Porte respecting its true interests at this crisis of the affairs of Turkey.

Abdi Pasha, it appears, has been recalled, and Her Majesty's Government will expect to hear that his cowardice and incapacity have been punished as they deserve; but Her Majesty's Government learn with astonishment that he has been succeeded by Ahmed Pasha, who has not only proved his unfitness for command, but who is justly detested by the soldiers for the cruel wrongs and ill-treatment which his rapacity has inflicted upon them; and this man's occupation will now probably be to thwart and undermine Khoorshid Pasha, the only good officer in the Sultan's service in Asia.

Great opportunities have been already lost, and Georgia might have been easily occupied; but the army has been demoralized, and confiding friends have been converted into bitter enemies. Men like Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha are far more formidable enemies to the Sultan's cause, than any number of Russians that have yet been brought into the field; but the Turkish Government, which has so long tolerated their misdeeds, and now rewards and promotes one of them, is hardly less culpable or less unfaithful to the best interests of its Sovereign.

Your Excellency, whose voice has been so influential in effecting beneficial changes in the Turkish Ministers, might render good service to the Porte by directing the attention of the Government in the choice of their military commanders to persons of honesty and capacity.

The English and French Governments are now about, at vast expense and inconvenience, to protect the Sultan's territory from Russian aggression. They are about to encounter the risks of an European war; and they have at least a right to insist that the Porte shall be true to itself, and that not only such criminals as these Pashas should not be retained in command, but that their condign punishment should warn others from following their example.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch to Reshid Pasha.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 222.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 20, 1854.

THE aspect of affairs here is still more satisfactory than when I last wrote to you.

Should the propositions sent by Orloff be refused by Russia, as is expected, the intention of taking more stringent engagements with England and France is announced, and in support of their own Government, (word omitted, qy. Austria) is prepared to concentrate an increased force on the frontier near Cronstadt (Croatia).

No. 223.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February* 18, 1854.

I HAVE received from Sir Henry Ward, under flying seal, a letter addressed by him to the Duke of Newcastle, which incloses the report he has received from his resident in Sta. Maura, as to the insurrectionary movements against the Turkish authorities in the neighbourhood of Arta and Prevesa.

This report will, without doubt, be communicated to your Lordship; I need not, therefore, recapitulate the information it contains.

I thought it essential to state this information to Count Buol, and the resolution which Sir Henry Ward had taken by calling upon Captain Peel to act in conjunction with the Turkish Governor for the defence of Prevesa, if it was attached by the Greek insurgents.

Count Buol could not but applaud the step thus taken by Sir Henry Ward, which he felt satisfied would be approved by Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the intelligence contained in the report, Count Buol considered it as most alarming, and as calling for the most energetic measures from all the allied Powers; he looked with hope to the military assistance which he understood was about to be afforded to the Sultan by our Government, as by that of France, for enabling him to employ a sufficient force to put down this insurrection, which otherwise he feared would spread to the neighbouring Turkish Provinces.

He felt also that the action of all the Governments would be required to counteract the Hellenic propagandism which had been displayed at Athens, and which he feared the King had very feebly endeavoured to oppose.

Count Buol stated he had just received despatches from the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in Greece, who was arrived at Trieste, and who reported the serious demonstrations which had taken place in Athens, and particularly before the King's Palace, in favour of the Greek cause, and the fears entertained there of a still more general demonstration against the Turkish Government.

Count Buol begged me to call your Lordship's most serious attention to this state of things, which might require to be met by some declaration to the Greek Government of the feelings and intentions of the allied Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 224.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February* 18, 1854.

COUNT BUOL has informed me that he has received despatches from Paris, stating that the French Government, although not much expecting any favourable result from the suggestion he had made to Count Orloff before his

departure, nevertheless agree to the mode and terms of negotiation therein stated, with the exception of the condition requiring the combined fleets to quit the Bosphorus before the conclusion of peace. Count Buol entirely concurs in this reserve.

He stated that the French Government had also made some remarks upon his having only mentioned to the Russian Government, in the statement made to Count Orloff, that they should abstain from passing the Danube, but without requiring the immediate evacuation of the Principalities.

Count Buol said his statements to Count Orloff were a message of peace, and therefore he avoided anything irritating which it was not necessary to put forth; that, if Russia should unfortunately reject the means of negotiation which were still open to her, circumstances would require a different declaration to be made, and he took this opportunity of reiterating that Austria was bound by her declarations to uphold and maintain, without reserve, the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

Count Buol said that this was the policy which he had declared from the commencement of these unfortunate discussions, and that it was with great pleasure that he had read through the correspondence which had been presented to Parliament upon the Eastern affairs, and that he was most entirely satisfied with all that was stated therein with regard to the Austrian Government, either by your Lordship or myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 225.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 20.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 9, 1854.

THE Emperor has been pleased to confer the Grand Cordon of St. Alexander Newsky upon General the Marquis de Castelbajac, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Emperor of the French at the Court of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 226.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 9, 1854.

A FRENCH courier, who arrived here on the 8th instant, brought General Castelbajac a very important despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated the 1st instant, in which, as is most clearly and satisfactorily shown, all the blame of the state of confusion into which Europe has been thrown, is attributable to Russia, while the moderation of the conduct of France and England throughout a complicated affair, is exhibited with the same force.

A copy of this despatch will be delivered to the Chancellor by the French Envoy this day.

By the same courier General Castelbajac has received a copy of M. de Kisseleff's note, calling for explanations as to the orders given to the Admirals of the allied fleets, and of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' reply.

He is apprised that M. de Kisseleff will probably demand his passports, and at the same time is instructed not to ask for his, but to await those which will, according to all probability, be sent him by the Russian Government.

A despatch from M. Botta, the French Consul at Jerusalem, under date of

the 2nd ultimo, of which likewise a copy has been sent to my French colleague, is well deserving of notice.

It states plainly that the results of the late arrangements respecting the holy places has been all to the advantage of the Greeks, and equally to the prejudice of the Latins; the rights of the latter having been, as M. Botta observes, assured to them by Treaty.

Such, he further remarks, with some plainness of speech, are the consequences of concessions which have been obtained from weakness. The return then made by Russia for the concessions which have so much distressed the Latin Church, and which have been so advantageous to the Greeks, is, that on behalf of the Greek faith, represented as being in a state of suffering and persecution, she overruns and lays waste the Sultan's dominions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 227.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 137.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1854.*

BUSINESS, as it may well be supposed, is nearly at a standstill at St. Petersburgh. The only commercial transactions which I hear of are such as are carried on upon a small scale, and as are provisional as to their completion.

Thus small portions of grain are sold for delivery in the spring, a rouble tchetwert being given as hand money, and the purchasers reserving to themselves the facility of not taking the corn when ready for delivery.

The distress among the grain dealers is, I believe, considerable. I hear of their endeavouring in vain to obtain money upon their bills at 12 and 14 per cent. discount.

As regards the timber trade business must be even more slack; purchasers, or rather acquirers, being allowed the facility of returning their deals after a time, although no hand money has been received upon them.

The persons, however, upon whom the present commercial stagnation presses the most heavily, are the holders and preparers of flax; many of the last of these are reduced to charity for their support.

With all this the money market is easier than it was a short time since, and there are now several houses at which good bills may be discounted at 7 per cent.

As regards Russian stock there is naturally a greater disposition to sell than to purchase, and I am assured that among the Russians there are not wanting those who are investing their money in the English funds.

In connexion with German houses, and more particularly with those of Hamburgh, attempts are making, as I understand, by some of the Russian merchants, at lowering the cost of land carriage for goods.

All that I learn confirms my impressions as to the misery and distress which the Emperor, by the short-sighted policy which he is obstinately bent upon, is preparing for all classes of his subjects, with the exception of contractors and other persons, who now enjoy extensive opportunities of profiting by corrupt practices.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 228.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1854.*

THE messenger Townley arrived here at 10 o'clock yesterday night, placing me in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 29 inclusive.

I have lost no time in addressing a private note to Count Nesselrode to know on what day and at what hour I can have the honour of waiting upon his Excellency for the purpose of making a communication to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I shall upon this occasion read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 27, a copy of which has been prepared for the purpose of being placed in his hands.

It is very possible that this may prove the last interview which I may have of his Excellency, and I will not conceal from your Lordship that if public considerations were not such as infinitely to outweigh those of a personal nature, I should hail with unfeigned satisfaction the approach of the moment which will release me from one of the most ungrateful tasks which I believe to have been ever imposed upon a diplomatic servant of the Crown.

I have long felt that I was struggling against a current which was too strong for me; while the pain of finding myself unable to give effect to the views of Her Majesty's Government has been heightened by the conviction which I shall ever entertain that very different results would have been obtained if those upon whose assistance I had in various degrees a right to count, had not been, I cannot say even the lukewarm supporters, but the secret opponents of my efforts.

I have seen a most dangerous policy adopted by a Government which considered my timely warnings as exaggerated and absurd; I have witnessed the disruption of those relations which it had been my great object to render of the most friendly nature: in the attempts which I have made to stem a course of ambition and folly, I have encountered odium and abuse, and I shall leave this country embarked in an undertaking which, while it can but insure great injury to itself, may be productive of extensive mischief to England and to Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 229.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1854.*

A GENTLEMAN whose extensive connection with business renders him well acquainted with what is passing here, informs me that he never remembers such activity as prevails at present in the public departments. He states that some considerable purchases of military stores have been made within the last three or four days upon public account; among which he notices those of 500 tons of sulphur and 1200 tons of lead. Of this last one-half is to be delivered at St. Petersburgh, and the other half at some place or places on the Volga.

One of my diplomatic colleagues states as a fact that the Russian Government have purchased three vessels—goelettes he terms them—in Holland, which will be sent as merchantmen, probably to Lisbon, either having on board or taking on board at that intermediate point, a considerable number of Russian sailors, who are to be sent on to reinforce the Imperial squadron in the Japanese seas. My informant states further, that the vessels will sail from Lisbon under the flag (supposing war to have broken out) of some neutral country.

This account seems to be a little improbable; the person, however, from whom it is received is confident as to its correctness.

I hear further, and this report appears to me to be at least as much worthy of belief, that several of the less seaworthy of the line-of-battle ships are to be employed as batteries, and to be moored off Cronstadt in the event of an attack from seaward appearing probable.

A notion prevails, as I understand, among some of the naval men here that it would have been judicious to have posted the ships now at Helsingfors, in the Sound, where, as they imagine, a position might have been taken up which would have prevented the entry of a fleet of very superior force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I am assured that a final resolution with regard to the removal (in the event of war) of lights and sea-marks in the Gulf of Finland has been taken. This appears to indicate on the part of the Russians the intention of keeping within their harbours.

G. H. S.

No. 230.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 140.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1854.

I HAD the honour of submitting to your Lordship, some months since, that although no prospect of a rupture with Russia was sufficiently alarming, it might prove that one of the attendant dangers of such a war, notwithstanding the contrary opinion so generally entertained, would prove visionary.

It had been supposed that a Russian war would be the signal for a revolutionary movement of an European character. I conjectured that it might prove, on the contrary, a cure for revolution, and such a duct for bad humours as would tend to bring about a more healthy state of public opinion than has prevailed for many years in Europe.

My calculation was, that in the presence of common evils, the tendency of men's minds is naturally to disregard those which are less; internal movements would probably not occur if Christendom were again threatened by the Saracens, or if the Moors were now to be ejected from Europe: and I reflected that so it would be were the hour to arrive when the civilization of the West and the South should find it necessary to make a stand against the encroachments of Russia.

If a colossus of this magnitude, however, is to be assailed, the attack should be very general, and some very general motive must be provided.

I would venture to remark that the motives already exist, and of the strongest order.

If Russia be strong enough to measure her forces against those of England and France, as she is prepared to do; if she is able to meet all Europe in arms, which she professes her intention of doing, rather than desist from an unjust demand upon an inoffensive neighbour, her strength must have become too great for the actual balance of power, whilst so far from the limits of her means of offence being exhausted, we know that she is preparing to make the most formidable additions to her fleets in the Black Sea and the Baltic.

These motives are sufficiently strong; but there is another which will likely carry great weight—the national feeling which must exist in Poland, Germany, and Sweden, as well as in Turkey and Persia, the absorption and plunder of which have made Russia what she now is.

It was but a few years ago that the cry of "Germany for the Germans" fired the whole Confederation, and led a Prussian army into Schleswig. It might prove that the same feelings, if called forth, would induce Germany to reflect that her safety would be insured and her power extended by making Esthonia, Courland, and Livonia German by possession, as they are already in language, habits, and creed; whilst the attempt would probably be accompanied by a move on the part of Sweden upon those provinces of which she was despoiled but half a century since.

I would venture then to submit to your Lordship, that, should Russia insist upon war, and should circumstances favour the undertaking to which I allude, no nobler task could be proposed to the energies of Governments and nations than that of averting the dangers of brute force and extended despotism by stripping Russia of her ill-gotten possessions, and restoring her to her former restricted limits.

In the case of Italy, Germany, France, or England, any injury inflicted upon these countries, as upon many of smaller extent, would be injuries inflicted upon civilization and humanity: the curtailment of Russia, and the rolling back of a half civilized population would offer no disadvantage; an enormous benefit would be conferred upon the rest of Europe, while the people whose vanity would suffer would be the only one, with the exception of their Turkish neighbours, of the whole European family which, never having made any contributions to science, arts, or literature, have established no claims upon the sympathy of the rest of the world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 231.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 141.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1854.

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to your Lordship a translated copy of a Pastoral Exhortation made by Philarète, Primate of Moscow, to the 1st Division (the last to march southward) of the 6th corps d'armée, upon the occasion of their quitting Moscow.

Monsignore Philarète, as your Lordship is aware, is one of the chiefs of the crusading party.

The address from which the inclosed extract has been taken has been published by the "Northern Bee," in its number of $\frac{\text{January 23}}{\text{February 4}}$.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 231.

Address of the Metropolitan of Moscow to the Soldiers of the 16th Infantry Division.

CHILDREN of the Czar our father, and Russia our mother, my warrior brethren;

The Czar, your country, the Christian faith, call you to great deeds, and the prayers of the church and country are with you.

The foe, vanquished under Catherine the Second, vanquished under Alexander the First, vanquished under Nicholas the First, again challenges Russia to the combat. Your comrades have already reasserted our wonted supremacy both by sea and by land.

And should it be the will of God that you too face the foe, forget not that you are doing battle for the most pious Czar, for our beloved country, for holy church,—against infidels, against persecutors of the Christian faith, persecutors of men united to us by ties of religion and of blood,—insulters of those who bow before the holy places, sanctified by the birth, passion, and ascension of Christ.

Blessing and honour to him who conquers; blessing and happiness to him who, with faith in God, and love for his Czar and country, offers up his life as a sacrifice.

It is written in the Scriptures, concerning those of olden times who fought for their country: "By faith kingdoms were conquered."—Hebrews xi, 33. Now, by faith, you too shall be conquerors.

Our most holy father Sergius whilome blessed our victorious war against the enemies of Russia. His image was borne in your ranks in the days of the

Emperor Alexis, of Peter the Great, and finally in the great war against twenty nations in the reign of Alexander the First.

That sacred form journies with you also, as a token of his fervent and beseeching prayers to God on our behalf.

Take unto yourselves, moreover, the triumphal war-cry of the Czar and prophet David: "In God is my salvation and glory."—Psalms li, 8.

No. 232.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1854.

"RUSSIA, strong in the love borne by a happy and contented population to its Sovereign, is entirely secure against the dangers from without and those internal commotions from which the other States of Europe have so much to apprehend."

This, my Lord, with a few variations in words, but none as to the sense, is the statement commonly made here.

It is given out from on high, and being telegraphed by the chief persons of the State to their subordinates becomes an article of faith; if not generally accepted, at all events much descanted upon by the Russians, and not uncommonly adopted by those foreigners whose impartiality of judgment is warped by the atmosphere of St. Petersburgh.

As regards the respect, attachment, and devotion of the Russians for their Emperor, no fact is, I conceive, better established; the feeling is due in part to the personal qualities of the Sovereign, it is honourable to him as to his people, and may justly be considered as a great element of force: but when, in addition to this, I am told that the Russians are generally contented with their lot, and that Russia is secured against those storms by which other countries are liable to be ravaged, an assertion is hazarded which appears to be absolutely repugnant to common sense.

That the Russians are a nation of courtiers is very generally known, and I have no doubt that the very great majority would prefer an Imperial smile, or even one of those decorations of which hundreds or thousands are annually distributed, to the grant of those institutions which in England are considered as essential to well-being and happiness; but it must be remembered that the great mass of the nation are far removed from the possibility of their existence being brightened by a ray of court favour, and the condition of that numerous class, the serfs, is truly such as cannot inspire contentment among any persons, however degraded in their habits, humble in their desires and inured to difficulty and privation.

It is to this particular point that I am desirous of drawing your Lordship's attention; for those who constantly breathe the free air of England must find it difficult to understand that a human being and a Christian should be reduced to the condition of a thing—a thing indeed known by the name of a soul, but being in reality a chattel.

An illustration being better than a description, I will take an instance which is perfectly familiar, and state to your Lordship what is the condition of a serf as it may be witnessed in the manufactories which abound in the neighbourhood of St. Petersburgh.

A manufactory is established, and the owner being in want of hands, applies to various landed proprietors for the necessary amount of serfs or souls, who are supplied as domestic animals might be, and upon the following terms:

Nine roubles are paid monthly by the manufacturer for the use of the workman or serf, of which sum 5 roubles are handed over to the owner, 3½ roubles expended in the purchase of black bread, upon which the working man subsists, and half a rouble, or 1*s.* 7*d.*, is left him for clothing, washing, and all other requirements.

The case then, as between the owner and the serf, stands thus. For the value of his slave's services the proprietor receives annually 60 roubles silver, or

about 10*l.* 10*s.*, for his share in his own services; the slave receives 6 roubles and 33 copecks, or 19*s.*

Upon this one simple fact I rest the case of the contentment with their lot supposed to be felt by the Russian population.

I believe the Russian peasant to be among the most enduring, resigned, and longsuffering of beings; but as, in spite of all the efforts made to degrade him, he still remains a human creature in feelings and desires, I cannot suppose that, if favoured by circumstances, he would neglect an opportunity of elevating himself in the social scale to that point at which he would be enabled to retain for his own necessities the price of his own hard labour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 233.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1854.

I HAVE heard for some days past that it was likely that a Russian decoration would be sent to General Castelbajac, but felt tolerably sure that the report was to be ascribed to malevolence; it appeared to me much more certain that if what, under the circumstances of the case, is to be considered as an indignity, should be offered to my colleague, a sense of what is due to his official character would point out the course which he had to follow.

I had formed an incorrect judgment, as well of the man as of the circumstances of the case.

On the 8th instant General Castelbajac received an autograph letter from the Emperor, who wrote that he had very great pleasure in sending him the Grand Cordon of the Order of St. Alexander Newsky as a mark of his regard, and of the great satisfaction felt by His Majesty at the manner in which his diplomatic duties had been performed at this Court.

To this announcement my unfortunate colleague replied by a letter of grateful and humble acceptance of the honour conferred upon him by His Imperial Majesty.

Not the least curious circumstance of this very remarkable transaction is that of the Chancellor having intimated to General Castelbajac that, had his opinion been taken, it would not have been advisable that a mark of Imperial favour should have been conferred upon him at a juncture like the present.

It is only an act of justice to state to your Lordship that the gentlemen forming the French Mission feel most sensibly the humiliation to which they have been subjected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since my despatch was written General Castelbajac has shown me the letter or rescript addressed to him by the Emperor Nicholas. The letter is not in His Majesty's own hand, as I had stated.

No. 234.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1854.

I WAITED upon the Chancellor yesterday by appointment; and after reading to him your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo, marked No. 97, placed a copy of the paper in his hands.

The conversation which ensued was of short duration. His Excellency did

not interrupt me whilst I was reading aloud; but when I had concluded, observed, that the position which was assigned to Russia was certainly a most strange one, since the maritime Powers had taken upon themselves to interdict the navigation of her vessels off her own coasts. I admitted that the position was anomalous; adding, that my objection to making use, at this juncture, of recrimination, restrained me from offering the explanation of the measures which had been adopted.

Count Nesselrode was of opinion that, with a little goodwill (bonne volonté) on the part of the Powers, composition would be yet possible; he feared there must be on their part a fixed resolution (parti pris) to thwart Russia; he could not in any other way understand the non-acceptance of terms to which she was willing to accede; as little could he comprehend the different course which it was intended to pursue towards Russian vessels and those under the Turkish flag.

I suggested that the explanation might be found in the absolute necessity of guarding against the recurrence of affairs similar to that of Sinope, and of providing for the security of the Turkish Empire, so little able to withstand a series of blows of such violence.

Count Nesselrode's manner was that of sadness—I might say of dejection, without any mixture of asperity. He spoke with feeling at the prospect of war with an old ally; saying, as before, that it was an idea to which he found it impossible to reconcile himself.

As was to have been expected, he was little disposed to speak of Count Orloff's mission. He only observed, that his return to St. Petersburgh might be looked for next week.

I will only add, that no allusion was made to my departure.

In reply to my inquiry whether Baron Brunnow had quitted London, Count Nesselrode stated that he had no intelligence of his having done so, but that he was in daily or hourly expectation of a messenger from England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 235.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1854.*

AS your Lordship is aware, Messrs. Sturge, Pease, and Charleton, three gentlemen belonging to the Society of Friends, arrived some days ago at St. Petersburgh, for the purpose of endeavouring to promote the cause of peace.

Without making themselves known to me, they applied directly to Count Nesselrode; and through his Excellency's good offices were admitted yesterday to an audience of the Emperor, to whom they presented an address explanatory of their mission.

His Imperial Majesty received them with great affability, commending the zeal which had prompted them to undertake a long and painful journey; and assuring them that no one was more intent upon peace than himself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 236.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 146. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1854.*

GENERAL DE ROCHOW waited upon the Emperor on the 8th instant, and, as I have reason to believe, besides reading to him a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, explanatory of the views of Prussia with regard to the late overtures of the Imperial Cabinet, delivered a letter from the King his master to the same

effect. I am assured that the King's letter contains these remarkable words: "Pour Dieu, faites que la Prusse ne soit pas forcée de tirer l'épée!"

The extreme repugnance shown by General de Rochow to afford me any information as to what passed upon the occasion, or even to admit of any allusion to his interview, was, I thought, injudicious on his part, and the more so as it tended to strengthen my suspicion of his being not uncommonly rather the zealous friend of the Emperor of Russia than the devoted agent of his own Sovereign.

I would here venture to observe that if it could in future be managed that the Ministers sent here from the Great Courts should be selected rather with reference to the steadiness of their opinions and the independence of their characters than for more brilliant qualifications, an immense advantage would be attained, and some chance would be afforded for the access of truth to quarters from which it is so habitually excluded.

I have been told that extraordinary talent is required on the part of the diplomatic gladiator who is to enter the arena of St. Petersburgh, but this opinion I cannot share. Very little talent would be encountered here—deceit and falsehood, the arms the most successfully employed in Russia, and these being within the grasp of very ordinary mediocrity. What I believe to be required here is good sense, great watchfulness, and, above all, honest straightforwardness.

Russia is a country of courtiers, and I am convinced that foreign Governments would render a real service to their own interests by not allowing the number to be swelled by the addition of their own Representatives; if this was not clear before, the fact has been well established by the events of the last few months.

To return to the communication made by General de Rochow to the Emperor. It was extremely ill received by His Majesty, whose feelings, even if kept under during the audience (a point upon which I have no information), appear to have been very freely vented afterwards. If I am rightly informed, His Majesty's displeasure at the conduct of his Royal brother-in-law was expressed in terms the least ambiguous, and was probably accompanied by denunciations of Prussian perfidy and Austrian ingratitude.

Had this not been the case similar expressions would not have been heard from those who are the faithful echoes of words pronounced in the Palace.

The Emperor's state of excitement appears to have been of some duration, for, on the following day, he expressed his resolution of sending away Count Münster, saying that he had no longer any occasion for the service of a Prussian Aide-de-camp; there is, I believe, however, no intention of acting upon a determination taken *ab irato*.

The plain truth is, that His Imperial Majesty has contrived to place himself in so deplorably bad a position that I should even now feel hopeful as to his endeavouring to recover himself by timely retreat if truth and reason could but gain a hearing, and if it were possible to assign the bounds within which a will during long years freed from all contradiction and control could now be brought under restraint.

It is yet just possible that the removal of two foreign Ministers from this Court may afford the means of deluding the Russian public into the belief of measures of great energy being commenced, and that a method may thus be devised for extrication from the difficulties which have been created by holding big language, by taking up over-forward positions, and by making appeal to dangerous passions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 237.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 64.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 18, 1854.*

AS it may not be without interest to your Lordship to learn the general tenor of the latest public information received here from the Principalities, I have had a précis made of the intelligence of the military movements reported in the Berlin press of this date, of which I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a copy in translation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 237.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

SINCE the battle of Citate only a few small skirmishes have taken place. Both armies suffer from the unhealthy climates. The Russian army, in spite of the reinforcements, is reported not to be as numerous as when it crossed the Pruth last summer. 35,000 are said to have fallen through the sword and disease. An epidemic, similar to the plague, has broken out in the Turkish army, which suffers extremely, though not so much as the Russians. The Egyptians are supposed to have brought it with them. The Russians are concentrating great masses of troops around and in Oltenitza; the Turks between Silistria and Turtukai. The island near Oltenitza was occupied by the Turks for two days. General Lüders sent his steamers to reconnoitre on the 5th and 6th instant from Ibraila to Matchin. A Turkish reconnoitering party passed the Danube on the 3rd, below the mouth of the Timak, but retired over the river on the approach of the Russians.

The last news from Lesser Wallachia is of the 11th. It is said the Russians will not begin operations against Kalafat under four weeks. The Russians have occupied an island on the Danube above Magkevit. The new Seraskier has given orders for active operations to commence as soon as the season permits. The Turkish troops are marching on Widdin. The reserves have left Schumla on the 24th, 28th, 29th ultimo, and 1st instant, for Rusgrad, Turtukai, Silistria, and Sistowa. Some redifs again crossed over to Turna on the 5th, but were beaten back.

Jassy.—Heavy Russian artillery is expected to pass through, also two regiments of Lancers. Gortchakoff is said to be instructed to await reinforcements before undertaking any operations.

Bucharest.—Prince Gortchakoff has returned from Lesser Wallachia. The Turks are completely surrounded in Kalafat. The Russians have advanced nearer. 6,000 Turks crossed by Giurgevo on the 3rd instant, but were repulsed by General Poimonoff.

No. 238.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 65. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 18, 1854.*

A FEW days ago Baron Manteuffel received an order from the King to consult with the Minister of War as to the arrangement which should be made in the event of foreign ships of war appearing in the Baltic ports. Upon hearing this information I immediately spoke to Baron Manteuffel, and learnt from his Excellency that this instruction had not originated with the King, but had been addressed to him at the suggestion of General Gerlach and M. Niebuhr, who are both interested in the cause of Russia; that he felt a great deal annoyed at it, but that he had no intention of sanctioning any arrangement which would close the Prussian harbours to our fleets; and that, as no regulations on the subject existed, he should endeavour to draw up an answer which would leave the matter much as it already stood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 239.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 18, 1854.*

I READ this morning to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 24 of the 18th instant, in which you approve of the course I had pursued in communicating to the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with my French colleague, the draft of the proposed Convention to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna; and his Excellency was much gratified with the assurance contained in that despatch, that there is no wish on the part of England and France unduly to press upon the Prussian Government, although in the present state of things the importance of coming to a clear understanding with reference to the future cannot be over-estimated.

His Excellency observed further, that Prussia is most anxious not to be pressed at the present moment, for many reasons. The greatest, perhaps, was the difficulties caused by the military organization; for though she had an army of 500,000 men, the calling out this force, and putting it on the war footing, would create financial requirements which it would be difficult to meet; and that he thought the prudent and best course was to reserve their strength with a view to striking a decisive blow hereafter.

I replied, that I thought this was scarcely fair towards the maritime Powers, who would thus have to bear the brunt of the commencement of the war; but, I added, can we count on your cooperation hereafter?

He answered, that he trusted we should find Prussia ready and disposed to do so; and he said, that he had no misgivings as to the King, for although he knew His Majesty might waver and be worked upon by Russia, still in the present state of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, he had less to fear, as its ill-humour would have less influence than its cajoleries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 240.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 18, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL told me to-day, that he was in daily expectation of answers from St. Petersburgh to his late communications to that Court, but that the only indication he had as yet received of the effect which they had produced, was contained in a letter to General Gerlach from Count Münster, the Prussian Military Agent at the Imperial Court, who reported that the Prussian despatches had produced great exasperation, and that the feelings towards the King and Government at the present moment were only equalled by that produced by the events which occurred at Berlin in 1848.

His Excellency added, that he understood that the military preparations

were pursued with the greatest vigour; and that he had heard, though not from an official source, that the Imperial Guards were under orders to march to Warsaw.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 241.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 68.)
Berlin, February 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Minister has received instructions from his Government of the 15th instant, which he has had the goodness to communicate to me. They consist in the copies of instructions which have been addressed to Baron Bourqueney in answer to his reports of Count Orloff's late mission to Vienna, and enumerate the objections to which the verbal proposals made by Count Buol to Count Orloff for a peaceful settlement of the Oriental question are open. These despatches are only for M. de Moustier's information; they are entirely in accordance with the impression which Lord Cowley had received from his conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as reported by his Excellency in his despatches, of which your Lordship has forwarded copies for my information under flying seal to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 242.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 50.)
Vienna, February 15, 1854.

My Lord,

IN a conversation with Count Buol, I mentioned the substance of the statements made by M. de Bismark to Mr. Edwards, as to the attempt of Austria to persuade Prussia to make a joint declaration of neutrality on the Eastern question. Count Buol stated that, having positively refused the propositions of Count Orloff to make any such declaration of neutrality, he could not be attempting to engage Prussia to take such an engagement. He supposed this statement was made upon the proposals which the Austrian Government had some time ago made to the Cabinet of Berlin, but which were not in the sense now reported.

With respect to the announcement to the Diet, on the part of the Governments of Denmark and Sweden, of the neutrality they intended to observe in case a more extended war should arise out of the complications at present existing between Russia and the Porte, Count Buol said that he could not but think it would be a very proper measure, since it had been notified to the other Powers, and therefore he thought it right it should be so to the German Confederation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 243.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 188.)
Paris, February 19, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I addressed yesterday to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing his Excellency that the French Government had no objection to the draft of Convention which your Lordship proposed should be entered into by the Governments of Great Britain, and France, and Turkey, for the better regulation of the measures to be taken by the three Governments for the defence of the latter country.

Your Lordship will see that General Baraguay d'Hilliers will be instructed to urge the Porte's acceptance of that Convention.

I have also read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 60 to Lord Stratford, informing that Ambassador that a considerable military force will shortly be sent by the English and French Governments to Turkey, and instructing him to insure a proper reception for the combined forces, and expressing a hope that orders will be given by the Porte to the Turkish commanders to prevent any want of unity of action between them and the English and French Commanders-in-chief.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys approves these instructions, and on my asking him whether it might not be as well to leave some latitude to the Ambassadors to introduce a stipulation of the kind into the proposed Convention, he replied that he had no objection, provided that care was taken not to press any conditions that might seem to trench upon the independent action of the Porte, or which would make the French Government appear to be responsible for every act of the Turkish Government.

My despatch to Lord Stratford will show your Lordship further that the idea of sending a messenger overland to Constantinople had been abandoned by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Your Lordship's despatches, therefore, which were destined to be transmitted by that messenger, were forwarded in the usual way by the extra messenger Purdie.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 243.

Lord Cowley to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,
Paris, February 18, 1854.

IT was intended that the accompanying despatches should have been conveyed to your Excellency by a French overland messenger; but circumstances having delayed his departure until the time had arrived for dispatching the regular mail, he will no longer be sent, and I forward the despatches in the usual manner.

I received yesterday a despatch from the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of which is inclosed;* and I have the honour, in compliance with the instructions which it contains, to inform your Excellency that the French Government approves entirely the draft of Convention to which that despatch refers; and General Baraguay d'Hilliers will be instructed by the present occasion to assist your Excellency to obtain its acceptance by the Porte.

I have, &c
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* No. 195.

No. 244.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)

Paris, February 19, 1854.

My Lord,

THE answer of the Emperor Nicholas to the letter which the Emperor of the French addressed to His Majesty on the 29th ultimo, and which has been the subject of so much discussion lately, reached Paris yesterday evening. Its tenour was made known to the public this morning, by a short article in the "Moniteur," of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

I called upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the course of the day, and his Excellency was good enough to show me the letter of the Emperor Nicholas. As a copy will be transmitted this evening to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship, I confine myself to stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys evidently thought that the refusal to accede to the French propositions had been conveyed in ruder terms than was necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 244.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of February 18, 1854.

LA réponse attendue de St. Pétersbourg est arrivée ce soir. L'Empereur Nicolas annonce qu'il n'accepte pas les propositions d'accommodement qui lui avaient été adressées.

No. 245.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 190.)

Paris, February 19, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, on being made acquainted with the instructions which your Lordship proposed to address to Her Majesty's Envoys at Vienna and Berlin, with copies of the notes exchanged between the British and French Governments, defining the future action of those Governments on the Eastern question, expressed his entire acquiescence in them; and he availed himself yesterday of Her Majesty's messenger to send instructions of a similar nature to the French Representatives at those two Courts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 246.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 195.)

Paris, February 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an article extracted from the "Moniteur" of this morning, which is intended to prepare the French nation for the commencement of hostilities with Russia.

It seems that the Emperor hesitates at publishing the answer which he has received from the Emperor of Russia. Much as I deplored the publicity given to His Majesty's own letter to the Czar, I cannot but think it unwise to be more reserved in respect to the answer which has been returned to it. Concealment in France is next to impossible. Several passages of the answer, or rather the tenour of them, are already known in Paris; and, in my humble opinion, it would be better, for the Emperor's sake, that the whole should be made public. I have not hesitated to express myself confidentially in this sense to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, observing that, after the publication of the Emperor's letter, secrecy in regard to the answer will be attributed to apprehensions on the part of the French Government as to the effect which that answer may produce on the feelings of the French people.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 246.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of February 20, 1854.

NOUS avons annoncé hier que l'Empereur avait reçu une réponse de St. Pétersbourg.

Dans sa lettre à l'Empereur, le Czar discute les conditions d'arrangement qui lui avaient été proposées, et déclare qu'il ne peut entrer en négociation que sur les bases qu'il a fait connaître.

Cette réponse ne laisse plus de chance à une solution pacifique, et la France doit se préparer à soutenir, par des moyens plus efficaces, la cause que n'ont pu faire prévaloir les efforts persévérants de la diplomatie.

En défendant plus énergiquement les droits de la Turquie, l'Empereur compte sur le patriotisme du pays, sur l'alliance intime de l'Angleterre et sur les sympathies des Gouvernements d'Allemagne.

Ces Gouvernements ont constamment déclaré qu'ils voulaient, aussi résolûment que nous, maintenir l'équilibre Européen, faire respecter l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman. Il n'y a pas d'autre question engagée dans le débat.

L'attention se tourne vers l'Autriche, que sa position appelle à jouer un rôle actif et important. L'Autriche s'est toujours prononcée, avec une grande fermeté, en faveur des points qui ont été établis dans le protocole de la Conférence de Vienne du 5 Décembre dernier.

Nous avons toute confiance dans la loyauté et le caractère chevaleresque du jeune Empereur d'Autriche; nous trouvons, en outre, une garantie des dispositions de son Gouvernement dans les intérêts de ses peuples, intérêts qui sont identiques aux nôtres.

Dans les circonstances générales de la politique Européenne, la France, forte de ses intentions loyale et désintéressées, n'a rien à redouter de la lutte qui se prépare. Elle sait d'ailleurs qu'elle peut compter sur l'énergie autant que sur la sagesse de l'Empereur.

No. 247.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Paris, February 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE been informed confidentially that the following is the summary of the circular despatch which has been addressed by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to all the Emperor's diplomatic agents.

The entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea causes the Imperial Government to fear that a state of open hostility will supervene between Russia and the Maritime Powers. The mission of Count Orloff was twofold: to support the counter-propositions of his Government, and to obtain from Austria and Prussia a promise of neutrality, on condition of giving assistance to these Governments should they be threatened with internal or external danger in consequence.

The Austrian circular remarks that this proposition fell to the ground by

the refusal of Prussia to enter into any arrangement of the kind proposed, and asserts that even if Prussia had not refused, Austria must have done so. In presence of the extended hostile movements of Russia against Turkey, which were evidently intended, and of the insurrection which was gaining ground in the European Provinces of Turkey, Austria must take council of her own interests only. Another argument put forward for refusing Count Orloff's proposition is, that it would destroy the union which had been established by the Conference among the Four Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 248.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 197. Confidential.)

Paris, February 20, 1854.

My Lord,

ON reading to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 93, his Excellency took objection to the supposition which seemed to exist in your Lordship's mind that he had ever said "that the proposal which it appears Count Orloff has engaged to communicate to the Emperor of Russia can only lead to delay, and may tend to set Austria at variance with France and England."

His Excellency added, that his views with regard to that proposal had been fully developed in a despatch which he had addressed to M. de Bourqueney on the 14th instant, a copy of which had been sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.

On referring to my despatch No. 148, which led your Lordship into this error, I find that a stronger impression has been made on your Lordship than I intended to convey. In the course of the conversation which I was recounting, M. Drouyn de Lhuys let fall the words, "It is probably another attempt to gain time, or to prevent Austria joining with France and England," but he founded no argument upon them; and my subsequent despatches Nos. 167 and 173 will have informed your Lordship of the more matured views of the French Cabinet.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is so anxious that there should be no doubt as to his real appreciation of the proposal in question that he has furnished me with a copy of the despatch to which I have referred above, for confidential communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 248.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Bourqueney.

(Confidentielle.)

Paris, 14 Février, 1854.

M. le Baron,

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 24 en date du 9 Février.

L'Empereur approuve complètement l'attitude que vous avez prise et le langage que vous avez tenu, par rapport à la double mission du Comte Orloff, mission dont M. de Buol, dans une dépêche adressée à M. de Hübner, caractérise le résultat en disant: "Les contre-propositions de la Russie n'ont pas été jugées acceptables par la Conférence, tandis que l'essai de lier l'Autriche en face d'éventualités d'une portée incertaine n'a pas eu plus de succès."

Cette même lettre contient relativement à la combinaison suggérée au Comte Orloff par M. le Ministre d'Autriche, des développements qui complètent les informations que vous m'aviez vous-même données. En voici le résumé textuel:

1. En réponse aux dernières communications de la Chancellerie de Vienne

tendant à engager le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg à examiner itérativement les propositions de la Porte dont la Conférence s'est rendue l'organe, la Cour de Russie transmettrait au Cabinet de Vienne des préliminaires de la paix, qui devraient se trouver en accord avec ces propositions, en abandonnant au Gouvernement Autrichien le soin de s'entendre avec la Conférence pour faire adopter et signer les préliminaires par la Porte.

2. L'Envoyé de Russie à Vienne se trouverait autorisé à concerter avec les membres de la Conférence, dans des voies confidentielles, les changements qui pourraient être jugés nécessaires éventuellement encore, afin de les rendre acceptables par la Porte.

3. Les préliminaires étant ainsi arrêtés seront envoyés à Constantinople par la Conférence, qui se chargera de les faire adopter par la Porte et signer par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan, en même temps qu'elle se trouvera autorisée par la Russie à arrêter avec la Porte une suspension temporaire des hostilités.

4. Les préliminaires de paix étant signés, seront envoyés à Vienne et transmis ensuite à St. Pétersbourg par une mission extraordinaire de l'Empereur d'Autriche, laquelle, en son nom et en celui des autres Puissances, devra obtenir de l'Empereur de Russie l'échange du document Turc contre celui qui sera révêtu de la signature du Chancelier de l'Empire de Russie pour le faire parvenir à la Porte.

5. Cette formalité accomplie l'Empereur de Russie donnera l'ordre à ses troupes d'évacuer le territoire Turc; de leur côté les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres prescriront à leurs Amiraux de quitter la Mer Noire, ainsi que le Bosphore et les Dardanelles.

6. Ces deux mesures étant en train d'éxécution, des Plenipotentiaires nommés par les deux parties belligérantes se réuniront dans une endroit dont elles conviendront entre elles, pour négocier et signer l'instrument définitif conforme aux préliminaires déjà signés.

7. Les six Puissances procéderont après au renouvellement du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841.

M. le Comte de Buol, en exposant ces idées à M. le Comte Orloff, a ajouté, avec une loyale délicatesse, qu'on ne devait nullement leur attribuer le caractère d'une ouverture de la Cour Impériale, encore moins y rattacher l'intention de prendre une position intermédiaire entre la Russie et les Puissances maritimes, mais que c'était simplement un bienveillant essai de conciliation émané d'une inspiration toute spontanée.

C'est dans cet esprit et sous cette réserve, M. le Baron, que je vais examiner avec vous, d'une manière confidentielle, les divers points traités dans la dépêche de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche.

Sur le paragraphe premier, je n'ai à faire aucune observation, si ce n'est que la conformité entre les préliminaires et les propositions du 13 Janvier devra être complète.

Le second doit, je le suppose, s'entendre en ce sens que le Représentant de la Porte serait admis, aussi bien que l'Envoyé de Russie, à délibérer avec les membres de la Conférence, sur les changements de rédaction qui pourraient être reconnus nécessaires. L'intervention de la Conférence, si elle était clandestine et en quelque sorte subreptice, porterait atteinte à la dignité des quatre Puissances, aux engagements déjà contractés par elles et aux graves intérêts qu'il s'agit de placer sous la sauvegarde de l'Europe.

Les paragraphes 3 et 4 ne me semblent donner lieu à aucune remarque. L'envoi d'une mission extraordinaire à Pétersbourg est peut-être superflu; mais c'est là une question qui regarde plus la Cour de Vienne que nous.

L'évacuation du territoire Turc par l'armée Russe (§ 5) pourrait motiver la sortie de la Mer Noire des escadres Anglo-Française; mais c'est seulement après la signature du Traité définitif que l'honneur et la prudence permettraient à la France et à l'Angleterre de songer à rappeler leurs vaisseaux du Bosphore ainsi que des Dardanelles. Tant que la paix n'est pas assurée, la menace permanente d'une escadre Russe à Sevastopol, et d'une armée Russe en Bessarabie, exige la présence d'un pavillon protecteur dans les eaux de Constantinople. Le paragraphe 6 ne soulève point d'objection, pourvu qu'il soit bien convenu que les préliminaires seront incorporés dans le Traité, dont ils feront partie intégrant.

En stipulant la réunion d'une Conférence où siégeront les Plénipotentiaires

des six Puissances pour procéder au renouvellement du Traité du 13 Janvier, 1841, le paragraphe 7 ne parle pas des clauses que devront être ajoutées à cet Acte pour rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe. Je ne pense pas que cette omission indique, de la part du Comte Buol, l'abandon d'une pensée que je trouve reproduite dans plusieurs documents émanés de la Chancellerie Autrichienne, et qui, inscrite dans les propositions de la Porte, a été consacrée le 13 Janvier par les déclarations de la Conférence de Vienne.

Telles sont, M. le Baron, les réflexions que me suggère l'examen d'une combinaison où je me plais à reconnaître avec M. le Comte Buol un honorable et sincère désir d'assurer aux grandes Puissances la participation qu'elles doivent avoir à l'œuvre de la paix, de ménager les amours propres en écartant les difficultés de forme de nature à les froisser, et d'obtenir au plus tôt l'évacuation du territoire Turc et la cessation des hostilités.

Je ne puis néanmoins m'empêcher de vous répéter ce que, dès le premier abord, j'ai dit à M. de Hübner, ainsi qu'aux Représentants de l'Angleterre et de la Prusse. Au point où en sont venues les choses, c'est moins à des combinaisons ingénieuses qu'à des résolutions énergiques que les Cours de l'Occident doivent recourir pour rétablir la paix, garantir la sureté de leurs Etats, conserver l'équilibre Européen, et sauver l'ordre social. Aussi dans l'opinion du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, l'attente du résultat des pourparlers actuels ne doit pas retarder d'un seul moment l'adoption de mesures rigoureuses.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 249.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 198.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 20, 1854.*

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch dated Vienna, eleven o'clock this day, states that the answer of the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor of the French was known there, and that Count Buol had expressed to M. de Bourqueney his conviction that his own proposition sent through Count Orloff would be equally refused. M. de Bourqueney appears to have had a conversation of the highest importance with Count Buol, the details of which are on the road by the messenger, but he does not hesitate to express his conviction that Austria will sign the Convention which has been proposed to her, as soon as the answer to Count Buol's proposition has been received from St. Petersburgh. In the meantime he is taking larger military precautions than were at first intended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 250.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 20, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that a French frigate has been ordered directly to Athens, and that the Commander will have directions to concert measures with Captain Peel, or any other of Her Majesty's officers whom he may meet with there, for preventing the encouragement by the Greek Government of any attack on Turkey.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has written again very strongly to M. Forth Rouen, and he is to have an interview with M. Mavrocordato to-morrow, when he will place strongly before that Minister the danger which his Government is incurring.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 251.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 21, 1854.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to me a despatch from his Government dated the 15th instant, suggesting that the Governments of England and France should jointly declare that their ships-of-war and Consular authorities would protect indiscriminately in all quarters of the world the commercial marine of the two countries. The French Government anticipates from such a declaration not only the primary benefit of commercial protection, but the still more important advantage of a public manifestation to the world of the union which exists between the two Governments, and of the spirit of cordial friendship and good understanding by which they are influenced when combining their efforts for the preservation of Europe from the evils which would result from the overthrow of the Turkish Empire.

Your Excellency is so well acquainted with the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, and of the value which they attach to the maintenance of an intimate and cordial alliance with France, not alone with reference to the exigencies of the present moment, but also to the general interests of the two nations at all times and under all circumstances, that it is unnecessary for me to assure you of the satisfaction with which this overture has been received, and of the sincerity with which it is accepted by Her Majesty's Government. I accordingly lose no time in transmitting to you the draft of an instruction* which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to issue to all the civil servants of the Crown in foreign countries, and which will be communicated to the Board of Admiralty to serve as the text of the corresponding instructions to be issued by that Board for the guidance of Her Majesty's naval forces.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch and its inclosure to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and you will say that as soon as I am informed by you that the course proposed to be taken by Her Majesty's Government corresponds with the views of the Government of the Emperor, the formal instructions shall be sent immediately to Her Majesty's civil and naval authorities abroad.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 252.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 22, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinion which you state in your despatch No. 195, that you expressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the expediency of making public the answer from the Emperor Nicholas to the letter of the Emperor Napoleon, which was published in the "Moniteur."

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 253.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 117.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 22, 1854.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for communicating to you confidentially a copy of his despatch to M. de Bourqueney on the proposal which

* No. 274.

Count Orloff undertook to make to the Emperor of Russia, and for rectifying the error into which I had fallen with respect to his opinions.

Considering the nature of the counter-propositions of Russia, Her Majesty's Government cannot but regard the proposals made to Count Orloff by Count Buol as unfortunate, and tending to produce delay as well as embarrassment to the Four Powers, if accepted by Russia.

I inclose for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Lord Westmorland on the subject of those proposals.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 254.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 203.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 21, 1854.*

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch, dated 6 o'clock this morning, has been received by M. Drouyn de Lhuys from M. de Bourqueney. The latter recounts that at a ball last night at Prince Schwarzenberg's, where he had met the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty had fully confirmed the language held by Count Buol, to which reference was made in my despatch No. 198, transmitted yesterday. His Majesty spoke of the proposed Convention with approbation, and any modications, M. de Bourqueney says, which may be asked for by Austria will only be to render it more effective. The Emperor said that he approved the policy of France, and would remain united with her; that they would come to an understanding about Italy, so that he might have all his forces disposable for the other extremity of his dominions. Never, says M. de Bourqueney, did the Emperor open himself to him so freely. His words were clear, concise, and resolute.

Trust, he adds, to the conduct of Austria. M. de Buol will await the answer to his last propositions, but it is only for form's sake; for nobody supposes that they will be accepted. M. de Bourqueney requests M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inform him what will be the first measures taken by England and France, as the knowledge may be of use to him. Count Buol had told him that if France and England fixed a delay for the evacuation of the Principalities, the expiration of which would be the signal for hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna would support the summons. It will be refused, adds M. de Bourqueney, and we shall then have Austria on the ground with us.

Count Buol is afraid of some resistance on the part of Prussia to the project of Convention, and he thinks that a little pressure will be necessary at Berlin.

The Austrian Cabinet is about to advise the assembly of 30,000 Prussian troops on the Polish frontier. Their own military movements are proceeding with activity.

Having read me this despatch, M. Drouyn de Lhuys requested me to telegraph immediately to your Lordship that part of it which related to the summoning Russia to evacuate the Principalities. He wished to have as early information as possible of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this point, and if they agreed to it, of the delay which they considered should be fixed. He himself was of opinion that the two Governments should address themselves to Count Nesselrode, summoning the Russian Government to order an immediate evacuation to be completed within a given time, and adding that silence or a refusal would be considered to be a declaration of war on the part of Russia.

May I ask your Lordship to let me have a reply by telegraph whenever a decision is taken? I have not time to enter upon the present occasion into any details of the conversation, not without its importance, to which the contents of this despatch led.

I shall have the honour of returning to the subject on the first opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* No. 219.

No. 255.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 204.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 22, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to state, that at 7 P.M. this day, I addressed the following telegraphic despatch to your Lordship in cypher:

"Count Buol assures M. de Bourqueney, that if England and France will fix a delay for the evacuation of the Principalities, the expiration of which shall be the signal for hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna will support the summons. M. Drouyn is of opinion that this should be done immediately, and that the two Governments should write to Count Nesselrode to demand the immediate commencement of that evacuation—the whole to be concluded by a given time, say the end of March. Silence or refusal to be considered a declaration of war on the part of Russia. Whenever a decision is taken, M. Drouyn de Lhuys begs that you will inform me by telegraph."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 256.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 33.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 22, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your language to Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the proposed Convention to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 66 of the 18th instant. Your Lordship will repeat to Baron Manteuffel, that there is no wish on the part of England and France to press unduly upon Prussia; but it must be remembered that the two Governments are contending for a great European principle, which involves the existing balance of power; and as Germany would be the first and principal sufferer by any great disturbance of the actual order of things, England and France are entitled to expect that the two principal German Powers should declare their intentions more formally than they have hitherto done.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 257.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 53.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 3, 1854.*

I BEG to solicit your Lordship's attention to the accompanying paper, which has been drawn up at my request by a British officer, by whom the plan described in it was originally suggested to me. In another memorandum, which is also forwarded to your Lordship by the present opportunity, allusion is made to the same plan. The proposed operation carries with it an appearance of practicability which recommends it for serious consideration; but it may be presumed that a portion, at least, of the forces employed to carry it out would require to be foreign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Inclosure in No. 257.

Memorandum.

THE Russian forces in the Principalities are supposed to consist of two corps d'armée and a part of a third, besides Cossacks.

These corps are the 3rd, or Osten-Sacken's, the 4th, or Dannenberg's, and a part of the 5th, or Lüders', the remainder of which are supposed to be in Circassia.

The different corps are believed to be posted as follows: Dannenberg's to the west of Bucharest as far as Kalafat, Osten-Sacken's between Bucharest and Foktchani, and Lüders' along the Danube from the Yalonitza eastwards, and as far as Ackerman; this latter corps being in greatest force about Ibraila, Galatz, Reni, and Ismail, between which places it is supposed that about 18,000 men are stationed. It will be seen, therefore, that these corps are *en échelon*, a part of Osten-Sacken's forming a second line in rear of Lüders'.

The operations of the Russian army appear, therefore, to extend over a front from Kalafat to Galatz of about 280 miles in a direct line, the principal part of their troops being at Bucharest, in the front and to the eastward of it.

The Turkish army is posted along the Danube and in the rear of it, there being in front of the Balkan probably about 120,000 men, of whom the main portion are at Schumla, and in front of that place between Rustchuk and the Black Sea, 18,000 being in the Tartary Dobrudscha.

From the best information respecting the Danube, it appears that there are numerous points at which it can be crossed by an army above Silistria, but that below Silistria, in consequence of the marshy nature of the banks and the numerous islands, it can only be crossed at Hirsova and between Matchin and Tultscha.

Silistria being a fortified town, garrisoned by about 8,000 soldiers, and requiring regular siege operations to reduce it, appears, with the forces at Schumla and near it, to secure the Dobrudscha from being taken in reverse by any Russian force which might pass the Danube to the west of Silistria. Hirsova, therefore, being covered, the position of the Dobrudscha would appear to afford a means for taking the Russian forces in Wallachia in reverse, extending as it does about ninety miles north of Silistria.

It is not improbable that being aware of this defect in their position the Russians have already made such strenuous and repeated efforts to gain a footing in the Dobrudscha.

Other causes may also have operated to produce these efforts; the road through it is the shortest line towards the Balkan, and by a well-selected entrenched camp near Karasow, they would secure their position if obliged to retreat and assume the defensive.

The position of the Dobrudscha might probably be used against the Russians, and afford a basis of operations for an offensive war in the Principalities.

If the Turkish troops could be depended upon to secure the position of Silistria, and to occupy the Russian forces at Kalafat and in front of Bucharest, it would be worthy of consideration—for which a careful reconnaissance of the course of the Danube from Silistria to its embouchure would be necessary—whether a corps d'armée might not be thrown into the Dobrudscha, and if the materials for crossing the Danube were collected at some point in its course (Matchin and the creeks near it appear to afford some advantages for this purpose); whether it might not cross and take up a good position with a *tête de pont* as a basis of operations on the left bank of the Danube, near the bend at Galatz, or at Ibraila, and operate in rear of the Russians, so as to threaten their line of operations and compel them to evacuate Wallachia, in which their position would, by a successful movement of this nature, become exceedingly critical. Their position would not only be critical on account of the distance of their advanced corps from their base of operations on the Russian frontier, but on account of the narrowness of the space, some fifty miles, left open to them between the Danube and the Carpathians above Foktchani, to which by the nature of the country their operations would be confined.

A short distance north of Foktchani the spurs of the Carpathians render the surface of the country so rugged that a movement across it would be very difficult; and, moreover, the river Sereth is not fordable between its embouchure and a point about ten miles above Foktchani, and is only traversed by two bridges, one near its junction with the Danube at Maximine, the other some fifty miles from it on the road from Bucharest to Jassy.

It is probable that a good position might be selected for establishing a permanent military bridge between the Sereth and Pruth, or even east of the Pruth in Bessarabia, covered by a *tête de pont*, which would form a secure basis for offensive operations in Moldavia or Bessarabia. The nature of the country on the left bank of the Danube appears to be such as to facilitate its passage; for being intersected by numerous lakes and rivers between Ismail and the Sereth, the concentration of troops upon any intermediate point to resist a passage must be difficult and require much time.

A sufficiency of boats could probably be formed on the Danube by making use of the various floating mills, the boats of which are admirably adapted for the construction of a military bridge.

The collection, however, of sufficient quantities of the means necessary for crossing may be difficult on account of the superiority of the Russian flotilla on the Danube. The fortress of Matchin and the islands near it might possibly secure a point for their collection, or perhaps the Lake Ramsin, or the St. George's Mouth might, upon examination, prove more favourable, as also securing greater secresy in their collection. In this latter case probably the passage might be effected near Isaktchi, or between it and Galatz.

The force which would be requisite to operate successfully in this direction depends necessarily on the disposable force of the enemy, but calculating upon a force of 100,000 men being under arms in the Principalities, it would appear that an effective corps of 50,000 would be sufficient, if the Turkish army were prepared to cross the Danube immediately upon the falling back of the Russians in Wallachia, and to follow them up with energy and rapidity, or to effect a simultaneous passage of the river between Silistria and Rustchuk.

No. 258.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 3, 1854.

I HAVE had it in mind for some time to put your Lordship more completely than before in possession of what appear to me to be the facts and points which most require attention with reference to the war unhappily existing between Turkey and Russia, and but too likely to extend to other countries, particularly to England. They are as numerous as they are important; and respect for your Lordship's time has concurred with the hope of peace to retard the performance of a task which I have, nevertheless, felt to be one of duty. Now that the worst is to be apprehended, and that we have passed through so much of the winter as to be within three months of the period at which it is usual with Russia to open her campaigns against Turkey, I no longer hesitate to submit my impressions in their full extent to your Lordship's consideration. I have thrown them into the shape of a memorandum in order to mark that they belong in general to no particular date, and perhaps also to avoid the sinister reputation of having sent home a monster despatch. There is little depth and still less novelty in the greater part of the composition, which I have endeavoured to keep within reasonable bounds by reckoning largely on your Lordship's previous information and natural sagacity. My principal object is to bring the scattered points which require consideration into one connected view. I have dealt frankly with weaknesses and dangers, because I am convinced that the greatest weakness and the greatest danger is to conceal or to understate them. In speaking of remedies, I have confined myself to general intimations, conceiving that all beyond is the special domain of Her Majesty's Government. I trust that my views, though extensive, are not exaggerated; though full of difficulty,

not impracticable. War is not of our choosing. We have to accept it as a necessity, which, if we do not shape it to good ends, will hurry us on to confusion and disgrace.

The memorandum is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 258.

Memorandum.

WHATEVER hopes of peace might reasonably be founded on the Porte's acceptance of terms recommended by the Four Powers, in virtue of the Emperor of Russia's declarations, it is difficult to read the correspondence from Petersburgh, or to observe the movements in Russia, without entertaining a strong persuasion that war will not only continue, but probably extend. On this supposition the Porte has little time to lose. Three months are barely sufficient for repairing her losses, completing her preparations, and arranging her plans for another and far more serious campaign.

If the Emperor of Russia were sure of having a single enemy to deal with, his policy might be directed rather to the exhaustion of Turkey by prolonged and overstrained exertions, than to its prompt submission under a violent and overwhelming attack. But having to apprehend the hostility of two other Powers at least, it is obviously his interest to strike home at once, and to gain a decisive advantage before England and France can mature and concentrate their efforts for the Sultan's defence. Appearances, and in some respects positive information, support the correctness of this presumption. There is much reason to expect a large increase of force in the Principalities, and a forward movement across the Danube on a proportionate scale, early in the spring. It is natural to suppose that the main attack will be accompanied with every auxiliary measure calculated to weaken the Porte's resistance. The Asiatic frontier of Turkey will, no doubt, be threatened by a Russian army; and also, notwithstanding the late return to better counsels at Tehran, by a strong Persian demonstration, capable of ripening into downright hostility on the first tempting occasion. The barbarous mountain tribes will naturally come in aid of an enemy advancing on that side. Long-prepared intrigues will be brought into play; and it is easy to foresee that wherever Russian influence can operate, from the Danube to the Morea, endeavours will be made to divide the subjects, to distract the counsels, and to cripple the energies of the Porte.

If the success of such operations were to stop short of Constantinople, the prospect of its going so far as to throw the Porte into alarm and to disperse her means of resistance for the time, is a just subject of anxiety and precaution. A negotiation imposed in this manner on Turkey would hardly fail of proving fatal in its results to that European policy for which so many notes have been framed, so many conferences held, and so many interests disturbed. Supposing even that the Turkish Empire could preserve its territorial integrity in such a case, its virtual independence must necessarily give way to Russian ascendancy; and the same act which confirmed the triumph of unjust aggression, would cast a deep shade on every prospect now opening throughout the East to improved civilization, and a more beneficial intercourse with Christendom. England, in particular, would have to rue the consequences of such a disaster. Foremost among those Powers which derive their nutriment from commerce, their vigour from free institutions, and their glory from the triumphs of justice and truth, she of all others would have reason to deplore the subjection of so fair and wide a field to the blighting influence of Russia.

Hence the duty, the importance, and the necessity of exploring and preparing, without loss of time, the most efficient means of strengthening Turkey in its weakest points, and of reducing its northern assailant to terms which would secure the Porte's independence and the future tranquillity of Europe on that score.

The Turks may not be entitled, as such, to extraordinary sacrifices on the part of Europe; but they have at least one real and powerful claim to support. They are the only existing race now capable of keeping this extensive Empire

together, and averting the calamities of a struggle for its partition. We are not, therefore, at liberty to abandon them on account of their errors and deficiencies. True policy appears to dictate another course, namely, that of supplying their deficiencies, to the best of our means, by friendly suggestions where friendly suggestions may avail, and, in failure of their own resources, by adequate material assistance.

Taking the average testimony of observers, whether professional or not, we must lay out our account for much imperfection in the national defences of Turkey. With respect to the army, it appears that its best points are the artillery and the infantry; its worst the cavalry. Its regiments of the line exhibit, in general, those qualities which characterize the good soldier. Their officers, if still in the ranks, would probably not differ from the men; but in the requisites for command they appear to be wofully deficient. The partial successes hitherto obtained by the Sultan's troops, may be traced to the artillery and privates. In Asia, where more depended on the commanders, success was limited to the impulse and vigour of a first attack. Reverses soon followed; and an army rated at 100,000 men fell into disorder and was all but dispersed. The soldiers have no reason to complain of their clothing and food. But they are scantily supplied with shoes—an essential article; and the Commissariat is wretchedly, if at all organized. The cavalry are ill mounted, and worse armed. The Turks imagine that their artillery would make up for the weakness of their cavalry; but the notion is a mistake which may cost them dear.

Turning to the navy, the same causes of regret and apprehension are perceptible. The large ships may serve well enough at anchor, as floating batteries, and they might venture occasionally to sea during the summer months; but their fitness for braving a gale of wind, or an enemy of equal force, may well be doubted. The Admirals of the combined squadrons gave their opinion against any such adventure, when there was lately an inclination at the Porte to hazard an experiment. The steamers are active in carrying troops and ammunition at the risk of being captured, and gun-boats for service on the Danube are only in a state of forward preparation. The seamen throughout the Turkish navy may appear to advantage when ranged for inspection, or engaged in exercising their guns; and they gave no doubtful proof of their gallantry and devotion in the late unequal combat. Yet so much practice is necessary for handling or fighting a ship at sea, that such appearances in port, however pleasing to the spectator, require to be tested by active service before they can be relied on.

Fortifications in Turkey are not more numerous than the defence of the country requires. The number, though already considerable, might, on the contrary, be extended with advantage. In those which exist, there is no lack of room for improvement; and it may be added, that the money and science wanted for their completion, are still in great measure to be sought. The Bosphorus itself is thought to be inadequately defended; and the Dardanelles, though, strange to say, an object of greater attention, is still susceptible of improvement. If Sinope had been efficiently and seasonably fortified, the Russians might have found less reason to boast of their miserable exploit there. Batoom, to say nothing of Trebizond and Heraclea, is still open to attack; and on the European side of the Black Sea, the more important points, where troops might be disembarked, are insufficiently or not at all defended, while the seaward works of Varna itself are far from affording a complete security to the place.

The supply of ordnance, though by no means small, is still unequal to the demand. The gunners are understood to be generally well-practised. Those of the navy have derived much advantage from the instructions of Captain Borlase. The gun-carriages are often of a defective construction, and few of the guns are made to traverse.

The desultory forces, whether horse or foot, which the Sultan employs in aid of his regular army, are of more service to the enemy than to their Sovereign. Ill-paid, and eager for pillage, they live upon the country through which they pass. They are ever the first to give way in battle; their advance or their flight is equally a signal of dismay to the peaceful inhabitants. In Asia they consummated the disasters originating in the incapacity of those who commanded the regular army; and they have made the Turkish name odious among the Georgians, who at first gave a cordial welcome to the Sultan's troops. Her

Majesty's Ambassador had cherished a hope of restraining their barbarous practices, by causing them to receive that moderate degree of discipline which their character and habits are capable of bearing. He fancied that instructors qualified for the task might be found amongst the East India Company's officers now in Europe on leave or on half-pay, who had been employed in training Mahomedan irregulars in India. Lieutenant-Colonel Beatson, who enjoys a considerable reputation on that score, was introduced by him to the Commander-in-chief, and also to Omar Pasha. Communications took place; but, for some unexplained reason, there was evidently no disposition to enter into the Ambassador's views on this point. It appears, however, that a certain impression has been made on the minds of the Turkish Ministers. Hairaddin Pasha, who was lately director of the police, is gone to the army in Asia with a commission relating to the irregulars, or "bashee bouzooks," as they are popularly called. But it is not clear whether Hairaddin Pasha is to exhort, to regulate, to control, or to dismiss them; and without European skill and energy little good is to be expected.

Passing to other causes of internal weakness it may be remarked that, notwithstanding the improved treatment experienced of late by the Christians in Turkey, and the corresponding increase of goodwill and loyalty on their side towards the Porte, so much practical injustice is still exercised by the Turks in dealing with them, and so bitter is the recollection of past grievances imperfectly removed, that any marked success obtained by Russia, or the advance of a Russian army towards Constantinople, would probably give occasion to serious disturbances in those parts of the Empire where the Greek population outnumbers the Turkish. Nothing in the nature of an outbreak, nothing demonstrating the existence of an extensive conspiracy, has hitherto occurred. But the elements of both no doubt exist, though in a latent state. How far Russian agents are at work to combine them for an eventual explosion is not unlikely to appear from an investigation which is now going on at the Police, in consequence of some arrests which have recently taken place. Constantinople, Bulgaria, and Thessaly are the localities where intrigue and disaffection are most likely to find a congenial atmosphere. I have seen depositions which may be understood to imply that a number of individuals pledged to take part eventually in the work of insurrection, are already enlisted on the strength of funds derived from a Russian source.

If disloyalty may be suspected among the Christians, and particularly among the Greek rayahs, danger of another kind proceeds from the Turkish fanatics, who, if they had power enough, would tie up the hands of their Government from making peace, and rely, in their blind confidence, on the single resources of Turkey for putting down the pretensions of Russia. Fortunately their strength is not equal to their zeal. In a moment of enthusiastic fury they might obtain a partial or temporary success; but the Government must lose sight of its duty, its interests, and its power, before it could allow them to acquire a permanent ascendancy.

In Servia and Montenegro a Russian army, advancing towards Constantinople, might find auxiliaries of some value. Hitherto appearances have been preserved in both. The Montenegrins, if I am rightly informed, have intrigued and made preparation without committing themselves to any overt act of hostility. The Servian Prince has given repeated assurances, not without an occasional proof, of loyalty. The Porte, contented with what is called his neutrality, and wishing to remove all doubt of its intentions by a solemn confirmation of the Servian privileges, which rest upon a part of the Treaties suspended by war, is rather surprised by the tone of the last communications from Belgrade, especially as it would seem that M. Moschin, the expelled Russian Consul, has lately had secret interviews with Prince Alexander and M. Simitch. On the whole, there is reason to apprehend that Servia and Montenegro would both require to be closely watched, if Russia should enter upon a fresh campaign with that display of force and resolution which is to be expected.

Those matters, however worthy of attention, are, after all, but secondary. Weakness unfortunately prevails in far more essential things—in the very sinews, and, prospectively, even in the flesh and blood of war. The revenue of the Empire is not equal to the demands of a great struggle; and if the struggle were to last with its natural waste of life, it would become daily more difficult to supply the growing deficiency of recruits. In neither case, however, is there any real necessity for the want. Turkey, whether in Europe or in Asia, teems with unexplored wealth, and there would be no lack of population for military recruitment if the contingents from Albania, Kurdistan, and other mountainous regions were trained into some kind of discipline and drafted into the regular army. Still more abundant would be the supply of soldiers if equal justice and the removal of a degrading impost were to open the career of arms to the Sultan's Christian subjects. As matters, however, stand now, the Porte must raise money by extraordinary means, and it must also look forward to an increase of difficulty in keeping its armies up to their present numerical strength. No inconsiderable portion of the regular army is already supplied from Egypt, which, unlike Tunis, has faithfully and generously performed its duty towards the Sultan. Three additional regiments appear to be ready for embarkation at Alexandria.

Crossing over the frontiers of Turkey we find three bordering Powers, widely separated from each other, and of very different character and magnitude, but each presenting matter of doubt and anxiety, perhaps even motives of precaution, to the Ottoman Government. Of these the greatest and most formidable has made a declaration of neutrality, upon which it is reasonable and just to rely; though if war be extended to the maritime Powers, Austria may find it no easy matter to maintain for long a delicately and nicely balanced attitude.

Persia is at best a fickle neighbour, liable to be swayed at any moment by the promises or threats of Russia, as well as by spontaneous movements of ambition or animosity. Though her last declarations announced a disposition more friendly to Turkey, two sudden changes may prove the forerunners of a third, and the presence of her armies on the frontier will operate to the advantage of Russia. In Greece both the Government and the nation appear to be quiet for the present, nor would it be wise to entertain suspicions rather originating in general surmise than founded on positive and connected facts. Yet character, position, and circumstance, when they concur, may naturally, without previous design or calculation, suggest a policy too obvious to be overlooked, and too seductive to be resisted. For a contingency of this kind the Porte and its allies ought surely to be prepared; the more so as the eventual inconvenience is likely to be felt, if ever, when the attention of the Governments may be absorbed by dangers far more pressing from an opposite quarter.

We cannot remain much longer in ignorance of what is to be finally expected from that side. The question of peace or war is now in the hands of Russia. Should the Emperor Nicholas resolve on declining the plan of settlement proposed to him, and follow up his resolution with characteristic vigour, the dangers which threaten this Empire may soon tumble in upon it with a full tide. The invasion, however formidable, must be resisted with corresponding determination, and it is almost idle to observe that Turkey has scarcely a deeper stake in the issue than her Allies. The triumph of Russia would be felt more immediately at Constantinople; but the wound inflicted on Europe would in its consequences extend further and last longer.

According to such information as we possess the principal attack may be expected to start from the Principalities, and to take the direction of the capital. It is in Bulgaria and the passes of the Balkan, in the varied region extending from the Danube to the chain of positions which cover the nearer approaches to Constantinople, that the Porte has to collect its principal means of defence. The greater part, and ultimately, perhaps, the whole, of the regular army may be wanted for this service. A considerable portion of it should be kept in reserve. A defeat in Bulgaria, followed by the passage of the Balkan, or the descent of a Russian army by Sophia into the plains of Adrianople, might prove fatal to the cause of Turkish independence, if there was no reserved army and a prepared line of defence to fall back upon. There is reason to believe that the features of the country are such as to allow good positions for making a stand in more places than one between Adrianople and the capital. In the immediate vicinity of Constantinople there is a chain of positions capable of being strongly fortified. It is the opinion of competent judges, that although the combined squadrons could do little or nothing for the defence of Constantinople against an army attacking it from the land side, they might greatly impede the approach of such an army by intercepting its supplies from the sea.

If England and France were disposed to give military as well as naval aid, there is some reason to believe that an army, placed in the Dobrucha district on the right bank of the Danube, between that river and Kustangi,

would operate as a powerful check on the advance of the Russian armies into or beyond Bulgaria. A strong force in that position, almost surrounded as it is by the Danube and open to the sea, might even contribute effectually to the dislodgment of the Russian armies from the two Principalities. Military assistance might be given by the Allies on a smaller scale by occupying Varna, and perhaps even the Dardanelles, with consent of the Porte, so as to allow the Turkish garrisons, in whole or in part, to join the Sultan's armies in the field.

Assistance of a less difficult and onerous description will probably be found indispensable. Gunpowder, muskets, rifles, and other arms are anything but overabundant in the Porte's magazines; and if Namick Pasha were to fail, as he probably will, in raising a loan, the Turkish Government might find itself reduced to the most perilous extremity for the want of necessary supplies. This prospect, however, does not seem to discourage them as much as their friends had expected. A convenient and not ill-founded speculation comes to their aid. They are supposed to argue, that in case of Russia's consenting to negotiate, the capitalists of London would lend them money on reasonable terms; and that in the event of war between Russia and the maritime Powers, the latter would be forced by their own sense of interest to give them a subsidy, or to guarantee their loan.

Be that as it may, the above-mentioned circumstances, ominous as they are, and others of a similar description, must be looked in the face, and met at once, if England and France are prepared to act with earnestness in support of a cause which they have proclaimed to be one of European magnitude. Turkey singlehanded has little or no prospect of escaping a final humiliation. Turkey supported as now by her allies may carry on the contest to a later period with occasional success.

But in order to insure an adequate and lasting result, the Turkish Government must of necessity look to its allies for nearly every kind of succour. A prolongation of the war, even on its present limited scale, involves hazards and entails sacrifices which require to be justified by the results as well as by the interests at stake. To obtain results commensurate with the interests which an unwarrantable spirit of aggression on the part of Russia has brought into immediate question, sacrifices must undoubtedly be made to no ordinary extent. But the efforts which they imply being once recognized as necessary, the sooner they are resolved on the more likely they are to prove effectual, and to attain their end while a national spirit is roused, and circumstances concur for their success.

It really would seem that there is no longer any room for choice. The Emperor of Russia is supposed to reject proposals which, according to his own declaration, he ought to accept. It remains for Europe, represented by more or less of its principal States, to overcome his obstinacy; and it is difficult to conceive how they can succeed, if not by a legitimate application of force.

It is presumable that the Emperor would not resolve on confronting such formidable adversaries without a strong reliance on the support of his subjects, and a determination to set in array the whole of his imposing resources.

There may be some exaggeration in the available amount of those resources, and there is a growing opinion that such is the case; but, taking into view the general elements of power which in Russia are, more or less, at the disposal of a single will, enough remains to task the energies even of such Powers as France and England for their control, where a signal and durable loss of position would be the consequence of defeat.

If this be true, as doubtless it is, the truth is one which fully accounts for the reluctance of Europe to give up the hopes of peace until every expedient for securing it had been tried to no purpose. But all disposable means having been exhausted in vain endeavours to bring the Court of Russia to reason, and the contest thus necessarily prolonged being one in which Turkey has everything to apprehend, and its allies a stake they cannot afford to lose, there seems to be no alternative but that of accepting the proffered challenge, and acting at once with that vigour and singleness of purpose which, besides being worthy of a good cause, may be expected to command success.

On this principle it may justly be thought essential to establish from the beginning a thorough understanding between the Porte and her two maritime allies: first, with respect to the plan of operations by sea and land; secondly, with respect to the means of execution, and the share to be contributed by each party; thirdly, as to the material securities which it would be the settled determination of the Contracting Parties to obtain from Russia.

The form of a Convention would probably be found the most suitable for objects of so much delicacy and importance.

On the supposition which forms the ground-work of this memorandum, there is no denying that Europe is in presence of that formidable Eastern question which has so long been an object of dread to all discerning statesmen, and which it has been the aim of so many diplomatic transactions to avoid or to postpone. It is not too much to say, that such a question being now unavoidably brought forward for decision, it behoves the Powers of Europe to settle it once for all on a basis of no temporizing character, and to grudge neither the means nor the exertions necessary for the accomplishment of so glorious and beneficent a purpose.

The vulnerable points and defective means of the Porte, in so far as they are open to general observation, require no further notice here. Attention has been sufficiently called to them in the preceding parts of this paper.

It remains with the Governments themselves to decide in what manner and degree the former are to be guarded, and the latter to be supplied.

Looking to probabilities, it would seem that the object of immediate urgency is the defence of the Turkish Empire, from the Danube to Constantinople. The operations in Asia might reasonably be made subordinate to the main object. A considerable portion of the regulars now stationed along the Asiatic frontier might be placed at the disposal of Omar Pasha, or held in reserve. The remainder of that army might take up a defensive position, without fear of being seriously attacked, so long as Shamil agrees to threaten the rear of the Russian forces in Georgia; and that the present return of Persia to better and more friendly feeling towards the Porte shall be perpetuated by the fear of giving offence to England, ready, if required, to substantiate her advice by directing a force from India on Karrak or Bushire.

The maintenance of a complete command in the Black Sea by means of the combined squadrons will obviously be still more requisite, even than now, when the military operations are actively resumed. It is to be hoped that the distribution of the squadrons for that purpose will be permanently settled in time. At present the difficult, if practicable, enterprise of taking Sevastopol, or destroying the Russian fleet, appears to be the surest, if not the only mode of permanently realising the views of Her Majesty's Government in the Black Sea.

If the allies entertained any idea of sending troops eventually to assist the Sultan's army in Europe, it would be desirable to have them ready, and at no great distance from the scene of action; but the Porte itself would hardly desire that kind of cooperation so long as it can succeed in making head against Russia by means of its own people alone. The need of it might, however, be felt or acknowledged too late; and on this account it might be desirable to provide at once for the contingency. Officers would at all events be acceptable without delay, even, perhaps, those of the highest military rank.

A small naval force under the two flags stationed in the Adriatic, and another in the waters of Greece, might be conducive to the success of larger operations elsewhere.

On the point of strengthening the coast and river defences, measures are already in progress, and it may be hoped that they will finally be carried out, though not by the unassisted energy of Turkish officers.

Looking, in conclusion, to the securities which the united interests of Turkey and Europe may imperiously require as the final results of the contest, it will be found that the principal and most obvious are, the revisal of the Treaties now suspended by the natural effect of war; the relief of the three Principalities from Russian protection, to be replaced by an improved political position, though still as privileged portions of the Turkish Empire: and a binding provision for the practical free navigation of the Danube. Two other eventual stipulations are suggested by a sense of justice: one would provide for the tranquillity and just pretensions of the Caucasian tribes unsubdued by Russia; the other would impose on Russia a fair indemnity for the expenses of the war, such as Russia herself has not unfrequently compelled a vanquished adversary to pay.

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These various and complicated matters demand a more extensive development than the present opportunity admits of.

Imperfectly as they are treated in this paper, they may, nevertheless, suffice to draw a reasonable attention to those points which, in the case supposed, will press for an early consideration, and which, to be dealt with effectually, require to be viewed in connection with each other.

But in guarding the Ottoman Empire against the wiles and encroachments of its colossal neighbour, we must never forget that Turkey nurses in its own bosom a far more powerful and deadly foe—that vicious system of administration which has long neutralized its component forces, and which spreads a corroding poison through every part of its population. It should be carefully borne in mind that, owing to well-known causes, a state of security is exactly that condition in which the poison would acquire its most fatal virulence, and in which corruption and injustice, the one familiarized by habit, the other sanctioned by religion, would take the deepest root, and cast the most noxious shade. The Powers to whom Turkey is compelled to look for safety will have done nothing efficient, nothing durable, for the substantive purposes of their union, unless, while fixing bounds to Russian aggression, they at the same time place Turkey under a distinct obligation to carry out with vigour and good faith those principles and plans of improvement which the Sultan has so often proclaimed in favour of a progressive intercourse with Europe, and of equal justice and benevolence to his subjects of every class, without exception. The Christians must henceforth be respected as well as tolerated throughout the Sultan's dominions, and Oriental Turkey must freely open its arms to the science, the skill, the industry, the fertilizing capital, and the ennobling sympathies of Western Europe.

Constantinople, January 1854. S. DE R.

No. 259.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 55.)
Constantinople, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM happy to derive from the contents of your Lordship's instruction No. 29 of the 17th ultimo, an additional confirmation of my fidelity in carrying out the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, when, in spite of the difficulties raised elsewhere, I persisted in urging the immediate entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea, first for the protection of the Sultan's territory, then for the protection of his flag and territory also; and thirdly, for obtaining the command of the Black Sea, and thereby preventing the recurrence of any affair like that of Sinope.

I learn, however, from the same instruction, that Her Majesty's Government would have been well pleased, under all the circumstances, if the plan of operations proposed by Vice-Admiral Dundas's draft of letter, dated the 29th of December, had been acted upon.

With reference to this passage I beg to observe that I did not consider it as lying within my province to determine the exact amount or description of force to be sent into the Black Sea. It necessarily required a professional judgment to decide that point.

In stating to Admiral Dundas the object to be accomplished in calling upon him to send out his ships in sufficient force for that purpose, and in apprizing him of what was believed to be the strength of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol, I thought to provide for an efficient execution of the service without depriving the Admiral of that degree of margin which was desirable for secondary considerations. I am free at the same time to state my personal impression that, considering the nature of the service in question, it would have been far from prudent to risk the honour of the combined flags with a force much inferior to that which Russia might have sent against them.

I take the liberty of adding that the combined steam force now in the Black Sea on the responsibility of the Admirals, would not be able to give effect

to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, if it fell in with that portion of the Russian fleet which Captain Drummond reported to be absent from Sevastopol, and, if it returned to the Bosphorus in order to fetch out the squadrons, that, taking the chance of winds at this season, the Admirals would have little or no prospect of arriving in time to prevent an act of hostile aggression on the territory or flag of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 260.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 58.)
Constantinople, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I FORWARD to your Lordship herewith, in copy, a letter which I have just received from Vice-Admiral Dundas, informing me that the four steam-frigates sent by him and Vice Admiral Hamelin into the Black Sea on a tour of *reconnaissance*, have returned this morning to the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Britannia, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the combined detachment of four steam-frigates, under Rear-Admiral de Tinan, which sailed on the 28th January, returned this morning.

At anchor, close in shore, at Kaffa, they found three Russian steam-vessels of war, of about 600 or 700 tons each, and twenty-five merchant vessels, three of them having, however, something the appearance of store-ships. The steam squadron did not anchor nor approach nearer than two miles. No communication took place.

The weather prevented Sevastopol being closely reconnoitered; and at Varna everything was tranquil, with no news from the Danube.

The fortifications of the land and sea faces at Varna were progressing very slowly.

The low land about Kaffa was covered with snow, and only one vessel, an Austrian trader, had been met with at sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 261.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 59.)
Constantinople, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that Ismail Pasha, who lately commanded with so much distinction at Csetati, is appointed to the command in chief of the Sultan's army in Asia, and that Ahmed Pasha, who succeeded to Abdi Pasha, and who figures with so little credit in Mr. Brant's correspondence, is ordered to Constantinople.

Khoorshid Pasha, known to your Lordship as General Guyon, is appointed

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"Chef d'Etat Major" to Ismail Pasha; an appointment which does honour to the Turkish ministry, and promises well for the improvement of the Sultan's Asiatic army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—The abovementioned arrangements are known to me confidentially from the Porte in virtue of my repeated representations and suggestions.

S. DE R.

No. 262.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 60.)

Constantinople, February 5, 1854.

My Lord,

THE late Seraskier appears to have entertained the project of forming a Polish Legion in the Sultan's service. How far his idea may have been sanctioned by the Government I cannot take upon myself to say. Count Zamoyski, invited by his Highness, arrived here ten days ago, and remains in the undisplayed character of agent to Prince Adam Czartoryski. He called upon me, and stated his views with every appearance of candour.

I have his assurance that he has no wish to outrun the progress of affairs, or to engage the Porte prematurely in plans which may compromise its interests, and expose his countrymen in Russia to unnecessary danger.

General Wysocki is also at Constantinople on a similar errand, and with similar professions of patience and discretion. He does not belong to Prince Czartoryski's party, and is more likely to embarrass Count Zamoyski than to promote his views.

The Porte has already allowed a company of Cossacks, joined with a second company of Bulgarians and emigrants—Poles and others mingling together—to be enlisted as cavalry, by M. Czayka, a former agent of Prince Czartoryski, who embraced Islamism a few years ago, and assumed the appellation of Sadik Pasha.

Lord Dudley Stuart, who, after a short excursion to the Turkish camp and the passes of the Balkan, has returned to England, informed me that he had met Sadik Pasha and his corps of Lancers on their way to the camp. Lord Dudley himself, notwithstanding his well-known enthusiasm in favour of the Poles, though he waited, with my assistance, on some of the leading Ministers, and was presented to the Sultan, appears to have acted with becoming discretion, and to have abstained from language calculated to lead the Porte into any premature acceptance of the services offered so warmly by those who exercise a leading influence among the Polish emigrants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 263.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 132. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 7, 1854.

My Lord,

ALL that is passing here is so strange that I think it desirable that some imperfect record should be preserved of transactions the exact account of which will never be given.

The French Minister has written this day to his Government to say that he had an audience yesterday of the Emperor, at which he delivered the Emperor Napoleon's autograph letter.

Two or three hours afterwards General Castelbajac acquainted me that, having been advised that in the excited state in which the Emperor Nicholas

has been for some days, he might possibly speak to him in a manner which would not be decorous, it would be advisable that he should send the Imperial letter to His Imperial Majesty, and wait upon him for the answer on the 9th instant, he had acted in conformity to this suggestion.

On this occasion, as I happen to know, it is the French Government that have been misled, while the truth has been spoken to me.

General Castelbajac has not seen the Emperor, and has been recommended not to see him until the impression produced by the receipt of the French letter should have been softened by reflection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 264.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 148. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 12, 1854.

My Lord,

IT is not in my power to offer your Lordship exact copies of the Imperial rescript which accompanied the Grand Cordon of St. Alexander Newsky sent to General Castelbajac, or of the letter which was addressed to him upon the occasion by Count Nesselrode; but the terms of the two papers which I inclose vary very slightly from the originals which were read to me, not without very manifest confusion on his part, by my French colleague.

If in preceding despatches I may have appeared to have taken a harsh view of General Castelbajac's conduct, at least it must be admitted that my justification is provided in the fact of his having under existing circumstances accepted (it may be having sought as well) a mark of favour at the hands of the Emperor Nicholas.

Before dismissing a subject which it is highly unpleasant to my feelings to dwell upon, I will venture to observe, that as regards Russian interests the reward received by the French Envoy has been well deserved. With regard to French objects the case is widely different, and I have no scruple in saying that my recollection supplies me with no instance of the interests of a Government having been betrayed by its own agent in the manner in which those of France have been sacrificed by General Castelbajac.

From the present hesitating and uncertain attitude of the Russian Cabinet it becomes tolerably clear that their policy would have been decisively influenced by the united and strenuous action of the English and French Missions.

Now the obstinacy of the Emperor has been principally occasioned by the conviction which even in very latter days he has entertained as to the impossibility of an alliance between England and France being sincere; and the opinion can hardly be considered unreasonable when French policy is judged of by so melancholy a specimen of national feeling as the conduct of the French Envoy has exhibited in circumstances the most critical.

There is probably no country in Europe in which acts of baseness are viewed with the same indulgence as in Russia; and perhaps the severest condemnation which can be passed upon General Castelbajac is the fact of his acceptance of one of their own decorations being, as I hear, very unfavourably judged by the Russians themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 264.

Count Nesselrode to General Castelbajac.

Le 27 Janvier, 1854.

M. le Marquis,

SA Majesté l'Empereur, désirant vous témoigner son estime particulière et les sentiments que vous lui avez inspiré par votre langage toujours franc et loyal, m'a chargé de vous transmettre les insignes de son ordre de St. Alexandre Newsky.

Heureux d'être l'interprète des bienveillantes intentions de mon auguste maître, permettez-moi, M. le Marquis, de vous offrir mes plus sincères félicitations, ainsi que l'assurance de haute estime que je vous ai invariablement voués.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 264.

The Emperor Nicholas to General Castelbajac.

St. Pétersbourg, le 27 Janvier, 1854.

Général,

LA mission que vous avez si honorablement remplie à ma Cour m'a donné l'occasion d'apprécier l'élévation de votre caractère, la noblesse de vos intentions et la rectitude de vos principes.

C'est avec un zèle persévérant que vous avez consacré des efforts pleins de loyauté à l'établissement de bons rapports entre la Russie et la France.

Bien qu'ils n'aient pas été couronné de succès il me tient à cœur de reconnaître et de vous offrir une témoignage ostensible de mes sentiments de véritable estime et d'amitié pour vous. Je vous envoi en conséquence les insignes de mon ordre de St. Alexandre Newsky, en vous renouvelant à cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 265.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 150. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 12, 1854.

My Lord,

THERE are good grounds for believing that the Russian Councils are at this moment divided.

The Emperor is understood to incline to that of leaving matters very much in their present uncertain condition, taking the chance of some favourable accident which may occur, and offering to his offended dignity such satisfaction as may result from the dismissal, more or less imperative, of the English and French Missions.

His Majesty's conduct during the latter days has not been altogether chivalrous. His indignation with the allied Governments has been unbounded; but these feelings have found a vent in language, the violence of which, although very alarming to the aide-de-camps in waiting, and more especially to the female attendants of the Empress, has not been corresponded to by the course which he is disposed to follow.

The second plan under consideration, is that which is termed here the "retreat;" that is, a compliance with the conditions of arrangement which have been considered suitable as well to the dignity of Russia as of Turkey, by the Conference of Vienna—a wholesome, reasonable plan advocated by the Grand Duke Hereditary and Count Nesselrode; whilst the Grand Duke Constantine, M. de Séniavine and other incendiary counsellors urge the expediency of crossing the Danube, raising the Christian population of Turkey, and of marching in all haste upon Constantinople.

In circumstances like the present, it would be idle to allow habitual forms

of respect to interfere with the expression of opinion; and I do not hesitate to express to your Lordship, that although the Emperor has shown himself wholly deficient in moderation, I do not believe him to possess the nerve which would render probable the adoption of the boldest of these schemes.

It might possibly succeed, but very possibly it might fail, and failure—indeed, even success—might be followed by Russia becoming rather an Asiatic than an European Power.

I am disposed, therefore, to conjecture that the Emperor's actual idea may prevail; and, as there is some slight reason for believing, His Majesty, after having had to-day a parting interview with the French Envoy, may be disposed, not indeed to send him and myself our passports, but to place them at our disposal.

However this may prove, I should feel wanting in duty if I failed to observe to your Lordship, that as dangerous councils are in agitation, and as an impetuous temper and an uncontrolled will may be acted upon by a variety of accidents neither to be foreseen nor guarded against, it cannot, I think, with safety, be assumed that a sudden dash at Constantinople is an attempt entirely beyond the bounds of possibility.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 266.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 151.)

St. Petersburgh, February 14.

My Lord,

THE publication by the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of the somewhat incendiary benediction bestowed by the Metropolitan upon the 16th Division, at the moment of its march from Moscow, gives an official character to the words of the fiery prelate.

Your Lordship has already been placed in possession of a translation of his address, but nevertheless I beg to inclose the number of the "Journal" in which it has now appeared.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 266.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{January 31}}{\text{February 12}}$, 1854.

ENFANTS de notre Souverain et Père, enfants de notre Mère la Russie, guerriers mes frères!

Le Tsar, la Patrie, la Chrétienté vous appellent au combat. Les prières de l'Eglise et de la Patrie vous y accompagnent.

Cet ennemi vaincu sous Catherine, sous Alexandre, sous Nicholas, provoque de nouveau la Russie, et vos compagnons d'armes ont déjà repris contre lui leur ancienne habitude de la vaincre et sur terre et sur mer.

Et si, d'après les décrets de la Providence, vous aussi vous devez vous présenter devant lui, vous n'oublierez pas que vous combattez pour notre pieux Souverain, pour notre chère Patrie, contre les infidèles; contre les oppresseurs des peuples nos coreligionnaires, presque nos compatriotes; contre les profanateurs des saints lieux, objets de notre adoration, de la Nativité, de la Passion, de la Résurrection de notre Sauveur.

Et maintenant plus que jamais, gloire et bénédiction aux vainqueurs; bonheur et bénédiction à ceux qui offrent en sacrifice leur vie avec foi dans le Seigneur, avec amour pour leur Souverain et leur Patrie!

L'Ecriture a dit des anciens défenseurs de la Patrie: "Par la foi tu vaincras les empires." (Heb. xi, 33.) Voilà pourquoi nous vous accompagnons de nos prières et des bénédictions de l'Eglise. Le grand et antique intercesseur de la Russie, le bienheureux Serge, bénit jadis les cohortes victorieuses qui marchaient

contre les oppresseurs de la Patrie ; sa sainte image précédait nos légions et sous le Tsar Alexis et sous Pierre-le-Grand, et enfin sous Alexandre, à cette époque mémorable de notre lutte contre vingt peuples divers. Que cette image du bienheureux Serge vous accompagne également, comme le signe de son intercession pour vous et de ses prières pour ceux qui sont forts devant le Seigneur!

Gardez donc et portez avec vous ces paroles guerrières et triomphantes du Prophète David : "En Dieu est le salut et la gloire." (Psa. lxi, 8.)

No. 267.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 153. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

GENERAL GRABBE, the officer commanding the gendarmes in the south, arrived here a few days since, after a very rapid journey from Odessa. The object of his visit to St. Petersburgh is not known, and gives rise to some speculation.

The version which appears to me the most acceptable, is that he has been sent here for the purpose of obtaining extended powers for the authorities upon whom, possibly, the defence of Odessa may devolve.

Already, if I may trust the report made to me, great alarm prevails at that port; and, as I am further informed, the Russians feel that, having no longer the command of the Black Sea, the arrival of a few thousand English or French troops at Constantinople, added to the facilities of steam-conveyance, would place the whole of their southern coasts in danger of attack.

It is gratifying to me to perceive that Russia, who, in the ill-founded consciousness in the assumption of superior strength, and of possessions out of reach of all aggressive measures, has wantonly plunged all Europe into expense and alarm, is herself full of apprehension.

This feeling is brought home to the great author of the mischief himself; and, as I learn, measures are being taken, even in the Imperial domains of Peterhoff, to guard against attacks which are to be apprehended from the Baltic.

On the opposite shore (at Cronstadt, that is) all bricklayer and masonry works are stopped or much impeded by the frost, which continues to be severe. For some days the thermometer has ranged from 15° to 18° of Réaumur.

Mr. Vice-Consul Simpson writes as follows from Cronstadt:

"The sailors, who were on unlimited leave, are making their appearances, according to the orders issued some time back.

"The work at the battery leading to the harbour is progressing."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 268.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

IT may be that having been misrepresented and unfairly treated myself I am the more disposed to come to the aid of those who are suffering from injustice; but so it is, that I should be sorry to quit this Mission without entering a protest against the unfounded attacks directed against General Count Orloff by a portion of the public press.

General Orloff is a Russian, and is consequently obliged to obey the orders of his master, be these orders what they may; but I have no hesitation in stating that very few men about the Emperor exhibit their attachment to him by endeavouring to resist his will when he is in error to the same degree as this

his supposed unhesitating instrument. I will go further, and will again state my firm conviction that all the present entanglements would have been avoided had Count Orloff been dispatched to Constantinople in the place of Prince Menchikoff, or if, at a much later period, his advice had been more attended to. As regards Prince Menchikoff, I will remark that one of the few instances in which I am aware of having misled your Lordship (though I may often have done so unconsciously), was in the character which I gave of that person upon his departure for Odessa and Constantinople.

The explanation of my incorrect judgment is a simple one. I knew him to be opposed to the principle of an extension of territory being an increase of strength and power, and an appreciation of this perception made me insensible of other circumstances which, as I might and ought to have known, rendered Prince Menchikoff a very unfit negotiator in an affair which required great discretion, some frankness, and conciliatory habits, to which the Prince is an utter stranger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 269.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 154.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

ACCORDING to a popular myth which has prevailed here during the latter weeks, the consciousness of having made exaggerated reports of various transactions in which I have been engaged, was so strong that it was certain that I should quit St. Petersburgh before the appearance of those Parliamentary papers which were to be expected at the opening of the session.

Here however I have remained, and the despatches which it had been my duty to address to your Lordship, having been published by the public papers, they have been extensively read here, and have, as I am assured by various persons, produced a good effect.

Of the nature of the rumours which have been in circulation with regard to my conduct, your Lordship will be able to judge by the circumstance that one of my diplomatic friends has called upon me to say, "Je viens de lire quelques unes de vos dépêches, mais je vous assure que je n'y ai trouvé aucune indice d'exaggération ; au contraire elles sont écrites avec calme."

What has given me more satisfaction has been the testimony of my Prussian colleague General de Rochow. He remarked to me that having received sometimes from myself, more frequently from Count Nesselrode, accounts of my conversations with the Chancellor, he had been very much struck with the fidelity of their reports which he had been reading in my printed correspondence. I can only tell you, he observed, that the very expressions employed on both sides were familiar to me.

I beg your Lordship to believe that it is neither a feeling of vanity nor the suspicion that my conduct requires any sort of justification which impels me to make the foregoing statement to your Lordship. I have done so because, as the misunderstanding between the English and Russian Governments commenced in some measure by a difference of opinion (of statement at least) as to the declarations made by the Chancellor to myself, it is not unimportant to possess the incidental and fortuitous testimony of an impartial diplomatist, often the confidant of both parties, as to the general fidelity of my reports.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 270.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 155. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

I FIND that I have omitted to state to your Lordship that the French messenger who left St. Petersburgh on the 11th instant was the bearer of the Imperial answer to the letter addressed to His Majesty by the Emperor Napoleon.

General Castelbajac had the honour of being received yesterday at the Winter Palace, when the Emperor read to him the copy of this reply. It appears to have been long, and, although courteous in terms rather official than friendly in their expression, according to General Castelbajac's phrase it may be regarded as a "pièce de Chancellerie."

The expression employed in the letter of the Emperor of the French, "Interdire la sortie de vos vaisseaux de Cronstadt," appeared to have given some slight offence,—a feeling which did not, however, prevent General Castelbajac from meeting with a very gracious reception. Upon his entering the room His Imperial Majesty said, "Comprenez que ce n'est point une visite d'adieu." He alluded to the contents of the Emperor Napoleon's letter, and observed that the terms of arrangement which it suggested were less favourable than those agreed upon at Vienna.

The Emperor was looking ill,—indeed, I hear on all sides that he is much altered of late, and he appeared out of spirits; he was, however, calm and collected, and General Castelbajac inferred that he had made up his mind not to give way.

When he left the palace General Castelbajac waited upon the Chancellor. His Excellency intimated to him in terms the most courteous, and with manifest feelings of reluctance, that it was probable that in three or four days passports would be—not sent—but offered to him and to myself.

It is to be believed that the Government would be well pleased that we should demand our passports, but being aware that Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff have quitted their respective posts, they feel naturally that our prolonged residence here might argue a want of spirit on the part of the Russian Court.

I need not observe to your Lordship that I shall consider the offer of a passport in the light of a courteous intimation to leave St. Petersburgh as speedily as those arrangements can be made which, in the case of a numerous family, require a certain time in this country and in the dead of winter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 271.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

At 20 minutes before 2 o'clock yesterday I received from Count Nesselrode the note of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy, informing me that diplomatic relations between England and Russia are suspended, and inquiring on what day, and for what point, I might wish my passports delivered to me and the other members of the Mission.

I should have been better pleased that diplomatic relations should not have been interrupted until after the receipt of the instructions which I am expecting from your Lordship; but as Count Nesselrode's note is of that kind which calls for an early answer, I returned him the reply of which I beg likewise to inclose a copy.

It is to be observed that on the same day on which the Russian Government were offering their passports to the English and French Ministers, an order came out for the levy of nine men on every thousand in the western half of the Empire.

The coincidence may be accidental, but it is at least worthy of notice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 271.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

St. Pétersbourg, le 1 Février, 1854.

A LA suite des notes échangées récemment à Londres entre l'Envoyé de Russie et M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères, M. le Baron de Brunnow, conformément aux instructions qu'il avait préalablement reçues, a demandé ses passeports pour quitter l'Angleterre. Les motifs de cette décision ayant déjà été communiqués au Gouvernement Anglais, il ne reste au Soussigné, Chancelier de l'Empire, qu'à informer Sir Hamilton Seymour, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, que les relations diplomatiques se trouvent ainsi suspendues entre les deux Gouvernements, et qu'il le prier en conséquence de vouloir bien lui faire connaître pour quel jour et quel endroit il désire que ses passeports, avec ceux des personnes attachées à la Légation, lui soient envoyés.

Il saisit, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 271.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

St. Petersburgh, February $\frac{13}{25}$, 1854.

THE Undersigned begs to acknowledge the receipt of the note of this date which Count Nesselrode has done him the honour of addressing to him, acquainting him that in consequence of the circumstances which have led to Baron Brunnow's departure from London, the diplomatic relations between the two countries are suspended; and desiring to be informed on what day and for what place the Undersigned may wish to be provided with passports for himself and the persons attached to Her Majesty's Mission.

As regards the one point, the Undersigned will request his Excellency to have the goodness to give directions that his passport and that of his family should be made out for London by Königsberg: with regard to the other point he would beg permission not to answer the inquiry at the present moment. The state of health of one of the members of his family is such at present as to render immediate departure impossible, and by waiting a little he may be enabled to ascertain whether he can accompany his family on their journey, or whether it will be necessary to make arrangements for their remaining here some days after their departure.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 272.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 157.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1854.*

UPON receiving Count Nesselrode's note yesterday I felt so convinced that a similar communication must have been addressed to the Marquis de Castelbajac, that, having previously come to an understanding with him as to the nature of the answer to be returned, it did not occur to me to make inquiries upon the subject.

It appears then to be my fate to quit the country without being prepared for the very small artifices to which this Government will condescend.

In the evening the First Secretary of the French Mission came to my house, and upon being informed of what had passed, immediately hastened home to apprize his chef.

Half-an-hour afterwards he returned, bringing with him General Castelbajac, who did not hesitate to state to me that, according to his instructions, if I left the town he should do so likewise.

After some conversation it was agreed between us, that if by 10 o'clock this morning General Castelbajac had not received a note of the same tenour as that which had been addressed to me, he should take the initiative and ask for his passports.

I asked my collegue whether I was at liberty to announce this intention to your Lordship, to which he immediately assented.

I send these despatches by a Prussian courier, keeping back Colonel Townley (who is fortunately provided with a messenger's passport for the next journey) until the 16th, by which time I shall hope to have received your Lordship's despatches due to-morrow, and possibly to have heard some intelligence respecting Count Orloff, whose return is hourly looked for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 273.

Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents abroad.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 23, 1854.*

THE communication which has recently been made to you of the correspondence on Eastern affairs which has been laid before both Houses of Parliament, will have shown you that there is every probability of an early commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France on one side, and Russia on the other. That correspondence will also have shown you that the British and French Governments, throughout the difficult and complicated negotiations which have preceded the existing state of affairs, have earnestly and cordially acted together, with a view to avert the calamity of war, and that they are equally prepared to act with the same earnestness and cordiality for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, if the Emperor of Russia should still be unwilling to negotiate for peace on fair and reasonable terms.

The time has now arrived when it is incumbent on the two Governments to prepare for all the contingencies of war; and among those contingencies it has been impossible for them to overlook the danger to which their subjects and their commerce on the high seas may be exposed by the machinations of their enemy, who, though unable from his own resources materially to injure either, may seek to derive means of offence from countries whose Governments take no part in the contest which he has provoked.

But it is a necessary consequence of the strict union and alliance which exists between Great Britain and France, that, in the event of war, their conjoint action should be felt by Russia in all parts of the world; that not only in the Baltic, and in the waters and territory of Turkey, their counsels, their armies, and their fleets, should be united either for offensive or defensive purposes against Russia, but that the same spirit of union should prevail in all quarters of the world, and that whether for offence or defence the civil and military and naval resources of the British and French Empires should be directed to the common objects of protecting the subjects and commerce of England and France from Russian aggression, and of depriving the Russian Government of the means of inflicting injury on either.

For these reasons Her Majesty's Government have agreed with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French to instruct their civil and naval authorities in foreign parts to consider their respective subjects as having an equal claim to protection against Russian hostility; and for this purpose, either singly or in conjunction with each other, to act indifferently for the support and defence of British and French interests. It may be that, in a given locality, one only of the Powers is represented by a civil functionary, or by a naval force; but, in

such a case, the influence and the power of that one must be exerted as zealously and efficiently for the protection of the subjects and interests of the other as if those subjects and interests were its own.

I have accordingly to instruct you, Sir, to act in conformity with this principle. You will consider it your duty to protect, as far as possible, against the consequence of the hostilities in which England and France may shortly be engaged with Russia, the subjects and interests of France equally with those of England; and you will make known without reserve to the French civil and naval authorities with whom you may have means of communication, any dangers to which the interests of either country may be exposed, or any opportunities with which you may become acquainted of inflicting injury on the common enemy.

Instructions to the same effect will be sent by the Government of France to its civil and naval authorities in foreign parts, and Her Majesty's Government concur with that of France in anticipating the most favourable results from this decided manifestation of the intimate union which prevails between them, and which it is their earnest desire should influence their agents in all parts of the world at a moment when they are about to engage in a contest with the Empire of Russia for an object of such paramount interest to Europe as the maintenance of the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 274.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, February 23, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government and that of France have agreed that their civil authorities and naval forces in all parts of the world should cooperate, or if necessary act singly, for the protection of the interests of the subjects and commerce of the two nations, wherever the same may stand in need of assistance, against the hostile machinations of Russia.

I have accordingly addressed to Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents abroad the instruction of which I inclose a copy,* and I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that an instruction to the same effect be forthwith issued by your Lordships for the direction of Her Majesty's naval forces in all parts of the world.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 275.

Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Naval Commanders-in-chief on Foreign Stations.

By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

THE Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having informed us that Her Majesty's Government and that of France have agreed that their civil authorities and naval forces in all parts of the world should cooperate, or if necessary act singly, for the protection of the interests of the subjects and commerce of the two nations, whenever the same may stand in need of assistance, against the hostile machinations of Russia; and Lord Clarendon having further signified the Queen's commands that an instruction to that effect should be issued for the direction of Her Majesty's naval forces in all parts of the world; we transmit to you herewith a copy of Lord Clarendon's letter,† together with a copy of a circular addressed by his Lordship to Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents abroad;* and we hereby

* No. 273. † No. 274.

require and direct you to conform yourself in all respects to the views and instructions of Her Majesty's Government as expressed in Lord Clarendon's letter, and in the circular in question.

We further acquaint you that a similar instruction has been addressed by the French Government to the naval forces of France.

We further require and direct you to take the earliest opportunity, after receipt of this order, of communicating in the most friendly manner with the officer in command of the French naval forces on your station, with the view of giving the fullest and speediest effect to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government and that of France.

Given under our hands the 24th February, 1854.

(Signed) J. R. G. GRAHAM.
HYDE PARKER.

No. 276.

Circular addressed to all the Governors of Her Majesty's Colonies.

My Lord, *Downing Street, February* 24, 1854.

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a circular instruction which has been addressed to Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents abroad,* directing them, in conformity with an agreement made by Her Majesty's Government with that of France, to afford protection to French subjects and commerce.

Instructions to the same effect will be forthwith issued to Her Majesty's naval officers in all parts of the world.

I have to direct you to conduct yourself in the exercise of your powers as Governor of in accordance with these instructions, so far as they are applicable to your office; to impress on all the local authorities under your superintendence the duty of affording similar protection to French subjects and commerce, and of cooperating for that purpose with Her Majesty's naval authorities; and to report to me, without delay, any measures which you may have deemed it expedient to take in reference to these instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NEWCASTLE.

No. 277.

Count Walewski to the Earl of Clarendon.

Londres, le 24 *Février*, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, a reçu l'ordre de son Gouvernement de transmettre ci-joint à son Excellence M. le Comte de Clarendon, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique au Département des Affaires Etrangères, copie des instructions adressées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale à tous les Agents Diplomatiques et Consulaires de France, comme aussi aux officiers généraux et autres, commandant à la mer, relatives à la protection commune à exercer par les Agents et Officiers de Marine de chacune des deux nations sur les sujets et le commerce de l'autre.

Le Soussigné, s'en référant du reste aux explications verbales qu'il a eu l'honneur d'échanger à ce sujet avec son Excellence M. le Comte de Clarendon, croit devoir se borner à constater ici le but que se sont proposé les deux Gouvernements dans cette occurrence, qui est non seulement de procurer à leurs sujets et à leurs navires, sous toutes les latitudes, une complète sécurité, mais encore de rendre plus éclatant le grand fait de leur alliance, en communiquant à leurs Agents dans toutes les parties du globe l'esprit qui anime les deux Cabinets.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

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* No. 273.

Inclosure 1 in No. 277.

Circular addressed to the French Diplomatic and Consular Agents abroad.

Monsieur, *Paris, Février* 1854.

FORCES d'admettre la possibilité d'hostilités entre eux et la Russie, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique ont pensé que l'alliance qu'ils ont contractée en vue d'un danger commun devait couvrir tous ceux de leurs intérêts que les conséquences de la guerre pourraient atteindre ou menacer. Quelle que soit l'étendue des ressources dont ils disposent, notamment sur mer, ils ont à tenir compte de l'imprévu. Il peut, si la guerre éclate, se produire, dans des parages où les forces navales de chacun d'eux ne seraient point constamment présentes, des conjonctures où leurs nationaux et leur pavillon de commerce n'auraient pas, au moment nécessaire, tout l'appui indispensable à leur sécurité.

Les deux Gouvernements n'avaient qu'à s'inspirer de la pensée qui préside à leurs rapports actuels pour trouver un moyen de pourvoir à ces éventualités, et ils l'ont vu dans l'adoption concertée d'un système de protection réciproque embrassant ces intérêts disséminés sous toutes les latitudes. Les Agents diplomatiques et commerciaux, ainsi que les commandants des forces navales, de chacun des deux pays, sur tous les points du globe, devront donc accorder leur appui aux sujets et au commerce de l'autre, dans toutes les hypothèses où ils seraient menacés par l'ennemi commun.

En conséquence, Monsieur, vous considérerez, en pareil cas, les bâtiments et les sujets Anglais, dans votre ressort, comme ayant le même droit que les bâtiments et les sujets Français à toute l'assistance que comportent vos attributions, et vous donnerez avis de cette prescription aux officiers de Marine de Sa Majesté Impériale qui seraient en position de concourir aux mesures que les circonstances résultant de l'état de guerre vous paraîtraient commander. Les Agents et les officiers de mer de Sa Majesté Britannique recevront des instructions identiques, et ainsi les sujets et le commerce des deux nations seront autorisés à compter sur la protection réciproque des Consuls et de la Marine des deux Puissances.

Vous comprendrez, Monsieur, que je ne cherche point à déterminer à l'avance tous les cas qui pourront réclamer votre intervention. C'est à votre sagacité de vous diriger dans l'application du principe destiné à vous servir de règle de conduite.

Les deux Gouvernements ont tenu beaucoup moins à préciser les circonstances et les formes dans lesquelles cette protection devra s'exercer qu'à bien marquer le caractère qu'elle doit prendre. Mais, en donnant au monde ce nouveau témoignage de l'unité de leurs vues et de la sincérité de leur alliance, ils sont persuadés que, pour assurer à cette mesure commune toute l'efficacité désirable, leurs Agents n'ont besoin que de se bien pénétrer de l'esprit de solidarité qui en a inspiré aux deux Cabinets la pensée.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 277.

Instructions of the Minister of Marine and the Colonies to the General, Superior, and other Officers commanding at Sea.

Messieurs, *Paris, Février* 1854.

MA dépêche du 18 Février a appelé spécialement votre attention sur les graves complications qu'a fait naître en Europe la question d'Orient. Les négociations entamées pour dénouer pacifiquement le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Russie et la Turquie sont demeurées sans résultat, et tout porte à croire que de nouveaux efforts demeureront impuissants.

L'Angleterre et la France ont résolu de protéger l'Empire Ottoman, et de s'opposer, même par la force, aux projets envahissans de la Russie. Ces deux grandes nations sont intimement unies dans leur politique et se sont mutuelle-

ment donné les gages les plus certains de leur alliance. Leurs escadres croisent de concert dans la Mer Noire; elles se prêtent réciproquement le plus loyal concours; les deux Gouvernements, après avoir adopté une politique commune, se sont mis également d'accord sur tous les moyens d'action.

Cette alliance de la France et d'Angleterre ne doit pas se révéler seulement dans les mers d'Europe. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et celui de la Reine de la Grande Bretagne désirent que la même union, le même accord, règnent sous toutes les latitudes.

Les forces navales de l'Angleterre et de la France doivent donc se prêter un mutuel concours dans toutes les régions même les plus lointaines.

Immédiatement après la réception de ces instructions, vous aurez soin de vous mettre en relation avec les commandants des stations ou des bâtiments de la Grande Bretagne. Vous devrez combiner, de concert avec eux, toutes les mesures qui auraient pour objet de protéger les intérêts, la puissance ou l'honneur du drapeau des deux nations amies. Vous vous prêterez dans ce but une mutuelle assistance, soit que vous deviez attaquer l'ennemi, quand les hostilités auront commencé ou quand la déclaration de guerre aura été faite, soit que vous vous trouviez, dès ce moment, dans l'obligation de vous défendre.

Vous devrez accorder votre protection aux bâtiments du commerce de la Grande Bretagne au même titre que les bâtiments de guerre de l'Angleterre prêteront aide et protection aux navires marchands de notre nation.

En un mot, les deux Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre désirant que leurs forces navales armées agissent comme si elles appartenaient à une seule et même nation, je compte que, pour ce qui vous concerne, vous ne perdrez jamais de vue cette règle de conduite, et que vous saurez la pratiquer de manière à cimenter davantage encore, s'il se peut, l'intime union des deux pays.

Tant que les hostilités entre la France et l'Angleterre d'une part, et la Russie de l'autre, n'auront pas commencé ou que la déclaration de guerre n'aura pas été faite, vous vous dispenserez de prendre l'initiative des mesures agressives, et vous vous tiendrez sur la défensive. J'aurai soin, aussitôt que le moment sera venu, de vous transmettre toutes les instructions nécessaires pour l'attaque.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) DUCOS.

No. 278.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1854.

I HAVE told Walewski that we propose asking Austrian Government whether it will join France and England in a summons to Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, announcing that silence or refusal would be considered equivalent to a declaration of war, and, if Austria will not, to inquire what course she will pursue.

I wait the consent of the French Government before writing to Vienna.

No. 279.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 209.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 22, 1854.

THE interview which I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 199 M. Drouyn de Lhuys was to have with M. Mavrocordato took place yesterday. M. Drouyn de Lhuys told the Greek Minister that France, more than any other Power, had a right to complain of the conduct of the Greek Government, because she had been the Power which had unfortunately stood up most for the honest intentions of the Greek Government, but that she could not tolerate the present state of things.

It was nonsense to say that the Greek nation was "entraînée," as was pretended, in this war. There was no "entraînement" but what was fostered by the King and Queen, and encouraged by the Greek Government. Not a soul in the Peloponnesus—not a soul in any of the islands, had stirred; a few brigands from the interior of the northern provinces were the only culprits. France, however, warned the Greek Government that they should not profit by their treachery and the violation of the Treaties which created Greece into an independent State. If this conduct was persisted in, the French cruizers would seize every Greek ship they met with, confiscate and sell it to defray the expenses of the war; the port of Athens would be blockaded; the islands seized and occupied. In short, there was no threat which M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not appear to have held out to M. Mavrocordato, who, to do him justice, thoroughly regrets, I believe, the state of affairs in his unhappy country.

Finally, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that it was useless addressing the Greek Ministers; and that perhaps M. Mavrocordato would do well to lay personally before the King a faithful exposition of the dangers he was incurring. M. Mavrocordato replied, that without leaving Paris he could insure the King's being made acquainted with the sentiments of the French Government, and that he would write to His Majesty immediately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 280.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 212.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 22, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he has received from M. de Bourqueney an answer to the despatch which he addressed to that Minister, commenting on the last propositions which Count Buol had made to Count Orloff. M. de Bourqueney represents Count Buol as sorry that his propositions should have been misunderstood by the French Government. He had never intended to depart from the basis of arrangement approved of and recommended by the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 281.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 213.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 22, 1854.

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 112, together with the draft of a circular instruction to Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents inclosed in it; and I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed complete acquiescence in those instructions. He will forward, to-night, to Count Walewski the French project of instructions to the French Naval Commanders, and, if it is approved of by your Lordship, Count Walewski will send you copies of them, of those addressed to the French Consular Agents, and of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatches to him on the subject of the neutral protection of the commerce of England and France by the naval forces of those Powers. I await a copy of the instructions which your Lordship informs me will be sent to Her Majesty's naval authorities abroad, in order to address a reciprocal communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 282.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 215. Confidential.)

Paris, February 22, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will no doubt have remarked that during the conversation which M. de Bourqueney states in a telegraphic despatch, of which I had the honour to give your Lordship the details in my despatch No. 203, had taken place between himself and the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty is reported to have said, "that France and Austria could come to an understanding concerning Italy, so that the Emperor would be enabled to dispose of all his military resources at the other extremity of his Empire."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in the course of the conversation which ensued, after he had read me M. de Bourqueney's despatch, said, that he wished to explain himself at once frankly though confidentially on this point. He need not, he continued, assure me that neither the Emperor of the French nor his Government had any *arrière pensée* in regard to Italy, and there was no assurance of this kind that he was not willing to give to the Austrian Government; but he confessed that he should have great difficulty in entering into any positive engagements with the Cabinet of Vienna, in consequence of the reprehensible measures in which that Government persevered in all its dealings with Italy. If the French Government were to enter into any solemn engagement defining the course of action to be followed by the two Governments in their relations with Italy, while Austria persisted in her present policy, the people of Italy would believe that the Emperor of the French approved of that policy, and that belief would soon gain ground in Europe. This made the question of joint action with Austria one of extreme delicacy and difficulty.

I suggested that the moment might be turned to account. What if the French Government were to say, in a way that should not give offence, that, while abjuring all intention of encouraging the enemies of Austria in Italy, they would enter into no engagement upon the subject, unless Austria would consent to adopt a policy in that country more in harmony with the feelings of Europe (?).

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that such a course might, perhaps, succeed; but that his object would be rather to lead Austria to see the error of her ways, than to make any demand upon her—in other words, to let Austria understand that, under altered circumstances, France would not be averse to entering into some distinct engagement respecting Italy.

There were two ways, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, in repetition of what he had often remarked before; there were two ways of carrying on the war with Russia. The one by fair and legal means, in defence of the public rights and in virtue of the public Treaties of Europe. Such would be the union of the Great Powers to oppose the lawless ambition of Russia, and a war waged in that way and for such a purpose, must carry with it the sympathy of all lovers of real liberty. There need then be no fear of revolutionary movements to be combatted.

The other would be the consequence of apathy on the part of the German Powers. But they would not escape war, they would be forced into it in spite of themselves, but not a war in which they would be gloriously fighting for the oppressed, but in which they would have to defend themselves as oppressors.

He need hardly add that the former of these ways secured, as far as was possible to secure in war, the present state of Europe; the latter threatened a total annihilation of the present state of things, and a reconstruction of the territorial distribution of Europe. He could add with truth that the Emperor and his Government would not cease to persevere in the former course. If the latter supervened it would not be their fault, though they would not shrink in consequence from the task in which they were engaged.

In truth, my Lord, whatever may have been the hints given by the Emperor and his Government in the course of last autumn to the Austrian Minister here, as to the consequences which a prolonged neutrality on the part of Austria might entail upon her, it can never be the policy of the French Government, although circumstances may compel them to it, to encourage

revolutionary movements in Italy. They may like to keep the power in their hands but they will be loath to use it, for the liberty they supported in Italy would soon seek to establish itself in France. In saying this I mean to cast no reflection upon the Emperor; for much as the present state of things may be regretted by those who are real lovers of constitutional liberty, I doubt the elements necessary to such liberty to exist in France, and every day's experience tends to change this doubt into conviction.

An article having reference to the policy to be pursued by the French Government in Italy, appeared in the "Moniteur" this morning. I do myself the honour to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 282.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of February 21, 1854.

EN publiant les documents relatifs à la question d'Orient, le Gouvernement a donné une nouvelle preuve de la loyauté de ses intentions. Le pouvoir qui a pour base la volonté nationale et pour seuls mobiles l'honneur et l'intérêt de la France ne peut pas suivre cette politique tortueuse, dont l'unique force consiste dans les intrigues et dans le mystère. Ses armes, à lui, sont la sincérité et la franchise. La lumière ne saurait jamais lui nuire; aussi ne doit-il jamais laisser échapper l'occasion de prévenir les équivoques, d'avertir chacun de ce que réellement il doit espérer ou craindre.

Dans la lutte qui a éclaté en Orient, la France, étroitement unie à l'Angleterre, s'est déclarée pour le bon droit et en faveur d'une cause qui est celle de toute l'Europe. L'indépendance des Etats serait en effet menacée si l'Europe permettait à la domination ou à l'influence Russe de s'étendre indéfiniment. Cette vérité frappe tous les yeux; l'Autriche, malgré les liens d'amitié intime qui l'attachaient à la Cour de Russie, se prononce chaque jours davantage pour la politique que nous défendons, et la Prusse, nous n'en doutons pas, conformera la sienne au vœu et à l'intérêt de toute l'Allemagne.

Aussi ce conflit, dans lequel on peut dire que toutes les Puissances du Continent sont ouvertement ou tacitement engagées contre la Russie, n'offrirait-il aucun danger, s'il n'y avait à redouter des complications venant de l'esprit révolutionnaire, qui essayera peut-être en cette occasion de se montrer sur quelques points. C'est donc le devoir impérieux du Gouvernement de déclarer loyalement à ce qui voudraient profiter des circonstances présentes pour exciter des troubles soit en Grèce, soit en Italie, qu'ils se mettraient en opposition directe avec l'intérêt de la France. Car, comme nous le disions plus haut, jamais le Gouvernement aura une politique à double face, et de même que, défendant l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman à Constantinople, il ne pourrait pas souffrir que cette intégrité fût violée par des agressions parties de la Grèce, de même il ne pourrait pas permettre, si les drapeaux de la France et de l'Autriche s'unissaient en Orient, qu'on cherchât à les diviser sur les Alpes.

No. 283.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, February 23, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

IF France and England summon Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, and announce that silence or refusal on the part of Russia will be considered by them as equivalent to a declaration of war, it is of urgent importance to know whether Austria will join them in the summons, and if not what part she will take upon the refusal of Russia to comply, and upon active hostilities being commenced by England and France.

Let me have an answer as soon as possible.

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No. 284.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1854.

IF France and England summon Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, and announce that silence or refusal on the part of Russia will be considered by them as equivalent to a declaration of war, it is of urgent importance to know whether Prussia will join them in the summons, and if not, what part she will take upon the refusal of Russia to comply, and upon active hostilities being commenced by England and France.

Let me have an answer as soon as possible.

No. 285.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 23, 1854, 5 P.M.

THE order for the assembling of a further force of 25,000 men for the protection of the south-eastern frontier of the Austrian Empire has been issued this day.

No. 286.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 23, 1854.

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 78 to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, expressing the indignation of Her Majesty's Government at the horrible atrocities which had been committed by the Turkish irregular troops in Asia Minor.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys had no knowledge of the transactions to which your Lordship's despatch relates, but he did not hesitate an instant at offering to send an instruction of a similar nature to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, for which I ventured to anticipate the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 287.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 221.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 23, 1854.

I HAD the honour to receive at 10 yesterday evening a telegraphic despatch from your Lordship in these words:

"I have told Count Walewski that we propose asking the Austrian Government whether it will join France and England in a summons to Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, and announcing that silence or refusal would be considered equivalent to a declaration of war, and if Austria will not, to inquire what course she will pursue. I wait for the consent of the French Government before writing to Vienna."

I called upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys early this morning, and found that in consequence of a telegraphic despatch which he had received last night from Count Walewski, he had already written by telegraph to Vienna.

There was, however, some discrepancy between the despatch of Count Walewski and that addressed to me by your Lordship. Your Lordship says that you propose to ask Austria to join France and England, &c. In Count Walewski's despatch there is no question of Austria joining in the summons,

which would be made by France and England alone; and it is in this latter sense that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has written to Vienna, though he would infinitely have preferred the former form of communication had he known it in time.

M. de Bourqueney continues to write in good spirits. He had yesterday a conversation with M. de Buol, in which the modifications to be introduced into the proposed Convention were discussed, and they all tend to make the Convention more stringent. He mentions further that an additional force of 30,000 men was to be sent to the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 288.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 22, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL was so much engaged at the Second Chamber yesterday, that I have only just been able to execute the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 26 of the 18th instant.

His Excellency has been for some time past prepared for the communication of which I was the bearer, and was anxiously waiting for it. I commenced our conversation by stating that I had brought with me a copy of a note which had been delivered by Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th instant, in exchange for one which had been addressed to your Lordship by Count Walewski; that these documents might be looked upon as a preliminary engagement into which the British and French Governments had entered, in consequence of the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the proposals of the Vienna Conference of the 13th ultimo, and that they would probably become the groundwork of a Convention to be hereafter concluded; that, however, before taking any further steps and entering into more detailed engagements with France for commencing a war which appeared inevitable, Her Majesty's Government wished me to bring this note to the consideration of the Prussian Government, and to invite them to examine its object, and to join in our efforts to maintain peace if still possible, and if not, to inform us how far they would unite with us in the adoption of other measures that may become necessary in order to restrict the war to the smallest possible compass.

I then read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 26; he listened to it with the greatest attention, and seemed generally to approve of it, but he expressed doubts as to whether the King would be persuaded to join in a Convention of the nature proposed, and consent to bind himself as to his future course of policy; nevertheless, he thought His Majesty would make fewer objections to the present proposal than to the Convention which had been submitted to him from England and France a fortnight ago; and Baron Manteuffel asked me what was to become of that project? I replied that I had received no further instructions from Her Majesty's Government respecting it, but that if the present proposals were more agreeable to the King, the first one need not, I imagine, be persisted in; that I had now laid the whole question before his Excellency without reserve, and I hoped it might be favourably received. He requested me to give him a memorandum of my instructions, and I have since sent his Excellency a copy of them, and hope your Lordship will approve of my having done so.

Baron Manteuffel made but few remarks on the object of my visit to him; he said that he scarcely expects the King will go to the extent we desired, for His Majesty could not as yet bring himself to contemplate the inevitability of war, and that he thought it would be advisable for Her Majesty's Government not to press Prussia too hard; that there were undoubted convictions as to the political errors which had been committed by the Emperor of Russia, but that there was a wide difference between moral support and joint action in the event of hostilities; that he had already told me (as reported in my despatch No. 66 of the 18th instant), that Prussia could certainly bring a large army into the field, if necessity peremptorily called for such a course, but that she had not

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sufficient pecuniary means to carry on protracted war, and that it was essential to husband her resources at the opening of a contest which, once commenced, might last for years. He desired me further to understand that Prussia was morally with us; that every day the mutual interests of the two countries would unite us more closely; and I have the satisfaction to state, that the general impression which I have received from his Excellency's remarks is, that although the Prussian Government is not prepared to make common cause with us at this instant, we may hereafter count on her co-operation; and if Russia should repeat her threatening language it would be more likely than anything else, in the present temper of the King, to decide His Majesty to enter into a close alliance with the Western Powers.

After I left Baron Manteuffel, I called on my French colleague, as had been previously settled between us, and he will, if possible, see Baron Manteuffel in the course of the day, and communicate to him a copy of Count Walewski's note of the 6th instant, and extracts of his instructions, and urge the Prussian Government to take our proposal into immediate consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 289.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 76.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 22, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 18th instant, in which I reported that a rumour had reached Baron Manteuffel of the intention of the Emperor of Russia to march the Guards from St. Petersburgh to Warsaw, his Excellency has since mentioned to me that this rumour was without foundation, and that the Guards would remain in their present quarters. On the other hand, I am informed that the Russian forces in the Crimea and in the Caucasus will be immediately increased by two divisions of the army, or about 35,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 290.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 158.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 15, 1854.*

I BEG to draw your Lordship's attention to a passage to be found in the third inclosure of your despatch No. 25.

In this paper (the Russian Projet de Protocole) the Russian Plenipotentiary declares, "Que si divers actes de la Porte, et notamment à l'égard des lieux saints, ayant paru à l'Empereur indiquer des dispositions peu favorables au culte qu'il professe, avaient engagé Sa Majesté à demander en même temps que l'arrangement spécial des dits lieux une garantie générale des droits, privilèges et immunités religieuses accordées à l'Eglise Orthodoxe." These few words contain a tardy tribute to veracity.

In the early days of Prince Menchikoff's mission it was stated to me repeatedly and most positively, that he had no other object in view than to re-establish and secure the rights of the Greek Church at Jerusalem.

When the real motives which had carried Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople became known, I was next informed that I had no right to consider that I had been misled, inasmuch as what was claimed for the Greek Church was the necessary confirmation of the Greek rights at the holy places; and only now it comes to light that the special arrangement regarding the holy places is

considered by the Russian Cabinet as a question quite distinct from that of the guarantee to be demanded of the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Greek Church.

I feel grateful to the Imperial Cabinet for having made this admission before my withdrawal from St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 291.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 159. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 15, 1854.*

GENERAL DE ROCHOW appeared to be a little surprised when I made him sensible of my being acquainted as well with some of the particulars of his late audience of the Emperor, as with His Majesty's violent deportment during and after the audience.

After some hesitation he said: "I must admit that the Emperor astonished me. I almost thought that I was in conversation with the Emperor Paul!" Similar reflections have been made by other persons of late.

I continued the conversation long enough to obtain full confirmation of my late statements respecting the Emperor's violence—a portion of which appears to have been directed against the Chancellor—and we then turned to other subjects.

General de Rochow informed me that he should henceforth dispatch a weekly messenger to Berlin, and very obligingly offered that Her Majesty's Consul should make use of this conveyance for the transmission of any of those reports which could not conveniently be sent by post.

They would be conveyed, he gave me his word of honour, as securely as by an English messenger.

General Rochow is most desirous that the service of the Prussian steam-packet "the Black Eagle," between Stettin and St. Petersburgh, should be continued in spite of any naval operations which may take place in the Gulf of Finland, and possibly he may have been desirous of showing me that Her Majesty's Government are interested in these wishes being attended to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 292.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 161.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 15, 1854.*

UNFORTUNATELY your Lordship's despatch No. 36 reached me twenty-four hours after the cessation of my diplomatic functions; I shall, however, seek a private audience of Count Nesselrode, at which I shall endeavour to obtain from his Excellency a written assurance that the official representations which it may be the duty of Her Majesty's Consul at St. Petersburgh to make on behalf of British subjects in Russia will be duly received by the Imperial Government.

I would, however, at once observe that it is not the practice at this Court that any Consul should correspond with the Government. They correspond with the chief authorities, as the Governor, the Chief of the Police, but not with the Minister of State.

The arrangement which I had made, and from which it now would be difficult, probably, to recede, is that M. de Michele should transact his business as he has done hitherto, and shall only have recourse to Baron Plessen's good offices in those exceptional cases in which he would have to refer to Her Majesty's Mission, if it still existed here.

Following my example, General Castelbajac has made the same arrangement respecting those of his fellow subjects who intend remaining at St. Petersburgh. Their wants will be attended to by the French Consul, who, when in need of support, is to receive that of the Bavarian Minister, Count de Bray.

I will here make an observation as to the choice which I made of the foreign agent to whom should be confided the protection of my countrymen; I had to choose between the Representatives of the Netherlands, of Sweden, and of Denmark.

The first of these I thought, from various reasons, would have been very ill suited to the task; the second, besides being of inferior diplomatic rank, and only provisionally at the head of the Mission, is sensible that his Government are regarded here as being too favourable to the English, and would be reluctant to have that feeling confirmed; so that, in fact, it can hardly be said that there was any option as to the choice which I had to make.

The greater number of the English merchants here are, I believe, Russian subjects; a quality taken for the protection of trade, easily laid aside, and very compatible, as I have more than once had occasion to observe, with genuine English feeling. As a body, they enjoy a respect here which is paid to no other strangers in this country, and I feel the less uneasy as to their position, under circumstances which may be at hand, as they are identified very much with the interests of the country, and so well able to attend to their own wants that their application to Her Majesty's Mission for support is infinitely rare. I had great pleasure in attending to your Lordship's very judicious suggestion, and caused it to be known that I should be glad to see any of those English gentlemen who would call upon me, at noon, on the 16th instant.

An occasion may thus be afforded me for making known that, in the event of war, all British subjects in the service of Russia will have to withdraw.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 293.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 163.)

St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.

My Lord,

THE messenger arrived here on the 14th, placing me in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 38 inclusive.

Count Nesselrode having, as your Lordship will have learned, put an end to my mission on the preceding day, I was precluded from the possibility of making an official announcement of the orders which I had received for withdrawing from St. Petersburgh with the other members of Her Majesty's Mission.

General Castelbajac informs me that in compliance with previous orders, enjoining him to place himself, under certain circumstances, upon the same line as his English colleague, he applied for his passports two hours before the arrival of the despatch brought here by the messenger Wright.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 294.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 164. Secret.)

St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT ORLOFF arrived here last night, and has no doubt met with an ungracious reception; the Emperor now insisting upon success.

It so happens that I have learned through a person who is almost domesticated in his family, that three or four days ago Countess Orloff received a letter from her husband, saying that affairs had not prospered at Vienna.

The Emperor Francis, he further wrote, is unchanged in his affection for the Emperor, but these unfortunate events have taken place two years too soon.

By that time he would have been enabled to follow his own feelings; as it is, his position is the most difficult one, and he is compelled to compound with the opinions which prevail in this country.

We have here a fresh illustration of the astonishing sagacity ascribed to the Russian Cabinet, but which is exhibited in running from one fault into another.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 295.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 165.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.

COUNT NESSELRODE having allowed me to call upon him yesterday, we conversed very amicably upon the position of Her Majesty's subjects now that diplomatic relations are interrupted, and that the rupture may be followed by grave circumstances.

Count Nesselrode showed no absolute repugnance to complying with the wish expressed in your Lordship's despatch No. 36, but observed that a written engagement on the part of the Russian Government to receive the representations of Her Majesty's Consul, must of course be corresponded to by a similar written promise on the side of the English Government.

Upon the whole, Count Nesselrode was of opinion that matters had better be left as had been contemplated. The English in fact required, he said, no protector; they would have the best protection,—that of the Emperor. Then Her Majesty's Consul would remain to watch over their interests; and in the event of the good offices of any intermediate authority being required, M. de Michele would have recourse to Baron Plessen, as he would do to myself were I still filling the post I have lately occupied.

Beyond this Count Nesselrode said, "On any special occasion I shall be ready to receive Her Majesty's Consul, if he will make application to me."

"All we ask," Count Nesselrode continued, "is that the English should conduct themselves with reserve and prudence; in other words, conduct themselves as they always have done here."

I remarked that I had two questions to put to his Excellency;—1st. Would the English remaining in Russia be allowed, in the event of war, to carry on business? 2nd. Would the English be allowed to carry on business at distant points; that is, not only from the place at which their names are inscribed? Would the English merchant at St. Petersburgh be at liberty, for instance, to purchase goods at Moscow and to export them by the land frontier?

With regard to the first point, Count Nesselrode answered unhesitatingly in the affirmative; adding good-humouredly, Whether they are able to trade will depend more upon you than upon us.

With respect to the second point, Count Nesselrode could return no positive answer: he took down the question in writing; stated his intention of causing it to be examined; and did not hesitate to express his wish that extended facilities should be given to trade; observing, however, that the plan suggested would require a revision of the regulations at present in force.

I propose adverting to this portion of my conversation with Count Nesselrode at a meeting of English gentlemen which will take place this day at my house.

Before I left him, the Chancellor was very desirous of learning whether I had received any information from your Lordship as to the position of neutrals during the war which unhappily appeared to be impending? Did Her Majesty's Government recognise the principle, so important to the Baltic Powers, of the flag covering the merchandize?

I could only state in reply, that I had received no instructions from your

Lordship upon this point, but that I would again remark that if war should break out, it was likely to be directed on our side very much against the nerve of war—against the resources of the country; that in these narrow seas it was very improbable that commerce of any kind would be carried on when once hostilities should commence.

Your Lordship will, I trust, pardon me if I venture to observe that Her Majesty's Government, who have shown so much solicitude about the condition of English subjects remaining in Russia, might possibly render a very important service to them by giving out in Parliament, or in any other manner, that Russian subjects remaining during war-time in England will enjoy the fullest security, and be at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations.

A feeling of mistrust exists here on the part of the Government and on that of the public, and the public profession of intentions towards a few foreigners in England might contribute greatly to the well-being of some hundreds of foreigners in the country to which the few belong.

It may appear in England unnecessary—almost absurd, to extend this declaration to the Greek chapels; but I have not the slightest doubt that such an assurance would be well received in Russia, and that it would tend to increase the security of the Anglican places of worship in this country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 296.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 168. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.*

IT appears to me very clear not only that the position which the Emperor has made for himself is an extremely bad one, but that the truth is becoming apparent, if not to himself, at least to his advisers. I have always observed that there is a certain throwing aside of reserve both on the part of and towards a diplomatic employé upon the eve of final departure from his post.

This disposition to speak with more freedom was very observable yesterday in Count Nesselrode, whose language really struck me as a kind of appeal "ad misericordiam." I must, he said, be sensible of the position of Russia; it could not indeed have escaped the observation of Her Majesty's Government. He did not wish to make reproaches, but he must say that considering the friendly feelings not professed, but proved, by the Emperor when the invasion of Belgium was apprehended, when even the English coasts were considered in danger, he thought that a bad return had been made to His Majesty's friendship.

I begged Count Nesselrode to believe that I did not wish to say anything harsh, but that I must observe that there was no parity between the cases: that the Emperor at one period had shown himself an enemy to aggression, and that it was feeling of the same sort which now brought us into opposition with him; but if His Majesty had been unjustly attacked by an overpowering enemy we should be as ready to come to his assistance as we now were to defend the Turks.

We spoke of England, and Count Nesselrode intimated to me, in guarded language, that the favourable opinions which had been expressed by the English press of him, and of Baron Brunnow, had produced an unfavourable impression in a high quarter here.

I will not close my despatch without stating to your Lordship that even now, after the letter addressed to the Emperor by the Emperor of the French, after the suspension of diplomatic relations between France and Russia, the same miserable deception which has so long been practised is still carried on. This Court insists upon receiving favourable intelligence; and the devotion of some of their diplomatic agents of both sexes has been shown by assurances received here from Paris within the last three or four days, as to the sentiments of the Emperor of the French towards Russia not being at all of the kind which may be inferred from late acts.

This is the continuation of an old system. M. de Kisseleff at Paris has long finessed against his own Emperor, and with correct diplomatic reciprocity General Castelbajac has done as much against the Emperor of the French.

I have, &c.

(Signé) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 297.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.*

A MEETING of several of the English merchants took place this morning at my house, when I had the honour of reading to them some passages of your Lordship's despatch No. 36, and of explaining to them in a short address the position in which they stand now that diplomatic relations between England and Russia have been interrupted.

Our countrymen expressed themselves full of confidence as to the protection which they will meet with from the Emperor, as gratified by the solicitude exhibited by Her Majesty's Government in their security and well-doing, and as fully satisfied with the arrangements which had been made on their behalf.

These feelings towards Her Majesty's Government I was requested to convey to your Lordship.

In compliance with a wish expressed by the English merchants, and to guard against the possibility of the meeting at my house being considered as having had in any degree a political character, I have addressed to Count Nesselrode the private letter of which I beg to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 297.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

Dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1854.*

TO guard against the possibility of any mistake or misapprehension as to the intention with which a meeting of some of the English merchants took place to-day at my house, I am desirous of stating to you, that it was simply this: that while taking leave of my countrymen, I was desirous of explaining to them what their situation in Russia is, now that diplomatic relations are unhappily interrupted between the two countries.

My countrymen are pleased at finding that Her Majesty's Consul is permitted, upon any occasion requiring assistance, to have recourse to the good offices of the Danish Mission, but expressed their unlimited confidence in the protection which they shall meet with from the Emperor your gracious master, in conformity with the assurances which have been made to them.

This feeling, which is very genuine, they were very desirous should be expressed to the Imperial Government. I could only state my regret at being unable to do so otherwise than in a private letter to your Excellency.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 298.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 229. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 24, 1854.*

I HAD yesterday a conversation of considerable interest with M. Bourré, who was formerly French Consul-General in Syria, and who is lately returned from the European Provinces of Turkey, whither he had been sent by the

French Government on a journey of inquiry. M. Bourré is come back penetrated with the danger to which Turkey is exposed from the sentiments prevailing in the Provinces through which he passed, unless some measures are immediately taken by the European Powers to counteract the poison which is at work. It is unfortunately to be apprehended that this warning may have come too late.

I will endeavour to follow M. Bourré through the information which he gave me. He began with Epirus, where he stated as much danger was to be apprehended from the Turkish as from the Christian inhabitants. The Turks were all of the old school, imbued with the most inveterate hatred against Christians, and consequently ready to rise against any Government whose policy was founded on concessions to the professors of Christianity.

The Christians here are chiefly of the Greek faith, and having been subjected to a long series of tyrannical oppression, are among the most discontented and the most rebellious of the Sultan's Christian subjects.

Thessaly and Macedonia are in much the same state as Epirus, but there are fewer Turkish inhabitants.

The object of the Christians in these Provinces is to be annexed to Greece. I inquired of M. Bourré whether he thought that they had been excited by Russian emissaries? He replied very positively in the negative. He said that the people were led by the priests and schoolmasters, who appeared to have a particular and very simple policy of their own in favour of a union with Greece, and that they were merely profiting by circumstances which Russia had produced to follow out their own ends.

Passing to Albania, M. Bourré said that the worst spirit prevailed there against the Porte's authority, but that it was counterbalanced by the certainty which he felt that the Albanians would not be induced to leave their own country to serve the insurrection.

Montenegro M. Bourré looks upon as a Russian fortress, containing 25,000 or 30,000 soldiers of the most ferocious description. Luckily, he adds, the hatred with which they have inspired all their neighbours, renders them comparatively harmless. They would not, he thinks, be allowed to cross their frontier. Every man capable of bearing arms would fall upon them. Austria appears to be a particular object of antipathy to this race.

Servia is the point from whence M. Bourré anticipates the greatest danger to the Porte, and he thinks that sufficient attention has not been paid to the immense influence for good or for evil which this country must have upon the issue of the Oriental question. He blames in very strong language the late proceeding of the Porte in sending a Commissioner with a firman which, although intended to advance the liberties of Servia, appeared nevertheless to make those liberties depend on the will of the Sultan. Now the whole object of Servia has been to establish a real, although not a declared independence. She has long refused to have anything to do with firmans, it having been too clearly proved to her that the firman of to-day might be revoked by the firman of the morrow. It is impossible, M. Bourré observes, that Russia, whose protection has done so much for, should not have immense influence in the country, and he sees no remedy to this but to establish the independence of Servia, under such limits as may be thought proper, but under the protectorate of the Four Powers, in which Russia might be permitted to participate, whenever the Eastern question is settled.

Bulgaria, M. Bourré represents to be so completely held in check by the presence of the Turkish army, that there is no expression of public opinion. Not so in Roumelia, where, about Nessa, Sophia, and Philippoplis, and from thence down to the sea coast, great disaffection exists.

This state of things is certainly not encouraging, and if it be accurately painted, the longer the struggle lasts the greater will be the complication of the whole question. But your Lordship will understand that I am merely narrating the opinion of another individual, though of an intelligent man, and one who had some previous knowledge of the affairs of the East.

What appears to have struck M. Bourré considerably is the comparative smallness of the Greek population in the countries through which he travelled. North of the town of Monastir (Macedonia) he says that the Greek language is no longer understood; that the population is Slavonic, and that the inhabitants of those districts call themselves Bulgarians.

M. Bourré paid a visit to Omar Pasha, whom he had known in Syria. It is useless giving his opinion of a man who has already gained a European reputation, and whom M. Bourré only knew previously as a queller of revolt in disturbed districts; but I was glad to hear that Omar Pasha had expressed an intention of avoiding general actions.

I asked M. Bourré whether he did not think that the insurrection which we knew unfortunately was daily gaining ground in the European provinces might, with judicious treatment, be turned to account by the allies. For instance, if the Ambassadors at Constantinople were to send confidential agents to assure the insurgents that their interests would be cared for by France and England, and that no settlement of the Eastern question would be made which did not guarantee them equal privileges with the Turks, at the same time that it was proved to them that, by aiding Russia and looking to her for protection, they risked becoming greater slaves than they had been under the Turks. "Would it not be possible," I asked, "to give the insurrection a different direction, and even to induce the insurgents to combat by the side of French and English troops in defence of their country? Could they be brought to do so, it would be impossible that the Porte should not recompense their fidelity by the most ample concessions in their favour!"

M. Bourré replied, that he did not think that such a plan as I had proposed would effect much; but that if France and England would send special Commissioners, who should proceed through the different provinces with a certain degree of pomp, explaining as they went along the objects of their visit, such a demonstration might have the happiest effect. The vanity of the chiefs would be gratified by the notice taken of them, the people pleased with the show, and great benefit might result from it.

I will only remark upon this part of M. Bourré's conversation, that I can answer from my own experience for the effect which a display of wealth and power invariably produces in the East. The arguments of the wisest man in the world would produce but little fruit if he were dressed in homely garments and travelling on foot; while a fool with a costly retinue and other attributes of power would find favour, or at least would enforce respect wherever he went.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 299.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 230.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 24, 1854.*

GENERAL CANROBERT, who will command one of the divisions of the French army about to be sent to Turkey, will set out with his staff in a few days for Constantinople to make arrangements for the reception of the troops.

I cannot but congratulate Her Majesty's Government and the general officers who will command Her Majesty's troops that the Emperor's choice should have fallen, among others, on General Canrobert. I feel sure that it will tend greatly to keep up a good feeling between the two armies.

I had some conversation with the General yesterday. He told me that he had been inquiring a great deal lately about the Russian army, and that he did not think it would prove very formidable.

From all he could learn the Russian soldier was a mere machine, without enthusiasm or intelligence, but brave from sheer stupidity. No troops could advance better under a heavy fire of artillery. They would stand to a man to be mowed down; but where quickness of movement or presence of mind was required, they were next to useless. They were so ill fed and so ill taken care of that they perished by hundreds of a dysentery known by the name of the "Russian fever." If he was to command against them he should avoid great actions, but harass them continually by quick and unexpected movements, the fatigue of counteracting which would soon destroy them.

He expressed a great deal of surprise at the movements making by the

Russian army in the Principalities. They were pressing their whole force to the right, he said, in a manner which, to a military eye, ought to insure their destruction, as they exposed the whole of their communications; and this must be done for one of three reasons—either to induce Omar Pasha to attack them in the open plain where they would have an advantage, or else under a certainty that Austria was friendly to them, or thirdly, with a view to extending assistance to the insurrection.

As General Canrobert was so shortly to set out for the East, I conceived that no harm could be done in hinting at the possibility of turning the insurrectionary movement against Russia. He appeared much struck with the idea. Whether it is practicable or not, or whether an attempt to turn it to account may not raise the suspicions of the Turkish Government, are questions which can only be decided on the spot.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 300.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's No. 213 of the 22nd instant, I inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter* which I addressed, on the 23rd instant, to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, relating to the reciprocal protection to be afforded by the civil authorities and by the naval forces of Great Britain and France to the subjects and commerce of the two countries in all parts of the world. I inclose also copies of the instructions† which the Lords of the Admiralty and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonial Department have addressed to Her Majesty's Naval and Colonial authorities for the purpose of carrying out effectually the intentions of the British and French Governments on this point. And I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate the inclosed instructions to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 301.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.*

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a letter‡ which I have addressed to Count Nesselrode, requiring that the Russian troops shall evacuate the Principalities. Also copies of despatches§ which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ministers at Berlin and Vienna, instructing them to communicate thereupon with the Austrian and Prussian Governments.

Your Excellency will communicate these papers to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and you will state to his Excellency that the messenger Captain Blackwood is available to convey the French letter to St. Petersburgh, and also any despatches which the French Government may wish to forward by him to Berlin and Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 274. † Nos. 275 and 276. ‡ No. 305. § Nos. 307 and 308.

No. 302.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 245. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 26, 1854.*

IN the course of the conversations which I have had lately with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the Eastern question, he has more than once let fall an opinion that advantage must be taken of the impending war with Russia, to put the relations of that Power with Turkey on a footing that should not give Europe cause for future disquietude.

The first time he spoke to me in this sense, I replied that I fully participated his opinion, and that I had never understood the reason why a declaration had been introduced into the notes which defined the future action of England and France, and which had been exchanged between the two Governments, pledging them to make peace on the basis of the Turkish propositions approved by the Conference of Vienna; for that, in fact, Russia would be no worse off as to terms after an unsuccessful war than she was at the present moment, when war had not commenced. The French Minister rejoined, that that Article had been introduced to prove the moderation of the two Governments, and in order that Austria and Prussia might not be scared from joining them by a declaration of great harshness towards Russia; but that it never was intended that that Article should be binding in case of active hostilities, and that he had every reason to believe that Austria would be the first to insist upon more stringent conditions towards Russia.

The points, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, which he considered should be insisted upon, in any Treaty of Peace, were the following:

1. Such a reconstruction of the Treaty of 1841, as should be a guarantee for the integrity and independence of Turkey.

2. The Protectorate of Servia and of the Danubian Provinces to be European, instead of exclusively Russian.

3. The Protectorate of Christians in general within the Turkish dominions, to be exercised in the same way.

4. The Dardanelles to be no longer shut, so as to exclude foreign ships of war from the Black Sea. Such a provision had no other effect than to make the Black Sea a Russian lake, and to enable Russia to prepare all her resources against Turkey in secret.

5. The opening of the Danube to the commerce of the world, which is now interdicted by the manœuvres of Russia to keep the Sulina mouth closed.

In a subsequent conversation, I asked the French Minister whether it might not be possible to introduce into the Convention, which Austria had stated herself to be ready to sign, a declaration of the nature he proposed, or, at all events, whether that Convention might not supersede the exchange of notes between England and France, care being taken that it contained no binding engagements in regard to terms of peace. He acquiesced in this idea.

I had subsequently an opportunity of saying a word upon the subject to the Emperor, who, without going into details, gave me to understand that His Majesty entertained the opinion that, in any Treaty of Peace, guarantees must be obtained for the future.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has, if I am not mistaken, already written in this sense to M. de Bourqueney; and I understand it to be his intention, in the course of a day or two, to address a detailed despatch upon the subject to the French Representatives in London, Vienna, and Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 303.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 59.)

Vienna, February 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, in translation, an official paragraph from the "Vienna Gazette" of this day, announcing that with a view to the protection of the south-eastern frontier of the Austrian Empire, on which a corps of 25,000 men are already assembled, a further corps of 25,000 men is ordered to be in readiness to be employed, circumstances may require. It is added that this measure is taken in the interest of peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 303.

Extract from the Vienna "Gazette" of February 22, 1854.

(Translation.)

IN consequence of the continued hostilities on the south-eastern frontier of the Empire, which still present no hope of a speedy peaceful conclusion, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty has felt himself called upon for the complete protection of the south-eastern frontier of his dominions, to order, in addition to the corps d'armée of 25,000 men already stationed in the Servian and Banat Provinces, and to the further reserves in the interior of the country, a further corps of 25,000 men to be in readiness to be employed as circumstances may require, so as to be at all times completely enabled to meet all disturbances on the frontiers of his States in a manner befitting the events occurring.

His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, whilst seeking in this manner to secure the independence of his Empire, and its dearest interests, does not nevertheless abandon all hope that his indefatigable and increasing efforts may prove unsuccessful in promoting by all the strength of his influence the re-establishment of that peace so necessary to Europe after the convulsions which have gone before, and the cessation of the miseries of a war which appears calculated to loosen the bonds of unity between all States, and in its ultimate consequences to menace them all equally with evil.

No. 304.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 60.)

Vienna, February 23, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE only just time, before the departure of the post, to forward to your Lordship the draft of the Convention proposed by your Lordship, rendered more stringent by certain alterations concerted with Count Buol, and to which the Emperor has given his entire consent.

I shall expect your Lordship's direction as to further proceedings with regard to this document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 304.

Project of Convention.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur des Français, l'Empereur d'Autriche, la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et le Roi de Prusse, dans leurs légitime préoccupation du préjudice que les complications survenues en Orient sont de nature à causer aux intérêts de leurs propres Etats, et dans leur vif désir d'y mettre un terme, ont jugé qu'il était nécessaire de constater plus solennellement l'entente que les protocoles signés à Vienne par leurs Représentants respectifs le 9 Décembre, 1853, et le 13 Janvier de l'année courante ont déjà établie entre leurs couronnes. Leurs susdites Majestés ont en conséquence résolu de conclure entre elles une Convention et nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

; lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins-pouvoirs, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

Art. I. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à employer tous leurs efforts pour opérer le rétablissement de la paix entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte aux conditions jugées compatibles avec les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, et mises en harmonie avec la ferme intention manifestée par Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, de protéger avec efficacité les intérêts religieux et civils de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Le principe de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman est et demeure la condition *sine qud non* de la transaction à intervenir entre les deux Puissances belligérantes, et les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à respecter elles-mêmes ce principe, base de leur union.

II. En conséquence les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'imposent comme leur première tâche de se concerter sur les voies les plus efficaces pour obtenir l'évacuation de tous les points du territoire Ottoman qui sont, ou seront, occupés par les troupes Russes.

III. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, avant d'être remis en vigueur sera revisé, et les Puissances signataires s'engagent à rechercher en commun les moyens les plus propres à rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe.

IV. Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, et le Roi de Prusse, désigneront immédiatement des Plénipotentiaires chargés de discuter et de déterminer d'un commun accord dans des Conférences la nature ainsi que l'emploi des moyens les plus convenables pour atteindre le but de leur concert.

V. Quelqu'événement qui se produise en conséquence de l'exécution de la présente Convention, chacune des Hautes Parties Contractances s'engage à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement définitif avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, ou avec toute autre Puissance, sans avoir délibéré en commun.

VI. La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications échangées dans l'espace de quinze jours.

En foi de quoi, &c.

No. 305.

The Earl of Clarendon to Count Nesselrode.

M. le Comte,

Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.

AS the ordinary channels of communication between England and Russia have been closed by the recent interruption of diplomatic relations between the two Courts, I am under the necessity of addressing myself directly to your

Excellency on a matter of the deepest importance to our respective Governments and to Europe.

The British Government has for many months anxiously laboured, in conjunction with its allies, to effect a reconciliation of differences between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and it is with the utmost pain that the British Government has come to the conclusion that one last hope alone remains of averting the calamity which has so long impended over Europe.

It rests with the Government of Russia to determine whether that hope shall be realized or extinguished; for the British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, that if Russia should decline to restrict within purely diplomatic limits the discussion in which she has for some time past been engaged with the Sublime Porte, and does not, by return of the messenger who is the bearer of my present letter, announce her intention of causing the Russian troops under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff to commence their march with a view to recross the Pruth, so that the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia shall be completely evacuated on the 30th of April next, the British Government must consider the refusal or the silence of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly.

The messenger who is the bearer of this letter to your Excellency is directed not to wait more than six days at St. Petersburgh for your reply; and I earnestly trust that he may convey to me an announcement on the part of the Russian Government that by the 30th of April next the Principalities will cease to be occupied by Russian forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 306.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul Michele.

Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.

Sir,

THE messenger, Captain Blackwood, will deliver to you a letter from me to Count Nesselrode, which you will immediately place in Count Nesselrode's hands, acquainting his Excellency at the same time that the messenger will be ready to return to England with his reply as soon as his Excellency shall send it to you.

But if, on the expiration of six days from the day on which you deliver my letter to Count Nesselrode, his Excellency should not have sent to you any letter to my address; or if, previously to the expiration of that period, Count Nesselrode should inform you that the messenger need not remain at St. Petersburgh, in either of those cases you will direct the messenger to return to England with the utmost speed.

The messenger will deliver to you at the same time a packet from Lord Cowley, inclosing a despatch from the French Government to their Consul at St. Petersburgh, covering a letter to Count Nesselrode; and you will concert with your French colleague for the simultaneous delivery of the two letters to the Russian Minister. If the messenger should likewise deliver to you packets for the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, you will place any such packets in the hands of those Ministers as soon as possible after the messenger's arrival.

On dispatching the messenger to England, you will give your French colleague an opportunity of sending by him to Berlin or to Calais, if he should wish it, any despatches which he may have for his Government; and you will afford the same facility, as far as Berlin, to the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, in case the messenger should have brought any despatches for them.

You will forward to Lord Bloomfield, at Berlin, by the messenger, a statement of the circumstances under which the messenger will have left St. Petersburgh; and as long as you continue at St. Petersburgh you will keep Lord Bloomfield as fully informed as possible in regard to all matters of political interest.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 307.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 86.)

Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter* which I have addressed to Count Nesselrode requiring the evacuation of the Principalities; and I have to instruct your Lordship to communicate it immediately to Count Buol, and to state that Her Majesty's Government having anxiously, but in vain, laboured for many months in conjunction with the Governments of Austria, France, and Prussia, to effect an amicable settlement of the differences between Russia and the Porte, must now consider that negotiation is at an end; that the inadmissible terms upon which the Emperor of Russia will alone negotiate for peace, and the vast scale on which military and naval preparations are proceeding in Russia, leave no doubt as to the disastrous policy which His Imperial Majesty is determined to pursue.

The dignity of the Powers concerned in these recent transactions, and the great interests now suffering from suspense, forbid any further delay, and require that all doubt as to the future should be removed; and as the forcible occupation of the Principalities was an injury inflicted upon Turkey and an offence offered to Europe by Russia, it has appeared proper to Her Majesty's Government, and to that of the Emperor of the French, that the final issue should have reference to that act of aggression, and that the Government of Russia should be required within a given time to evacuate that portion of the Sultan's territory.

Both Governments, however, are animated by the sincerest desire of co-operating with Austria. They acknowledge the paramount necessity of a cordial understanding between the Four Powers at this critical juncture of the affairs of Europe; and they are convinced that the all-important questions as to whether the war is to become general or be confined within narrow limits, and whether the contest is to be protracted or peace speedily restored, must depend on the policy of the Four Powers being decided, vigorous, and united.

They have consequently determined not to send forward the identic letters they have addressed to Count Nesselrode without previous communication to the Government of Austria, in the conviction that that Government will appreciate the friendly confidence implied by this proceeding. Her Majesty's Government have every reason to hope that the letter to Count Nesselrode will meet with the approval of the Austrian Cabinet, and should this fortunately be the case they trust that it will be made known by Count Buol to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. It is impossible for your Lordship to overstate the importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to a decision upon which the best interests of Europe may depend.

Your Lordship will place the messenger Blackwood at the disposal of Count Buol, and may for that purpose detain him for a few hours; but it is desirable that he should proceed on his journey to St. Petersburgh with the least possible delay.

You will read this despatch to Count Buol, and you will give his Excellency a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 308.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 38.)

Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter* which I have addressed to Count Nesselrode requiring the evacuation of the Principalities; and I have to instruct your Lordship to communicate it immediately to Baron

* No. 305.

Manteuffel, and to state that Her Majesty's Government having anxiously, but in vain, laboured for many months, in conjunction with the Governments of Austria, France, and Prussia, to effect an amicable settlement of the differences between Russia and the Porte, must now consider that negotiation is at end; that the inadmissible terms upon which the Emperor of Russia will alone negotiate for peace, and the vast scale on which military and naval preparations are proceeding in Russia, leave no doubt as to the disastrous policy which His Imperial Majesty is determined to pursue.

The dignity of the Powers concerned in these recent transactions, and the great interests now suffering from suspense, forbid any further delay, and require that all doubt as to the future should be removed; and as the forcible occupation of the Principalities was an injury inflicted upon Turkey and an offence offered to Europe by Russia, it has appeared proper to Her Majesty's Government, and to that of the Emperor of the French, that the final issue should have reference to that act of aggression, and that the Government of Russia should be required within a given time to evacuate that portion of the Sultan's territory.

Both Governments, however, are animated by the sincerest desire of co-operating with Prussia. They acknowledge the paramount necessity of a cordial understanding between the Four Powers at this critical juncture of the affairs of Europe; and they are convinced that the all-important questions as to whether the war is to become general or be confined within narrow limits, and whether the contest is to be protracted or peace speedily restored, must depend on the policy of the Four Powers being decided, vigorous, and united.

They have consequently determined not to send forward the identic letters they have addressed to Count Nesselrode without previous communication to the Government of Prussia, in the conviction that that Government will appreciate the friendly confidence implied by this proceeding; and your Lordship will earnestly request Baron Manteuffel to join in the requisition to Russia; or, if he should unfortunately decline to do so, that the Prussian Government will at least make known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh that it has their sanction and support. It is impossible for your Lordship to overstate the importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to a decision upon which the best interests of Europe may depend.

Your Lordship will place the messenger Blackwood at the disposal of Baron Manteuffel, and may for that purpose detain him for a few hours; but it is desirable that he should proceed on his journey to St. Petersburgh with the least possible delay.

You will read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and you will give his Excellency a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 309.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 28, 1854.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of an amended draft of Convention,* forwarded to me by Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, as altered by Count Buol.

I have informed Lord Westmorland that Her Majesty's Government approve the amended draft, and authorize him to sign it with his colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosure in No. 304.

No. 310.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 25, 1854.*

IN answer to your telegraphic despatch of the 23rd, Count Buol looks upon his readiness to sign the Convention, such as it is transmitted to your Lordship by my despatch No. 60, as the best assurance he could give of the entire concurrence of his policy with that of England and France. He approves your proposal of a summons to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, which he will direct Count Esterhazy to support on the following grounds:—1st. His original representations to Russia against the occupation of the Principalities; 2ndly. The disastrous consequences resulting from refusal to evacuate them; 3rdly. The responsibility of the war with which Russia will charge herself by such refusal; 4thly. Citing the reply of the Austrian Government to Orloff's proposals, by which they reserve their entire liberty of action. When the term fixed for the evacuation has expired, and if hostilities have commenced, Austria, who with a view to this situation is prepared herself, will then have to complete the Convention. She is now prepared to sign (by) a further Act applicable to the state of war which will have arisen. She will accept the duties imposed upon her to attach herself to the object of our common policy, but she desires to be allowed to judge when the moment of action should commence with most effect for the object in view, and the least danger for her particular position. She cannot and ought not to expose herself to a struggle which might be concentrated against herself till her allies can support her. When they are upon the ground, she will not fail to unite with them in support of her engagements. Count Buol asks of our Cabinets that the Convention should not be made known before hostilities have taken place. No better proof can be given of the importance attached to this document. His Majesty, declares Count Buol, has thus given to the French Ambassador and to myself the full consent of the Emperor of Austria. The above declarations will be further developed in a despatch of Buol to Colloredo, which leaves this day for London and Paris.

No. 311.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 88.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 28, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the amended draft of Convention as inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 60 of the 23rd instant, and your Lordship is authorized to sign it with your colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 312.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 250.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 27, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is very anxious that Her Majesty's Government should exercise all the influence which they possess at Berlin to determine the Prussian Cabinet to sign the Quadruple Convention.

The observations made to the French Government from the Cabinet of Berlin, both through Count Hatzfeldt and M. de Moustier, show a great disinclination to put the resolutions adopted by the Vienna Conference in a more binding form; while at the same time Prussia allows it to be seen that if the dissolution of the Turkish Empire is the result of the present crisis, she expects to profit by it as well as others.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had a long conversation with Count Hatzfeldt on

this subject, and was about to write to M. de Moustier to-morrow. He maintains that Prussia cannot hold aloof without renouncing all right to be reckoned a Great European Power, and forfeiting all claims to future consideration. He thinks, however, that your Lordship's warning voice is more likely to be listened to than his, and he begs you therefore to raise it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 313.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 251.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 27, 1854.*

IN a telegraphic despatch dated yesterday afternoon, M. de Bourqueney informs M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had communicated to Count Buol the text of the Convention which it was proposed to sign with the Porte. M. de Buol had highly approved it, but had at the same time pressed for the signature of the Quadruple Convention which France and England had proposed for the acceptance of Austria and Prussia.

Your Lordship will have been made acquainted with the alterations proposed by Austria, and which will do away with the objectionable engagement to be found in the notes exchanged between the French and English Governments, to which more particular allusion was made in my despatch No. 245.

Your Lordship will also have been told that Austria declines signing the summons to evacuate the Principalities which the two Western Powers are about to address to the Russian Government, but she will support the demand when made.

M. de Bourqueney observes in the telegraphic despatch alluded to above that the Austrian Government will not commit any overt act of hostility against Russia until the Western Powers are actually engaged; that this is a fact on which they may rely, for that Austria would not risk the loss of a battle without any allies in the field; but he maintains that the active cooperation of Austria may be relied on whenever France and England are themselves engaged.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether it would not be worth while to ask Austria to explain herself with a little less reserve. Here we are, I observed, on the point of a war with Russia. Our plans are uncertain and undefined. It is obvious that the cooperation of Austria must have an immense influence upon them. For instance, if Austria were to say, "Carry on your operations in Europe, and I am with you, *vi et armis*; but carry them on in Asia and in the Crimea, and I wait to see the result," we could hardly hesitate which we should attempt. Or we might tell her that our plans would depend very much on what she did, and that as a friend she ought to explain herself more clearly; that we would respect her confidence by observing the utmost secrecy, if she desired it; but that really before the Commanders-in-chief started, they ought to know whether they were to look for active cooperation, or merely for a favourable neutrality.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys will write immediately in this sense to M. de Bourqueney, telling him to profit by the time which must elapse before the answer from Russia to our summons can be received, to ascertain distinctly the exact intentions of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 314.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 79.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

WHEN I called to-day on Baron Manteuffel, the Austrian Minister was with him. I was in hopes that Count Thun had been charged with some communication connected with the Eastern question, and an announcement perhaps of the intentions of Austria to act more energetically with England and France; but was surprised that he had not made any communication whatever on this all-absorbing subject, and that his conversation had turned on the internal affairs of Germany.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he had inquired of Count Thun if he had not received instructions from Vienna bearing on the position which the two Maritime Powers might shortly assume towards Russia, and that the Austrian Minister appeared to be in total ignorance of the intentions of his Government, and quite scoffed at the idea of a "rapprochement" between his Government and that of France and England; so much so, indeed, that Baron Manteuffel scarcely knew how to reconcile the language I had held on the subject with that of the Austrian Representative, for Count Thun stated his conviction that rumours which had reached the Exchange of Berlin from Vienna to the effect that Austria was about to participate actively with us on the Eastern question, and that an army was ordered into Transylvania for the purpose of checking the Russian forces, were completely false.

In the meantime Baron Manteuffel has written by telegraph to Vienna and requested Count Arnim to report instantly the result of his inquiries of Count Buol on this subject, and I incline to think that the future conduct of the Prussian Government will be a good deal influenced by the news which must soon arrive from Vienna, though I fear it will lag far behind that of Austria. Indeed, Baron Manteuffel can scarcely bring himself to believe the extent to which the Austrian Government seems disposed to carry its policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 315.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 80. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

HAVING heard that a Prussian messenger was dispatched last night to St. Petersburgh, I asked Baron Manteuffel if anything of importance had been sent to General Rochow by this opportunity. His Excellency answered that Baron Budberg had brought to him two days ago a despatch from Count Nesselrode, acknowledging the communication which had been lately received from Berlin, and which had caused so much dissatisfaction at the Imperial Court that Count Nesselrode had not attempted to answer these despatches, or enter into any reasoning on their contents, but had violently assailed the general policy of the Prussian Government, and introduced into his despatch some passages made use of by the King in his last letter to the Emperor, which Baron Manteuffel considered so improper a proceeding, and the whole tone of the communication so offensive, that he refused to receive from Baron Budberg a copy of the despatch which he had been directed to deliver to his Excellency.

Baron Manteuffel then said to me that he had sent General Rochow an account of what had occurred, but that he had no further directions to give him at the present moment, and that the relations of the two Governments had undergone no change. He had however thought it advisable, as Baron Budberg had thrown out hints that there was a considerable difference between the opinions of Austria and those of Prussia—adding that the former were more favourable to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh—to state to General Rochow that

there was every disposition on the part of the two Governments, as far as he was informed, to act together.

I replied that I rejoiced to hear this, for that there was never a moment when it was so essential for the two Great German Powers to be of one mind; and that as to Baron Budberg's insinuations, it was only an artifice to create disunion between Austria and Prussia, as the Russian agents had been endeavouring to effect between England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 316.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 83.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that he has written this evening to Count Arnim at Vienna, upon the subject of the more decided policy which it is supposed the Austrian Government is about to adopt in the affairs of the East, and that he has expressed the satisfaction of the Prussian Government at the interests of Germany on the Danube being likely to be so warmly espoused. His Excellency appeared gratified at the course which Austria was apparently about to follow, and he gave me to understand that he had thought it necessary to make this communication to the Imperial Court for fear of its being spread abroad by Russian or other agents that, because Prussia was not disposed to take an active part in these supposed measures, she was either indifferent to them or that she disapproved of them. Prussia, he said, must take a deep interest in everything which so deeply concerned the welfare of Germany as the mouths of the Danube, and he was glad that this question was likely to be seriously considered and strenously supported.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 317.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a copy of a paper giving a statement of the present position of the Russian corps d'armée, which I have obtained confidentially from a private source.

I am informed that this paper is taken from a military report addressed to the Prussian War Office by Count Münster, the Prussian Military Resident at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 317.

Statement of the present position of the Russian Corps d'Armée.

LE corps de Gardes, le corps de Grenadiers, le 1er corps d'armée (Quartier-Général Suwalki) et le 2me corps d'armée dans le Royaume de Pologne continueront à peu près dans leurs positions actuelles faire face vers l'Ouest et la Finlande.

Le 3me corps d'armée (Sacken) a laissé une division d'infanterie et une brigade de cavalerie en Bessarabie et aux environs d'Odessa. Les deux autres divisions d'infanterie et l'autre brigade de cavalerie sont entrées en Valachie et forment le centre de l'armée du Danube.

A l'arrivée des troupes susmentionnées le 4me corps d'armée (Dannenberg) a pris l'aile droite de cette armée et se trouve essentiellement opposée à Kalafat.

Le 5me d'armée (de Lüders) a détaché une division d'infanterie dans la Trans-Caucasie et une brigade en Crimée. Le reste du corps forme l'aile gauche de l'armée du Danube depuis la frontière de la Moldavie et de la Valachie.

Du 6me corps d'armée (Tchéodajew) deux divisions sont en marche pour la Trans-Caucasie; la troisième pour la Crimée. La cavalerie du corps se rend en Trans-Caucasie.

On croit qu'à l'arrivée de la division du 6me corps en Crimée, la brigade du 5me corps qui s'y trouve actuellement se rendra à Odessa, et qu'en revanche alors une brigade de la division du 3me corps, laquelle se trouve en Bessarabie, se rendra sur le Danube.

Le corps de réserve de grosse cavalerie demeure pour le présent stationnaire dans ses cantonnments actuels.

Le corps de réserve de Dragons est mobilisé. Il se rendra sur le Danube excépté quatre regiments qui iront en Trans-Caucasie.

Quant aux réserves (zapasny) la réserve du corps des Gardes tiendra probablement garnison à St. Pétersbourg.

La réserve du corps de Grenadiers sera distribuée sur le Golfe de Finlande à Wiburg, Reval, &c. La réserve du 1er corps fournira le cordon de la côté de la Baltique depuis Réval jusqu'à la frontière de la Prusse.

La réserve du 2me corps sera employé aux garnisons des places du Royaume de Pologne.

Les réserves des 3me et 4me corps se réuniront à Kiew, Chitomir, et occuperont plus tard les Principautés sur les derrières de l'armée du Danube.

La réserve du 5me corps se trouve déjà dans la Bessarabie méridionale à Ismail, &c., quelques fractions aussi, si l'on a bien compris, en Crimée et en Bessarabie.

La réserve du 6me corps sera réuni à Moscow et y demeurera.

Les officiers Russes à St. Pétersbourg considèrent comme probable le passage d'armée du Danube au printemps sur la rive droite de ce fleuve.

No. 318.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 87.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday 8·15 P.M. reached me this day at 1·30 o'clock. I immediately sought an interview with Baron Manteuffel, and communicated the substance of it to his Excellency, requesting him to take the King's orders on the subject. He said that he did not think His Majesty would perhaps object to join in a summons which it is proposed to address to the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities; but he did not think His Majesty would take a part in active hostility in the event of a refusal.

I replied that the summons would be of little use if Prussia declined supporting her demands with an armed force; but that I hoped, if the Austrian Government, as we had reason to believe, joined with us that such a resolution might produce some effect on the King—for Prussia would surely not like to remain behindhand in carrying out a work of such great European importance—and that as his Excellency had already mentioned his having written to Vienna, I would not press him further at this moment, relying on the hope that a little reflection might bring about a modification of the opinions which he now entertained.

I have again seen his Excellency this evening, when he informed me that after making the communication with which I had charged him, His Majesty had said that he disapproved as much as ever of the proceedings of the Russian Government, and that he remained firmly resolved to continue to act in the sense of the declarations which he had already given, but that he was not prepared to go to war with Russia, and that he did not feel that, though deeply

interested in the settlement of the affairs of the East, he was called upon by his position to join in any hostile demonstration, and that he considered at the present moment that the part which devolved on Prussia was to endeavour to carry on at St. Petersburgh negotiations which might tend to peace.

I replied that I was sure Her Majesty's Government would be greatly disappointed on learning his resolution not to associate with us in the manner we could have wished, and which I thought was the one most becoming the interests of Europe and of Germany; for to talk of peace when the Emperor of Russia was preparing great armaments, and showed no disposition whatever to treat upon any reasonable terms, was useless, and could lead to no result but to prolong a struggle which, by the cordial cooperation of the four Powers, might be brought to a more speedy conclusion.

This is, I regret to say, the substance of my interview with the President of the Council, and your Lordship will, I am sure, have been almost prepared for such a result from the tenour of my late communication, and the doubt I have always expressed that Prussia would at once come forward and play the part becoming one of the Great Powers of Europe at this critical juncture. The family ties which exist between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia are certainly one of the obstacles to an immediate rupture, but the unprepared condition of the army and the state of the finances of Prussia are also a serious difficulty; still Baron Manteuffel assured me that I must not consider what he had told me as a declaration that Prussia might not hereafter join the other Powers in active hostilities, though in his opinion the time was not as yet come for doing so, and her immediate interests in the East were not of the same character as those of Austria, England, and France.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 319.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)

Vienna, February 22, 1854.

My Lord,

IN a recent conversation with Count Buol, his Excellency remarked to me that, during the whole of the discussions upon the Eastern question, the truth had not been told to the Emperor Nicholas; for he had always been permitted to believe that the German Governments would side with him. Baron Meyendorff, who since the month of April had constantly been told that Austria never could permit the humiliation of Turkey, had never reported the case as it really stood. He said that the Emperor Nicholas had now treated the Emperor Francis Joseph without proper regard, considering all the friendly exertions His Majesty had made to place the Russian Sovereign in a position to repair the false policy he had pursued. If he had accepted the modifications of the Vienna note, he would have had a Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and would have received every satisfaction he could have required; but the time was now gone by.

Count Buol looked upon the determination of the British and French Governments to send a corps of troops to the assistance of Turkey, as of the highest consequence; and never, he said, had he felt greater pleasure than on learning that Lord Raglan was chosen to command the English force. It was very important that his name should be associated with this measure; it would be a demonstration which the revolutionary party could not mistake if they looked forward with any hope for their own projects in the active hostilities which might arise. He hoped Lord Raglan would pass through Vienna on his way to the seat of his command. The Emperor has expressed himself to me in the same sense.

With regard to the insurrection in the Turkish provinces bordering on Greece, Count Buol expressed great alarm lest they should spread to the provinces adjoining them. He said that they were too far from the Austrian frontier to permit of the action of the Austrian troops, but the Turkish Government should forthwith send a force to occupy them.

With respect to Servia, he entertained no present fears. The Austrian General, Caronini, in command of the troops on the frontier, had visited the Prince of Servia, and also the Turkish Governor, and had made confidential arrangements with them of a most cordial nature. He mentioned this in reply to a passage in a despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which stated that Austria should not enter Servia but with the consent of Turkey, which, M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked, was what France was now doing with regard to the expeditionary force she was about to send, in conjunction with England, to the assistance of Turkey. In this and in another despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, remarks were made on the language of Austrian Agents, particularly of Count Thun at Berlin. Count Buol said that he was aware that Count Thun had used language in support of Baron Budberg's late proposals at a time when the Emperor and himself at Vienna were entirely rejecting the same proposed by Count Orloff; but Count Thun was acting entirely upon his own inclinations; and being now acquainted with the sentiments of his Government, he would, no doubt, avoid falling into the same error, as he was a man of perfect integrity.

Count Buol said the same with regard to the Russian tendencies attributed to the Austrian Consul at Belgrade, and also, in some degree, to Baron Bruck at Constantinople. He said that the policy of Austria having become more marked, these expressions of individual opinion would be put an end to; and in conversation with Baron Bourqueney, he said: "All I ask of your Government and the Emperor Napoleon is that as long as I am Minister they will believe in my word, and in the word of the Emperor as long as he lives."

Baron Bourqueney read to Count Buol the despatch from his Government, commenting upon the proposals given to Count Orloff to take with him to St. Petersburgh; Count Buol agreed that the leaving the Bosphorus ought not to take place before the peace was signed and fully established. He was of opinion with the French Government, that the Treaty of 1841 ought to be extended to further guarantees for the maintenance of the independence of Turkey; and he should be glad to see the mouths of the Danube under a better arrangement.

To me Count Buol observed that he had almost abandoned the hope of receiving a reply from St. Petersburgh which the Emperor could accept. He stated, that if the proposals sent there were not accepted in full, if three-fourths only were agreed to, he should not be satisfied. In case the propositions failed, he should immediately recommend the assembly of an army on the frontier of Transylvania at Cronstadt. This force, from its position, would render it very difficult for a Russian army to pass the Danube at any point between Silistria and the sea; and any attempt to do so by Servia would be decidedly opposed by Austria. He felt the time was come for considering the propriety of entering into further engagements with England, France, and Prussia; and he said this in allusion to the project of Convention which, at his request, had been forwarded to him by Baron Bourqueney, who stated it to be only a project drawn up by his and the English Governments. Count Buol mentioned the refusal of Prussia to sign it, and said it was requisite she should do so after it had been discussed and arranged. He felt it would be necessary to call upon Prussia, when an Austrian force was moved to the frontier, to collect a Prussian corps on the frontiers of Poland. He also stated, that whenever the Governments of England and France had determined upon the time they would take if they declared war, if this was done by announcing a term for the evacuation of the Principalities, he would support that measure at St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol said, that when Austria took the engagements above referred to, France and the allies would be asked to take similar ones for the maintenance of tranquillity in Italy. He said he should not require any extensive engagements, as he felt confidence in the French Government, which having happily put down insurrection, would not suffer her ally to be menaced by revolution while engaged in concert with her; but some act of assurance would be asked for, so that Austria, while her army is engaged in operations on a distant frontier, might have no fear of being attacked in her Italian possessions. He stated, the Emperor to be quite decided in the line he would take. Count Buol looked upon the refusal by Russia to accept the propositions contained in the Emperor Napoleon's letter, as so clearly indicating the policy which, the Czar was determined to follow, that he did not doubt that those sent by Count Orloff would share a similar fate. He thought the conduct of Russia towards the Austrian

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Government was blameable; the manner in which Count Orloff, on his arrival here, had invited those Austrian officers (who were known to have Russian tendencies, and who did not belong to the Government), to call upon him before he had seen the Emperor or himself, was an affront.

Count Buol told me he had looked over the Convention, and thought it a very proper one, although there were alterations, in the interest of the allies, which he thought might be made in it with advantage. He had submitted it to the Emperor, who was equally satisfied with it. He felt it would be necessary to obtain the signature of Prussia, and her cooperation in all the future arrangements to be come to, consequent upon the signature of a Convention. He said that the German Diet ought also to be called upon to a certain degree to adhere to the policy which would thus be adopted: the Wurtemburg and Saxon Governments would alone, he believed, object at present to such a line of policy.

Count Buol, having spoken to Baron Bourqueney as to some changes in the project of Convention of a more stringent nature, the latter has called upon me to concert such as he thinks might be conformable to Count Buol's intentions.

I inclose herewith what has been drawn up, and which I told him I would submit to your Lordship for your opinion.

Count Buol wished not to confine the engagement for the evacuation of Turkish territory to the Principalities, lest Prussia should state that as they were upon the Austrian frontier it was more a question for the Austrian Government than for the other Powers.

At a ball at Prince Schwartzenburg's on the 20th instant, the Emperor, in conversation with me, confirmed in all respects the statements of Count Buol which I have above reported to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Suggestions for alterations in Project of Convention, drawn up by Baron Bourqueney.

POUR opérer le rétablissement de la paix entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte, aux conditions jugées compatibles avec les intérêts généraux de l'Empire et mises en harmonie avec la ferme intention manifestée par Sa Majesté le Sultan, Empereur des Ottomans, de protéger les intérêts religieux et civils de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Art. II. L'évacuation de tous les ports du territoire Ottoman, qui sont ou qui seraient occupés par les troupes Russes, devait être opérée le plus tôt possible.

Quelques changemens que puisse apporter l'exécution de la présente Convention, dans les rapports des Puissances signataires avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, elles s'engagent réciproquement à ne conclure avec elle aucun arrangement particulier de quelque nature qu'il puisse être sans le consentement des trois autres.

No. 320.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 28, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 74 of the 22nd instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel in communicating to his Excellency the notes which have been exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, in consequence of the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the proposals of the Vienna Conference, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion. I have only to repeat that Her Majesty's Government are not desirous to press unduly upon Prussia, and still less to recommend any course of action that would be prejudicial to her interests; but as England is equally concerned with Prussia in restricting the theatre of war to the narrowest limits, and rendering its duration as short as possible, Her Majesty's Government think it is of vital importance that the policy of the two countries should be identically the same. The Four Powers have solemnly recorded their opinion that the terms offered by the Porte were just and reasonable, and such as should be accepted by Russia; but the Emperor has not even noticed them, and has sent to Vienna proposals of his own, which the Conference declared to be inadmissible, and not of a character that would justify their being transmitted to Constantinople.

Thus the Emperor of Russia, who might, without loss of honour or dignity, have preserved the general peace, has preferred to involve Europe in war; for that calamity must now be considered as inevitable.

The Four Powers have exhausted every effort to maintain peace, and they should now use every effort to restore it. A firm and decided policy, prompt and vigorous action, may prevent war from becoming general, and may bring it to a speedy termination. Weakness and vacillation cannot but lead to the pecuniary exhaustion and the protracted contest that the Prussian Government apprehend. It is therefore with regret and disappointment that Her Majesty's Government learn that although we may hereafter count upon her cooperation, yet that at the present moment Prussia is not prepared to make common cause with us.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 321.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 172.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 18, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship, I do not doubt, will be acquainted with the nature of a plan of arrangement which has been sent from Vienna for the Emperor's consideration, and which, if approved of by him, is to be adopted and brought forward as emanating from the Russian Cabinet.

Of the nature of the proposition I am not informed, though I have reason to believe that it involves the principle of direct negotiation with Turkey.

Judging from such slight evidence as I have been able to obtain, the suggestion has been well received by Count Nesselrode, but is unfavourably looked upon by his imperial master.

It appears probable that there will be no cause for regret should the proposal be put aside by His Imperial Majesty; a acceptance being likely to carry with it the support of its authors, while rejection could hardly fail to give offence.

The feelings entertained in St. Petersburgh at present towards foreigners of all description (not excepting the members of the corps diplomatique), is such as to indicate that at no distant period Russian interests will be totally distinct from those of the rest of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 322.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 28.*)

(No. 173.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 20, 1854.*

ALMOST unceasing exertion during the last few days on the part of the gentlemen attached to Her Majesty's late Mission, having enabled me to complete the arrangements attendant upon the recall, I propose setting off with my family for England to-morrow, on which day Lord Napier will also take his departure; and Mr. Lumley, Mr. Ker, and Mr. Strachey will follow on the 22nd instant.

Upon the occasion of receiving my passports, I have addressed the despatch of which I have the honour of transmitting a copy to Mr. Consul de Michele, and identical despatches of which a copy is likewise inclosed to Mr. Consul-General Yeames, and the Consuls Whitehead and Lousada.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—As I am closing my despatch, I have received a communication from Her Majesty's Consul, of which I also transmit a copy herewith.

Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Consul Michele.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 19, 1854.*

I BEG to acquaint you that having received my passports from the Chancellerie d'Etat, I propose leaving St. Petersburgh with the other members of Her Majesty's Mission, in the course of a few days.

The interruption of diplomatic relations between the two Governments does not, however, carry with it that of commercial relations, and it is, I believe, the intention of Her Majesty's Goverment that for the present, at least, you should remain at St. Petersburgh in the discharge of your duties.

In the event of any case arising in which the special intervention of any intermediate authority should become requisite on behalf of any of our fellow-subjects, I will request you to address yourself to Baron de Plessen, the King of Denmark's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Her Majesty's Government having been desirous that any British subject remaining in Russia should be placed under the protection of the Danish Mission, and this arrangement having met with the approbation of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Her Majesty's Consuls at Odessa, Archangel, and Riga.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 19, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of informing you that having received my passports from the Chancellerie d'Etat, Her Majesty's Mission are upon the eve of quitting St. Petersburgh.

The interruption of diplomatic intercourse between Her Majesty's Govern-

ment and that of the Emperor is not, however, accompanied by a cessation of commercial relations, and for the present it will be your duty to remain at your post in the discharge of your habitual functions.

Although I have no doubt that no such protection will be required, Her Majesty's subjects remaining in Russia have been placed, with the consent of the Imperial Government, under the protection of the Mission of the King of Denmark; and any application which it may become necessary to make to Baron de Plessen, His Majesty's Envoy, had better, I apprehend, be addressed to him through Her Majesty's Consul, M. de Michele, as long as he shall remain at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 322.

Consul Michele to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 20, 1854.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch, of the 18th instant, apprizing me that your passports having been forwarded to you from the Chancellerie d'Etat, you propose leaving St. Petersburgh with the other members of Her Majesty's Mission, in the course of a few days; that the interruption of diplomatic relations between the two Governments does not, however, bring with it that of commercial relations; and that it is, your Excellency believes, the intention of Her Majesty's Government that for the present, at all events, I should remain at St. Petersburgh in the discharge of my habitual duties. And further, that in the event of any case arising in which the special intervention of any intermediate authority should become necessary on behalf of any of our fellow-subjects, instructing me to address myself to Baron de Plessen, His Majesty's (of Denmark) Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Her Majesty's Government being desirous that any British subject in Russia should be placed under the protection of the Danish Minister, an arrangement that has met with the approbation of the Imperial Government.

In acknowledging the receipt of your Excellency's communication, I think it right to state that I am without instructions from Her Majesty's Government as to the nature of the duties that may, possibly, devolve upon me after the departure of Her Majesty's Mission, "duties" that your Excellency described to the British merchants on Thursday last, as "of a more onerous and responsible character" than those I have already had the honour of fulfilling during my residence in this country. While, therefore, it seems that increased labour and responsibility are likely to devolve upon me, I may suddenly be deprived, by the commencement of hostilities between Russia and Great Britain, and the consequent closing of the port of Cronstadt to British merchant-vessels, of nearly two-thirds of my ordinary revenue!

Under these circumstances I have to request that, in conveying to Her Majesty's Government my willingness to remain at my post, and to exert myself to the utmost to afford assistance and protection to our fellow-countrymen in Russia, your Excellency will do me the favour to represent my position to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who, I feel assured, would not desire me to remain in this country in the altered position in which I am placed—a position necessarily entailing upon me increased expense—without assigning me such an augmentation of income as will not only supply the deficiency caused by the cessation of British trade with this port, but also enable me to meet the heavier disbursements that a state of war cannot fail to necessitate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. EASTLAND DE MICHELE.

No. 323.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 174. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1854.*

NO ejected diplomatist ever quitted his former post with the same reluctance as my French colleague.

On the 18th he had a fresh audience of the Emperor, and has now put off his departure till the 22nd instant.

I cannot help connecting this reprieve which General Castelbajac has given himself with the arrival of a fresh overture from Vienna, and the possibility of this offering some chance of a renewal of diplomatic relations.

At her request, the Marquise de Castelbajac was received on the 17th by the Empress, when Her Imperial Majesty presented her with a valuable India shawl.

These demonstrations of Imperial favour at such a moment produce the worst effect, and tend to confirm the popular, though I believe quite unfounded, notion of its being General Castelbajac's intention to establish himself in Russia, and possibly to enter into the Emperor's service.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 324.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 175. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1854.*

COUNT NESSELRODE called upon me on the 18th instant for the purpose of taking leave of me and my family.

A conversation took place in which, although in terms the least displeasing and aggressive, he defended the conduct of the Imperial Cabinet at the expense of that pursued by Her Majesty's Government.

I told Count Nesselrode that, not being prone to argue, it was not at the moment of leaving that I would recommence a discussion which was so little likely to bring our opinions into accordance; but that, as he regarded the case from his "point de vue," I did not hesitate to follow his example. As I view the case, M. le Comte, I said, all the mischief which has arisen has been produced by false calculation and erroneous information. You undertook an affair the serious consequences of which you did not foresee; and whilst from one quarter you were told that the feeling manifested in England was temporary and fictitious, you were assured from another that a *bonâ fide* alliance between England and France was a matter of positive impossibility. There is the whole case in a few words.

Count Nesselrode who, as is now habitual to him, appeared dejected, observed, as he has done several times, that he still cannot bring his mind to "realize" the idea of a war between England and Russia, and, connected with this idea, expressed his regret that Baron Brunnow had not established himself in Brussels instead of Darmstadt.

He took leave of me in the most friendly manner, and left me under the full conviction that his opinions, if they could be made known, agree much more closely with mine than with the official language which he is compelled to employ.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 325.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 176. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1854.*

I SHOULD have unbounded satisfaction in making the following communication to your Lordship, were I not compelled to request earnestly that it may be regarded as strictly confidential.

Not having seen Count Orloff, the Grand Master of Police, since his return from Vienna, I waited on him yesterday, to recommend the English who purpose remaining at St. Petersburgh to his goodwill and protection.

The application was taken in very good part, and a communication respecting the deplorable state of affairs having ensued, Count Orloff observed that he owed me an explanation.

I might, he said, remember that at the commencement of Count Menchikoff's mission he had assured me positively that the demands to be made upon the Turks related solely to the holy places. Before you leave St. Petersburgh, accordingly, Count Orloff said, I am anxious to declare to you upon my honour that I misled you unconsciously. I had been told the mission had one sole object, and having been misled myself, I misled you.

To this somewhat remarkable confession I can add, and upon the most certain authority, another which is still more striking; viz., that a few days ago the Emperor himself stated to Count Orloff that he had been misled as to the rights which were secured to him by the Treaty of Kainardji, and that his conduct would have been different but for the error into which he had been led. The person whose opinion upon this point was overruled and put aside was, as your Lordship will recollect, myself; the persons, if I am correctly informed, by whose representations the Cabinet were misled are the Greeks, Cutaczi and Zographo.

I need not observe to your Lordship that these tardy confessions, which justify to the fullest extent the information which at the time I had the honour of stating to your Lordship, would be of inestimable value to me if they could be brought to public knowledge; but I feel obliged to repeat my request as to their not being divulged, as they would materially affect the position of one of the most honest men among the few with whom I have been brought in contact in Russia. I shall not, I hope, be thought presumptuous if I remark that what I have just related confirms fully not only statements which I have made but opinions which I have expressed to Her Majesty's Government. Nothing certainly was required to reconcile me to departure from St. Petersburgh; had anything of the kind been required, the want has now been supplied.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 326.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 178. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1854.*

WHEN everything depends upon the will of one individual, and that person or personage is under the influence of strong passion and of contending parties and interests, it is difficult to say what decision may be taken; I may however state to your Lordship that yesterday at the Winter Palace there was a disposition to accept the basis of composition which has been sent here from Vienna, and to reserve for a subsequent and distinct negotiation Count Orloff's demand relating to the political refugees.

As regards the manifesto, I know with certainty that it has been prepared, and that it is not improbable that it may appear on the 22nd or 23rd instant; and singular as it may appear, I am certain that the terms of the paper are not known to Count Nesselrode; whether or no they have been communicated to

Count Orloff I am unable to say, but he assured me positively yesterday that he had no knowledge of them.

The state of affairs here is in a word most extraordinary, and such as to prove that a will at once stubborn and vacillating is freeing itself from the restraints to which it has hitherto been submitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 327.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 81.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 33 of the 22nd instant, approving of the language which I had held to Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the proposed Convention to be signed at Vienna; and I have not failed to draw Baron Manteuffel's attention to the principle involved in the great struggle now pending: and in order also that the King should be clearly informed of the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to learn the opinions of the two great German Powers on this subject, I have delivered to his Excellency an extract of your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, which has, I have since heard, been laid before His Majesty, and I trust that your Lordship will approve of my having taken this course.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 328.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 25, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 22 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that I have not failed to seek the opinion of the author of the military memorandum transmitted in my No. 38 of the 14th instant on the subject-matter of the despatch No. 12 addressed to your Lordship by Colonel Du Plat.

The author of that memorandum has furnished me with an explanatory paper of the general topics to which that despatch relates, and which contains further interesting remarks and information as to the operations for defending Constantinople, and the most advisable site for the encampment of an auxiliary force.

I also inclose a précis of some verbal observations by the same person relating to suggestions conveyed in Colonel Du Plat's despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 328.

Memorandum on Russian Military Operations in the ensuing Campaign.

UN corps expéditionnaire de 30,000 à 40,000 hommes de troupes de terre, que l'alliance enverrait au secours de la Turquie, frapperait vivement l'esprit de tous les Rayas en contribuant à les maintenir dans l'obéissance; exalterait le courage des Turcs; découragerait les Russes; agirait fortement sur l'esprit des populations Asiatiques; et ôterait au jeu que l'alliance soutient, en Orient, contre la Russie, à peu près toutes les chances contraires.

Toutefois nous pensons que l'alliance se priverait des meilleurs avantages qu'elle pourrait retirer d'un tel envoi, si elle plaçait le corps en question soit à

Rodosto, soit à Andrinople—ou en d'autres termes au sud du Balcan—en réserve de l'armée Turque opérant au nord de cette chaine de montagnes. Il pourrait, en ce cas, arriver que la fin de la prochaine campagne survînt sans que l'ennemi eût approché du corps expéditionnaire à une distance plus rapprochée que 150 milles Anglais, et sans que ce corps eût exercé aucune influence sensible sur les opérations entre le Danube et le Balcan. Car nous nous tenons assuré qu'à moins qu'Omar Pacha ne s'embarque imprudemment dans une bataille générale et rangée, en rase campagne, contre les Russes; il y a sur dix chances certainement neuf, que ces derniers, dans la prochaine campagne, n'atteigneront pas seulement la cime du Balcan, bien que ces derniers employassent sur le Danube les 3me, 4me et 5me corps d'armées (une division de ce dernier corps se trouve actuellement dans la trans-Caucasie et n'en sera guère retirée.)

L'alliance jetterait un bien plus grand poids dans la balance de la lutte des Turcs avec les Russes, si elle plaçait le corps expéditionnaire de manière qu'il restât en communication permanente et proche avec la flotte alliée; menaçât continuellement d'un débarquement tous les points du vaste littoral Russe sur la Mer Noire depuis Batoum jusqu'aux bouches du Danube; contribuât à enrayer tout mouvement de l'armée Russe du Danube du moment que cette armée eût franchi ce fleuve; et n'en restât pas moins dans la position de garantir, pour tous les cas, la sûreté du point de Constantinople.

Supposé que l'alliance se prononçât pour le dernier parti indiqué, il y aurait à choisir entre deux emplacements à assigner au corps expéditionnaire; dont l'un serait sur les bords du Bosphore, et l'autre dans le grand camp rétranché qu'offre le système de Varna.

Placé à Varna, le corps expéditionnaire, lui-même à l'abri de toute attaque directe, flanquerait de près tout mouvement des Russes ayant passé le Danube vers la ligne du Balcan, et rendrait même d'abord le siège de Silistrie ou de Roustchouk bien difficile aux Russes; car le maximum de forces avec lesquelles ces derniers, après avoir laissé en arrière les détachements indispensables pour garder la rive gauche du Danube et pour se couvrir du côté de Widdin et de la Petite Valachie, pourraient passer le Danube, ne dépasserait pas 80,000 hommes sous les armes. Or en en défalquant la moitié pour former le corps de siège, protéger le point de passage, et observer les places Turques sur le Danube en amont et en aval de la place à assiéger, l'armée destinée à couvrir le siège contre l'armée Turque à Schumla et contre Varna, ne saurait guère dépasser 40,000 hommes effectifs.

Il est vrai que dans les calculs Russes il figure des nombres beaucoup plus élevés. Mais nous nous tenons persuadé que, si l'on analyse bien les deux grandes invasions en Bulgarie de 1810 et 1828, auxquelles les Russes avaient employé tout ce qu'ils avaient des forces disponibles (et alors, soit remarqué en passant, les Russes étaient les maîtres absolus de la Mer Noire), on s'arrêtera aux chiffres que nous avons donnés, et qui atteignent de plus l'extrême limite du nombre d'hommes concentrés sur le même point que les Russes, exclus de la Mer Noire, pourraient nourrir, pendant quelque tems, entre le Danube et le Balcan.

Or comment 40,000 Russes attaqués à la fois par le corps expéditionnaire établi à Varna, et l'armée Turque campée à Schumla, qui pour commencer leur mouvement combiné d'attaque eussent attendu que le corps Russe de siège fût bien engagé dans son entreprise, sauraient-ils résister et parvenir à couvrir le siège?

Mais supposons même, quelqu'invraisemblable que cela soit, que l'armée Russe couvrant le siège est trop forte pour que le corps expéditionnaire et l'armée Turque principale réunis eussent pouvoir aborder cette armée, croit-on que les Russes continueraient à s'acharner au siège, si le corps expéditionnaire se rendait subitement par mer à Odessa, où la division qui se trouve stationnée dans cette partie de la Bessarabie ne saurait lui opposer une résistance prolongée; et s'il s'emparait, avec cette place, des principaux dépôts de l'armée Russe du Danube, en menaçant en même tems, comme un coup d'œil jetté sur la carte suffira pour le faire sentir, toutes les communications de l'armée Russe sur le Danube avec la Russie?

A Varna le corps expéditionnaire se trouverait simultanément bien à portée de la Crimée, qui est incontestablement la clef de tout l'établissement Russe au-delà de la grande steppe Caucasienne, lequel, avec la porte de cette peninsule, qui le flanque comme un bastion avancé, brûlerait dans ses fondements mêmes.

Les Russes viennent de diriger sur la Crimée une division du 6me corps d'armée. Mais si même ils y tenaient stationnées deux divisions, ils ne sauraient résister avec succès à un débarquement du corps d'expédition qui pourrait au besoin se renforcer passagèrement des troupes Turques formant réserve à Constantinople, et même d'un détachement tiré de l'armée Turque de Schumla, lorsque les opérations des Russes sur le Danube se trouvaient momentanément suspendues. Il serait superflû de remarquer expressément à cette occasion, combien il serait difficile aux Russes de faire passer des secours dans la Crimée ayant une population essentiellement Musulman, si la flotte alliée avait établi un blocus maritime stricte de cette peninsule, à laquelle alors des secours Russes ne sauraient arriver que par l'isthme de Perchop et par la Grande Steppe qui s'étend immédiatement au nord de cet isthme.

Cependant, quelqu'avantageux que serait la position du corps expéditionnaire à Varna, il mériterait un examen sérieux s'il n'était pas préférable de la placer d'abord sur le Bosphore, d'où, lorsque les circonstances l'exigeraient, il pourrait toujours être rendu à Varna en très peu de tems.

Il y a sur le Bosphore une position unique pour y faire camper un corps d'armée; c'est l'emplacement que les Russes occupaient, lors du Traité de Hunkiar-Skelessi, sur le rive Asiatique. Cet emplacement touche à la Baie de Beykos, et presque à Therapia; a une descente facile au Bosphore et une très bonne eau à boire. Il est assez élevé, aucunement fiévreux, mais très sain; point capital, auquel on ne saurait accorder trop d'attention dans ce pays, pour le choix de camps destinés à des troupes occidentales non encore acclimatées. Andrinople serait suspect sous ce rapport, vû les fièvres qui dans les temps y abîmaient l'armée de Diebitch.

A Varna, il est vrai, il y aurait aussi du côté de Galata-Bournou un camp assez sain, ayant bonne eau et ne manquant pas de bois, où campaient en 1828 Omer Vrienes et le Général Russe Ristrom. Nous préférerions cependant à Varna, comme premier établissement d'un corps expéditionnaire, l'emplacement au-dessus de Hunkiar-Skelessi, assez séparé de Constantinople pour éviter le contact immédiat d'une troupe y campée avec la population de la capitale; très propre à entourer la troupe, en cas de peste, d'une ligne de quarantaine; et cependant en communication facile avec la capitale Ottomane et ses resources. Surtout, comme le corps expéditionnaire saurait toujours arriver à Varna assez à temps pour concourir à faire lever le siège des places de Silistrie ou de Roustchouk, dont nous croirions ne pouvoir évaluer la durée de résistance de chacune au-dessous de deux mois de tranchée ouverte.* Vu aussi que le séjour sur le Bosphore marquerait d'abord beaucoup mieux les intentions du corps expéditionnaire, et enhardirait davantage les Russes à passer le Danube. Car quant à nous, si un corps expéditionnaire de 30,000 à 40,000 hommes était venu au secours de la Porte, laquelle serait d'ailleurs en possession de la Mer Noire, nous craindrions, dans l'intérêt de la Porte et de l'alliance, beaucoup plus que les Russes se tinssent à la rive gauche du Danube, que de les voir passer ce fleuve, et surtout se lancer dans une pointe au sud du Balcan, laquelle, dans ces circonstances et les Russes n'étant pas en possession des points de Varna et de Schumla, nous regarderions militairement et politiquement comme une pure folie, et comme tout ce qu'il y aurait de plus désirable, même si au lieu des trois corps d'armée ils en avaient cinq sur le Danube.

Dès que l'opération d'invasion des Russes sur le Bas Danube aurait manqué, et qu'ils eussent été obligés de repasser ce fleuve, le moment serait arrivé d'exécuter l'expédition contre la Crimée, supposé que les nouvelles qu'on aurait de l'état des forces Russes dans cette peninsule étaient propre à encourager une telle entreprise. S'il en était autrement, et que les Russes y eûssent concentré des forces trop considérables, alors nécessairement Odessa devrait être dégarni, et ce serait sur cette ville et sur Nikolajiv que serait frappé le coup.

Une des choses auxquelles il faut savoir se tenir particulièrement en garde en combinant les opérations à opposer aux Russes sur ce théâtre de guerre, ce sont les évaluations de leurs forces qu'ils s'étudient à répandre, et à qu'il ne faut pas ajouter plus de foi qu'on ne doit pas se laisser influencer par les vastes entreprises qu'ils annoncent.

* Silistrie, alors beaucoup moins bien fortifié qu'aujourd'hui, fut investie en 1829 par l'armée principale Russe le 17 Mai, et capitula le 29 Juin. Roustchouk soutint, en 1810, un siège de près de trois mois par le gros de l'armée Russe, après avoir repoussé deux assauts, dont le dernier coûta aux Russes 300 officiers et 8,000 soldats.

Ils ont maintenant, outre l'armée locale du Caucase, quatre corps d'armée sur la ligne depuis Bayasid jusqu'à Orsowa. Sur ce nombre il y aura une division de 5me corps et deux du 6me, ou la valeur d'un corps d'armée, dans la trans-Caucasie.

Une division du 6me corps sera stationnée dans la Crimée, d'où la brigade du 5me corps, qui s'y trouve aujourd'hui stationnée, se rendra à Odessa pour y former, avec une brigade du 3me corps, la valeur d'une division. Les deux et demi divisions restantes du 3me corps, les trois divisions du 4me corps, et les deux restantes du 5me formeront l'armée sur le Danube. Le corps d'armée complet compte quarante-huit bataillons, avec la cavallerie et l'artillerie en proportion. L'armée sur le Danube compterait donc 120 bataillons. La réserve (zapasnie) des 3me, 4me, et 5me corps occupera les Principautés et la Bessarabie sur les derrières de l'armée de l'opération. Cette "zapasnie" est une espèce de milice, et une institution toute neuve et pas encore éprouvée. Il y en a une division (seize bataillons) par corps d'armée, mais ses bataillons sont plus faibles que ceux de l'armée active.

Une forte partie de l'armée Russe du Danube a fait la campagne d'hiver sur ce fleuve; le reste a exécuté de longues marches durant l'hiver. D'après toutes ces données, un militaire saura apprécier assez au juste la force réelle d'invasion que l'armée Russe du Danube pourra déployer au printemps.

Ecrit à la fin de Février, 1854.

Notice.

Un des points essentiels dans la guerre prête à s'ouvrir, démeure de faire prendre les armes contre les Russes à toutes les peuplades Musulmannes habitant le Caucase, et surtout à celles du versant qui tombe vers la Mer Noire (Circassiens proprement dits et Abasses), qui depuis une vingtaine d'années observaient une espèce d'armistice vis-à-vis des Russes. La flotte alliée ne devrait donc pas tarder à une promenade maritime le long de la côte de l'Abassie et de la Circassie, depuis Gagri jusqu'à Magda. Cela suffirait pour faire tomber la douzaine de fortins que les Russes ont établis de long de la côte, afin d'interrompre les communications des Circassiens et Abasses avec la mer. Pour mieux compromettre ces peuplades vis-à-vis des Russes, il faudrait laisser prendre ces fortins par elles, sans que la flotte conclût les capitulations. Anapa seul exigerait un siège, et Gelengir et Soudjouk-Kalé qu'on débarquât quelques bataillons et quelques canons pour les battre. Comme la Circassie et l'Abassie abondent en bétail, et surtout en boeufs, la flotte, aussitôt que les communications seraient assurées, pourrait s'y approvisionner pour sa viande de boucherie.

Notice.

L'Empereur Nicholas est dépourvu de tout esprit de commandant d'armée. Il formait un embarras majeur lors de sa presence, en 1828, à l'armée de Bulgarie. L'Empereur a senti cela lui-même, et c'est pour cela qu'il évite de se rendre à l'armée en Pologne en 1839, et à l'armée de Hongrie. La presse devrait donc l'aiguillonner de toutes manières à se rendre à l'armée, et à ne pas manquer personnellement au milieu des champions pour la foi orthodoxe. Si le Sultan se rendait à Andrinople, la presse pourrait y trouver de nouveaux motifs pour pousser, en fesant des comparaisons, l'Empereur Nicholas, qui, sous ce rapport, a rendu lui-même sa position difficile en prêchant la croisade pour la foi orthodoxe, dont il est le chef sur la terre.

The opinion of the author of this memorandum is, that the passage by the Russian army of the Balkan, and an advance on Constantinople by any route, is totally impracticable under the present circumstances. He considers the route (alluded to in that despatch) of Eshir Schumnia-Asman Bazar as totally

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impracticable for an army. The route, in case of such advance, would probably either be by Turnova or Gabrova.

He does not consider it positively necessary to take Lesser Wallachia, Kalafat and Widdin, or indeed even Routschouk, provided the strength of the army was sufficient to admit of their leaving a sufficient force of observation, and to cover their road.

It must be borne in mind that in the campaign of 1828-1829, none of these places were taken. The route then followed by the Russian army was by the sea to Pravodi and Toos to Varna.

In Northern Bulgaria the population is certainly not favourable to Russia. To the south of the Balkan there may exist a greater sympathy for Russia; but it is clear that the Turks, on retreating through that Province, would thoroughly devastate it of all means of provisioning a Russian army. They could only depend on the subsistence they brought with them. After June, the herbage and vegetation is so burnt up, that even the cattle would not find pasture.

With respect to the idea of placing an Austrian corps at Adrianople, I refer you to the opinions and views expressed thereon in the annexed paper.

He completely participates in the opinion expressed of the impossibility of a Russian army taking Constantinople if the heights were properly fortified, and if a foreign auxiliary corps were stationed there.

He has no doubt that a camp formed at Varna would not only prevent the Russians from attempting to cross the Balkan, but it would render it almost useless for them to cross the Danube and to invest the fortresses of Routschouk, Silistria, &c.; but in this respect he is of opinion that the Russians should not be deterred from crossing the Danube. It is after the passage of that river that their greatest difficulties will commence; that their armies will melt; and that their campaign will be rendered abortive and fruitless.

No. 329.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1854.

I RECEIVED on the 23rd instant your despatch No. 156 of the 14th instant, inclosing copy of a note from Count Nesselrode, stating that diplomatic relations between England and Russia were suspended, and requesting to be informed for what direction, and for what day, passports for yourself and the members of Her Majesty's Mission should be sent to you.

Your mission to the Court of Russia is thus brought to a close; but it is a great satisfaction to me to have received the Queen's commands to convey to you on your quitting Russia Her Majesty's entire approbation of your conduct during your residence at that Court. And I deem it due to you to add, on my own behalf, and on that of Her Majesty's Government generally, that the fidelity with which you have reported your communications with the Russian Government, and the ability, tact, and firmness which you have displayed under the circumstances of extraordinary difficulty in which you have been placed, are fully and cordially acknowledged.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 330.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 257. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 28, 1854.

COUNT BUOL has requested M. Drouyn de Lhuys, by telegraph, to observe the utmost secresy as to the signature of the proposed Quadruple Convention. Count Buol has no objection to giving publicity to the identity of views which unite England, France, and Austria on the Eastern question, but he is unwilling that the signature of a Convention should be made public.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 331.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 258.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 28, 1854.

THE messenger Blackwood delivered to me this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 136, with its several inclosures.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys as soon as possible after the messenger's arrival, and I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that his Excellency will send instructions to Vienna and Berlin in the same sense as those which your Lordship has addressed to the Earl of Westmorland and to Lord Bloomfield on the subject of the summons to evacuate the Principalities about to be made to Russia by the Governments of England and France.

I informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at the same time, of the arrangements made by your Lordship for conveying this summons to St. Petersburgh, and read to him the copy of the letter which you have addressed to Count Nesselrode.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys agrees in all these arrangements, and in the terms of the letter. He will prepare one of a similar purport, and the messenger will continue his journey this evening.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 332.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 1, 1854.

COUNT BUOL'S views and opinions, as reported in your No. 54, afford sincere satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, who hope that the policy of Austria will not be made to depend upon the course that Prussia may adopt.

No. 333.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 1, 1854.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 250, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was anxious that the influence of Her Majesty's Government should be used with the Cabinet of Berlin to induce the Prussian Government to join the allies in opposing Russia, you will have seen, by my

despatch No. 40 to Lord Bloomfield, of which I yesterday transmitted to you a copy in my despatch No, 140, that Her Majesty's Government have in the strongest manner urged Prussia to adopt a firm and decided policy, and to sign the Convention.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 334.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 25, 1854.*

THE official "Oesterreichische Correspondenz" of last night brings intelligence from Athens up to the 16th instant, by which it is stated that the insurrection in Epirus was increasing; large bodies of students had left Athens to join the army in Epirus, the strength of which already amounted to 8,000 men. The garrison of Chalkis had joined the insurgents. The troops on the frontier were being reinforced; and a Turkish note had been presented to the Representatives of the protecting Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 335.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 26, 1854.*

THE reports Count Buol has received from the Turkish provinces bordering on Greece are, that the insurrection is making considerable progress: and he learns that armed bands to the number of 2,000 men have proceeded to join the insurgents from Montenegro. He is most anxious that every measure should be taken to counteract the spread of this movement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 336.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon,—(Received March 2.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 27, 1854.*

I HAD the honour to address to your Lordship last evening the following telegraphic despatch in cypher; but owing to an interruption of the line of telegraphic communication beyond Hanover, the despatch could not be transmitted, and I have, therefore, the honour to transcribe to your Lordship the numbers as follows:

"Prussia is disposed to support a summons to evacuate the Principalities; she wishes to know in what terms it is to be drawn up. She will not consider a refusal on the part of Russia to comply with the summons as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will continue in her expectant position. If Austria takes an active part in hostilities, Prussia may be disposed to do so likewise, but will decline any cooperation on the Danube.

"Baron Manteuffel has just read to me the answer to a telegraphic despatch which he had written to Count Arnim at Vienna, stating that the rumours of the intention of Austria to join the Maritime Powers, to advance an army into Transylvania, and invite Russia to place 150,000 men on the Vistula, are false.

"I am not able to explain the reasons why the Prussian Government are kept in ignorance of the intentions of the Cabinet of Vienna."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 337.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 27, 1854.*

THE Duke of Saxe-Gotha left Berlin this morning for Brussels and Paris. His Royal Highness was three hours with His Majesty yesterday, endeavouring to obtain some assurances with the regard to the conduct of Prussia on the Oriental question. He tried to persuade His Majesty to send some decided message to the Emperor of the French; but His Royal Highness was unable to elicit anything positive, and described to me His Majesty's language as extremely unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 338.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 264.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received a messenger from Berlin last night, bringing advices that the Prussian Government would support the summons sent to Russia by England and France in the same measure as Austria, but that they declined signing it.

Although the Prussian Government still hesitated at signing the quadruple Convention, it was confidently hoped that their scruples would be overcome.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 339.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 266.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1854.*

THE advices from Greece brought by the last Levant boat, and delivered yesterday in Paris, are far from satisfactory.

The Queen of Greece appears openly to countenance the assistance given by Greece to the insurgents in Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 340.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon,—(Received March 3.)

(No. 267.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1854.*

M. DE HUBNER has communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys four despatches which he has received from his Government. Of these, one relates to the signature of the proposed Quadruple Convention; another, to the support which the Austrian Government is disposed to give to the summons sent by England and France to Russia; a third, to the policy which Austria proposes to pursue with respect to Servia; and the fourth, to the guarantee or assurances which Austria wishes to have from France in respect to Lombardy and the State of Venice.

Count Colloredo will no doubt have received despatches identic with the three first, and I need not take up your Lordship's valuable time by entering into their details.

I am not in possession of the exact terms of the fourth, M. Drouyn de Lhuys having alluded to it very shortly, saying that he was to discuss the subject at an early day with the Austrian Minister.

None of these despatches have given satisfaction here, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have shown his dissatisfaction by his language to M. de Hübner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 341.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 270.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the speech* which the Emperor addressed this day to the members of the Senate and of the Legislative Body, convoked for that purpose in the Salle des Maréchaux at the Tuileries.

Your Lordship will see that the Emperor alludes only to two topics—the scarcity of provisions, and the Oriental question, though he treats them both at considerable length, with the intention, no doubt, of making the French people understand that every precaution has been taken by the Government to alleviate the hardships entailed by a scanty harvest, and that in regard to the second and more serious point, every effort has been made to preserve peace

I call your Lordship's attention with pleasure to that part of His Majesty's speech which reprobates in the most emphatic terms wars undertaken for conquest, as also that which proclaims that France has as great or even greater interest than England in curbing the ambitious designs of Russia. I am the more gratified at the latter declaration, because a not unsuccessful attempt has been made by the Emperor's enemies to make the French nation believe that they were dragged into an Eastern war for the furtherance of English interests, and that I have for weeks and weeks been calling in vain upon those Ministers who occupy themselves with the press to show in the pages of the "Moniteur" what a monstrous absurdity it was attempted to palm upon common sense.

I have only to add that the Emperor's reception by the Senators and members of the Legislative Body was excellent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 342.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 145.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve of the suggestion which you state, in your despatch No. 251, that you made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the propriety of obtaining distinct explanations from Austria in regard to the cooperation to be expected from the Cabinet of Vienna when war shall actually commence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Not printed.

No. 343.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 147.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning from your despatch No. 258 that the French Government had concurred in the course proposed by Her Majesty's Government for summoning Russia to evacuate the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 344.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 154.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with sincere satisfaction the speech made by the Emperor of the French to the Senate and Legislative Body, and published in the "Moniteur," of which your Excellency has forwarded to me a copy in your despatch No. 270; and they anticipate from its tenour the most useful results in support of the policy in which England and France are engaged.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 345.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 156.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.*

I INCLOSE to your Excellency copies of despatches from Mr. Wyse,* containing an account of proceedings in Greece with reference to insurrections against Turkey. You will communicate these papers to M. Drouyn de Lhuys as one of many proofs that the excitement now prevailing in Greece is encouraged by the Court and Government, and you will suggest to his Excellency that the French and English Ministers at the Court of Athens should be directed to inform the Greek Government that their conduct of late does not permit of their being considered as neutral towards the Porte, nor consequently as friendly towards England and France; and that if any movement takes place in Greece, either for the purpose of promoting insurrection among the Christian subjects of the Porte, or with the avowed or well-ascertained object of aiding Russia in her contest with Turkey, a rigorous blockade of Athens will forthwith be established.

Your Excellency will perceive by the inclosed copy of a deposition made by the masters of two British vessels before Her Majesty's Consul at Prevesa that the fact of Greek troops passing the frontier is clearly established.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Not printed.

No. 346.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 44.)

Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 80 of the 25th ultimo, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the communications which have recently passed between the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburgh, I have to inform your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 347.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 45.)

Foreign Office, March 3, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 81 of the 25th ultimo, reporting that you had given Baron Manteuffel an extract from my despatch No. 33, on the subject of the proposed Convention to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your having done so.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 348.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 93. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 1, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has related to me confidentially the substance of a conversation which he had just had with the King on the attitude which the Emperor might adopt towards Prussia if war was shortly declared. His Majesty appears to have expressed his conviction that the character of the Emperor was that of vindictive nature that it was not impossible but that his attention might be immediately directed against this country; that there was still a large disposable force near St. Petersburgh and in Poland, consisting of upwards of 200,000 men which might be employed in this way; and further, that it might be found perhaps more convenient for Russia to fight her battles on the Eastern question in Germany than on the Danube, where the troops would die of fever and starvation if not able to advance with rapidity.

These impressions of the King, Baron Manteuffel said, might work well for the great cause in which we had embarked; for if His Majesty conceived that there was a possibility of Germany being exposed to immediate danger, he would be less inclined to keep out of the alliance about to be concluded between Austria, England, and France, and more disposed to take an active share in military operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 349.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 94.)

Berlin, March 1, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Minister communicated yesterday to Baron Manteuffel the draft of a Convention which his Government is ready to sign with England, France, and Prussia, by which the Four Powers shall bind themselves to unite their efforts for the pacification of the East.

His Excellency told me that he had not this paper at hand at this moment, or he would show it to me, but that he believed the modifications prepared by Austria were known to your Lordship, and he was happy to be able to assure me that he had reason to hope that the King would shortly be brought to agree to the Convention, if not entirely, at all events to the essential points contained in it.

I asked Baron Manteuffel whether he had not received from the Austrian Minister some communication of the ulterior intentions of the Cabinet of Vienna in the event of Russia attempting to cross the Danube, and also whether nothing had been said to him by Count Thun as to the summons to evacuate the Principalities, which France and England proposed to address to the Russian Government, and in which Austria had expressed a willingness to join? His Excellency said that Count Thun had not said one word on the subject, and that Count Arnim had not written to him at all.

It is right that I should inform your Lordship that the French Minister has received from his Government reports of M. de Bourqueney's late conversation with Count Buol, and he has also received direct from Baron de Bourqueney a copy of the Convention which Austria is ready to sign.

Not being, however, in possession of any instructions from Paris, he has not communicated further with Baron Manteuffel, and has been prompted to this course in order not to press the matter without me; but we have only delayed our co-operation in this matter until we are made acquainted with the wishes of our respective Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 350.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 2, 1854.

My Lord,

WHEN I saw Baron Manteuffel to-day, I thought it advisable to read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 40 of the 28th ultimo, containing your observations on my despatch No. 74, in which I reported the impressions I had received from his Excellency's language to me, in communicating to him the notes which have been exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, in consequence of the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the proposals of the Vienna Conference.

Baron Manteuffel admitted to the fullest extent the advantage of restricting the theatre of war to the narrowest limits, and expressed also his desire that the policy of England and Prussia should be the same; but he still persisted that the circumstances of the two countries were different, though both had an equal interest in the question at issue, when considered as an European one.

I laid much stress on that part of your Lordship's despatch in which you state that a firm and decided policy, prompt and vigorous action may prevent war from becoming general, and may bring it to a speedy termination; whilst weakness and vacillation cannot but tend to the pecuniary exhaustion and protracted contest that the Prussian Government apprehend; and it appeared to me that these words produced a good effect. His Excellency said, that personally he agreed with the truth of your Lordship's remarks; but that he

had been unable, up to the present time, to bring the King round to the views which he himself entertained, and was therefore obliged to hold language to me which he wished could have been differently interpreted, adding, that he hoped a more favourable state of things would take place, and that we should shortly have less reason to find fault with the conduct of the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 351.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 99.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith in translation, copy of a manifesto issued by the Emperor of Russia, bearing date February 9, old style.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 351.

Manifesto.

(Translation.)

By the grace of God, we, Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat, &c., make known publicly.

WE have already informed our beloved and faithful subjects of the cause of our misunderstanding with the Ottoman Porte.

Since then, notwithstanding the commencement of hostilities, it has not ceased to be our sincere desire, as it is also still our desire, to put a stop to the shedding of blood. We indulged the hope that time and reflection would convince the Turkish Government of its delusion, engendered by crafty instigations, in which our just demands founded on Treaties were represented as an attempt against her independence, concealing projects of aggrandizement. But our expectations have hitherto been in vain. The English and French Governments have taken up the cause of Turkey, and the appearance of the combined fleets at Constantinople served as a further encouragement to the stubbornness of the Porte. Finally, both the Western Powers, without any previous declaration of war, have taken their fleets into the Black Sea, declaring their intention to protect the Turks, and to forbid our ships of war a free navigation for the defence of our coasts.

After such an unheard-of proceeding on the part of civilized Governments, we have recalled our Embassies from England and France, and suspended all political relations with these Powers.

And thus England and France have ranged themselves by the side of the enemies of Christianity against Russia fighting for the orthodox faith.

But Russia will not alter its divine mission, and if enemies fall upon its frontier, we are ready to meet them with the firmness which our ancestors have bequeathed us. Are we not now the same Russian nation of whose deeds of valour the memorable events of the year 1812 bear witness? May the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds! And in this trust, taking up arms for our persecuted brethren professing the Christian faith, we will exclaim with the whole of Russia, with one heart, "O Lord, our Saviour, whom have we to fear? May God arise, and His enemies be dispersed."

Given at St. Petersburgh, on the 9th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1854, and the 29th of our reign.

Signed by the Emperor's own hand,
(L.S.) NICHOLAS.

No. 352.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 100.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1854.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 38 of the 27th ultimo, I have this day delivered to Baron Manteuffel copies of that despatch and of the letter which your Lordship has addressed to Count Nesselrode requiring the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.

I read both these papers to his Excellency, and he seemed to concur entirely in the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to take this step. He said he should communicate them to the King to-morrow, and submit to his Majesty, at the same time, the draft of a despatch to General Rochow, instructing that Minister to support in strong terms the summons which has been addressed to the Russian Government; but he was unable to say, until he received the King's orders, what terms would be given to the communication, and I can, therefore, only add, that he assured me there should be no delay in the matter, and that the despatch would probably reach St. Petersburgh as soon as the English messenger.

I placed Captain Blackwood at his Excellency's disposal according to your Lordship's instructions, but on finding that there would probably be a delay, if he waited for the Prussian despatches, which might be detrimental to Her Majesty's service, I decided on directing the messenger to proceed on his journey this night, and he has just started for Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 353.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 102. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's instructions to urge the Prussian Government to sign the Convention relative to the Eastern question which has already been agreed to by the Governments of England, France, and Austria, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel is unremitting in his endeavours to bring the King to authorize Count Arnim to concur in it, but that he has hitherto failed in his efforts to do so. His Excellency and Count Pourtales were for two hours this day arguing the question with His Majesty, who raised objection after objection to it, and seemed at one moment resolved not to bind himself to any measure which would tie his hands hereafter and fetter his liberty of action.

Baron Manteuffel, whom I saw just after his return from the Palace, told me that the King was quite unreasonable, and that his imagination had been so worked upon by reports which His Majesty had received of the forces which the Emperor of Russia might dispose of to attack the Prussian dominions, and more particularly by intelligence which had reached him that orders had been sent from St. Petersburgh to stop the march of some of the troops from Poland towards the Danube, that any one who did not know the King's character as well as he did would consider it useless to continue discussing the subject further with His Majesty; but his Excellency added that there were, nevertheless, some indications which lead him to hope that he may yet obtain his assent to the greater part of the Convention, though he scarcely expects that he will agree to the whole of it, particularly to the 5th Article. Still he did not despair, and should resume his task to-morrow, in the hope that his next efforts would be more successful, for he himself ardently wished that the Four Powers should act together in this matter. It appears to me quite evident that the Prussian

Government do not wish to be behind Austria, and that they now feel the influence which the bolder and more decided course which she was about to adopt might have in Germany; thus the rivalry of the two States may again turn to our advantage.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 354.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 66.)
Vienna, March 1, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 72, I brought before Count Buol the statements mentioned in Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 44, with respect to the discussions which had taken place at Belgrade on the subject of the frequent visits to that place of M. Mouchine, the person who is named Russian Consul in Servia, but whose appointment has not as yet been legalised, from Semlin.

Count Buol stated that he had already expressed his opinion that the Prince Alexander ought to forbid the visits which were complained of, if he thought it proper to do so, as it clearly was not the duty of the Austrian authorities to put a restraint upon the movements of a Russian subject if his papers were in order; but since he found there was hesitation on the part of the Servian Government to take any measure upon this subject, he had instructed the Austrian authorities at Semlin to make a representation to M. Mouchine, seeking to induce him to desist from giving the umbrage complained of by the Turkish and Servian Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 355.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 67.)
Vienna, March 1, 1854.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of the directions contained in your Lordship's despatch addressed to me No. 75, I read that despatch to Count Buol, and left with him a copy of it.

Count Buol expressed his entire concurrence with your Lordship in the feelings you express as to the nature of the counter-propositions transmitted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and the regret you felt that the Emperor of Russia by that proceeding should have thrown away an opportunity of effecting a just and honourable peace upon terms which would have secured to him all that he had a right to demand and all that he has professed to require.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 356.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 69.)
Vienna, March 1, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have read to Count Buol your despatch No. 71, together with the inclosures contained in it, being the copies of the correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of France, defining their future action, as well as the objects which they have in view.

I called the attention of Count Buol to your Lordship's opinion that the time is now arrived for the Four Powers to consider in what manner they can give effect to their recorded declaration not to permit any alteration in the territorial limits of the Turkish Empire, and to the inquiry as to whether and to what extent the Cabinet at Vienna can adopt the views and aid in carrying out the objects of the British and French Governments. I did not fail to remind Count Buol of all the reasons recapitulated by your Lordship, which impose upon Her Majesty's Government the duty of asking for a clear declaration of the intentions of Austria with the view of enforcing the engagement of the 5th December to which Austria was a party.

I have already stated to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of the 25th instant (of which I inclose a copy), that Count Buol considered his readiness to sign the amended Convention (which has been transmitted for your approval), as well as to support your proposed requisition to the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, as sufficient evidence of the policy which the Austrian Government has determined to pursue; a policy, the basis of which has long since been announced to your Lordship, which has been rendered more stringent by the Protocols which have lately been signed by the Four Powers, and which, by the proposed Convention above alluded to, is clearly defined.

Count Buol expressed his hopes that this assurance on his part would, for the present, be looked upon as fulfilling your Lordship's immediate objects in the inquiry you had made; and before making any further declaration which might be rendered necessary, he should wait till he had received the answers from your Lordship and the Government of France as to the last proposals with respect to the Convention which have been transmitted to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 357.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 70.)
Vienna, March 1, 1853.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's instructions to Mr. Wyse upon the attitude of the Greek Government under the circumstances attendant upon the insurrection which has taken place in the provinces of Turkey, adjoining the frontier of the Kingdom of Greece. Count Buol expressed his satisfaction at the policy thus declared by Her Majesty's Government, and informed me that he had made similar representations at Athens, through the Austrian Minister.

I also informed Count Buol of the nature of the instructions which had been transmitted to Captain Peel with regard to the supposed movements of the insurgents at Prevesa, which Count Buol entirely approved.

As I have already reported to your Lordship, Count Buol felt great annoyance at the movement which has taken place in Montenegro; he stated he had used, and should continue to use, his best endeavours to discourage this movement, which he feared had received some encouragement from Russian agents, more particularly from Colonel Kowalowsky, who had lately repaired to that country.

Count Buol has directed a representation to be made upon this subject at St. Petersburgh, as he has with regard to the conduct of the Russian Commanders in Moldavia and Wallachia, who are openly forming a legion composed of the subjects of the Sultan, and now amounting to nearly 3,000 men, for the purposes of the war carried on against the Turkish Empire, and which Count Buol characterises as a most revolutionary measure, and which he has instructed Count Esterhazy to represent in that light to Count Nesselrode.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 358.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

Vienna, March 4, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

"BLACKWOOD arrived here only this morning. At the same time Baron Meyendorff received a Russian courier bearing the answer of the Russian Government to the proposals taken by Count Orloff from [here?] Count Buol assembled the Conference. He said the Russian answer now arrived consisted of preliminaries to be sent to Constantinople. They accepted the evacuation of the Principalities after the acceptance of these preliminaries, but they differ from those set forth in the Protocol of the 13th of January. He begged that the preliminaries might be examined in Conference. In the meantime he entreated that the messenger might be delayed. He cannot write in support of the summons without having examined these new proposals with the Conference, and he is most anxious to learn your Lordship's opinions and those of the French Cabinet under the present circumstances. Count Buol will write his despatch in support of the summons and be ready to send it in case you should decide that the messenger is to proceed at once, but he wishes to have your sanction in the question. To escape the reproach of acting with precipitation, the French Ambassador and I consented to delay the messenger till Monday; we consider it of such extreme importance to remain in perfect union with Count Buol, who evinces extreme anxiety for your Lordship's opinion at this crisis.

A copy of the preliminaries will be transmitted by the post to-morrow.

No. 359.

Baron Bourqueney to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, March 6.)

Vienne, le 4 *Mars*, 1854, 7 *heures du soir.*

(Télégraphique.)

UN courrier Russe du 26 Février apporte à M. de Meyendorff des préliminaires présentés comme conformes aux dernières idées échangées entre le Comte Buol et le Comte Orloff, au moment où le courrier Anglais, porteur de la sommation, descendait chez Lord Westmorland. Le Comte Buol, à qui Lord Westmorland venait de faire demander la dépêche pour le Comte Esterhazy, a réuni la Conférence, et lui a lu la pièce contenant les dits préliminaires. "Je n'exprime aucune opinion sur ce document," a dit M. de Buol, "mais avant d'expédier la sommation, les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris ne devraient-ils pas être informés de son arrivée par le télégraphe? La rédaction de ma dépêche au Comte Esterhazy me place dans un extrême embarras, car je préjuge seul, en l'écrivant, l'opinion des autres Cours. J'ai pris la parole pour faire ressortir les différens que je discernais, au premier coup d'œil entre, le Protocole du 13 Janvier et les préliminaires Russes. Ces différens m'ont paru décider irrevocablement du rejet." Le Comte Buol n'a fait aucune objection, mais en insistant pour que Lord Westmorland arrêtât son courrier et écrivit ainsi que moi par le télégraphe à sa Cour, il a proposé de nous réunir demain. Nous constaterions les différences déjà signalés dans un protocole précédé d'un examen sérieux. L'ordre télégraphique de passer outre à l'expédition du courrier porteur de la sommation arriverait de Londres et de Paris Lundi matin au plus tard. L'incident des nouvelles propositions Russes aurnient été vidé négativement par un Acte collectif. Le Comte Buol écrirait la dépêche qu'il a promise, et d'un simple délai de trente-six heures nous échapperions tous au reproche de n'avoir pas poussé la longanimité jusqu'au bout. Lord Westmorland écrit par le télégraphe une dépêche semblable à celui-ci, et tous deux nous attendrons impatiemment la réponse. Une dépêche télégraphique ne se prête pas à l'analyse d'une aussi longue pièce que les nouveaux préliminaires Russes. Ce qui m'a frappé, et ce qui est décisif, c'est l'insertion dans le Traité Turco-Russe des assurances que Rechid Pacha offrait de donner aux cinq Puissances par une simple déclaration. Le silence sur les parties à introduire dans la révision du Traité de 1841, &c., bref, excepté l'exigence de l'envoi

du négociateur Turc à Pétersbourg, c'est toujours le même thème. M. de Meyendorff n'est pas autorisé à se mettre en rapport avec la Conférence pour discuter des modifications.

Nous avons eu, ce matin, la vraie mesure de la loyauté du Cabinet Autrichien. La communication Russe était un piège habilement tendu pour nous diviser. La Russie aura échoué.

(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

No. 360.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

Vienna, March , 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Conference has unanimously recognized that they cannot entertain the proposed preliminaries from Petersburgh.

Under the circumstances Count Buol has prepared his letter to Count Esterhazy in support of the summons addressed to the Russian Government, and also the Austrian passports for the messenger. I hope to receive this evening your answer to my telegraphic despatch of yesterday, so that Blackwood may start by the first train to-morrow evening.

No. 361.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

WE approve of the proceedings adopted in accordance with the judicious advice of Count Buol upon the receipt of the Russian proposals.

Those proposals, as far as we know them, do not justify the further delay of the messenger Blackwood; and we desire that he should proceed at once to St. Petersburgh.

We are glad to learn that Count Buol will support our summons to evacuate the Principalities.

No. 362.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

Paris, March 4, 1854.

(No. 280. Confidential.)

My Lord,

THE following has been communicated to me in strict confidence, as the contents of a confidential despatch addressed by M. de Manteuffel to General Rochow on the 24th ultimo. This despatch is a reply to the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to M. de Budberg, of which Lord Bloomfield states in his No. 80 that M. de Manteuffel had refused to receive a copy. The latter, however, in the despatch to which I am calling your Lordship's attention, only says that he did not ask for a copy of it.

M. de Manteuffel observes to General Rochow, that he was astonished to find it asserted in Count Nesselrode's despatch that the King of Prussia had declared to M. de Budberg that he would, under no circumstances, engage in hostilities against Russia. He (M. de Manteuffel) had been present during the whole conversation to which M. de Budberg adverted, and he could not charge his memory with any expressions of the King which could bear the interpretation put upon them by M. de Budberg. All that His Royal Majesty had asserted was free liberty of action. In fact, His Majesty had refused to enter into any engagements of any kind.

M. de Manteuffel then proceeds to state, that he must protest against a violation of confidence of which M. de Nesselrode had been guilty. In this same despatch to M. de Budberg, Count Nesselrode had alluded to and taken note

of some passage of a letter addressed by the King of Prussia to his imperial brother-in-law. M. de Manteuffel remarks upon this indecorous proceeding, and expresses his confident hope that it may never occur again.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 363.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 281.)
Paris, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received the day before yesterday a telegraphic despatch from Berlin, stating that the great hesitation felt by the King of Prussia to sign the proposed Quadruple Convention arose from an apprehension that if he took so positive a step the Emperor of Russia would attack him at once, and that Prussia was not prepared for that attack. M. de Manteuffel did not share this apprehension, but hinted that if an English and French expeditionary corps were to be disembarked in the Baltic it might decide the King to take more energetic proceedings.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered M. de Moustier yesterday by telegraph that he could not understand these hesitations, and that he thought it would be more prudent in the Prussian Government to place a corps d'armée voluntarily on the Vistula now than to be forced hereafter to place one on the Rhine.

Your Lordship will understand the hint intended to be conveyed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 364.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 110.)
Berlin, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

AT the moment of the departure of the messenger I received a private letter from Mr. Lumley, who left St. Petersburgh forty-one hours after Sir Hamilton Seymour, and who arrived here to-day, which I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship in original.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 364.

Mr. Lumley to Lord Bloomfield.

Berlin, March 4, 1854

My dear Lord Bloomfield,

THE fact of my having quitted St. Petersburgh forty hours after the departure of Sir H. Seymour will, I hope, prove sufficient excuse for addressing these lines to you, though my news will, I fear, be of very little interest from the length of my journey, consequent on the dreadful state of the Riga road.

On the 22nd ultimo I called, by appointment, on Count Nesselrode, who received me with great kindness and cordiality, and expressed his sincere regret at the circumstances attending the departure of Her Majesty's Mission.

He had hoped, his Excellency said, that the last propositions made by the Russian Mission in London would have been received in a very different manner.

I asked Count Nesselrode if he referred to Baron Brunnow's last communication on the subject of the orders sent to the Admirals in the Black Sea. He replied in the affirmative, and said, that if Her Majesty's Government had

taken that opportunity to declare their intention of preventing a collision between the Russian and Ottoman naval forces, and, while allowing Turkish ships to proceed from one port to another had secured the same liberty to Russian vessels, such a declaration, Count Nesselrode stated, would have left the two Governments in a very different position, the Ministers would have remained at their respective posts, and perhaps some means might have been found to employ the time thus gained in behalf of peace.

I ventured to observe to Count Nesselrode that Baron Brunnow's communication had not been considered so much in the light of a proposal for a naval armistice as in that of a demand for an explanation of the verbal communication which had been made to him by Sir H. Seymour, and that Lord Clarendon's note to Baron Brunnow was a reply to that demand, and not to any proposition of the nature to which he alluded.

I then asked Count Nesselrode if he really saw no other means of maintaining peace. None, his Excellency replied, unless Her Majesty's Government show themselves more conciliatory than they have lately proved. But, I said, M. le Comte, I hear that proposals have been received from Vienna, since Count Orloff's return; and they are reported to be of such a nature as to raise the expectation of a pacific solution of this question. It is true, Count Nesselrode replied, that we have received a communication from Vienna, but its terms are extremely vague—it is, in fact, a proposal that we should state the preliminaries upon which we will treat for peace. And what can these be but those which Count Orloff has already proposed—terms which are based on the Vienna note and the declaration of Olmutz? by which we ask for nothing new, for nothing but that to which we are entitled, and the justice of which has been universally acknowledged. But surely, I replied, M. le Comte, the article relating to the refugees is a new feature, and one that raises a question which has already caused great embarrassment, and which it was hoped had been set at rest. Well, Count Nesselrode replied, I can only say that if our propositions had been entertained, that article would not have stood in the way of an arrangement; its acceptance would not have been made a *sine qua non*.

In reply to my question as to whether any answer had been sent to the last proposals from Vienna, Count Nesselrode answered that one was being prepared, and would probably be ready in two or three days.

On the 23rd I paid a visit to General Rochow. The Chancellor, he said, he had just left him to read over the "projet de preliminaires" (drawn up by M. Labensky) before submitting it to the Emperor. This draft was based on the proposals made through Count Orloff at Vienna, and the Vienna protocol of January 13: the objectionable Article V of the Russian propositions had been omitted, and it would leave St. Petersburgh on the 25th ultimo. General Rochow allowed that the reference backwards and forwards to Constantinople and St. Petersburgh would be frequent and demand a considerable time, and I could not but infer from his manner that this very delay was the principal object in view. The General said further, that Count Nesselrode had expressed great satisfaction at the presence of Marshal Paskiewitch at St. Petersburgh, and had stated that his endeavours to maintain peace had received great support from the very decided opinion the Marshal had given against the passage of the Danube by the Russian army.

On the 24th ultimo, half-an-hour before leaving St. Petersburgh, I saw the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires, from whom I learnt that Count Nesselrode had sent for Baron Plessen, and had told him that he had reason to believe that the English Government intended to recruit for Baltic pilots in Danish harbours, and that if such a proceeding were tolerated by the Danish Government he should consider it as an act of direct hostility against Russia.

Count Piper also informed me that a communication, of the nature of which he was not aware, had also been made two days before to the Swedish Government; he suspects, however, that it relates to coal, as M. de Maltzoff, one of the rédacteurs of the Foreign Office, had spoken on the subject, the night before, in a manner which led him to suppose that a declaration would shortly published, or that a communication would shortly be made to the Swedish and Danish Governments to the effect that coal will be considered by the Russian Government as "contrebande de guerre."

During the journey through the Baltic provinces, it was impossible not to be struck with the almost total absence of military.

The only soldiers at Dorpat, as I learnt from certain information, were a few invalids, and at Riga some of the principal ports of the town, such as the water-gates, were guarded by single men, probably belonging to the navy, but who were without uniforms or muskets, and whose only resemblance to a soldier was a long grey coat and a sword.

It may be as well to remark that, from the high ground near Waivara (one station from Narva), the Gulf along the Esthonian coast, as far as could be seen in the direction of Reval, was free from ice to the distance of at least half-a-mile from the shore (from thence to the opposite coast it appeared to be frozen), and, as I was informed, there was little probability of its being frozen again this season.

I regret very much that I did not know, till at the moment of leaving Dorpat, that Professor Schwarz, who has just returned from the River Amoor, was residing in the town; that gentleman has been engaged for the last three years in a survey of the Amoor, but on no account will the Russian Government permit any of his observations to be published.

Several scientific men from Dorpat are at present employed with the squadron of the Sea of Japan, now at Sagalien, and I heard great alarm expressed as to the probable fate of the vessels engaged in that expedition in the event of war breaking out between Great Britain and Russia.

Pray excuse the unavoidable insufficiency of this report, the greater portion of which is I fear so stale as to be totally devoid of interest; and believe me, &c.,

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 365.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 290.)

Paris, March 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 156, together with its several inclosures, suggesting the line of policy to be observed by the Government of Great Britain and France towards Greece, in consequence of the encouragement given by the Court and Government to the excitement now prevailing in Greece against Turkey.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys agrees in your Lordship's suggestions, and instructions will be sent in unison with them to M. Forth Rouen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 366.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 103.)

Berlin, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

AS it may not be without interest to your Lordship to learn the latest reports received here, by means of the public press, from the theatre of war on the Danube, I have the honour to inclose herewith a translated précis of the military movements which have been reported in the "Vossische Zeitung" up to the 4th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 366.

Précis of Intelligence from the "Vossische Zeitung," dated Vienna, Bucharest, Galatz, and the Lower Danube.

THE Russians are preparing two pontoon bridges at Dzurdzmoo. Heavy artillery has arrived at Giurgevo, and an unremitting fire has been opened on Rustchuk. The Turkish reinforcements from Shumla have arrived at Matchin,

Rustchuk, and Silistria, and an attack on their part is expected. The Russian batteries at Giurgevo, erected by the order of General Schilder, have, on the 12th of February, so much damaged the Turkish vessels assembled in Rustchuk for the purpose of effecting a passage, as to render them unfit for service.

Eighteen Russian batteries have been constructed between Galatz and Ibraila; and 100 waggons with pontoons are assembled at the former place.

The Turks pass over the Danube nearly every day, and sanguinary conflicts are continually taking place. It would appear that the effects of the insurrection of the Greeks, which is spreading, are beginning to be felt by the Turkish army. According to some reports, the Albanians and Arnouts demanded to be dismissed, or to be sent home; and Omar Pasha has been obliged to weaken himself by dispatching some of his regular forces against the Greeks. Others again say that the army of the Danube is taking no notice of the insurrectionary movements.

General Schilders has left Giurgevo for Oltenitza, which has been occupied by the Turks from Turtukai.

The Turks have, on the 11th of February, attacked the Russian batteries at Braila, but could not maintain a footing on the Wallachian side of the river.

In Little Wallachia the Russians are at least 50,000 strong. They have completely surrounded Kalafat, and their nearest posts are three hours' march from the Turkish fortifications. The Turks having placed a post of 4,000 men before the village of Ciuperceni, the most easterly point of their fortifications, the Russians resolved to drive them back within the entrenchments. On the night of the 16th and 17th, two Russian columns, each of from 4,000 to 5,000 men, moved from both sides against Ciuperceni. One of them, missing its way in the dark, met the other column, and mistaking it for the enemy, opened fire upon it, which was immediately returned. The action continued till daybreak before the Russians perceived their error. The loss is said to amount to 300 men killed and wounded.

No. 367.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 104.)

Berlin, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a memorandum which has been placed in my hands by Sir Hamilton Seymour, detailing the subject of his interview with the King of Prussia.

As your Lordship will be verbally informed in a few days by Sir Hamilton Seymour of the matter to which His Majesty's conversation referred, it is not necessary that I should accompany this statement with any remark further than to observe that, in as far as I am informed, he has represented a most faithful picture of the present spirit of His Majesty's political feelings.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 367.

Memorandum of a Conversation with the King of Prussia on the 3rd of March, 1854.

I SHOULD find it extremely difficult to give even an outline of a conversation which lasted an hour and twenty minutes, during which time the King spoke nearly the whole time, and upon a great variety of subjects.

His Majesty appeared to me in great alarm as to the present aspect of affairs. He seems possessed with the notion of the storm which is getting up being likely to break upon Prussia, and is equally afraid of his Imperial brother-in-law and of the Emperor of the French.

He is resolved, firmly resolved, to keep to his position of neutrality, but conceives that even this resolution may incur the displeasure of the Emperor Nicholas, and lead to the attack of the east provinces of Prussia. Already His Majesty said there were 250,000 Russian troops in Poland, and their number might be easily doubled. An attack on the part of Russia would of course oblige him to take up arms, and he could do so effectually; in six weeks he could have 470,000 men in the field, not in the Russian style on paper, but 470,000 men well armed, and prepared to fight to the death.

The King's great fear, however, is that inspired by the plans which he imputes to the Emperor Napoleon. That man, he said, is bent upon changing the map of Europe, and will make a sudden turn in his policy. As an ass cannot become a mule, or a mule cannot be changed into a horse, neither can the Emperor Napoleon change his nature, or modify the plans which he formed years ago. For that reason, independently of my horror of shedding blood, and of engaging in a cause which is so indifferent to me as that of Turkey, I must keep aloof, if possible, and husband the thalers and the lives of my Prussians; all my sympathies are with the Queen and with England; but I cannot draw my sword now, or sign a summons which would be equivalent to a declaration of war. You may call me a quaker if you please, but it will not alter my determination; and the time may come when you will be glad to see me coming to your assistance with 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 men, as assuredly I would do in case of need. With respect to the importunities of France, they affect me still less. I have the greatest sympathy for England. I have none for France and the Emperor Napoleon, and I tell you so frankly.

I observed before, that the King is full of anxiety and apprehensions; these fears are of all kinds. He is convinced that the Emperor Nicholas is particularly excited (monté) against Prussia and against himself; that the fate of Turkey is already decided, and that the expeditionary forces in the Baltic and the Black Sea are about to be exposed to the greatest danger. The predominating fear, and one which I in vain endeavoured to combat, is that of a Russian attack. The Russians, the King is convinced (and I am sure without reason), will leave the Danube to carry war across the Vistula.

I used every attempt to prove to His Majesty that fortune favoured him, and that he had now an opportunity, such as he never could have expected, for taking precautions against an avalanche which at any moment may come down upon his home and country; that sooner or later the wings of the Northern Eagle must be clipped, and that the occasion was most favourable; that Russia was evidently entering the aggressive phasis; that 20 first-class ships-à-hélice at Cronstadt, not to speak of a like number at Sevastopol, could only indicate an intention of being able to despatch armies at a few days' notice to any point; to Pomerania for example; and that if Europe allowed these preparations to be matured by a country of enormous military power, and without colonies or trade, no neighbour of Russia would henceforward be able to pass a day in tranquillity.

To all this the King only replied by protestations of his love of peace, and of affection for his Imperial brother-in-law; not, however, he said, but that the Emperor behaves extremely ill to me; the expressions about me are such, that my servants have been obliged to tell him that they cannot stay in the room if he persists in using such language. "Néanmoins je pleure, je sanglotte, quand je pense à lui et aux embarras qu'il s'est créé.

Her Majesty's Government, the King said, had no confidence in him, he was aware of that; but though he regretted it, he would prove that he deserved confidence; what he promised he would fulfil; and he would repeat that, as all his sympathies were with England, so might his assistance be counted upon by her in case of need.

The King spoke of some of his plans. He proposed sending an officer to Russia to suggest to the Emperor to come forward with the proposal of evacuating the Principalities on the 15th of April, of declaring himself ready then to assemble a Congress at which his disputes with Turkey might be settled. "What," he would ask, "did I think of this scheme?" I replied, that I was certain the Emperor would not listen to it, and even if he did, I doubted very much whether it would be entertained by the other Powers. His Majesty had the further intention of dispatching some trusty person in a few days to London,

whom he did not yet know, for the purpose of making known and explaining his resolutions to Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to the Conference at Vienna, His Majesty did not know how to act. He was willing that his Minister should continue to attend the Conference if desired, and it was perhaps better that he should do so; but His Majesty could not associate himself to the Acts now in preparation, and if it was judged expedient, Count Arnim could withdraw from the meeting.

After a very long and didactic conversation, of which it is only in my power to note the principal points, the King dismissed me in the most gracious and obliging manner, repeating at the last moment that it would be to no purpose to attempt to make him depart from the system which he had laid down for himself; but that quietly, and in such a manner as would not excite the jealousy of Russia, he should endeavour to prepare for coming events, and that, come what might, Her Majesty's Government might be certain that he would not be found fighting on the side of Russia.

I will only add that the King is perfectly aware of the nature of the original demands of Russia upon the Porte. "Tout cela," he said more than once, "n'était que mensonge et intrigue," an opinion which I confirmed by the recital of various conversations which I had held with Count Nesselrode and with the Emperor himself.

Nothing which escaped the King gave me (I am sorry to observe) the idea of His Majesty's being desirous of extending his dominions at the expense of Russia.

Berlin, March 3, 1854.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

An expression used by the King in speaking of himself is worth recording from its being characteristic. "N'oubliez pas," His Majesty said, "que ma position est très difficile; il faut me traiter comme un œuf pellé."

G. H. S.

No. 368.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 4, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just informed me that he had not failed to submit to the King the copies of your Lordship's despatch No. 38, and of the letter therein inclosed which you have addressed to Count Nesselrode, requiring the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, and that His Majesty immediately ordered him to address an instruction to General Rochow in the sense desired by Her Majesty's Government.

This instruction, he said, was sent to St. Petersburgh last night by the post, and was drawn up in very pressing language. It urged the Russian Government to consider the dangers to which the peace of the world would be exposed by a refusal, and declared that the responsibility of the war which might be the consequence of that refusal would rest with the Emperor.

Baron Manteuffel added that the King, in approving the draft of the despatch which had been laid before him, observed that this communication would only increase the Emperor's ill-will towards him, but that he felt it to be his duty to give all the support in his power to any measure which might still hold out a hope, ever so slight, of the maintenance of peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 369.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 7.*)

(No. 107.)

Berlin, March 4, 1854.

My Lord.

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC, the late French Envoy at the Court of St. Petersburgh, arrived here yesterday, and left this morning for Paris.

I had some conversation with him on the present state of affairs. He seemed to be deeply imbued with the magnitude of the struggle in which the Western Powers were shortly to be engaged against Russia, and I was somewhat surprised to perceive his impression of the immense resources and of the military power which the Emperor could command in the approaching conflict with England and France.

It is not from any participation in this conviction that I am induced to report these impressions of General Castelbajac. It is rather my wish that due account should be taken beforehand of any bias with which that General may seek to influence the views and opinions of the French Government, or of the military authorities at Paris, on grounds which can only be accounted for by excessive weakness or feelings of personal vanity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 370.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 7.*)

(No. 108. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I REGRET to inform your Lordship that up to the present moment the King refuses to agree to the Convention relative to the Eastern question, which has been submitted to him from England, Austria, and France, and that his objections are founded on the false impression which he has received that the Emperor of Russia is ready to march a large and overwhelming force against him if he adopts the policy of the other Powers, and cordially unites with them.

Baron Manteuffel, who was with the King three hours yesterday, and again this evening, tells me he has literally exhausted every argument in his discussions with His Majesty, and is at present unable to say how the matter will end, but nevertheless he still hopes, with a little more patience, to be able to bring His Majesty round; that he expects to have means of calming his fears on the subject of an attack from Russia, which at one time he thought, as reported in my No. 93 of the 1st instant, might fortify the King in a desire to join the three Powers, but which unfortunately produced a contrary effect.

His Excellency complained bitterly of the intrigues at Court, to which he attributed much of the present difficulty; and I may add, in order to show your Lordship the painful position of the President of the Council, that he and the Minister of War had yesterday resolved to place their resignations in the King's hands if His Majesty did not consent to the Convention, but their intention has been changed in consequence of His Majesty having entered on a discussion of the details of the Convention, which they consider a favourable circumstance, and one which will open the way for its final adoption, with some reservations.

Count Thun called to-day on Baron Manteuffel, and requested him urgently to press the King to agree to the Convention, stating that the Austrian Government are anxiously waiting for His Majesty's decision.

His Excellency in telling me this, said that he had written to Vienna to explain the delay, and that though the King hesitated, his opinions coincided entirely with those of the four Powers.

I told Baron Manteuffel that it was grievous to see so much vacillation at a moment of such importance to Europe, and that the consequence of it would

perhaps be that the Convention might be signed without Prussia, a contingency which I could not help thinking must place the King in a great dilemma. Time, I added, pressed, and it was necessary for us to come to a clear understanding before the commencement of the operations which would begin shortly after the combined fleets reached the Baltic, an event that would take place before many days passed over.

I have, &c.

(SIgned) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 371.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 7.*)

(No. 109.)

Berlin, March 4, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Moustier read to me this morning a despatch which he had just received from his Government, written in an angry tone at the delays of Prussia in agreeing to the Convention, and directing him to hint to Baron Manteuffel, if he thought it advisable, that longer hesitation would produce an alteration in the present good feeling of the French Government towards this country, and shake their confidence in the intentions of its Government, and that he might ask them if it would be more agreeable to them to have a French army on the Rhine than for them to place a Prussian one on the Vistula.

The question of Servia, and the necessity of effecting a change in the Government of that country, are also introduced in this despatch for the consideration of the Prussian Government.

The Marquis de Moustier asked my advice as to how he should act on this instruction, and we agreed that it would be better to delay making the contents of this despatch known at the present moment. I spoke to him in this sense under the conviction that a communication of the kind from France, in the present temper of the King, was more likely to do harm than good, and would certainly be made a handle of by the Court party, and thwart our chances of getting the King to sign the Convention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 372.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 8.*)

(No. 293. Confidential.)

Paris, March 7, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that Count Hatzfeldt has been desired to enter into explanations with him respecting the determination of Prussia to maintain a complete neutrality in the Eastern question, the Prussian Government founding its obligation so to do on the comparatively little interest which Prussia has in that question, while the danger of offending Russia by active interference in it is great.

Still, while holding this language of isolation, M. de Manteuffel appears to be anxious to ascertain what price would be offered for the adhesion of Prussia to the policy of the Western Powers; and he asks, with considerable adroitness, since Prussia could not, from her geographical position, profit by the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, what compensation would be given her nearer home.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to Count Hatzfeldt that the very reason which Prussia had given for non-interference in the East, was that which should most engage her to interfere; of all the Great Powers, Prussia was the one most interested to prevent the partition of Turkey, precisely because she was the one which could not profit by it.

But Prussia evidently hoped to be indemnified nearer home, and, by holding aloof at present, to keep her strength unimpaired in order to assert her claims hereafter. Now suppose, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Austria, suspicious of your intentions, was to come to England and France and say that with the best intentions she could not cooperate with them unless they gave her some assurances respecting the safety of her German possessions, and that she was to propose to them to guarantee the present territorial distribution of Germany, could England and France refuse such an appeal? Let Prussia consider all this, and she would see that her true interests would lead her to contribute her aid to control the ambition of a neighbour, whose power she already dreaded, but which power would be increased tenfold if she was allowed to succeed in projects the iniquity of which Prussia had, with the other Great Powers of Europe, so unequivocally condemned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 373.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 100 of the 2nd instant, reporting the steps taken by you on the receipt of my despatch No. 38, inviting the Prussian Government to join the summons which has been addressed by the Governments of Great Britain and France to the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 374.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 48.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 105 of the 4th instant, reporting that on the receipt of my despatch No. 38, inclosing the letter addressed to Count Nesselrode, requiring the evacuation of the Principalities, instructions had been addressed to the Prussian Representative at St. Petersburgh, in the sense desired by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government on learning the tenor of these instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 375.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 49.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government approve your having pointed out in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 108 of the 4th instant, the importance of a distinct understanding between the four Powers before the commencement of operations in the Baltic.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 376.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 109 of the 4th instant, reporting your reasons for advising M. de Moustier to delay communicating to the Prussian Government the contents of the instructions which he had received from his Government, with respect to the hesitation shown by Prussia in agreeing to the Convention, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice given by you to M. de Moustier.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 377.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, reporting the line adopted by himself and his French colleague, on the question of the insurrectionary movement on the part of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and I have to instruct your Lordship to ask Baron Manteuffel to send instructions to the Prussian Minister at Athens to co-operate with Mr. Wyse and M. Rouen in remonstrating against the course adopted now almost without disguise by the Greek Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 378.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 55. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

IT is hardly necessary for me to inform your Lordship that the reports contained in your Lordship's despatches Nos. 97 and 102 of the 2nd instant have been received by Her Majesty's Government with disappointment and regret.

Your Lordship will submit to Baron Manteuffel that the question now at issue, is not simply a difference between Russia and the Porte, in which one Power may be supposed to take greater interest than another, but it is whether the Great Powers shall quietly permit and thereby give their sanction to an unjust interpretation of Treaties being sustained by unlawful aggression, whether a weak State shall be despoiled by its powerful neighbour, and whether territorial limits determined by Treaties shall be violently disturbed. The question has been rendered European by the course that Russia has unfortunately pursued, and your Lordship will again remark to Baron Manteuffel that the united policy and action of the four Powers can alone shorten the duration and limit the extension of the war into which they are about to be forced; but we may reasonably expect, that as a result of that union the ambitious and encroaching policy of Russia will be checked, and that not only peace will be re-established on a solid foundation, but that Germany and the North of Europe will recover the independence and the freedom of action which, in consequence of Russian interference, they do not now possess.

With these views and expectations, and with reference to the firm and dignified attitude assumed by Austria, it certainly did not occur to Her

* Not printed.

Majesty's Government that in inviting Prussia to join in a Convention with Austria, France and Great Britain, which would be kept secret until hostilities between the two latter Powers and Russia had commenced, that they proposed anything at variance with the dignity or the interests of Prussia, or that compliance with the proposal would unduly expose her to danger.

Yet such would in some degree appear to be the opinion of the Prussian Government, as the Chevalier Bunsen called upon me on Saturday last, the 4th instant, and in a state of great excitement said that the wish was to sacrifice Prussia, and to draw down upon her alone the vengeance of Russia; that the King had solemnly determined not to sign the Convention without full guarantees for the protection of his dominions, and that Prussia would not be bullied.

I doubt, however, if these representations can have been authorized by Baron Manteuffel, as his Excellency must be well aware of the frankness and cordiality with which the views of Her Majesty's Government have always been communicated to him, and that in inviting a corresponding Declaration we have studiously guarded ourselves against the appearance even of undue pressure.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 104.)
Foreign Office, March 8, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn, with satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch No. 66 of the 1st instant, the steps which have been taken by the Austrian Government to put a stop to M. Mouchine's visits to Belgrade; and I have to instruct you confidentially to inform Mr. Fonblanque of these steps.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 380.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 106.)
Foreign Office, March 8, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 69 of the 1st instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Count Buol on the occasion of your communication to his Excellency of the correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, defining the future policy to be pursued by the two Governments, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on this occasion; and your Lordship will express to Count Buol the entire confidence felt by Her Majesty's Government in the policy that Austria will pursue.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 381.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 107.)
Foreign Office, March 8, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 70 of the 1st instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Count Buol relative to the insurrectionary movements on the part of the Christian subjects of the Porte, I

have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with Count Buol as to the true character of the conduct pursued by the Russian commanders in the Principalities. The activity of Russian agents in Montenegro and elsewhere to excite the Christian subjects of the Porte to revolt; the appeal made to them by the recent manifesto of the Emperor of Russia, and the enrolment of 3,000 subjects of the Sultan to carry on the war against their lawful Sovereign, are measures of revolution such as the Emperor's whole reign has been passed in opposing, although they are consistent with that reckless disregard for the peace of Europe which His Imperial Majesty has of late exhibited.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 382.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 108.)
Foreign Office, March 8, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, inclosing a copy of the instructions which his Excellency has addressed to the Austrian Representative at Constantinople, on the affairs of Servia.

These instructions are to the following effect:

Count Buol observes, that whilst the reports of Baron de Bruck represent the Porte as being not without anxiety as regards the dispositions of the Servian nation, a telegraphic communication from the Austrian Consul-General at Belgrade states that, if Edhem Pasha is to be believed, Servia has decided to declare herself against the Russians, because she neither could nor ought to remain neutral at the present juncture.

The Austrian Government has always endeavoured to persuade the Servian Government that an attitude of strict neutrality was most in accordance with Servian interests, since such an attitude alone could preserve the Principality from the embarrassments that Servia would inevitably bring upon herself by taking a decided part with either of the contending parties. Austria has considered herself the more authorised to give this advice, from the fact that as a bordering Power she must feel that any events that may occur in Servia must have a direct and most sensible influence upon Austrian provinces.

No opportunity has been lost to hold the same language at Constantinople, and to represent that it is by no means the interest of the Ottoman Government to urge Servia to pronounce herself openly in favour of the Porte, and to engage in hostilities against Russia.

Baron Bruck is instructed to renew these representations, and to state, that although nothing can be more satisfactory to Austria than to see Servia persevere in the line of fidelity and devotion towards the Suzerain Power, no service would be rendered to the latter were Servia to assume an attitude which would provoke new complications, and cause a wider extension of the operations of war, which it is the interest of the Porte to restrict within the narrowest possible limits.

In the despatch to Count Colloredo inclosing these instructions to Baron Bruck, Count Buol observes that it would be an illusion to imagine that the deeply-rooted sympathies of the Servian population for the Russians have been weakened or are ready to give place to an unlimited devotion to the Suzerain Power. It is more than probable that the masses of the Servian people, once called to arms, would only swell the ranks of the enemies of the Porte. The Porte would therefore do well, with a view to the true interests of Turkey, to abstain from exercising any pressure on Servia, in order to induce her to abandon the attitude of strict neutrality which she has, up to this moment, preserved.

According to the Austrian Consul-General in Servia, Edhem Pasha has already been convinced of the justice of this view, and has considerably modified the ideas with which he was imbued on his arrival at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government has already informed the Porte that the concen-

tration of troops on the south-east frontier had no other object than to act eventually with a view at once to the security of Austria and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Austria is the first to acknowledge, as a general rule, that no Power at peace with Turkey has the right, without the previous consent of the Porte, to occupy with a military force any portion of the Ottoman territory. Circumstances, however, might occur from one moment to another of a nature to justify a departure from this principle, and in such a case Austria would not hesitate to send her troops into Servia even though there should not be sufficient time for obtaining the previous consent of the Porte.

These circumstances would be:

1. A revolutionary movement, threatening to reverse the state of things legally established in Servia. Care for her own security would then impose upon Austria the imperious duty of opposing the installation of a revolutionary power in the immediate proximity of her frontiers.

2. If Russian troops were seriously to menace Servia with an invasion. In this case military considerations of decisive weight would render it obligatory on Austria to anticipate the Russians and to take up a position in Servia before their arrival.

In either case where delay would be productive of fatal consequences, the objects of Austria would be no other than to maintain the legal *status quo*, and would therefore be entirely in the interest of the Ottoman Government: in such an event no time will be lost in giving to Turkey, on this head, the fullest and most satisfactory assurances.

I expressed to Count Colloredo my satisfaction that frank and full assurances upon this subject would be given to the Ottoman Government, but I said it was earnestly to be hoped that the necessity for the contemplated intervention would not take place, as it was likely to be misinterpreted and might add to existing difficulties.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 383.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland

(No. 109.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, transmitting a copy of the original project of Convention between the Four Powers, communicated to him by Baron de Bourqueney, and also a copy of the document as amended, in consequence of conversations between Count Buol and the French Minister. Count Buol makes the following remarks upon these projects:

With regard to the alteration in Article I, substituting for the words "bases indiquées dans le Protocole du 13 Janvier," &c., "des conditions jugées compatibles avec les intérêts generaux de l'Europe," &c., Count Buol observes that Russia having rejected the bases of the Protocol of the 13th January, the expression of a wish on the part of the Four Powers to maintain them without variation would be to offer as it were a premium to the obstinacy of Russia; since whatever might happen, even should the war be pushed to the greatest extremities, she would be sure to be able to end by signing a peace renewing all her former Treaties with Turkey. It therefore appears to the Austrian Government that it would be useful to let Russia see that the disposition of the Powers on this subject would be susceptible of modification, if she obstinately persists in her present system.

Moreover, the engagement to be made by the Powers themselves to respect the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire would not, in Count Buol's opinion, impose any obligation other than that of refraining from any act of a nature to injure that integrity.

If, however, despite their common wishes and exertions, the order of things as it actually exists in Turkey should happen to be subverted by a concurrence

of circumstances independent of their will, in this case it should be well understood that the principle of the union of the Powers should continue to exist with the establishment of new bases of understanding.

The phraseology proposed by Count Buol for Article II has in view only the modification of what is in his opinion too categorical in the words—"devra être opéré le plutôt possible."

The object of Article V added to the amended project is to establish from the present a closer unity between the Four Powers, and to paralyze at one blow the unceasing attempts of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to divide them.

The Austrian Government would be ready on their part to sign the Convention as thus drawn up, without excluding changes in the wording which might be proposed, provided that the foundation should be kept intact—always, nevertheless, with the understanding that the three Powers should be unanimous in concluding the Act in question. According to accounts received by Count Buol, the Cabinet of Berlin has shown certain scruples on this subject. His Excellency will however use every exertion to overcome them, and he feels persuaded that Her Majesty's Government, on their part, will do as much.

Count Buol does not conceal the importance of this act. It will invest with a more solemn form the principles enunciated in the Protocols, it will establish an entire conformity of views between the Austrian Cabinet and the Cabinets of the maritime Powers, and will doubtless unite them in the common object of obtaining a solution of the Eastern question which should insure the maintenance of the balance of Europe, and oppose all conquest and extension of influence on the part of Russia.

The more Austria feels the importance of this act, and the more firmly decided frankly and loyally to follow out the end traced out by this Convention, the more necessary does she consider it not to allow any undue extension of its scope, or any conclusions to be drawn from it which she cannot admit. Count Colloredo is therefore directed carefully to explain that while Austria unites in policy with the Western Powers, she will preserve intact her liberty of action as to the choice of the moment which her interests may point out to her as that when she should add the weight of her material forces to the measures which may have been agreed upon for the attainment of the common object.

Count Buol moreover reserves to himself the right to propose in Conference a stipulation to the effect that the Act shall remain secret up to the moment when the maritime Powers shall be actually in a state of war.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, and said that the Convention, which had been prepared some time ago by the French Government, had manifestly become inapplicable to present circumstances, but that Her Majesty's Government rejoiced that the necessary amendments should have been proposed by Austria, and upon the grounds stated in Count Buol's despatch.

I begged leave to add that the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government in finding their views identified with those of Austria was increased by the conviction that the course now pursued by her was the one best calculated to promote her own interests, as a firm and decided policy would avert the revolution which must have been inevitable if Austria had unfortunately taken part with Russia and against the public opinion of Germany, and would lead to solid and lasting advantages.

One great element of the power of Russia, I said, was the belief she had artfully created in her unlimited resources and in her determination to maintain peace and repress social disturbance throughout Europe, but more particularly in Germany. It is now apparent, however, that in order to gratify her ambition, she is ready to plunge Europe in war, and is reckless about the consequences it will entail; but Russia has for many years past indirectly served the cause of revolution; for having acquired a right of interference with certain Governments, she has always exercised it to prevent the reforms and improvements that those Governments were disposed to grant, and that the people were entitled to expect.

Such changes have been stigmatized as revolutionary by Russia, who has succeeded in averting them, but she has thereby given rise to just discontent on the part of the people, who have been constantly watching the occasion to rise against their Government.

Russia has, however, at length created an opportunity for shaking off her hurtful and unjustifiable interference, and the Powers who have now been forced by her to encounter the risks, the expense, and the calamities of war, would

show but little regard for their own welfare if they did not take effectual measures to guard against a similar disturbance of the peace, and to protect themselves against the future interference of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 384.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 110.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, reporting the line adopted by himself and his French colleague on the question of the insurrectionary movement on the part of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and I have to instruct your Lordship to ask Count Buol to send instructions to the Austrian Minister at Athens to cooperate with Mr. Wyse and M. Rouen in remonstrating against the course adopted now almost without disguise by the Greek Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 385.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 6, 1854.

THE continued difficulties which Baron Manteuffel has had to contend with have been brought to a climax by a telegraphic despatch which arrived yesterday from Chevalier Bunsen, in which that Minister appears to have urged his Government to take a more decided course, and prepare at once to enter into hostilities with Russia; and to have stated that England would in that case be disposed to offer some species of guarantee to Prussia of her eastern provinces. When this intelligence was communicated yesterday to the King, His Majesty became greatly irritated, and declared that he did not comprehend how any of his servants could make such a proposal; that it was in positive opposition to his wishes, and to the instructions which Chevalier Bunsen had received, and that he should be recalled from London. Baron Manteuffel at once felt all the inconvenience that would result from such a step. He proved to the King that it would be immediately interpreted into a change of the policy of this Government, when His Majesty became more calm; the matter was dropped, and the question of recall fell to the ground. It is, however, nearly settled that Count Albert Pourtales shall again proceed to London on a special mission with explanations on the subject. Baron Manteuffel has already suggested this to the King, and His Majesty will take the proposal into consideration.

The immediate effect of the communication of Chevalier Bunsen has been the conviction that the question of the Convention must for the present be laid aside; and in order not to interfere with any arrangement consequent on the decision which the three Powers may wish to make, Baron Manteuffel has written this evening to Vienna to explain the exact position of affairs here, declaring that the Prussian Government do not in any way depart from their approval of all the acts of the Conference of Vienna, and of the policy pursued by the three Powers on the Russo-Turkish question; but are ready to support them, though unwilling to bind themselves to become parties to active hostile operations.

The King is extremely desirous, notwithstanding that he declines to agree to the Convention proposed to him by England, Austria, and France, to be a party to the Conference of Vienna, which he hopes will continue to act; and he

* Not printed.

desires it to be understood that all his sympathies are with the allies, and that he will gladly cooperate with them in any way short of becoming a belligerent.

Baron Manteuffel read to me this despatch hastily this evening, and told me that a copy of it would be sent to Chevalier Bunsen to-morrow for communication to your Lordship. His Excellency told me further, that he had written a confidential despatch to Count Arnim at Vienna, to the effect that he was to inform the Austrian Government that he by no means separated from their policy, but approved of it; and that if hereafter his material support were required, after the commencement of hostilities, and that if armed assistance were wanting to repel any attack on the Austrian territory, Prussia would be found ready to come forward in the case of need.

Baron Manteuffel expressed to me his personal regret that more could not be done at this moment; that he had urged every argument to persuade the King to agree to the proposals of his allies, but that they had proved unavailing; and that it was painful to him to give up all present hope of obtaining any other result, though he was still of opinion that Prussia would hereafter cordially unite with us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 386.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 4, 1854.

THE messenger Blackwood having unfortunately missed the train at Breslau, was delayed on his journey from Berlin, and only arrived here this morning. I immediately informed Count Buol that I desired to submit to him the important despatch brought by the messenger as quickly as possible. Count Buol being however engaged at a Cabinet Council, could not see me till 3 o'clock, when I laid before him your Lordship's despatch No. 86. I then learnt from Count Buol that he had just before received from Baron Meyendorff preliminaries of peace which had been drawn up at St. Petersburgh, in accordance with the suggestions made to Count Orloff for transmission to the Porte, and Count Buol informed me that he had in consequence called together the members of the Conference, and M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim were already waiting to be received. Count Buol stated that he had told Baron Meyendorff he could in no way charge himself with the office of mediator with the other three parties to the Conference upon these preliminaries, and finding there were points of difference with the Protocol of the 13th of January, he told me he thought it important that these differences should be recorded in a protocol after being examined by the Conference. Before at once rejecting a document so important to the peace of the world he considered it a paramount duty to examine it with attention, which could not be done upon a simple perusal without comparing it with the propositions of Reshid Pasha, and he could not himself have time to examine the documents, prepare his own despatches, and submit it to the Emperor by to-morrow morning. He therefore proposed to send each of the members of the Conference a copy of the Russian preliminaries, and that we should meet to-morrow, after having examined them, to record our deliberate opinion upon them. He then proceeded to state the difficulty he should feel in supporting the summons from the Governments of England and France to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, while he had in his hands a proposal for preliminaries of peace not yet examined, and how important it would be if, in drawing up his despatch to Count Esterhazy in support of the summons, he should have the authority of the French and English Governments to declare that they persisted in their summons, notwithstanding that they were aware that preliminaries offered by Russia at this last moment had reached Vienna. He therefore most earnestly requested Baron Bourqueney and me to delay the departure of the messenger to St. Petersburgh till an answer can be received from your Lordship, and he will have his despatch in support of the summons ready to send in case you

should decide that the messenger is to proceed at once. I felt great reluctance to consent to this delay, but as M. de Bourqueney considered it to be unavoidable and important not to incur the reproach of precipitate action, and that it will only make a difference of twenty-four hours (as supposing your Lordship's reply to order the messenger to proceed, he would start on Monday instead of tomorrow), I yielded, and dispatched as quickly as possible the telegraphic message to your Lordship, M. de Bourqueney at the same time sending a similar one to Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—*March* 5. This despatch having been too late to send by post yesterday, I am enabled to report to your Lordship what I have already stated to you by telegraph: that the Conference, after examining the differences which were pointed out particularly by Baron Bourqueney and myself between the Preliminaries now submitted to them and the propositions adopted by the Conference in the Protocol of the 13th of January, have decided that they cannot accept the present proposal. A Protocol to this effect was drawn up, stating the reasons upon which this determination was come to, and we are to meet in Conference to-morrow to sign it. Count Buol has written a strong letter to Count Esterhazy to communicate to Count Nesselrode in support of the summons addressed by your Lordship and the French Government, which will be transmitted to me this evening. He has also sent me the Austrian passport for the messenger Blackwood, who will thus be enabled to leave Vienna by the first train to-morrow morning, by which time I shall hope to have received from you the order for his departure. I have the honour of inclosing a copy of the preliminaries proposed by the Russian Government and submittted to the Conference by Count Buol.

W.

Inclosure in No. 386.

Project of Preliminaries.

Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant.

LA Cour de Russie et la Sublime Porte Ottomane animées du désir sincère de mettre fin au différend qui a motivé la guerre actuelle, d'en effacer toutes les traces pour l'avenir, et de ramener dans leurs rapports réciproques l'harmonie indispensable aux intérêts des deux Empires, les Ministres respectifs des Affaires Etrangères, &c., ont arrêté comme base de la paix les Articles suivants:

Art. I. Par la signature du Traité définitif à intervenir entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, il y aura à perpétuité paix, amitié, et bonne intelligence entre l'une et l'autre, et les relations diplomatiques habituelles seront rétablies sur leur ancien pied.

II. Tous les Traités, Conventions, Actes et Stipulations conclues et arrêtées de part et d'autres à différentes époques, depuis le Traité de Koutschouk-Kainardji jusqu'à celui d'Andrinople, y compris les Conventions spéciales relatives aux Principautés Danubiennes et à la Servie, sont complètement confirmées, et les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à les observer religieusement et inviolablement.

III. Les privilèges religieux de tous les sujets du Sultan qui ne professent point d'Islamisme, privilèges concédés dans le cours des siécles par les ancêtres de Sa Majesté le Sultan et par elle-même moyennant des firmans, ayant été confirmés encore récemment, et nommément en ce qui concerne le culte et les églises du rit Grec par un firman Impérial revêtu de son auguste khatti-shérif et adressé au Patriarche de Constantinople le , la Sublime Porte n'hésite pas à déclarer qu'elle regarde comme une question d'honneur de maintenir ces privilèges, droits et immunités à tout jamais, en accordant aux différentes communautés Chrétiennes dans son Empire une entière égalité. En témoignage

de cette ferme intention, le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman sera chargé de communiquer officiellement, et comme annexe au Traité, le dit firman à la Cour de Russie, qui l'accueille de son côté comme un nouveau gage de bonne et sincère amitié et dans l'esprit d'une confiance entière.

IV. Le firman souverain émané de Sa Majesté le Sultan le pour expliquer et corroborer celui du Janvier 1852, ainsi qu'un autre firman en date du relatif à la réparation de la grande coupole du Temple du St. Sépulcre, sont confirmés; et il est convenu que ces ordonnances souveraines destinées, dans leur stricte exécution, à garantir le *status quo* des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs, soit exclusivement soit en commun avec d'autres cultes, sont regardées par les deux Cabinets comme mutuellement satisfaisantes, sans qu'elles puissent à l'avenir donner lieu à de nouvelles discussions. La Sublime Porte en outre promet que si quelque cas imprévu nécessitait une modification quelconque à l'état actuel des choses, elle aurait soin d'en informer préalablement la Cour de Russie; se réservant d'en faire également notification à celles des Cours Européennes envers lesquelles elle se trouve liée par des stipulations particulières.

V. Comme les sujets de l'Empire de Russie, tant séculiers qu'ecclésiastiques, auxquels il est permis, suivant les Traités, de visiter la sainte ville de Jerusalem et autres lieux de dévotion, doivent être considérés à l'égal des sujets de nations les plus favorisées, et comme celles-ci, tant Catholiques que Protestantes, ont leurs prélats et leurs établissements ecclésiastiques particuliers, il est arrêté que pour le cas où le Cabinet Impérial de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera accordé une localité convenable dans la ville de Jerusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes et d'un hospice pour les pelérins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations pieuses seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

VI. A dater de la signature des présents préliminaires, tant à Constantinople qu'à St. Pétersbourg, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie donnera l'ordre à ses troupes d'évacuer les Principautés. De son côté, la Sublime Porte s'engage à obtenir préalablement des deux Puissances maritimes dont elle a appelé l'assistance, qu'elles donnent les ordres nécessaires à leurs escadres pour quitter simultanément la Mer Noire, ainsi que le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. La Sublime Porte s'engage également à obtenir que la rentrée des flottes respectives dans les ports de Malte et de Toulon soit combinée de manière à coincider avec le moment où les troupes Russes auront entièrement évacué le territoire Ottoman.

VII. L'évacuation des Principautés consommée, l'ordre des choses gouvernemental et administratif, tel qu'il ressort du Traité d'Andrinople et des Conventions spéciales à cet égard et qui y avait été momentanément suspendu par suite de l'occupation et de la guerre, sera rétabli dans son intégrité.

VIII. Les bases de la paix étant signées conformément à ce qui précède, et remplie la condition préalable des ordres à donner simultanément d'une part au Commandant-en-chef des troupes Russes dans les Principautés, de l'autre aux Amiraux des flottes Anglaise et Française, des Plénipotentiaires nommés par les deux parties belligérantes se réuniront dans un endroit dont elles conviendront entre elles, pour négocier directement et signer l'instrument définitif du Traité de Paix.

En foi de quoi les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des deux Cours ont signé provisoirement le présent Acte.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 387.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 74.)

Vienna, March 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM just come from the Conference, where, in accordance with my telegraphic message to you of yesterday's date, the Protocol has been signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, the members of the Conference.

I transmit this document to your Lordship, as well as a paper containing the remarks upon the Russian preliminaries which I submitted yesterday to the Conference before the Protocol was drawn up.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 387.

Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, March 5, 1854.

Présens: Les Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse.

LES Soussignés, Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne et de la Prusse, s'étant de nouveau réunis en Conférence à la demande du Plénipotentiaire Autrichien, lecture leur a été donnée du document ci-joint communiqué au Cabinet de Vienne par M. l'Envoyé de Russie et contenant les préliminaires du Traité à intervenir entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte, le Cabinet de Vienne étant prié par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg de requérir l'appui des deux Puissances maritimes pour obtenir l'acceptation de ces préliminaires par la Sublime Porte.

Après mûre délibération les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne, prenant pour base de leur examen les documents antérieurs revêtus de la sanction des Quatre Puissances, ont constaté entre ces documents et les préliminaires proposés des différences radicales:

1. En ce que l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes, fixée après la signature des préliminaires, est subordonnée à la sortie des flottes combinées, non-seulement de la Mer Noire mais des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, condition qui ne pouvait être acceptée par les Puissances maritimes qu'après la conclusion du Traité définitif.

2. En ce que le document en délibération tend à revêtir d'une forme strictement conventionnelle, synallagmatique et exclusivement applicable aux relations de la Porte avec la Russie les assurances relatives aux privilèges religieux des Grecs; assurances que la Porte n'a offert de donner qu'aux cinq Puissances simultanément et sous la forme d'une simple déclaration identique. Les assurances, en effet, une fois insérées dans un Traité préliminaire devraient dès lors être reproduites dans le Traité définitif, et seraient accompagnées en outre d'une note officielle confirmative des dits privilèges adressée à la Cour de Russie exclusivement, note qui, à son tour, devrait, aux termes mêmes des préliminaires, être considérée comme annexe aux Traités, c'est-à-dire, comme ayant même force et même valeur.

3. En ce que les préliminaires communiqués à Vienne sont implicitement soustraits à toute discussion de la Conférence sur les modifications reconnues nécessaires pour les rapprocher du texte original des Actes revêtus de son assentiment, et que la conclusion du Traité définitif ne réserve pas davantage sa surveillance et son action.

4. En ce que tandis que les propositions de la Porte réclament expressément la révision du Traité de 1841 de manière à faire participer la Turquie aux garanties du droit public Européen, cette condition se trouve accueillie par voie d'omission.

Les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche et de Prusse appréciant la force des observations présentées par les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne, ont dû, de leur côté, reconnaître également les notables divergences signalées entre le projet de préliminaires Russe et les Protocoles des 13 Janvier et 2 Février.

En conséquence la Conférence s'est unanimement reconnue dans l'impossibilité de donner suite à ces propositions.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 387.

Remarks upon the Russian Preliminaries.

Proposals of Reshid Pasha.	*Preliminaries of Peace proposed by Russia.*
THE first object in the proposals of Reshid Pasha, which is to be discussed, is the evacuation of the Principalities.	1. IN the proposed preliminaries by the Cabinet of Russia, this evacuation is placed in Article VI. A stipulation as to the simultaneous evacuation of the Black Sea, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, is inserted; but Count Buol states that he has already represented at St. Petersburgh that the Bosphorus would only be evacuated on the Treaty of Peace.
The second object is to stipulate the renewal of all the Treaties with Russia.	2. This renewal of all the Treaties, as they are enumerated, which existed between the Porte and Russia, is stipulated in Article II.
The third object regards the stipulations as to the religious privileges of all the subjects of the Sultan not professing Islamism. The "rit Grec et les églises" is not mentioned in Reshid Pasha's proposals. No mention of "les droits et immunités." Nor is the firman proposed to be annexed to the Treaty, although it is to be communicated to all the Governments, and to the Court of Russia.	As to the third object, the same religious privileges are treated for in Article III. The different firmans by which these privileges have been confirmed, "nommément en ce qui concerne le culte et les églises du rit Grec," are mentioned. In speaking of the maintenance of the privileges, it is added "droits et immunités;" and it states that "en temoignage" of the firm intention to maintain them, the Ottoman Plenipotentiary shall be charged to communicate officially, and to annex to the Treaty the firman recently addressed to the Patriarch of Constantinople, to the Court of Russia, which will receive it as a fresh "gage" of sincere friendship, and in a spirit of entire confidence.
The fourth object, to complete the decision as to the holy places, and the construction of a church, &c., which project will be definitively adopted. The French Plenipotentiaries remarked upon this stipulation as affecting the established Conventions between France and the Porte.	Article IV of the Russian preliminaries confirms these decisions, and the firmans by which they are granted; and stipulates that if any changes should be desired in them, or should be rendered necessary, they should be previously announced to the Court of Russia, the Porte reserving to themselves to communicate them to other Courts with which they have particular stipulations. Article V recites the arrangements in detail as to the rights granted by

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Proposals of Reshid Pasha.

Preliminaries of Peace proposed by Russia.

the firmans of the Sultan for Russian subjects, both lay and clerical, visiting Jerusalem, and the power of building a church, and maintaining a hospital; and that these pious foundations should be under the special superintendence of the Russian Consul in Syria and Palestine.

Article VI, as stated above in Paragraph No. 1, stipulates for the evacuation of the Principalities, at the signature of the preliminaries at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh; but with the stipulations with regard to the fleets, and that the return of these fleets to Malta and Toulon should take place simultaneously with the entire evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops.

Article VII stipulates the reintegration of the former state, governmental and administrative, existing before the occupation, and the adoption of war measures; and that the Provinces should be established in their integrity, according to the Treaty of Adrianople and the special Conventions regarding them.

Article VIII stipulates that the above conditions being fulfilled, and Plenipotentiaries named by the two belligerents, they shall meet at a place designated by them to negotiate directly and sign the definitive instrument of the Treaty of Peace.

The fifth object stipulates that, if Russia accepts the above as a basis, a Plenipotentiary will be named by the Porte to conclude an arrangement with a Russian Plenipotentiary in a neutral town, to be fixed upon by the Four Powers in a Conference at which the Representatives shall assist, and that, then, a temporary armistice should be agreed to.

The sixth object stipulates that the Treaty of 1841 should be renewed and extended, with the friendly concurrence of the Four Powers.

Seventh. The Porte also desires the good offices of the Four Powers that an answer may be returned in forty days.

Eighth. States the readiness of the Porte to declare its intention of confirming and improving the principles of security and justice enacted by the Tanzimat, &c., and that it will make this declaration to the different Courts.

Count Buol states that, in a confidential despatch from St. Petersburgh, it is stated that Russia will not object to renewal of this Treaty, although she does not see the necessity for it.

Count Buol stated that he believed this will be perfectly agreeable to the Emperor of Russia.

It is to be observed, that in the present preliminaries the Russian Cabinet no longer insists on the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace taking place at the Russian head-quarters, or at St. Petersburgh.

Secondly. They no longer mention the former stipulations relative to the granting the "droit d'asile" to agitators, &c.

No. 388.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 118. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 8, 1854.*

THE state of parties here, and the intrigues at Court, are carried so far at this moment that it is necessary I should draw your Lordship's attention to them, as they will serve to explain the change which appears to have come over the policy of this Government at a moment when we were given to expect that we should shortly obtain its more formal adhesion to our views with respect to the Russo-Turkish question. The real cause of failure is, I believe, attributable to the over-zealous and imprudent conduct of the Bethmann-Hollweg or constitutional party (to which Count Pourtales, who was lately employed on a special mission to London, belongs), by their having raised suspicions in Baron Manteuffel's mind that they were seeking to supplant him.

Your Lordship will recollect my having reported in my despatch No. 92 of the 28th ultimo, that the King had issued a Cabinet order, addressed to Baron Manteuffel, directing that Count Pourtales should be employed in carrying on the correspondence of the Foreign office on Eastern affairs, and that M. d'Usedom was shortly to be appointed Under-Secretary of State in that department. The above-mentioned Cabinet order lay for several days at Baron Manteuffel's, and his Excellency never having chosen to communicate it to Count Pourtales, the latter suspecting that some intrigue was being carried on against him, requested that it might be published in the official paper. Baron Manteuffel demurred, and explained that it could not be so, for that though it was duly signed, His Majesty had ordered that it should not be promulgated. Upon hearing this, Count Pourtales naturally felt that the King's confidence in him was shaken, and that it would be useless to expect to carry out the policy he had recommended. He had been labouring hard to obtain His Majesty's assent to the proposed Convention, had prepared several papers explanatory of its object, and endeavoured to show that the King would not be bound to take up arms if his signature were affixed to it; in fact, he exhausted every argument that was applicable to the subject. The King declared that he had no thought of going back from the policy of neutrality and independence which he had all along avowed, but that he would not sign this Convention, nor do anything that changed his position or indicated an intention to take a step in advance; that he had been already led on further than he wished, and that he should now stop.

Things were in this state when a telegraphic despatch arrived from the Chevalier Bunsen, stating that Her Majesty's Government expected that Prussia would immediately take an active part in the impending hostilities, and upon this the King lost all command over himself and declared that his resolution was definitively taken, and that nothing would induce him to change his opinion. Count Pourtales and M. d'Usedom, who belongs to the same party, have now resolved to keep aloof from the Foreign Office as long as present opinions prevail there.

In the mean time, the Russian party consider that they have regained their lost position, and it is but too true that they have obtained an advantage of which it will be no easy matter to deprive them.

M. de Bismark, the Prussian Minister at Frankfurt, has arrived here, and his presence has given countenance to the Russian party; he has been received by them and at Court with open arms, and to him in some degree is attributable the change which has occurred; however, it is impossible to say who has not been concerned in these intrigues, for they have been carried on almost in the open streets. The Queen is at the head of the movement in favour of Russia; she has been watching every turn which the late affairs have taken, and has found zealous assistants in all the officers of the Court. Letters have arrived from the Empress of Russia, imploring that every effort should be made to prevent war from breaking out between the two countries; the King's feelings and his fears have been worked upon, his love of peace, and the hope hereafter of playing the part of mediator, have made His Majesty abdicate the high part in the

councils of the world which he has held, and he now voluntarily seeks to establish for himself a position of neutrality in the important struggle for the maintenance of a great European principle, which is unworthy of a kingdom like Prussia.

Every effort to make the King consider the responsibilities of his duties as one of the Great Powers has been useless, and I hear that he is under the conviction that, after a time, we shall all be glad to appeal to him as a neutral State ready and disposed to forward negotiations for peace, little thinking that the affairs of the world can be settled without him, and that he will have lost all claim to our confidence and goodwill, or to any advantage that might result from the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 389.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 8, 1854.*

THE departure of General Count Gröben for London, charged with a letter for Her Majesty the Queen from the King of Prussia, will take place to-morrow morning.

Baron Manteuffel has informed me that Count Gröben will probably remain but a very short time in London, and his Excellency did not seem to expect that anything would result from this mission. I told him, and I also told Count Gröben himself, that I apprehended that his arrival in London with a letter from the King expatiating on the advantages of maintaining peace would take place very inopportunely just after the rejection by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna of the last Russian preliminaries; and that I thought Her Majesty's Government had reason to be dissatisfied with Prussia, which, after going with us almost hand in hand the last half-year, suddenly stopped and refused to take upon herself the responsibility of one of the Great Powers and arbiters of the fate of Europe. I said that Prussia, by declining to accede to the proposed Convention, had forfeited all further claim to our sympathies, and had placed herself in a position which would assuredly excite our suspicion. That to talk of peace at the moment hostilities were about to commence was worse than useless, and could only lead to harm instead of good; that I was, however, sure the King's intention in sending Count Gröben to London was founded on the best motives, but it was not to be expected that they could produce any other impression than that which I had above expressed.

I said also that the conduct of Prussia with respect to the negotiations on the subject of the Vienna Project of Convention had led us into a serious error, and might produce incalculable results; but that the fatal consequence of Prussia's desertion of our policy was that the war which was about to commence—for there could no longer be a question of its being averted—would become general, as it could no longer be confined to the narrow limits within which we had hoped it might have been restricted, if Prussia had been on our side.

Baron Manteuffel was surprised at the tone I assumed on this occasion, and asked me what was the part we expected Prussia to take if she had joined us? I replied that I knew not how far we should have sought her cooperation, and that for the moment we had only asked her to sign a Convention, which would not have bound her to anything in the shape of active hostilities, but which would have had a moral effect which might have been of great advantage to the general cause, and would have proved that Prussia felt the injustice of the aggressions of Russia, and proclaimed her concurrence in the motives which dictated our policy.

I regret to say that Baron Manteuffel's language gave no encouragement to suppose that there was any chance of a change in the King's present resolution; he appeared disposed to accept the position as incapable of modification,

and to be himself relieved from the necessity of renewing his hitherto fruitless efforts to bring the King round to our views, which were too distasteful to His Majesty to admit any chance of success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 390.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 8, 1854.*

IT may be presumptuous in me to offer an opinion as to the language which Her Majesty's Government may think it right to hold to Count Gröben, but I venture, nevertheless, to make the following observations on this mission.

Count Gröben is not a person of any political influence, and he is, I apprehend, quite ignorant of the details of the important negotiations which have lately taken place on the Eastern question. His early life and associations have led him to believe that the principles of the Holy Alliance are those best adapted to the interests of his country. He has, however, much good feeling and attachment to England, and expresses a grateful recollection of the kindness which his son, who accompanies him on his present journey, received from Lord Hardinge and the officers of our army in India, where he had the good fortune to assist at the last glorious battles in that country. He will, I am sure, faithfully report to the King of Prussia any impressions he may receive from your Lordship's conversation with him, and it appears to me that, when he sees his mission of peace is not likely to be attended with success, he may, perhaps, be induced by the powerful arguments you may use, to make a last effort to bring his royal master again to take into his consideration the Convention which he has refused to sign. Should, on the other hand, no impression be made upon him, I would venture to say that I think it would be useless at this moment to hold threatening language to Prussia. Such language would, in the present temper of the King, only widen the difference which exists in the policy of the two countries, and we have but lately seen the effect produced on the Prussian Cabinet by the threats of the Russian Minister. It would, therefore, I think be unwise at this moment, though it may become necessary hereafter, to follow that example, for it might immediately result in increasing Russian influence, in doing away with the still slender chance which exists of effecting a change to our advantage, and in throwing the patriotic party into the hands of Russia, who are now inclined to an English alliance. The fact of threatening this country would arouse the feelings of the nation and unite all parties against us; whereas something might occur which would leave an opening for an improvement in our position, and public opinion, if left to itself, cannot fail soon to make its way through the press and be useful to us.

The French Minister participates in this feeling, and has written to his Government in the same sense as this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 391.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 121.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 8, 1854.*

RUMOURS having reached me that the Court party express their conviction that the success which has attended their efforts to shake the English influence at this Court will be felt at Vienna, and that they expect to learn that the Imperial Cabinet will now refuse to sign the Convention, which they have accepted, in consequence of the separation of Prussia from the alliance, I have

to-day inquired of Baron Manteuffel if he has written in a sense to Count Arnim which would induce him to urge the Austrian Government no longer to agree to this Convention, and I learned from his Excellency that he had not used any arguments whatever in this sense, but as he had before told me, as reported in my despatch No. 108 of the 4th instant, the Prussian Government had no objection to offer to the adhesion of Austria to the Convention.

I was induced to put this question to Baron Manteuffel, as the Court party appear to entertain the belief that Austria will eventually come round to their views, and that the Holy Alliance will soon be re-established.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 392.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 9, 1854.*

I LEARN by a message from Reshid Pasha that the firman which declares the undisturbed continuance of the Servian privileges had reached Belgrade, and that the Prince of Servia had consented to have it read publicly. I conceive the Porte to have acted with proper firmness in not allowing any compromise on the point; but I feel some anxiety to know the impression made on the people of Servia generally by the publication of the firman.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 393.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 9, 1854.*

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instruction No. 39 of January 30th of this year, I have made a communication to Reshid Pasha in the sense of the instruction addressed to General Baraguay d'Hilliers by M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the confidential despatch communicated to the Four Powers by the Turkish Representatives accredited respectively at their Courts.

This was little more than a form, as I had already made his Highness fully acquainted with your Lordship's sentiments on the subject of the note, which I had returned to Reshid Pasha, and which was nearly, if not quite, identic with the instruction to M. Musurus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 394.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 14, 1854.*

THE Porte has received despatches from Ettem Pasha, who took the Sultan's firman respecting the privileges of Servia to Belgrade. The Servian agent, in pursuance of his instructions, has expressed the thanks of his Government for the assurances contained in that document. I have not concealed from Reshid Pasha the doubts which are still entertained by Mr. Fonblanque as to the fidelity of the Servian Government and nation towards the Porte. As long as the frontier at Kalafat is maintained by the Sultan's troops there is reason to

presume that the Russians will not attempt to send any forces across the Danube into Servia.

Prince Alexander has given intimation of his wish to obtain the hereditary investiture of the Servian Principality from the Sultan. I question whether the Sultan's Government will be persuaded to comply with his wishes under present circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 395.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 15, 1854.*

I HAVE much satisfaction in stating that the firman, which I obtained about four years ago, for placing Christian evidence in matters of criminal jurisprudence on the same footing as that of Mahometans, is now to be extended throughout the Empire, for the benefit not only of foreign Christians in Turkey, but for all classes of the Sultan's tributary subjects without exception. When the firman was originally granted to me for the regulation of proceedings in the mixed criminal courts of Alexandria and Cairo, I obtained a promise that it should be extended, after a time, to the Rayahs of the whole Empire. Hitherto my repeated efforts to secure the performance of this promise failed, and the present appearance of success is owing to a strong appeal in writing, which I addressed to Reshid Pasha several weeks ago. It is altogether painful to observe with what unreasonable and ill-omened tenacity the professors of Islamism still adhere to their stupid misapplication of religious principles. In the present instance, however, I trust that the prejudice is practically surmounted, and that the firman, calculated as it is to remove the most crying injustice under which the Rayahs of the Empire have laboured for centuries, will shortly receive the Sultan's sanction, in addition to the approval of the Council, with which it has been submitted to His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 396.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 20, 1854.*

HAVING observed that the Earl of Westmorland, in his despatch to your Lordship No. 34 of this year, a copy of which despatch has been transmitted to me from the Foreign Office, maintains the entire correctness of his statement as to the Internuncio's motive for making to Reshid Pasha a communication adverse to the entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea, I thought it but fair to afford the Ottoman Minister an opportunity of stating deliberately his version of the fact. His Highness on learning the contents of Lord Westmorland's despatch to your Lordship, repeated the assertion which he had conveyed to me on a former occasion, and I am assured by M. Pisani that the Austrian interpreter's recollection of the occurrence coincides with that of the Pasha. M. Pisani's report, which I inclose herewith in copy, will convey to your Lordship a circumstantial account of what his Highness distinctly remembers to have passed between him and the Austrian Legation, and also between him and the Prussian Legation, on the occasion and the subject referred to. I have only to add my testimony to the general exactness of Reshid Pasha's memory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 396.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, February 20, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING, in conformity with your Excellency's verbal instructions of this day's date, communicated to Reshid Pasha Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 34 of the 1st instant to the Earl of Clarendon, stating that Reshid Pasha made a communication to Baron de Bruck and to M. de Wildenbruch, to the effect that the entrance of the allied fleets into the Black Sea had been decided upon with the approbation of the Four Powers, I have the honour to report that the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs positively denies his ever having made the least allusion to the above purport.

What passed between Reshid Pasha and the Ministers of Austria and Prussia is this; that both these Ministers having sent their respective interpreters to ascertain officially of the Porte whether it were true that the combined squadrons were to proceed shortly into the Black Sea, his Highness replied in the affirmative. The next day the Internuncio sent a message to Reshid Pasha requesting him to use his influence with the British and French Embassies, with a view to have the departure of the fleets put off, at least for some time; but his Highness replied, that far from preventing the fleets from going out, the Porte on the contrary was very anxiously urging the Ambassadors to send them out with as little delay as practicable.

Two days after Baron de Bruck and M. de Wildenbruch sent the instruction to their respective interpreters, the contents of which are well known to your Excellency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 397.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 79.)

Constantinople, February 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE much satisfaction in reporting to your Lordship that the firman for establishing Christian evidence on an equality with Mussulman throughout the Turkish Empire is completed. It received the Sultan's sanction shortly before I had the honour to receive your Lordship's instruction relating to the question, which it has now settled, once for all, on a broad and firm basis. I have received a copy of it from the Porte. No time will be lost in promulgating it, and I propose to send your Lordship a translation of it by the Trieste steam-packet, which goes to sea the day after to-morrow.

I have reason to hope that this great act of long-withheld justice will be followed by other proofs of the Sultan's comprehensive beneficence, and of the improved spirit prevailing among his Mahomedan subjects.

It is my ardent wish that the Christian, and other non-Mussulman, classes of the population of this Empire may duly appreciate the benefit conferred upon them, and justify by their peaceful and loyal behaviour the increasing goodwill manifested towards them by the Sultan and his Government.

The haratch is no longer levied in a manner vexatious to individuals, but it is an unjust and degrading tax, for the complete abolition of which I shall continue to employ my strenuous exertions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 398.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 80.)

Constantinople, February 24, 1854.

My Lord,

THE consideration which you have shown in seeking to diminish my responsibility, with respect to Her Majesty's squadron now at anchor in the Bosphorus, deserves my especial acknowledgments. Though little inclined to shrink from responsibility when it is imposed upon me by the interests of the public service, I find a welcome relief in the limitation which your Lordship has expressly established in the present instance. Before the receipt, indeed, of your Lordship's instruction of the 8th instant, I had taken a similar view of my duty, and acted carefully upon it in my communications with Vice-Admiral Dundas. I must have expressed myself ill, if I ever conveyed the idea of intending to do more in addressing a requisition to the Admiral than summon him to employ adequate means for the accomplishment of a stated object. Whatever latitude your Lordship's earlier instructions may have left, no ordinary circumstances would, I conceive, have warranted an attempt on my part to overrule any objections grounded exclusively, by the Admiral, on strict professional considerations. I remember, indeed, that in one of my letters to him I distinctly declined any responsibility on that score.

But I question whether a clear discrimination in that respect will suffice to prevent inconvenience, or worse, to the public service. The command of the Black Sea under present circumstances is, no doubt, the principal object of attention. But it is by no means the only one; and I am deeply impressed with a conviction that to succeed against Russia in the more extensive struggle which now appears to be imminent, we shall have to cooperate with the Porte not only on the waters of the Euxine, but wherever the Russian forces, or the partizans of Russia, may obtain, or seek to obtain, a footing. Already there are appearances of a serious Greek insurrection in the Turkish Provinces bordering on Greece, seconded by sympathisers from that kingdom and warranting a suspicion that the Hellenic Government is by no means unfavourable to the movement. It is manifestly of urgent importance to check the insurrection in its opening, and particularly by the employment of regular troops. The Porte is fully alive to its interest in these respects. Anxious to reinforce its troops in the disturbed Provinces, and having no steam-vessel at its disposal, it applied to the British and French Embassies for steam conveyance equal to the object in view. I made the application to Admiral Dundas, and the French Ambassador to Admiral Hamelin. A refusal was the result; and the consequence has been a delay of several days in consequence of the Sultan's reinforcements to Volos and Prevesa. The case, without implying censure, may serve to exemplify my meaning, and enable your Lordship to figure others of a similar tendency, though differing in form and in aim. I will only add, that the power of commanding prompt means of communication appears to be indispensable for the effective performance of my duties, and, that whether for the purpose of assisting the Porte, of cooperating with France, or of looking to our own immediate interests when endangered or compromised by passing occurrences, I hope not to be left without a degree of authority commensurate with the trust reposed in me, and necessary to meet the incidental exigencies of this most critical and trying state of things.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 399.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 24, 1854.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch relating to the incapacity of the Turkish officers placed in command of the Sultan's army on the Asiatic frontier, I have the honour to state, and partly indeed to repeat, that Abdi Pasha was recalled in virtue of my representations founded on the advices which I had received from Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom; that Ahmed Pasha, his successor, has since been recalled on the same account; and that Ali Ferik is involved in the same disgrace.

I have to add, that General Guyon has been appointed on my recommendation Chef-d'Etat Major on the staff of the new Commander-in-chief, Zarif Pasha; that reinforcements and ammunition have been landed at Trebizond for transmission to the Asiatic army; that measures have been taken to exercise a certain degree of control over the undisciplined soldiery acting with that army; and, finally, that although the army is reduced in number, it has never sustained that amount of loss which was erroneously believed in the first instance.

An inquiry is to be instituted into the conduct of Ahmed Pasha and Ali Ferik as soon as they arrive at Constantinople, and I sincerely hope that they will never more be trusted with the command of an army. If Abdi Pasha had been recalled as soon as my representations against him were received at the Porte, he at least would not have been the cause of those disasters which took place under his command.

With the view of confirming and strengthening the impression already made on the Turkish Ministers, I have caused your Lordship's instruction to be read to Reshid Pasha, who acquiesced in the truth of its contents. The Porte, it must be allowed, has no easy task in finding commanders and functionaries equal to the duties of their respective stations; but so many appointments originate in private favour and corrupt influence, that oppression, discontent, and defeat, the natural offspring of such a system, while they occasion no surprise, can hardly fail, by reason of their consequences, to make the necessity of improvement felt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 400.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 26, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a French translation of the firman relating to Christian evidence, reported in one of my preceding despatches, dated the 24th instant, and also a translation in the same language of the regulations appended to that firman.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 400.

Firman relative to Christian Evidence.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir Mehmed Pasha, Vali de la Province de Salonique, j'ordonne:

Ainsi que tout le monde sait, et que je l'ai tant et tant de fois publié par les ordres souverains que j'ai donnés partout, animé que je suis, par un effet de la grace Divine, d'une vive sollicitude pour le bien-être de mes sujets, je dirige toutes mes pensées toujours et en chaque occasion vers le but que je me propose, à savoir, d'assurer le repos et la tranquillité de mes sujets, et de faire prospérer mon Empire. Aussi est-ce dans ce but salutaire et utile qu'avec l'assistance Divine les Tanzimat, et tant de lois et de règlements qui en sont les suites, ont été établis, et l'on voit les nombreux avantages qui en découlent. Et comme je tiens très fort à ce que toutes les questions qui roulent sur des réclamations et sur des règlements de police soient partout convenablement examinées, afin que les habitants et les sujets de mes Etats n'aient pas à souffrir à cet égard, un Tribunal de Commerce et un Tribunal pour les Causes Criminelles ont été établis, il y a quelque temps à Constantinople; d'autres ont été établis dernièrement dans quelques villes de conséquence de mon Empire, et l'on voit les avantages qui en résultent sur tous les rapports et pour les sujets Ottomans et pour les étrangers.

C'est pourquoi un Commission spéciale a été nommée dans le sein du Conseil d'Etat, et chargée d'organiser des Tribunaux pareils à ceux dont nous avons parlé plus haut, pour les établir dans d'autres villes de mes Etats où cela serait convenable. Ce projet a été discuté et considéré sous toutes ses faces, et le Mazbata du Conseil a été lu et pris en même considération par le Conseil de mes Ministres aussi.

Comme les attributions des Cours pour les Causes Criminelles consisteront uniquement à vérifier les faits et procéder au jugement des sujets de ma Sublime Porte qui se seront rendus coupables de crimes envers des sujets des Puissances étrangères, comme aussi à celui des sujets des Puissances étrangères qui se seront rendus coupables d'assassinats, de vols, ou d'autres crimes envers les sujets de ma Sublime Porte; que le véritable objet qu'on a en vue en établissant ces Tribunaux, c'est de vérifier les faits par toutes sortes d'informations et de recherches exactes, afin de tirer au clair la culpabilité ou l'innocence des accusés avec équité, et que les individus réellement coupables ne puissent échapper à une juste punition conforme à l'équité et au code pénal, et commandée comme résultat des vérifications faites:—il va donc être établi des Tribunaux sous la dénomination de Medglis Tahkquiqui (Tribunaux d'Enquête), à l'instar du Tribunal de Police qui existe dans ma capitale, dans quelques villes considérables dans les provinces, indépendamment de ceux qui existent déjà dans quelques autres endroits. Ces Tribunaux seront chargés exclusivement de procéder à la vérification des litiges survenus entre Mussulmans et Chrétiens et autres classes de mes sujets, comme aussi entre sujets de ma Sublime Porte et sujets étrangers, concernant des crimes commis. Le but qu'on se propose par là c'est de bien constater et tirer au clair les crimes commis afin que l'innocent n'ait pas à souffrir.

Les Gouverneurs et les officiers de police mettront tous leurs soins à exécuter le Règlement qui a été rédigé sur ces Tribunaux; ils se garderont bien de contrevenir aux principes y établis, et ne cesseront un seul instant d'employer tout leur zèle à observer strictement toutes les règles qu'il prescrit.

Les personnes employées dans ces Tribunaux doivent être, comme cela est dit dans un Article du Règlement, des hommes extrêmement justes, judicieux, droits, et d'une conduite éprouvée, choisis parmi les membres du Grand Conseil Municipal, et parmi d'autres personnes convenables; et au besoin, on pourra nommer aussi un ou deux commis, tout cela conformément aux circonstances du pays, et on informera ma Sublime Porte des dispositions qui auront été faites.

Voilà ce qui a été jugé à propos par les membres de la Commission, et mes ordres ayant été demandés à ce sujet, j'ai ordonné qu'il soit fait comme il a été décidé, et je t'envoie conséquemment ci-inclus copie du Règlement précité.

Toi donc, Vali susmentionné, lorsque tu auras pris connaissance de ce dont

il s'agit, toi aussi tu devras, conformément à ton bon jugement et à ta sagacité, établir le Tribunal dont il s'agit de la manière prescrite plus haut, tu éliras et nommeras les membres de ce Tribunal, et tu informeras ma Sublime Porte de ce que tu auras fait.

Ce sera ton devoir, d'avoir le plus grand soin que les affaires qui surviendront soient examinées et traitées conformément au Règlement susmentionné avec la plus stricte impartialité et la plus grande équité; que le crime du coupable soit parfaitement constaté et établi, et que les innocens n'aient pas à souffrir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 400.

Regulations.

(Traduction.)

MINUTE des devoirs imposés aux Medglis (Cours) établis pour la vérification exacte et préalable et le jugement des sujets de la Sublime Porte que se seront rendus coupables, les uns envers les autres, de crimes tels que, assassinats, blessures, vols, &c., ainsi que des auteurs de crimes semblables connus entre sujets Ottomans et sujets des Puissances Etrangères:

Cette Cour, qui n'aura rien de commun ni avec le Grand Conseil Municipal, ni avec le Tribunal de Commerce, devant être établie, à l'instar de celle de la police de Constantinople, pour vérifier, comme il a été dit plus haut, les circonstances des crimes dont on se sera rendu coupable, se réunira dans certains jours fixes de la semaine; elle sera composée de ceux des membres du Conseil du chef lieu de la province qui seront jugés convenables, et d'autres personnes d'une extrême probité qui seront élues parmi les notabilités honorables du pays et qui sont en état de remplir les obligations de l'équité et de la justice, et elle sera sous la présidence du Vali.

On procédera lors de l'examen et du jugement des accusés, dans leur interrogatoire, ainsi que dans l'interrogatoire des individus qui donnent des informations, avec la plus grande impartialité et la plus grand équité.

Si la majorité des membres de la Cour a quelques doutes sur la véracité des témoins à charge, la Cour leur fera prendre serment, dans les formes usitées, comme quoi ils diront la vérité, qu'ils ne diront rien contre la pure vérité, qu'ils ne cacheront point la vérité, et qu'ils diront, sans rien omettre, tout ce qu'ils savent du cas dont il s'agit; après cela, elle écoutera ce qu'ils auront à dire sauf à les punir, s'il conste qu'ils n'ont pas déclaré la vérité.

Tant qu'il ne sera pas devenu nécessaire que les individus venus pour donner des informations soient présens ensemble, ils ne seront pas introduits tous ensemble à la Cour, mais ils seront interrogés séparément. Aucun d'eux n'y sera introduit pendant qu'un autre subit son interrogation. Les témoins seront interrogés en présence de l'accusé.

S'il se trouve des personnes se faisant fortes de prouver que les dépositions des témoins à charge ne sont point véridiques, on écoutera aussi ce qu'elles auront à dire à cet égard, après leur avoir fait prendre serment de la manière susmentionnée, et la Cour prononcera conformément à l'opinion de la majorité de ses membres sur la véracité de l'une ou de l'autre partie.

On prendra en considération tout ce qui peut établir l'innocence de l'accusé avec autant de soins qu'on a mis à entendre les dépositions qui ont été faites contre lui.

Afin de tirer au clair la culpabilité ou l'innocence d'un accusé, c'est-à-dire, afin qu'un homme vraiment coupable n'échappe au glaive de la loi, et qu'un innocent ne soit puni injustement, on prendra les dépositions des individus de toutes nations et *millète*, sans aucune exception, qui ont des notions personnelles et particulières sur le cas dont il est question, seulement pendant que la Cour est à examiner l'affaire, et pour qu'elle obtienne toutes les informations positives qu'il faut qu'elle se procure.

On obligera de venir à la Cour pour déclarer ce qu'ils savent, les individus qui auront été désignés par le demandeur ou le défendeur, comme ayant connaissance du fait dont il s'agit.

La Cour aura à prononcer la peine qu'aura encourrue l'accusé, convaincu, lors de l'examen qui a eu lieu en sa présence, de culpabilité suivant le degré de

sa culpabilité, et conformément aux lois pénales de la Sublime Porte; et elle fera exécuter la sentence après que cette sentence aura été confirmée par le Vali.

Quant aux crimes qui exigent le "kissas" (la peine capitale d'après la loi du "talion"), ou bien le "diyete" (prix du sang de l'homme tué), la Cour ne décidera rien là-dessus, elle ne prononcera aucune sentence; et elle se bornera à présenter au Vali le résultat des informations positives qu'elle aura acquises sur l'un ou l'autre de ces deux cas, et le Vali les mettra sous les yeux du Grand Conseil, qui aura à prononcer une sentence conforme aux lois pénales de la Sublime Porte.

Toute question concernant le sujet d'une Puissance Etrangère, soit comme plaignant, soit comme accusé, sera discutée dans cette Cour, en présence du Consul du Gouvernement protecteur, ou devant le délégué de ce Consul, et cela en vertu des Traités qui exigent sa présence, et il devra y avoir aussi au préalable son concours et son adhésion, soit pour la sentence qui doit être prononcée, soit pour l'exécution de cette sentence.

Si l'individu qui est sous jugement est un sujet d'une Puissance Etrangère, ou un sujet Ottoman qui aurait commis quelque attentat contre un sujet étranger, l'interrogatoire et le jugement se feront, d'après les Traités en vigueur, devant le Consul, ou devant le drogman délégué de sa part, du Gouvernement dont l'individu, soit plaignant, soit accusé, est le sujet. Et le Consul, ou son délégué, aura la faculté, tout comme les autres membres de la Cour, d'interroger les parties, et de poser des questions aux personnes qui font leurs dépositions, et d'exprimer, s'il faut, sa propre opinion et ses reflexions.

Si la majorité des membres de la Cour est d'avis, d'après les informations obtenues, et par la force même des raisons, qu'un accusé est innocent, et si cet accusé n'a pas des antécédens, la Cour représentera au Vali la nécessité que le détenu soit mis en liberté.

Si un accusé s'avoue, de sa propre bonne volouté, coupable, il n'y aura rien à dire. Seulement s'il est constaté qu'en réalité cet individu n'est pas coupable, et que l'abus qu'il a fait est uniquement dû à des menaces ou à des promesses, et que c'est malgré lui, ou pour avoir été induit à erreur, qu'il a fait cette confession, un pareil aveu fait à son propre préjudice ne comptera pour rien. Et s'il conste, de son propre aveu, qu'il est vraiment coupable, et après cela il prétend qu'on l'a engagé à faire cet aveu, ou bien qu'il l'a fait pour avoir été induit à erreur, on ne fera aucun cas de cette assertion.

A l'occasion de l'interrogatoire et de la punition des coupables, la Cour ne fera usage ni de coups de bâton, ni de la bastonnade; et surtout elle ne leur fera donner aucun genre de question.

Lorsqu'il sera devenu nécessaire d'arrêter quelque individu, il sera mené devant une autorité qui décidera sur le champ s'il y a lieu de le mettre sous jugement ou s'il faut le mettre en liberté.

No. 401.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 106.)

Foreign Office, March 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 82 of the 24th of February, with the view of inducing the Porte to supersede the Turkish commanders in Asia whose misconduct or incapacity have led to such disastrous results; and they also approve of your having communicated to Reshid Pasha the observations on this point contained in my despatch No. 48 of the 7th of February. The result of your Excellency's interposition in this matter is satisfactory.

It is to be hoped, for the credit of the Sultan and the interest of his service, that the inquiry which is to be instituted into the conduct of Ahmed Pasha and Ali Ferik (your Excellency does not mention Abdi Pasha, but Her Majesty's Government conclude that his conduct is also to be made subject of inquiry) will not be nominal; but that the punishment awarded to them may serve for a warning as to the fate which will in future attend cowardice and rapacity. Justice would indeed demand that an example should be made of the Minister

who appointed Ahmed Pasha to the chief command in the place of Abdi Pasha.

The Porte is now engaged in a mortal struggle, and if it hopes to succeed, it must adopt its means to the end it has in view. If at this most critical moment of the Sultan's affairs there is not sufficient virtue and patriotism in the Turkish Government to suspend even for a time that system of private favour and corrupt influence in which the most important appointments originate, oppression, discontent, and defeat, as your Excellency truly observes, must be the inevitable result.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this subject under the most serious consideration of the Turkish Government, and, if necessary, of the Sultan himself. You will state that England and France are now about to incur enormous expense, and at great risk and inconvenience actively to support His Highness's cause; and they will not endure that their efforts should be thwarted, or their forces exposed to disaster, in order that a few corrupt men should enrich themselves by the sale of commands to others who plunder the Sultan's subjects and fly from his enemies.

The question now of urgent importance, and upon which an immediate decision should be come to, is the employment of foreign officers. Many officers, English and French, of great experience and distinction, are desirous to enter the Sultan's service; and there can be no doubt that His Highness's interests would be greatly promoted by employing them, more particularly as your Excellency states that it is difficult for the Porte to find commanders equal to the duties of their respective stations, and if, as there is good reason to believe, the appointment of foreign officers would be viewed with satisfaction by the Turkish soldiers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 402.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 107.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 80 of the 24th of February, that Her Majesty's Government consider it necessary that the mode of executing the particular service required by the Porte, and indicated by your Excellency in that despatch, should be left to the responsibility of Vice-Admiral Dundas; and this will be even more indispensable when active hostilities with Russia commence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 403.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with extreme satisfaction by your despatches Nos. 74, 79, and 85, of the 15th, 25th, and 26th of February, that your Excellency's efforts in regard to the acceptance of Christian evidence have at length been attended with success, and that this long-deferred measure of justice and wisdom is about to be put in force: and they cannot doubt that it will be received by the Christian subjects of the Sultan as a further proof of His Highness's determination to redress their just grievances, and to remove all future ground for complaint on their part.

I have to add that Her Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency's intention to endeavour to effect the abolition of the haratch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 404.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, March 11.)

Vienne, le 7 Mars, 1854.

M. le Comte,

LORD WESTMORLAND a bien voulu me donner lecture et copie d'une dépêche que Lord Clarendon lui avait adressée à la date du 27 Février, et à laquelle se trouvait jointe une lettre écrite par Sa Seigneurie au Comte de Nesselrode dans le but d'exiger l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes dans un délai fixé.

Votre Excellence trouvera ci-près le texte de l'une et de l'autre de ces pièces.

L'Empereur mon auguste maître a pleinement apprécié la preuve de confiance que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique nous a donné en nous faisant connaître la communication adressée au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avant de l'acheminer d'ici à sa destination.

Reconnaissant que la sommation adressée identiquement à la Russie par les Gouvernements Anglais et Français, et tendant à obtenir l'évacuation des Principautés, et à faire rentrer la question litigieuse dans les voies diplomatiques, s'appuie sur des motifs de justice et d'opportunité, nous n'avons pas hésité à nous énoncer dans ce sens envers le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg moyennant une dépêche au Comte Valentin Esterhazy dont votre Excellence trouvera ci-près copie, et dont le messager d'Etat que Lord Clarendon a bien voulu mettre à notre disposition est porteur.

Vous êtes autorisé, M. le Comte, à donner à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat lecture de cette dépêche et de cette annexée au Comte Esterhazy, et à lui laisser copie de l'une et de l'autre si Sa Seigneurie en témoignât le désir.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

Inclosure in No. 404.

Count Buol to Count Valentin Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 5 Mars, 1854.

LES Ministres de France et de Grande Bretagne nous ont communiqué les lettres qui ont été adressées par les chefs des Cabinets Anglais et Français à M. le Comte de Nesselrode, pour exiger de la Russie de replacer son démêlé avec la Porte dans des termes purement diplomatiques et d'évacuer les Principautés Danubiennes dans un espace de temps donné. Nous ne pouvons que bien sincèrement déplorer qu'une demande, dont nous ne saurions contester l'équité et qui en elle-même est aussi conforme au bon droit qu'aux intérêts Européens, ait dû être présentée dans des formes qui—nous sommes loin de nous le dissimuler—en rendront l'accomplissement très difficile. Toutefois nous ne croirions ni constater les soins incessants que nous avons voués au maintien de la paix, ni même l'intérêt que nous portons à l'honneur et aux destinées de la Russie, si nous pourrions hésiter à élever une voix d'ami pour supplier le Cabinet de Russie de bien réfléchir aux funestes conséquences qui résulteraient d'un refus. Qu'il nous rende la justice que nous n'avons jamais hésité dans l'appréciation d'un acte d'agression qui nous a paru aussi injustifiable au sujet de la Turquie que peu conforme aux égards dûs à l'Europe. Mais bien que toutes nos représentations, offertes dans les formes les plus amicales, pour arrêter la Russie dans une voie dont nous avons dès le commencement prévu toutes les graves conséquences, aient été vaines, nous ne nous en féliciterions que doublement si aujourd'hui au moins notre voix fût écoutée à la dernière heure, pour mettre un terme à un aussi malheureux conflit.

La puissance et la gloire militaire de la Russie sont des faits acquis aux yeux du monde. Il ne tiendra qu'à elle de voir applaudir l'Europe entière à une gloire bien autrement grande et plus réelle, celle d'une généreuse modération, qui, sans amoindrir sa puissance, pourra rendre le repos et le bonheur à l'humanité justement effrayée des maux qui l'attendent.

Puisse la voix de l'Autriche cette fois-ci au moins ne pas avoir retenti en vain. Quelle que soit au reste la décision souveraine de l'Empereur Nicolas, l'Empereur François-Joseph pourra se rendre le témoignage que ses efforts ont jusqu'au bout loyalement tendu à faciliter à la Russie une issue honorable d'une complication qui a été si fatalement envénimée par un concours de circonstances, sur lesquelles il serait du reste oiseux de récriminer aujourd'hui.

L'Empereur mon auguste maître ne veut point encore désespérer que son auguste allié et ami abandonnera une politique si peu en accord avec celle qu'il est appelé à suivre lui-même. Si toutefois cette malheureuse guerre se présentait comme inévitable, Sa Majesté ne connaîtra plus d'autres devoirs que de veiller aux intérêts des peuples que la Providence a confiée à ses soins, et de se réserver cette liberté d'action si nécessaire pour les préserver du contact des principes subversifs qui ne tarderont pas à s'associer aux développements de cette lutte.

Vous êtes autorisé, M. le Comte, à donner lecture et copie de la présente dépêche à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 405.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 303.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 10, 1854.*

THE Prince of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen has been announced to arrive this evening at Paris, bearer of a letter from the King of Prussia to the Emperor. It is supposed that His Prussian Majesty is desirous of trying to make another overture for a peaceful solution of the Oriental question. I need hardly add, that no great success is likely to attend this mission.

Prince Hohenzollern is the son-in-law of the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden, and consequently connected, to a certain degree, with the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 406.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 308.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 11, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship's attention has, without doubt, been called to an article published in the St. Petersburgh "Gazette," of the 2nd instant, wherein allusion is made to certain confidential communications which passed during the period when Lord John Russell held the Seals of the Foreign Department, between Her Majesty's Government and the Emperor of Russia, on the subject of the Ottoman Empire, and the course to be pursued by the two Governments, should that Empire, as was the Emperor Nicholas' conviction, come to an early dissolution.

The object of this article could hardly be mistaken. The inuendos which it contained respecting an understanding between England and Russia, disguised under the terms "confidential exchange of opinions," "amicable correspondence," &c., were enough to arouse the suspicions of this Government, whose nature it unfortunately is to believe that Great Britain has some particular interest at stake in the East. I determined, therefore, on seeing the article transcribed into the French newspapers, to lay the correspondence to which it alluded, and of which your Lordship had furnished me with copies in the outset, for my personal information only, at once before the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Accordingly, I waited this morning upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and,

adverting to the article, I said that it was perfectly true that confidential communications had passed between the two Governments in the spring of last year; that, if they had not been made public by Her Majesty's Government, it was from a feeling of delicacy towards the Emperor of Russia, which his Excellency would appreciate, for, as I was about to read to him the whole correspondence, he would see that, as far as Her Majesty's Government was concerned, there could be no object in keeping the papers secret on any other account.

I then read to him Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatch No. 24, Lord John Russell's No. 38, and Sir Hamilton Seymour's No. 87 and 88, of last year; and, having done so, I said that I left it to his Excellency to determine how far the assertions of the Russian Government, that they had never intended, had they met with an assent on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to dispose of the provinces of the Turkish Empire according to their own ideas, were founded on fact.

I have the satisfaction to add, that this frank communication had the happiest effect. M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated, that nothing could have been more correct than the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, both in the language which had been employed in replying to the overtures of the Emperor of Russia, and in the secrecy which they had observed until now, in respect to this correspondence.

I trust that I may not incur your Lordship's disapprobation for what I have done. The effect which I wished to produce, seemed to me to depend so much upon immediate and spontaneous action, that I ventured to take the responsibility of the step, rather than refer to your Lordship for instructions. I have insisted, however, on the most rigorous silence on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, except towards the Emperor; but I confess that I should be glad to be empowered to state the case fairly, in answer to the numerous questions which will no doubt be made to me upon the matter.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, that he was much mistaken, if he could not produce despatches from General Castelbajac, of about the same date as those of Sir Hamilton Seymour, conveying, though not in such distinct terms, offers of a separate understanding with France respecting the partition of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 407.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 198.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 13, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve of the language which you held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as reported in your despatch No. 308, relative to the Russian version of confidential communications between the Emperor Nicholas and Her Majesty's Government, and of your having read to his Excellency the despatches containing an account of those communications.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 408.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 26, 1854.*

THE disorders now prevailing in the Turkish Provinces bordering on Greece derive, from the insurrectionary character which they have assumed, and from the successes attending them, a degree of importance which is enhanced by their probable connection with the hostile operations of Russia against the Porte, to say nothing of the suspected connivance of the Hellenic Government.

Her Majesty's Consul at Prevesa has forwarded to your Lordship's office such information as he possessed respecting the numbers and movements of the force collected at Radovisi and directed against Arta.

Mr. Blunt has, in all probability, transmitted to your Lordship the substance of his advices from Larissa; and I cannot doubt that Mr. Wyse has been equally prompt in bringing to your Lordship's knowledge whatever may best serve to place the proceedings of the Hellenic Government and of its civil or military dependants in their true light.

What I collect from these different sources, and also from the advices received at the Porte or from private correspondence, amounts, in general, to an appearance of insurrection more formidable in prospect than at present, requiring to be counteracted with prompt decision, and capable of being insulated and repressed if met at once with adequate forces. Unfortunately the Turkish forces are few in number, and of a bad description, while the Pasha of Janina is paralysed by an illness which unfits him for business.

The Porte, taken by surprise, though often warned, is called upon to apply its immediate attention to the means of supplying these deficiencies, and restraining the Hellenic authorities from any participation in the rebellious movement of its subjects.

Communications on both these matters took place between Reshid Pasha and myself without loss of time. I found him disposed to act in perfect harmony with my views; to send reinforcements without delay to Prevesa, Janina, and Volo; to send them from the regular army; to discriminate carefully between the guilty and the innocent,—punishing the former with just severity, protecting and encouraging the latter.

Four battalions go by steam to Volo and Prevesa; others march by land on Janina. Bessim Pasha, an able and trustworthy commander, goes from Monastir to act as Muchir at Janina. Fuad Effendi is to follow him in the capacity of Imperial Commissioner. A prelate of the Greek Church is specially charged by the Patriarch to repair to the same district, with the view of exhorting the Porte's Christian subjects to remain in peaceful and loyal submission to the Sultan.

The Porte applied in the first instance to Her Majesty's Embassy, and also to the French, for steam-conveyance for the troops, having no steam-vessels of her own immediately within reach. Conceiving that it was most desirable to save time, and also to give public evidence of our concurrence with the Turkish authorities, I applied to Admiral Dundas, and General Baraguay d'Hilliers applied to Admiral Hamelin, for means of complying with the Porte's request. The answer was a refusal, as stated in the correspondence already transmitted to your Lordship; and the Porte, after waiting for the return of its steamers from the Black Sea, and completing some necessary preparations, has finally embarked the four battalions; and that portion of them which is destined for Volo and Larissa starts to-day, in company with an English and French steamer, whose presence at their landing may be expected to produce a good effect. I could have wished an earlier and more complete arrangement, but hope, nevertheless, that the troops may arrive in time to check an insurrection which cannot strengthen and expand without occasioning much prejudice to the Sultan's interests, and, eventually, much embarrassment to His Majesty's allies. I learn from Mr. Saunders that Sir Henry Ward had sent one of Her Majesty's vessels on that station to Prevesa.

With respect to the Hellenic Government, and its very questionable attitude, the first idea of Reshid Pasha, on reading the despatches from the Turkish Minister at Athens, was to recall that Representative, and to leave the post vacant. I took the liberty of advising him not to adopt so decisive a measure in the first instance, but to send for the Greek Representative here, and with due formality to require a full and clear explanation of the circumstances which have been brought to the Porte's knowledge. An interview founded on this suggestion will take place to-morrow at Constantinople between Reshid Pasha and Count Metaxa in the presence of the Grand Vizier and the Seraskier. The conference promises to be of a serious character; and I believe it is the intention of the Turkish Ministers to make an official communication to the British and French Embassies of whatever may pass on the occasion; such communication having the value of enabling us to add our remonstrances, if necessary, to those of the Porte, through the channel of our respective colleagues in Greece.

It will afford me the liveliest satisfaction to find that, being thus called upon to take my line without the advantage of special instructions from your Lordship, I have anticipated the views of Her Majesty's Government without exceeding the limits of a reasonable discretion.

I shall no doubt have occasion shortly to return to this subject, and in the meantime I inclose, for your Lordship's more complete information, copies of the correspondence which passed between Reshid Pasha and me with respect to the conveyance of the Sultan's troops to Volo and Prevesa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 408.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Translation.) *February* 19, 1854.

ALTHOUGH, in consequence of certain turbulent movements which have taken place first at Arta, and subsequently in the Agrafa, it is of urgent necessity to send with all speed a certain amount of regular forces to those districts, yet as the Imperial steamers are at present in the Black Sea, the execution of this decision is delayed till their return; and as under these circumstances a further loss of time would be injurious to the state of affairs, it has become necessary to make an appeal for assistance to the allied Powers, who have never failed in any particular to display proofs of their good dispositions, your Excellency is requested to be so good as to use your endeavours that two steam-vessels of your squadron may be applied for the purpose of transporting the regular troops to the scene of action. The troops to be dispatched being in number such as the vessel is able to carry will be divided into two detachments, one to be landed at Volo, the other at Prevesa; and this favour will be looked upon by the Porte as a further cause of its great obligation. The same request has been officially made to your colleague the French Ambassador, in informing you of which I avail myself, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 408.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Péra, le 21 Février*, 1854.

PAR suite de la lettre que vous me fites l'honneur de m'écrire avant hier je me suis adressé à l'Amiral Dundas pour que deux bâtiments à vapeur de son escadre fussent mis à la disposition de la Porte pour porter des troupes régulières soit à Volo soit à Prévésa. M. l'Amiral m'ayant répondu que dans ce moment-ci il n'est pas à même d'obtempérer à ma démande, je me réjouis de ce que les huit bâtiments à vapeur Turcs, qui se trouvaient dans la Mer Noire, viennent de rentrer, et que la Porte, par conséquent, se trouve maintenant en possession de tous les moyens nécessaires pour comprimer sans délai les désordres qui viennent de se manifester dans les provinces Ottomanes limitrophes de la Grèce.

Je prie, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 409.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 27, 1854.*

IN the despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Neale, which I forward to London by this opportunity, I am happy to observe indications of the Porte's attention to some, at least, of the suggestions which I have occasionally submitted to its consideration, and those, in particular, which were founded on Colonel Du Plat's information. This is the more important, as that intelligent and experienced officer confirms in later despatches the information which he conveyed to your Lordship at an earlier period respecting the intended operations of Russia upon the Lower Danube. The works erected opposite to Ibraila, the additions made to the batteries at Matchin, and the collection of provisions at Silistria, appear to have in view an expected attack from the Russians in that quarter. I have informed Reshid Pasha of the preparations making for the construction of a bridge near Galatz, and have urged him again to hasten and extend the construction of gun-boats for service on the Danube. His Highness assures me that whatever information of a positive or reliable description I give him is forthwith transmitted to Omar Pasha. Among the statements in Colonel Neale's correspondence is the advance of 10,000 men towards the Dobrudja, which, I presume, may be taken as evidence of the just importance attached to the positions in that district.

In stating the numbers which compose the Turkish army in Bulgaria, Colonel Neale has omitted to state whether he includes the detachment at Kalafat. I presume that such was his meaning; but on the return of Chekib Effendi in five or six days I hope to obtain an exact enumeration of the troops commanded by Omar Pasha, whether on the left or on the right bank of the Danube.

I am assured that 10,000 men have been assembled at Adrianople, I trust with the view of forming a reserve in lines to be established somewhere in that neighbourhood. Sir John Burgoyne, who is just returned from the Dardanelles, will, I hope, be able to inspect that part of the country and to afford his valuable advice. The Turkish Ministers are not yet frankly disposed to accept the services of European officers for the actual command of troops. Some few cases are quite exceptional. A French Colonel and a French Major, for instance, are at Kalafat in the command of troops. General Guyon, as Chef-d'Etat Major in Asia, may be called upon at any moment to command in person. Other officers are employed upon the staff, or as instructors, but even they are far from being numerous. In proportion as the necessity is felt, a greater latitude will probably be given to the introduction of foreign officers; but prejudice on one side, and ignorance of the language on the other, are serious bars to progress.

It is generally believed that French and English troops are likely to come out as auxiliaries to the Sultan's army. However desirable and even necessary such a combined measure may be, it is well for the Turks to remain in ignorance of it until they have settled their defences as much as possible on their own resources. The relaxation which would naturally ensue on looking forward to foreign assistance, might have an injurious effect. The additional body of men expected from Egypt is understood to amount to 10,000.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 410.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 7, 1854.*

I HAVE read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 88, which empowers me to sign the Convention in its amended form. His Excellency expressed to me the very great annoyance caused him by the continued hesitation

on the part of Prussia to adopt and sign the Convention, and he stated that he had once more written to Berlin, to urge the Prussian Government not to persist in its refusal. He said that it would be considered as a triumph by Russia, if a bond of alliance, drawn up for the Four Powers, should be signed only by three of them, and he added that the withdrawal of Prussia would produce the most unfavourable impression, especially in Germany. Count Buol proceeded to state that he did not withdraw from any of the engagements stipulated in the Convention, and he was perfectly willing to confirm them; but he viewed with such grave anxiety the refusal of Prussia to sign this document that he would be inclined to alter its form in order to secure her cooperation. If, therefore, he found that the refusal on the part of the Prussian Government to accept the Convention rested chiefly upon its form, he should desire to substitute in its place a Protocol which he thought the Prussian Government could not refuse to adopt.

March 8.

Since I wrote the former part of this despatch, I have seen Count Buol, who had received from Count Arnim the communications which have been transmitted to him from his Government, upon the proposal to take part in the Convention in conjunction with the Governments of England, France, and Austria.

Count Buol stated that these communications attested the desire of the Prussian Government to adhere to all the engagements they had contracted by the Protocols and Acts of the Conference, and therefore it was from no desire in any way whatever to separate herself from that Conference, or from the policy by which it has been directed, but from reasons which had been transmitted to the English and French Governments, as well as to Austria, that she declined to become a party to the Convention.

Count Buol, under these circumstances, repeated what I have already stated to your Lordship, that he was convinced it would have the worst effect if the three Governments alone should become parties to this Convention, and thus separate themselves from Prussia; that the great force of the present position of the allied Powers was their perfect union in face of the dangers with which Europe was menaced; that if that union was broken up by detaching from it any one of the Great Powers, it would be seized upon as an advantage by that numerous class of persons who had long been striving to accomplish a separation of interests between the Four Powers, and most particularly between Austria and Prussia. Count Buol therefore declared his decided opinion to be against the present signature of this Convention, but he suggested that when the answer to the summons which had been addressed to the Russian Government, and which had been most strongly supported by the Prussian Government, as well as by Austria, was received, he thought a favourable moment would offer for communicating that answer to the Conference, and then in a Protocol, in which this communication would be acknowledged, the whole of the engagements contained in the proposed Convention might be inserted.

I told Count Buol that I would faithfully report his opinions to your Lordship, and that I could at once assure him that his declaration that he withdrew from none of the engagements which were stipulated by the Convention would be received by your Lordship with the most entire satisfaction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 411.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 8, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 85, inclosing despatches from M. de Fonblanque, and asking what foundation there is for certain charges contained in them, implying that Austria is pursuing a secret policy in collusion with Russia, and adverse to the interests of the Porte.

I cannot but think that your Lordship will concur with me in the opinion that the clear and decisive manner in which the Austrian Government have,

through their highest organs, declared the identity of their policy with that of the Governments of England and France, most completely meets and refutes such charges as appear to be founded only upon the arbitrary interpretation given to the acts and reported language of its subordinate agents.

I think it impossible more effectually to repel those charges than by referring to the language of Count Buol, reported in all my late despatches to your Lordship. At the same time it may be proper to observe that M. de Fonblanque himself in his last despatches which I have transmitted to your Lordship, appears to abandon them as groundless.

Count Buol has already had to complain of the indiscreet language of some of his agents who had given expression to their own opinions, which had sometimes been mistaken for those of their Government; but he remarked to me that now that the policy of his Government had been openly and unreservedly declared, it was probable that such expressions of individual opinion as those to which he referred would no longer be indulged in, and it is to be hoped that the distorted accounts of the policy of this Government, to which they have given rise, will no longer be circulated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 412.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 82.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 8, 1854.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol, to his great satisfaction, the statement in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch to me of the 6th instant, in which you express your approval of the proceedings adopted in accordance with his judicious advice upon the receipt of the Russian propositions, and the pleasure with which your Lordship learnt that he would support your summons to evacuate the Principalities.

Count Buol requested me to thank your Lordship for this communication.

After waiting with great anxiety I received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch just before midnight on the 6th, and the messenger Blackwood left a few hours afterwards by the first train in the morning of the 7th, with instructions to use all possible despatch in reaching St. Petersburgh. He took with him the letter from Count Buol to Count Valentin Esterhazy, which I placed under cover to Mr. Michele, Her Majesty's Consul at St. Petersburgh, with directions to cause it to be delivered without delay.

The messenger was also furnished with a passport from Count Buol, in addition to the one of which he was the bearer from your Lordship.

A copy of the letter to Count Valentin Esterhazy, which was read to the Conference, has been transmitted to Count Colloredo for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 413.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 84.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 10, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship the despatch marked in the margin, which I have received under flying-seal from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade.

I transmit this despatch by the opportunity offered by the messenger Marshall, who arrived here this morning from Constantinople. I have received by him no communication from Lord Stratford, but he has brought me several despatches under flying-seal from Sir H. Ward to the Duke of Newcastle, which

I forward by him to their destination. These despatches will naturally be communicated to your Lordship, and I need not therefore enter into any detail with regard to them, but having reported to Count Buol their general contents, he stated that he had received no intelligence from the Turkish provinces on the northern frontier of Greece, but that he considered that which came from Sir H. Ward as very alarming, and as an additional reason why the arrival of the forces which are destined by England and France for the support of Turkey should not be delayed, as he could not divest himself of some apprehension lest the summons sent to St. Petersburgh might tend to immediate war, while the means of giving the assistance to the Turkish Government, which has been assured them, might still be unassembled.

Count Buol told me he had received a report from the Austrian Minister at Athens, who had had an audience of the King of Greece, by whom he had been assured that he would seek by all the means at his disposal to prevent any assistance being given from Greece to the insurrection which had taken place in the Turkish districts bordering upon his frontier, and that he would adhere to the policy which was recommended to him by the allied Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

No. 414.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 122. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 11, 1854.

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this morning, and made known to him the disappointment and regret with which Her Majesty's Government had learned the decision which had been taken by the King with respect to the Convention lately proposed for his acceptance by England, France, and Austria. I thought the best way of conveying to his Excellency your Lordship's sentiments on the subject was to read to him your despatch No. 55 of the 8th instant. He seemed to feel that every word was true, and every reproach merited; and I am happy to say that he rendered full justice to the moderation which had been used by Her Majesty's Government in the various communications that I had been directed to make during the course of the negotiation. He said with deep regret that the matter had been seriously precipitated by Chevalier Bunsen's despatches; and from his Excellency's account of the way in which that Minister appears to have written by telegraph on the 24th instant, it would appear that he must have been under some strange delusion as to the terms in which you may have alluded to the question of whether Prussia would or would not prepare for war against her colossal neighbour, for he said that he had never authorised him to speak in the manner described by your Lordship, and still less to require from Her Majesty's Government any guarantee for the protection of the Prussian dominions in the event of the King's agreeing to the Convention. He added, that he was greatly annoyed at what had occurred, and that he should not fail to let Chevalier Bunsen know of his disapprobation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 415.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 123. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 11, 1854.

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I observed to Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government were well aware that it was not from the want of exertion on his part that the Convention had not been agreed to, but that what was now more important

than the Convention was the conviction that we could never count on the success of any negotiations with Prussia relating to the Eastern question; for that the refusal of the King, and his announced declaration to maintain a strict neutrality, was not only a retrograde step, but, in my opinion, one that was most detrimental to the great cause in which Europe was about to embark, as the decision had already produced an unfavourable effect on Austria, and made her hesitate as to whether she would sign the Convention with England and France, and thus cause a separation in the position of the two German Powers; and further, we must consider Prussian neutrality to be worth 200,000 men to Russia, as her frontiers were now guaranteed by this arrangement. She might now, without danger, throw all her forces against Turkey, and feel that she was secure to act as she pleases, for Europe was not united to support the opinions which had been declared in the Protocols of Vienna; and the question, by this act of the Cabinet of Berlin, was no longer an European but an Eastern one. These considerations, I said, could not fail to strike Her Majesty's Government, and I was sure he must feel the altered position in which the affair now stood.

His Excellency said that he deeply felt the inconvenience of what had occurred; and he added, in confidence, that he had spoken in this sense yesterday to the King, observing that His Majesty had made a retrograde movement in his Eastern policy, and that he must beg his permission to retire from his service, for he could not undertake to defend it.

Upon this the King endeavoured to explain that his opinions were unchanged, and that he was ready to stand by all the acts of the Conference of Vienna; but that he had invariably determined to maintain his neutrality as long as it was possible; that he wished to be on the most friendly terms with England; and that he certainly had no intention of entering into an alliance with Russia.

We then had some conversation respecting Chevalier Bunsen's correspondence; and a rumour having reached me that that Minister had submitted to his Government some wild schemes and ambitious projects as to the future partition of Germany on the termination of the war with Russia, I inquired of this was true. His Excellency replied, that Chevalier Bunsen had really transmitted to the King a memoir embodying his dreams as to what was to happen hereafter, and had thereby greatly displeased His Majesty. He added, that Chevalier Bunsen must be very ignorant of His Majesty's feelings on questions of this kind if he supposed that he was likely to be taken by such notions, for that His Majesty had invariably discountenanced all projects of aggrandisement, and was perhaps almost over-scrupulous on the subject.

Baron Manteuffel then said that he thought it would be essential for some person to be sent to London to explain what had lately taken place here; and that he should be glad if Count Albert Pourtales would undertake this mission, but that he feared he would not be disposed to do so under present circumstances.

The Government here seem to be in a sad state of confusion. Baron Manteuffel's resignation is still in the King's hands. M. de Bismark has not yet returned to Frankfort; and it is said that the Court party are using all their influence to have him placed at the Foreign Office. He is a favourite of the King, and not without talent, but inexperienced, and knowing little beyond the affairs of Germany. If he succeeded to Baron Manteuffel's office he would probably become the mere tool of the King and the "Kreuz Zeitung" party; but it may yet be hoped that this will not be the case.

He was at one moment this week directed to accompany Prince Charles of Prussia to St. Petersburgh, but he persuaded the King of the impropriety of such a mission, and the subject was dropped; and indeed a more improper selection than Prince Charles could not be made, for he certainly would only have encouraged the Emperor Nicholas in expecting countenance at Berlin for his aggressive projects, and would have himself brought back from St. Petersburgh the most exaggerated notions of the military resources of Russia, and of the necessity of making every concession to insure a Russian alliance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 416.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 124.)

Berlin, March 11, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 51 of the 8th instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Athens respecting the line adopted by himself and his French colleague on the question of the insurrectionary movement on the part of the Christian subjects of the Porte, I have asked Baron Manteuffel to send instructions to the Prussian Minister in Greece to cooperate with Mr. Wyse and M. Rouen in the remonstrances which they had addressed to the Hellenic Government, and learned from his Excellency that he had already done so. He added that he regretted to say that the disturbances still continued, and that the Greek Government did not appear as yet to have taken any measures to quell them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 417.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 125. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 11, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 52 of the 8th instant, I have this day requested Baron Manteuffel to inform me what reasons had induced the Prussian Government to make certain military preparations on the Rhine. His Excellency replied that nothing whatever had been done in this sense beyond those which were carried out every year, with the exception of the purchase of grain which had been effected at the present moment in consequence of the expectation that there would shortly be a great rise in prices, and that it was a mere precautionary measure.

I rejoined that I had heard that large purchases of timber had been made at Manheim for the fortresses. He explained that this was necessary for repairs, and that he could affirm positively the measure was not an extraordinary one; but that he could tell me at the same time that their attention had not been directed in these matters so much to the Rhine as to the Eastern Provinces, and that at Königsberg the works of the fortress were undergoing considerable repairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 418.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 126.)

Berlin, March 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in French translation, copy of an article which has been lately published in a Berlin gazette, called the "Preussiches Correspondenz."

This article is the more worthy of notice as it is currently reported to bear an official stamp, and to foreshadow the future attitude and policy of Prussia in the grave events which are soon likely to occur.

The publication of this article at the present crisis, coeval with the change

lately manifested in the political feelings of the King of Prussia, has created some sensation in the public mind, and has given to it an importance which renders it worthy of being submitted for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 418.

Extract from the "Preussiches Correspondenz" of March 18, 1854

PLUS s'approche le moment d'une crise décisive pour la question d'Orient, plus il nous semble que nous pouvons espérer que la Prusse, en suivant une politique aussi loyale qu'indépendante, ne se trouvera pas engagée immédiatement dans une lutte qui grandit chaque jour en importance, malgré toutes les tentatives de médiation qui ont été faites.

Quiconque a suivi d'un œil impartial les dernières négociations, ne pourra pas disconvenir que la Prusse a su faire respecter son indépendance, contre laquelle ont été impuissants tous les efforts de l'étranger; les sympathies que la politique Prussienne a rencontrées dans le pays en sont la preuve.

Cette politique Prussienne, quelque nationale qu'elle soit, ne doit pas éveiller les soupçons de l'Europe. Elle proclame hautement le but auquel elle tend, le maintien des intérêts Allemands et de l'équilibre Européen. Elle n'a pas en vue seulement des intérêts particuliers, mais ceux de tous. La Prusse a dessiné franchement son attitude en prenant part à la Conférence de Vienne, attitude qu'elle a conservée au-delà même du temps où cette Conférence était reunie. Unie à l'Autriche elle s'est entendue avec les Puissances Occidentales pour assurer par une transaction non seulement la souveraineté et l'indépendance de la Porte, mais encore les droits concédés aux Chrétiens en Orient. Quoique les travaux de la Conférence de Vienne n'aient pas atteint leur but, elles ne prouvent pas moins l'accord qui a subsisté entre les Quatre Puissances de l'Occident dans les efforts qu'ils ont faits pour maintenir l'équilibre et la paix de l'Europe—accord qui n'existe pas moins malgré l'inutilité de leurs tentatives. Quelque sincère que fut l'entente des quatre Gouvernements au sujet des principes qui pourraient établir un compromis honorable entre la Russie et la Porte, le Protocole de Vienne ne mentionne pas que les Puissances aient pris l'engagement d'intervenir dans le débat à main armée. Il laisse au contraire à chacun des Etats qui l'ont signé, la faculté de soutenir le programme qu'il a arrêté par les moyens les plus en rapport avec sa situation. Nous croyons que les Puissances Allemandes ne peuvent en aucun cas être regardées comme ayant pris part aux mesures que les deux Puissances Occidentales ont mises à exécution par suite de décisions qui leur sont particulières, soit qu'elles aient été arrêtées pendant le temps de la Conférence de Vienne, soit que ce n'ait été que plus tard. Si dans ces derniers temps on a exprimé sur l'indépendance de l'Allemagne des doutes blessants, il nous semble que le moment est venu de prouver que son indépendance est au contraire entière. Par respect pour d'anciens alliés, les Puissances Allemandes n'ont pas hésité à défendre l'indépendance de la Porte contre des prétensions exagérées de tout le poids de leur autorité morale. Mais elles devaient abandonner aux Puissances qui exercent une grande influence à Constantinople, et dont les flottes occupent la Mer Noire, le soin de défendre par les armes l'Empire Ottoman menacé, pendant que par leur attitude elles ne reservaient le droit de faire entendre aux deux parties des paroles de reconciliation dans des circonstances plus favorables. Nous espérons sincèrement que les principes de cette politique indépendante, qui jusqu'à ce jour a trouvé réunies d'une manière si heureuse la Prusse et l'Autriche, se fortifieront toujours de plus en plus, de manière à ce qu'elle se montre au grand jour si les evènements l'obligeaient à prendre une attitude plus décidée en faveur des intérêts de l'Europe et de l'équilibre Européen.

Quant à ce qui concerne particulièrement la Prusse, l'attitude qu'elle prendra au milieu des parties belligérantes est seule capable de maintenir la paix dans l'Europe Centrale. Du jour où elle armera soit pour l'Orient, soit pour l'Occident, elle attirera infailliblement la guerre des bords du Danube sur le Rhin ou la Vistula. L'Allemagne et le reste de l'Europe ne peuvent désirer une

pareille éventualité. C'est ce qui nous donne l'espoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté reconnaitra également et les devoirs qu'elle est appelée à remplir comme Grande Puissance Européenne et la responsabilité que lui imposent les intérêts particuliers de la Prusse et de l'Allemagne.

No. 419.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 111.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 15, 1854.*

I RECEIVED on the 12th instant, and I have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches from No. 87 to No. 90, both inclusive; the last of the 26th of February.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the advice which you gave to the Turkish Government, as reported in your despatch No. 88, with reference to the insurrectionary movement in the Turkish Provinces bordering on Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 420.

Resumé of a Conversation between Count von Gröben and the Earl of Clarendon, held on the 13th of March, on the views of Prussia respecting the Eastern Question.—(Communicated by Count von Gröben, March 15, 1854.)

My Lord,

VOUS connaissez déjà le contenu de la lettre adressée par le Roi, mon auguste maître, à Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, et dont je suis porteur.

Sa Majesté a daigné me charger en même temps d'attirer la haute attention de la Reine et de son Gouvernement sur deux points essentiels.

Le premier de ces points se rapporte aux dernières propositions Russes envoyées à Vienne. Il paraît malheureusement que les observations que je pourrais faire à ce sujet arriveraient trop tard, comme pendant mon voyage la situation est si changé et que les propositions Russes n'ont point paru acceptables à la Conférence de Vienne, et qu'ainsi que je viens de l'apprendre, les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris ont confirmé l'avis émis par la Conférence de Vienne en les repoussant également de leur côté.

Mais malgré cela je le sens de mon devoir de faire part à votre Seigneurie du vif et ardent désir dont le Roi est animé de voir empêchée cette guerre dont les conséquences sont incalculables. Le Roi désire donc que les Puissances maritimes fassent, avant d'en appeler irrévocablement au sort des armes, un dernier essai en adressant à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie des propositions acceptables sur l'objet qui a provoqué ce conflit entre la Russie et la Turquie.

La sommation de l'évacuation des Principautés a été adressée à la Russie; la réponse de l'Empereur n'est pas douteuse. Que cette réponse soit négative, et la guerre paraît devoir éclater avec toutes ses horreurs; mais ne serait-il pas digne de la grandeur et de la magnanimité du Gouvernement Britannique qu'à ce moment suprême il fît s'arrêter pour quelques jours encore dans ses positions avancées sur les côtes de la Russie la flotte de la Baltique, et qu'il adressât une nouvelle et dernière proposition à la Russie, qui résumât les propositions faites à différentes reprises, et qui appuyât surtout sur la considération que les points principaux réclamés par la Russie en faveur des populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte se trouvent virtuellement accordées par le Sultan à ses sujets de toutes les confessions Chrétiennes par les firmans publiés dernièrement, et qui sont dûs aux efforts réunis et pacifiques des quatre Puissances?

Si la Russie renouvelait son refus, alors, je l'avoue moi-même, la guerre paraît inévitable dans la situation avancée où se trouvent les choses; mais les Puissances maritimes pourraient se dire qu'elles ont fait jusqu'au dernier

mouvent tous les efforts pour résoudre sans effusion de sang la grave question dont ils ont jugé de leur devoir de prendre la défense.

Le second point sur lequel je dois appeler l'attention de Sa Majesté et de son Gouvernement, traite de la position que Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse a prise dans ce moment-ci dans cette même question.

De cœur et d'âme le Roi a soutenu les propositions de la Conférence de Vienne ; mais actuellement sa position est devenue autre.

Les deux Puissances maritimes, qui se trouvent éloignées des frontières de la Russie, ont envoyé des flottes dans la Mer Noire et dans la Baltique, non plus dans le seul but de couvrir la Turquie, mais pour prendre l'offensive contre la Russie. Des troupes Françaises et Anglaises sont en route pour la Turquie dans ce moment-ci pour agir également contre la Russie. Que les opérations de la France et de l'Angleterre soient heureuses ou malheureuses, les deux pays restent à l'abri de tout danger du côté de la Russie, et ni le territoire de la France ni celui de l'Angleterre ne peut être attaqué, et cela aussi longtemps que la Prusse, l'Autriche, et le reste de l'Allemagne restent neutres. La guerre resterait donc restreinte dans certaines limites, où pour ainsi dire, localisée. Mais aussitôt que la Prusse et l'Autriche faisaient cause commune avec les deux Puissances maritimes, en déclarant également la guerre à la Russie, alors cette guerre deviendrait inévitablement une guerre Européenne.

Les frontières de la Prusse et de l'Autriche bordent la Russie sur une longue étendue—elles sont donc exposées à un danger immédiat ; d'un autre côté leur intérêt dans cette question n'est qu'indirect, tandis que celui des Puissances maritimes est de la nature la plus directe. Que la Russie ne voulût pas admettre la neutralité de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, qu'elle exigeât qu'il fallait être ou pour ou contre elle, et que l'existence de la Prusse et de l'Autriche fût menacée, alors sans doute ces États commettraient une grande erreur s'ils ne faisaient par cause commune, les armes à la main, avec la France et l'Angleterre. Mais il n'est nullement question de cela.

Comme leur position est autre que celle des Puissances maritimes, de même leurs devoirs sont d'un caractère différent.

Ces devoirs consistent à faire des efforts d'un autre genre, mais dans le même but, et avec l'espoir du succès, pour détourner de l'Europe le danger d'une guerre Européenne et d'un changement du *status quo* non plus seulement de la Turquie mais de l'Europe entière.

La nature conciliatrice, pacifique et amicale de ces efforts est non seulement prescrite aux deux Etats Allemands par leur position, et par leurs devoirs pour leurs unions, mais il est aussi calculée sur le caractère de l'Empereur Nicolas.

Si l'Empereur voyait que toute l'Europe se trouverait contre lui, alors il croirait la Russie rejetée dans l'année 1812, et la fermeté bien connue de son caractère ne ferait que se roidir davantage. D'un autre côté, s'il voit des amis parmi ses adversaires, il reste le moyen de lui parler le langage de la vérité et de la raison, et l'espérance qu'il l'écoute.

Il conserverait par là la possibilité de faire un pas rétrograde devant sa nation, qui se trouve fortement excitée. Il y a l'espoir que l'Autriche marchera entièrement d'accord avec la Prusse, mais si cette union ne pourrait être complètement conservée, ce ne serait pas à la suite d'une différence d'opinions, mais seulement d'une situation différente par rapport à ses frontières vers la Turquie et à ces sujets professant le culte Grec.

En résumé, toutes les Puissances poursuivent le même but en ce qui regarde la nature des demandes faites par la Russie à la Porte ; elles diffèrent seulement quant aux moyens par suite de leurs positions territoriales. Par ces motifs les Puissances maritimes marchent en première ligne, puisqu'elles ont un intérêt plus direct et qu'elles sont beaucoup moin exposées ; les autres Puissances suivraient en seconde ou troisième ligne selon les circonstances.

En ce qui regarde la Prusse en particulier elle possède une armée formidable, qu'elle serait prête à appeler sous les drapeaux si son honneur ou son existence le réclamaient. Cet appel de l'armée entière ne peut pas se faire sans des sacrifices immenses pour la nation entière, que le Roi en son âme et conscience ne se croit pas en droit de lui imposer si le motif d'une guerre, comme celle qui nous menace, est le résultat d'une chimère.

Le Roi a refusé l'alliance que lui offrait l'Empereur Nicolas, et qui ne lui paraissait pas conforme avec sa dignité ; si l'Empereur voulait s'y entraîner de force, il trouverait une résistance résolue : mais le Roi est également résolue à

résister à des démonstrations hostiles ou des menaces de quel côté qu'elles viennent, et quiconque l'essuyerait se trouverait face à face avec un peuple décidé à sauvegarder son indépendance et capable de le faire.

On a fait dernièrement, je ne sais de quel côté, des propositions au Roi, qui faisaient entrevoir des promesses d'agrandissement pour la Prusse, ou d'avantages quelconques en cas que la Prusse se joignît à la guerre contre la Russie. Je n'ai pas besoin de dire avec quel dégoût le Roi repousse loin de lui de pareilles propositions.

Je répète encore une fois que la guerre une fois commencée peut facilement envelopper l'Europe entière. Je ne puis insister assez combien cette guerre peut devenir fatale, car elle réveillera tous ces intérêts hostiles qui sommeillent en Europe et toutes les mauvaises passions qui l'ont agitée, et qui n'hésitent pas d'attaquer les trônes et les Gouvernements légitimes.

Je suis soldat, M. le Comte, et je l'avoue franchement, je ne crois une guerre pas toujours un mal ! Une guerre pour les plus hauts intérêts de l'existence humaine relève les cœurs et produit des bienfaits qui dépassent souvent les sacrifices qu'elle réclame ; mais la guerre qui nous menace, si elle venait à éclater, serait un malheur.

Les flottes sont en route ; je comprends qu'il soit difficile de les arrêter dans leur marche : elles vont laver la tache de Sinope, mais n'oubliez pas que plus vous remportez de succès, plus vous rendez une paix difficile. L'incendie de Moscou appela sous les armes une nation de 60,000,000. La Russie une fois attaquée, sa nation entière, fière du sentiment de sa force et de sa grandeur, y prendra part pour défendre son honneur et sa nationalité, et l'Empereur lui-même ne pourra alors plus faire la paix comme il le voudra.

Mais ma mission s'arrête ici. Si l'Angleterre se croit dans son droit et qu'elle le croit de son devoir de faire la guerre à la Russie, je ne puis l'en empêcher. Que l'Angleterre alors se batte avec la générosité qui sied au caractère d'une grande nation.

No. 421.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction your despatch No. 77 of the 8th instant, containing a refutation of the reports communicated by Her Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade, with respect to the policy of Austria, for which Her Majesty's Government were prepared. The frank and decided policy pursued by Austria is fully appreciated, but the language of some Austrian agents has been so much at variance with that policy, that reports such as those which M. Fonblanque transmitted are not to be wondered at.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 422.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 119 of the 8th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of Count Gröben's mission to this Court, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 423.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 59.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 123 of the 11th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel relative to the position of Prussia on the Eastern question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 424.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 60.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 125 of the 11th instant, reporting the explanation given by Baron Manteuffel of the military preparations made by the Prussian Government on the Rhine, I have to instruct your Lordship to convey to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this explanation, as Prussia most certainly has had no grounds for suspecting the good faith of the Emperor of the French.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 424a.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 122.)

Foreign Office, March 16, 1854.

[REMARKS on Convention. Hope that Austria will sign it even without Prussia.]

No. 425.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 327.)

Paris, March 16, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO will have made to your Lordship a communication similar to one made yesterday by M. de Hübner to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, with the object of inducing England and France to abandon the project of a Quadruple Convention, and to substitute for it a Protocol of Conference, which should contain the same declarations that it had been proposed to consign to a Convention. An opportunity of signing such a Protocol would be offered if the English and French Governments made an official communication to the Conference of the answer which they were expecting from Russia to their summons to that Power to evacuate the Principalities.

M. de Bourqueney had already communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the intention of Count Buol to make this proposition, and the reasons why the Austrian Government were induced to put it forward; the principal being that since Prussia would not sign the Convention, the value of the united action of the Four Powers would be lost if the remaining three signed it without her, and the consequent triumph of Russia would be great, while the recorded schism of the two great German Powers would have a regrettable influence on the smaller States of Germany.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion that without absolutely breaking with Austria by rejecting her present proposal, every effort should be made in the period which must intervene before the Russian answer to the summons of England and France can be received, to induce her still to sign the Convention.

With this view he has written to M. de Bourqueney and spoken to M. de Hübner, in vigorous though not in unfriendly language, in the hope of proving to the Austrian Cabinet that the course proposed by Austria would be productive of the very evils which she is desirous of avoiding: that the abandonment of a Convention for a Protocol, although the Four Powers might agree in signing the Protocol, would be a greater triumph to Russia than the isolation of Prussia, and the signature of the Convention by Great Britain, France, and Austria alone; and that there is greater danger of exciting discord among the German people, whose sympathies are known to be unfavourable to Russia, by any hesitation on the part of the two great German Powers solemnly to record their opinions respecting the character of the war into which Russia was about to plunge. That, moreover, circumstances had occurred which had, however unfairly, brought the word "Protocol" in connection with the Eastern question into disfavour, and that the Vienna Conference would not be raised in public opinion by being made the vehicle of another compromise.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes addressing a despatch in this sense to-night to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship, but he holds himself free to agree to the signature of the Protocol later, should Her Majesty's Government be of opinion that any advantage could result from it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 426.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 91.)

Constantinople, February 28, 1854.

My Lord.

INTELLIGENCE from Russia reaches us very slowly. I have nothing from Odessa, Galatz, or Bucharest later than the 10th instant.

I learn from Mr. Cunningham that the Russians have called for 32,000 waggons in the Principalities.

Mr. Yeames informs me that the 7th Division of Russian infantry had only just reached its position between Reni and Ismail, relieving the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Division, now passing the Pruth for Galatz.

General Osten-Sacken had arrived at Odessa as Military Governor-General, expecting to be removed before long to Ismail. The Russians were moving forward, and the conscripts appeared in general to be mere boys. Prince Woronzow had obtained leave to go to Carlsbad, on the ground of ill-health.

A letter received yesterday at the Porte from the Governor of Widdin states that the Russians had begun to cannonade the lines at Kalafat. We are in daily expectation of further intelligence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—*March* 1. I am informed that the cannonade heard at Widdin was not accompanied with any serious attack on the lines at Kalafat.

S. DE R.

No. 427.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 92.)

Constantinople, February 28, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is copy of an instruction addressed by the Prussian Envoy at this Court to the first interpreter

of his Legation, with respect to the confidential communications annexed by Reshid Pasha, and declined by me, to the official note accepting the terms of negotiation delivered on the 15th of December to his Highness by the Four Representatives.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 427.

Baron Wildenbruch to his Interpreter.

Péra, ce 16 Février, 1854.

Monsieur,

JE m'étais cru autorisé dans le vrai intérêt de la Porte à regarder les explications verbales dont son Altesse Reshid Pasha vous avait chargé le 2 Janvier, explications dont le but apparent était de préciser et d'expliquer le sens de la réponse de la Porte à la note identique du 12 Décembre, 1853, comme étant d'une nature tout-à-fait confidentielle.

Une dépêche en date du 23 Janvier m'informe d'une démarche analogue que la Porte a cru devoir faire directement par l'entremise de son Chargé d'Affaires à Berlin.

Le Gouvernement du Roi, après avoir pris connaissance de la dépêche du 4 Janvier que son Altesse Reshid Pasha a adressée à Ali Effendi, tout en communiquant à cet employé le texte de la déclaration de la Porte du 31 Décembre, 1853 (1 Rebi-ul-Akhir 1270), ne saurait convenir de l'opportunité de la démarche en question.

Les notes identiques du 12 Décembre, 1853, ont posé la base des négociations. Cette base a été acceptée par la Porte, l'acceptation en a été constatée par la note que la Porte a adressée à la Légation du Roi, en date du 31 Décembre, 1853, et c'est à l'acceptation de ces bases par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que tendent les efforts des Puissances.

Le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait admettre que la dépêche de la Porte du 4 Janvier soit écrite dans le but d'altérer ces bases. Il devrait dans ce cas refuser de la recevoir.

Le Gouvernement du Roi doit donc croire que la dépêche du 4 Janvier ne contient rien de nouveau, qu'elle n'est qu'un corollaire de la note du 31 Décembre, et alors elle est superflue.

Mais comme dans tous les cas cette démarche de la Porte s'occupe d'éventualités que les efforts des Puissances réussiront peut-être à écarter, le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait la regarder que comme superflue.

Partant de ce point de vue et dans le véritable intérêt du Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même, le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait que conseiller à la Porte de ne point donner suite à la démarche en question, et c'est à cet effet qu'il consent à la regarder comme non-avenue.

Veuillez, Monsieur, porter à la connaissance de son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le contenu de cette instruction dont vous êtes autorisé à lui laisser copie.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

No. 428.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 4, 1854.

INCLOSED herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, is Mr. Chabert's report of the French Ambassador's communication to Reshid Pasha, and the latter's reply respecting the combined military forces ordered out from England and France in aid of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 428.

Mr. R. Chabert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Péra, le 4 Mars, 1854.

My Lord,

SON Altesse Reshid Pasha vient de me charger de faire à votre Excellence la communication suivante:

"M. Sheffer, premier drogman de l'Ambassade de France, vient de me communiquer de la part de son Ambassadeur une dépêche dont le résumé est ce qui suit:

"Que le Gouvernement Français, d'accord avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, va envoyer des troupes qui seront débarquées dans le Golfe de Saros au-delà de Gallipoli.

"Que le Gouvernement Français désire savoir si ces troupes seront accueillies en amis par le Gouvernement Ottoman, et si cette communication lui causera de la satisfaction.

"Que l'Ambassadeur de France est autorisé à signer avec la Sublime Porte une Convention concernant le débarquement, le séjour, et le départ de ces troupes, et à lui offrir en même tems toutes les assurances qu'elle voudrait avoir à ce sujet."

Reshid Pasha a répondu à M. Sheffer que le Gouvernement de France ne doit pas douter de l'accueil amical qui sera fait aux troupes Françaises, leur arrivée et leur objet étant une preuve de l'amitié du Gouvernement Français.

Que pour la satisfaction que cette communication causera au Gouvernement Impérial, il (Reshid Pasha) pouvait la lui exprimer d'une manière privée, se réservant à le faire d'une manière officielle après qu'il l'aura communiquée à ses collégues et à son Souverain.

Reshid Pasha a demandé en suite à M. Sheffer si la Convention que son Ambassadeur est autorisé à signer, sera signée entre lui, le Représentant de Sa Majesté Britannique et la Porte, ou bien s'il y aura deux Conventions séparées, une entre le Représentant de la France et la Porte, et une autre entre la Porte et le Représentant de Sa Majesté Britannique, à quoi M. Sheffer a répondu qu'il ne le saurait pas.

Telle est, Milord, mot à mot la communication que son Altesse Reshid Pasha vient de me faire pour l'information de votre Excellence.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

No. 429.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 5, 1854.

YESTERDAY I had the honour to receive your Lordship's instructions of the 16th ultimo, announcing the intention of the British and French Governments to send a combined military force in aid of the Turkish Empire.

I called on Reshid Pasha at an early hour this morning, to acquaint him confidentially with this intelligence, which could not fail to afford him the highest satisfaction. The French Ambassador made a similar communication by means of his interpreter yesterday.

I made Reshid Pasha distinctly understand the terms on which it would be expected that the troops should be received by the Turkish authorities. Indeed, I put him in possession of all the important points declared in your Lordship's instruction. He could not, of course, express any opinion on the part of his Government; but his personal sentiments were testified by unmistakeable symptoms of satisfaction and gratitude. I really see no reason to anticipate any difficulty in carrying out the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the auxiliary forces destined for this country.

I propose to make an official communication to-morrow, in concert with

General Baraguay d'Hilliers; and in the mean time Reshid Pasha will apply for the full powers necessary to enable him to join with us in concluding a formal agreement on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 7, 1854.*

ALTHOUGH General Baraguay d'Hilliers has received the draft of Treaty proposed by your Lordship and accepted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, together with instructions which appear to be similar to mine, he has unfortunately not received any full-powers, and, in consequence, feels himself unauthorised to sign the Treaty at present. He is willing, however, to sign, in concert with Reshid Pasha and myself, a Protocol, in which the terms of the Treaty shall be textually inserted.

Having no reason to suspect that the delay in sending his full-powers is more than an unintended oversight, I propose to adopt the expedient of a Protocol, and Reshid Pasha has no objection to take the same course.

We are to meet, all three, to-morrow at noon, and I do not despair of being able to forward the result of our conference to your Lordship on the 9th or 10th instant. Meanwhile, I have informed Lord Cowley of the omission which retards our proceedings, and, should the requisite full-powers arrive from Paris in a few days, the Treaty will be signed and forwarded with the least practicable delay.

The day before yesterday I sent to ask the French Ambassador whether he was in possession of the necessary full-powers, and his answer being in the affirmative, I was not prepared for the difficulty which he announced to me next day. No doubt there was some mistake in the delivery either of my message or of his reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, *Pera, March 6, 1854.*

I HAVE to request that you will see the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs without delay, and that you will confirm officially to his Highness the important information which I conveyed to him confidentially yesterday, and which he has also received confidentially from his Excellency the French Ambassador.

The substance of this information is, that Her Majesty's Government, as also that of France, have resolved on sending a military force into Turkey without delay for the purpose already explained.

Not doubting that the Porte will receive this additional proof of the friendly determination of the two Governments with cordial satisfaction, you will propose to Reshid Pasha to fix an early day for meeting the French Ambassador and myself with the view of coming to a complete agreement on the matter in question.

Your faithful, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 430.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, March 6, 1854.*

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instructions of this day's date I waited on Reshid Pasha and confirmed officially to his Highness the important information which your Lordship conveyed to him confidentially yesterday, that Her Majesty's Government, as also that of France, have resolved on sending troops into Turkey without delay.

The Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received this additional proof of the friendly determination of the two Governments with heartfelt gratitude, and lost no time in conveying the same to his Imperial Master.

His Highness was willing to fix to-morrow for meeting your Excellency and the French Ambassador with the view of coming to a thorough understanding and complete agreement on the matter in question; but being obliged to attend the Cabinet Council which will be held to-morrow at the Porte on the same subject, he will be most happy to receive you the day after to-morrow (Wednesday) at twelve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Cowley.

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 7, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's despatch of the 18th ultimo, inclosing copy of an instruction from the Earl of Clarendon, and informing me that the draft of a Treaty transmitted therewith having been accepted by the French Government, General Baraguay d'Hilliers would be instructed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to cooperate with me in obtaining its acceptance by the Ottoman Porte.

On communication with the French Ambassador I find that his Excellency has received instructions to that effect, but I also find, to my regret, that he is not yet provided with full-powers.

This circumstance he has represented to me as a reason for not signing the proposed Treaty at present, though he is prepared to sign, in concert with Reshid Pasha and myself, a Protocol, in which the terms of the Treaty would be textually inserted.

This mode of proceeding will probably be adopted, and I hope that the early arrival of full-powers from Paris will enable General Baraguay d'Hilliers to complete his cooperation by joining with Reshid Pasha and myself in signing the Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 431.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 7, 1854.*

THE term appointed by Treaty for the stay of Russian merchants in Turkey and of Turkish merchants in Russia for the settlement of their respective affairs in case of war is drawing to a close. The Internuncio has applied for an addition to the term; but the Porte is not disposed to comply with his request at a moment when proofs of Russian intrigue, exerted to her prejudice by means of numerous partisans in this country, are coming day after day to light. Reshid Pasha is preparing an official note by which Baron Bruck will be made acquainted

with the Porte's decision. The communication will be softened by an extension of the term for two or three weeks in favour of Russian merchants residing at a distance from the seat of war and insurrection. The Austrian Minister will, moreover, be allowed to continue the exercise of his protection over the few public buildings which Russia possesses in this country.

Baron Bruck has lately sent copy to the Porte of a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to M. de Meyendorff and communicated by the latter to Count Buol, with respect to the protection by Austria of Turkish subjects residing in the Russian dominions during the term appointed by Treaty. As your Lordship may possibly not have seen the document I forward a copy of it herewith, accompanied with a copy of the covering despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 431.

Count Buol to Baron Bruck.

M. le Baron, *Vienne, le* 12 *Décembre*, 1853.

AINSI que votre Excellence en a été informée dans le temps, nous avons eu soin de faire connaître au Gouvernement Russe le désir qui nous avait été exprimé par la Porte, que les sujets Ottomans en Russie fussent placés durant les six mois qui s'écouleraient après la déclaration de guerre sous la protection des agens de l'Autriche.

Le Baron de Meyendorff, Envoyé de Russie près la Cour Impériale, vient de nous communiquer une dépêche qu'il a reçu de St. Pétersbourg, et dont je joins ici une copie, dans laquelle son Gouvernement se déclare prêt à reconnaître aux agens diplomatiques et consulaires Autrichiens en Russie, pendant le délai précité, le droit d'accorder aux sujets Ottomans la même protection qu'ils exercent dans les limites de leurs attributions en faveur de leurs nationaux.

Le Gouvernement de Russie rappelle à cette occasion que lors de la dernière guerre avec la Turquie on avait toujours su respecter les intérêts des sujets Turcs en Russie qui ont joui du bénéfice de la protection des lois du pays, même après l'expiration du délai stipulé. Il est ajouté dans la dépêche au Baron de Meyendorff qu'on n'entendait pas cette fois-ci s'écarter de cette ligne de conduite.

Cette résolution ayant été communiquée au Chargé d'Affaires Impérial à St. Pétersbourg, celui-ci, en conformité des ordres que nous lui avions donnés éventuellement, a aussitôt adressé aux Consulats d'Autriche dans les Etats Russes les directions en conséquence.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 431.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.

St. Petersbourg, le $\frac{10 \text{ Novembre}}{1 \text{ Décembre}}$, 1853.

VOTRE Excellence n'ignore pas qu'après la déclaration de guerre de la part de la Turquie, et lors du départ de Constantinople du personnel de notre Chancellerie commerciale, nous avons demandé au Gouvernement Autrichien de prendre sous sa protection les intérêts des sujets Russes qui séjourneraient encore dans l'Empire Ottoman. Vous aurez également en connaissance des instructions qui ont été adressées à ce sujet au Baron de Bruck de la part de son Gouvernement et du résultat des démarches de l'internonciature à Constantinople.

M. le Baron de Lebzeltern vient de me communiquer la dépêche du Comte de Buol ci-jointe en copie, pour m'annoncer le consentement de la Porte à reconnaître aux agens Autrichiens le droit de protection en question, pendant le délai de six mois après la déclaration de guerre, aux termes de l'Article LXXV du Traité de Commerce de 1783, entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane. Il ne me reste ainsi qu'à prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien exprimer au Gouvernement Autrichien combien nous apprécions la sollicitude dont il a fait preuve à cette occasion pour les intérêts des sujets de l'Empereur.

La communication du Baron de Lebzeltern nous informe d'une demande qu'à son tour la Porte a adressé à l'Autriche pour réclamer de sa part la même protection en faveur des sujets Turcs en Russie pendant le délai des six mois stipulé par le Traité précité. Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal étant disposé à accorder à ce désir sauf le consentement de votre Cabinet, je n'ai pas manqué de prendre sur cet objet les ordres de l'Empereur.

Sa Majesté daignant accueillir cette ouverture avec le sentiment de confiance qu'elle a invariablement voué au Gouvernement de son auguste ami et allié, m'a autorisé à faire munir les autorités compétentes de l'Empire des instructions nécessaires à l'effet de reconnaître aux agens diplomatiques et consulaires Autrichiens en Russie, pendant le délai de six mois à partir du jour de la déclaration de guerre, le droit d'accorder aux sujets Ottomans la même protection qu'ils exercent dans les limites de leurs attributions en faveur de leur nationaux.

Vous observerez, M. le Baron, que c'est en vertu d'une stipulation du Traité de 1783, que la Porte a accordé le délai susmentionné aux sujets Russes en Turquie; c'est aux termes de la même stipulation qu'elle a cru devoir réclamer la réciprocité pour ses propres sujets. Je ne crois pas inutile de rappeler ici que lors de notre dernière guerre avec la Turquie nous avons toujours su respecter les intérêts des sujets Turcs en Russie: ils ont joui du bénéfice de la protection de nos lois, même après l'expiration du délai stipulé; nous n'entendons pas cette fois-ci nous écarter de cette ligne de conduite.

Votre Excellence voudra bien donner connaissance de la présente dépêche au Gouvernement Autrichien.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 432.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 139. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 18, 1854.

I HAVE already had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that a Prussian officer had been sent to the Emperor of Austria at Munich, and that that officer was to proceed from thence to Vienna. Colonel Manteuffel, one of the King's Aides-de-camp, is the person who was selected for this duty: and it was with considerable surprise that I heard yesterday of his having come back suddenly to Berlin.

The reason of his unexpected return is explained by the anxiety of the King to hear his report of his audience of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and His Majesty consequently sent him a telegraphic message to Leipsig to repair to this place. The King saw Colonel Manteuffel immediately on his arrival, and despatched him again last night to Vienna.

Baron Manteuffel, from whom I have endeavoured to learn the precise object of his cousin's mission, has told me that he was not charged with any special proposals to the Austrian Government, but that he had been directed generally to make known to the Emperor Francis Joseph the anxious desire of the King for the maintenance of peace, and the intention of His Majesty in sending Count Gröben and Prince Hohenzollern to London and Paris. His Excellency said, however, that the principal object in view was to explain the desire of Prussia to act in concert with Austria on the Eastern question, and to concert with the Imperial Government as to the course which should eventually be followed by the two Governments.

He then told me, that Colonel Manteuffel had found the Emperor much dejected at the little prospect which existed of the maintenance of peace; that His Imperial Majesty was grieved to see that the conduct of Russia left no hope of any accommodation of the matters in dispute; and had said, that although it would be most painful to him to feel himself on the eve of a misunderstanding with the Czar, his duty to his country would be the sole interest he should

have to consult, and that he must now prepare for the inevitable result of these long-pending and fruitless negotiations.

This, Baron Manteuffel said, was the impression which Colonel Manteuffel had received of his audience at Munich, and of which a faithful account had been rendered to the King.

His Excellency added, that this report had produced a satisfactory effect on His Majesty, and that he hoped like impressions would be made by Prince Hohenzollern and Count Gröben, whose return he was anxiously looking for, as he anticipated good from their visits to London and Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 433.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 20.*)

(No. 140.) *Berlin, March 18, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the translation of a Ministerial declaration communicated this day by Baron Manteuffel to the Second Chamber.

This paper contains an explanation of the policy hitherto pursued by Prussia in the Eastern question. It expresses the firm intention of the Government not to recede from the principles in which they had concurred at the Vienna Conference. It delineates the present attitude of Prussia as an expectant one, and it clearly demonstrates a wish to preserve a strict neutrality, reserving an entire freedom of action should necessity call for the energy of Prussia in her own defence or in that of Germany.

Your Lordship will likewise perceive that in referring to Austria, a belief is insinuated that Austria by her geographical position may be called upon to take a more active and decided part than is imposed on Prussia, while it holds forth assurances of the efficient aid and assistance of Prussia, should her own interests or the defence of her German allies demand them.

Your Lordship is already informed that the motive of this Ministerial declaration was to gain the support of the Chambers to a vote of credit for 30,000,000 dollars (about 5,000,000*l.* sterling).

This measure has been referred to a Special Committee of the Chamber, composed of twenty-one members. According to the Parliamentary rules no debate was raised on submitting this proposal to the Chamber, but an animated discussion will probably take place on bringing up the report of the Committee.

I learnt from Baron Manteuffel this afternoon that this Ministerial declaration had been well received by the First Chamber, but that it had met with silence and coldness in the Second Chamber.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 433.

Declaration of the Prussian Government to the Second Chamber.

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,

HIS Majesty's Government have with the greatest attention followed the course of the events which have disturbed the peace in the East, and endangered it in a more extended circle, and have always kept in view the duties imposed upon them on the one hand by the position of Prussia among the States of Europe, and on the other by the particular circumstances of this country and its relations with the rest of Germany.

With regard to the former Prussia was called upon to devote her efforts to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, and the Government can indulge in the satisfactory consciousness of not having left untried any means for attaining that object. They have not only independently exerted the influence and confidence they enjoy with foreign Governments to this end, but at the Vienna Conferences have united their strenuous efforts to those of Austria and the Western Powers to bring the differences between Russia and the Porte to a peaceable issue. The Government have not hesitated to express in the Protocols their honest opinion of the affair, and to impart by their cooperation the full weight of unanimity to the steps taken by the Conference for the maintenance of peace. But before renouncing her liberty of decision beyond that point, and more particularly before making engagements the direct or indirect consequences of which might have been a pledge for active participation in the quarrel, they believed it their duty scrupulously to weigh the sacrifices which they would thereby impose upon the country, and Prussia's own interests which are at stake.

The Government are determined under all circumstances to preserve for Prussia her due cooperation for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, but for the present we must confess that we are not called upon in the same degree as other Powers are, by their geographical position and maritime resources, to interfere actively for the protection of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, in a quarrel, the extent of which is not to be foreseen, and which originated not in the interests of our fatherland, but in the privileges and influence which other Powers claim in the territory of the Porte. Therefore we cannot consider ourselves called upon to take any active part in the present struggle; it is still a satisfaction to the paternal heart of His Majesty the King to be enabled to preserve for Prussia and her German allies the blessings of peace longer than it appears desirable to those Powers more directly concerned.

In this sense His Majesty the King has resolved only to require of the Prussian people those heavy sacrifices inseparable from war, when the true and particular interests of our country, the foremost of which are the honour and independence of Germany, render such a decision imperative.

We hold now, as before, to the position taken up by the Vienna Protocols. For if it remains the essential object of the Vienna Conference to maintain and bring about peace, we shall do nothing in contradiction with it by reserving ourselves, as long as our particular circumstances permit, for fresh renewals of peaceful endeavours, while other States feel themselves called upon by their different position to appeal to arms.

We trust our conduct will meet with fair and unprejudiced estimation, and consequently with the approbation of the foreign Powers; but more particularly our regard for our German allies, and the confidence in the good understanding into which we have already entered with them, and more particularly with Austria, have had a prominent share in guiding the decisions of the Government.

In the same degree in which His Majesty is penetrated with the Royal duty of protecting Prussia and Germany from the miseries of war so long as the dignity and welfare of either permit, he is also resolved under all circumstances to do justice to the exalted mission which appertains to the position of Prussia as an European Power, and to stand faithfully by that ally who, by his geographical position, might be called upon to draw the sword sooner than Prussia in the defence of the interests of Germany.

His Majesty's Government are led to hope that this independent and national line of policy will meet with the full concurrence of the country, and particularly of this House. But they cannot also conceal from themselves the fact that a successful execution of their intentions can only be attained if coupled with a distinct and declared determination to oppose every attempt, from whatever quarter it may come, to force Prussia out of the course the decision of which has been her free choice, and to make the energies of this country subservient to other interests than those which she herself recognises as incontestable, with all the means which God has confided to the hands of the Kings of Prussia for the preservation of the independence of Germany. His Majesty the King considers he must in the present moment prove this firm resolution by demanding from the Chambers the pecuniary means to enable Prussia to carry through with dignity and energy, in the present grave position of European policy a part worthy of her power and her history.

I therefore submit to the House by Royal authority, which I will deliver immediately, a bill respecting a grant of credit of 30,000,000 thalers, for the purpose of its being decided upon according to the Constitution. In direct connexion with it is a proposition which has the object of providing the means of paying the interest and the capital by a temporary increase of taxation in the possible though unwelcome case of the Government being obliged to make use of the grant of credit.

His Majesty's Government openly shows you, gentlemen, the path they will follow; and the greater the decision of the whole country to support a free and firm position of the Government is demonstrated by the voting of the credit required, the less is the probability that Prussia will be exposed to such demands as will necessitate the Government to raise the sums they have required; and we count the more confidently on an unreserved support from the Representatives of the country, as we can assure you that His Majesty's resolutions, which might lead to the use of the required credit, will allow of no influence to considerations not strictly confined to the circle of the particular interests of Prussia and her German allies.

Gentlemen, the rulers of Prussia, when they demanded a sacrifice and a pledge of confidence of their people in the name of the highest of earthly possessions—in the name of the honour and independence of the fatherland—have never received other reply than the expression of a joyful devotion of property and person; and you, gentlemen, will concur in our opinion that your voice faithfully pourtrays the feeling of the whole country, if you confidently place in the hands of His Majesty's Government the means of protecting the independence of the fatherland from every offensive attack, and if you convince Europe that the whole force of the country is to-day and ever ready without hesitation to undertake, when called upon, to transmit that inheritance of honourable independence acquired by the heroism of our fathers, unsullied and unsullied through the storms of time.

Berlin, March 10, 1854.

No. 434.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 331.) *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the letter addressed on the 27th ultimo by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Nesselrode, summoning the Emperor of Russia to evacuate the Principalities, with which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs has furnished me for your Lordship's use.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 434.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Nesselrode.

Paris, le 27 Février, 1854.

M. le Comte,

JE remplis les ordres de l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, en ayant l'honneur de déclarer à votre Excellence que si le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg persistait à ne pas vouloir replacer son démêle avec la Sublime Porte dans des termes purement diplomatiques, et ne nous annonçait pas, par votre organe, l'intention de faire immédiatement commencer aux troupes commandées par M. le Général Prince Gortchakoff leur mouvement de retraite au-delà du Pruth, limite fixée par les Traités aux territoires respectifs de la Russie et de la Turquie, de façon à ce que les deux Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie fussent complétement évacuées à la date du 15 Avril prochain, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale se verrait forcé de considérer une réponse négative, ou le silence, comme l'équivalent d'une déclaration de guerre, et d'agir en conséquence.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 435.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 332.) *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE I addressed your Lordship my despatch No. 327, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received advices which convince him that the Prussian Government is not only ready to sign a Protocol of Conference, embodying all the stipulations of the proposed Quadruple Convention, but that they are willing to empower the Conference to discuss the measures that may become necessary to give effect to those stipulations. Under these circumstances, and having been informed by Count Walewski of the reasons why your Lordship considers that the wish of Austria to substitute a Protocol for a Convention should be acceded to, his Excellency is not disposed to press on the Austrian Cabinet his preference of a Convention, and he is willing to agree to the signature of a Protocol that shall contain all the points mentioned in and sanctioned by the Convention, provided that the clause alluded to above as having been proposed by Prussia is added; and that Austria binds herself beforehand to sign the Convention "à trois" if Prussia declines to accept the Protocol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 436.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 333.) *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING been informed that there was some intention on the part of the French Government to establish depôts in Candia for the use of the Eastern expedition, I inquired this morning of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether such was the case.

He was evidently embarrassed by my question. He said that he had made no application to the Ottoman Government through General Baraguay d'Hilliers, but that he had asked Vely Pasha whether it would be possible to obtain a few houses on the island which might be converted into hospitals and stores.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that in asking this question of Vely Pasha, he had been careful to state that the English Government might equally profit by the permission if it was granted, and he expatiated to me upon the advantages of good air for convalescents which this island would afford, and also of its being in such a position that its occupation by foreign troops would keep any insurrection in check.

As yet M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me no answer has been received from the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 437.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 336. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

IN my despatch No. 303 I informed your Lordship of the expected arrival in this capital of the Prince de Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, charged with a special mission from the King of Prussia to the Emperor.

The Prince was the bearer of two letters from His Imperial Majesty, one official, the other private; their object being to induce the Emperor to consent to

reopen negotiations with Russia on the basis of the last propositions sent from St. Petersburgh to Vienna. I presume that letters of a similar nature were sent by General Gröben to the Queen.

The diplomatic character being entirely new to Prince Hohenzollern, I do not believe that he has taken much pains in conversation to support the proposal of his Royal relative. He sets out on his return to Berlin this evening having failed entirely in the object of his mission.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys read to me in confidence this morning the answer of which the Prince would be the bearer from the Emperor, and of which the following is a faint sketch.

His Imperial Majesty thanks the King for his letters, and for the choice of the messenger by whom they had been sent. He does homage to the sentiments which induce the King to persist in his desire for peace, and although His Majesty's present proposal is inadmissible, yet the Emperor professes himself ready to listen to any future overtures the acceptance of which may not be inconsistent with the honour of the nation over which Providence has called him to rule. But war being imminent he requests His Prussian Majesty to turn his thoughts to the future rather than to the past, and to endeavour to lessen the calamities of war by bringing it to an early termination. This, His Majesty observes, can best be obtained by the active union of the European Powers against the perturbator of the general peace. The King of Prussia is reminded that his Representative at Vienna has signed protocols which declare the public law to have been violated, and whence the violation comes. His Majesty looks with confidence to His Prussian Majesty acting up to His declaration in a manner worthy of the virtues and understanding for which he is renowned, and of the sentiments which distinguish the people over whom he reigns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 438.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 337.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

HER Majesty's Consul at Marseilles informed me by telegraph, that Sir Stephen Lakeman left Marseilles at noon on the 15th instant with despatches from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. Under these circumstances Sir Stephen ought to have been here yesterday, but as he is not yet arrived I do myself the honour of stating in a few words the substance of General Baraguay d'Hilliers' reports of the 5th instant to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Ottoman Government appeared to be engaged in the furtherance of measures to ameliorate the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects.

The projected expedition to the East of British and French troops was known at Constantinople, and had been received with lively satisfaction. Preparations were making to do every honour to them on their arrival, and supplies for their use were ordered to be collected at Adrianople, with an intention of sending what might be wanted to Gallipoli.

The Convention proposed by the French and English Governments to secure the admission of French and English troops within the Turkish territory appears to have been well received and approved by Reshid Pasha, but it had not obtained the sanction of the Council of Ministers, or of the Sultan, when the mail of the 5th was dispatched.

The Porte was much in want of money, and had pressed the French Government to make the Turkish treasury an advance of 10,000,000 francs. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs me that he telegraphed this morning to Count Walewski to state this circumstance to your Lordship, and the intention of the French Government to comply with the demand of the Porte, asking at the same time whether Her Majesty's Government would be willing to share the responsibility.

It was clear to me, from M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations in making this

statement, that the French Government looks to be repaid by supplies of various kinds, to be furnished by the Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—*March* 19. I have the honour to add, that Sir Stephen Lakeman reached Paris late last night with a sealed bag for your Lordship.

C.

No. 439.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 338. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

IT appears that M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote some weeks back to the Prince of Servia to exhort him to maintain a strict neutrality in the struggle between Russia and the Porte, observing to him, that the part which France and England took in the contest was a guarantee that the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte would not be neglected; that if the Treaties which gave to Russia the protectorate of Servia were destroyed by the fact of war, other Treaties might vest that protectorate in the hands of all the European Powers, and that those of the Sultan's provinces which assisted the Christian Powers in their endeavour to restrict the ascendancy of Russia, would naturally find greater favour in the eyes of those Powers, during future negotiations, than those who countenanced the Czar's proceedings.

To this letter the Prince of Servia has replied in becoming terms, assuring M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he relies on the sympathy of England and France; and that he shall do nothing in this war which will militate against the duties he owes to his Sovereign the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 440.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 339. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 18, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has had the goodness to read me an extract from a despatch of some importance, which he has received from the French Minister at Munich, who, it appears, had managed to obtain a private audience of the Emperor of Austria during His Majesty's late visit to that capital.

After making inquiries respecting the departure of the French troops for the East, the health of Marshal St. Arnaud, &c., the Emperor said: "The work we have undertaken in the East is full of peril," &c., thus associating himself in the undertaking of the British and French Governments.

It may not be superfluous to add that M. de Menneval states the feelings in the higher classes of Bavaria to be Russian, while that of the lower is decidedly the contrary.

The conduct of Prussia appears to have excited the animadversion of the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 441.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 340. Confidential.)

Paris, March 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I WAS about to write to your Lordship on the subject of the sympathy said to have been evinced by the Pope for the Russian cause, when Mr. Lyons' interesting despatch No. 14 of the 4th instant reached my hands.

The following I believe to be the particulars of the paltry intrigue which it has been attempted by Russia to get up at Rome.

Some weeks ago the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden, now at Paris, received a letter from the Duchess of Leuchtenberg, which it was evidently intended should be shown to the Emperor; and in which her Imperial Highness, in allusion to the Emperor, speaks of the sorrow with which she had seen her dear cousin's misunderstanding with her father, and her astonishment that the Sovereign of a country so remarkable for the protection which it gave to Christians in the East, should be found aiding the Turks; adding that the Pope himself had blessed the Russian arms.

The Emperor, it appears, took some pains to ascertain what could have been the source of such an assertion; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave me lately the following explanation:

On some occasion lately the Pope, in conversation either with a Russian of high rank, who was passing through Rome, or with the accredited Russian Diplomatic Agent, spoke of the affairs of the East; and in taking leave of the person in question, sent some messages to the Emperor of Russia, adding, "I do not forget him in my prayers."

It seems that this phrase, although a common one in the mouth of the Pope, when speaking of foreign Sovereigns, and intended as a prayer for their conversion when applied to those Princes who are deemed heretic by the Court of Rome, was magnified by the person to whom it was addressed into a prayer for the Czar's success in the East; and a letter written in the same exaggerated tone was immediately written by him to St. Petersburgh. This produced an autograph letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Pope, thanking him for his prayers and good wishes, which the Pope could not understand; and His Holiness, M. Drouyn de Lhuys tells me, has written an answer in which he enumerated, with considerable astuteness, several complaints which it had been his duty to make to the Emperor of Russia as to the treatment of the Roman Catholic Church in the Russian dominions, and supposes that these must be the communications to which His Imperial Majesty alludes.

I should hardly have thought it necessary to trouble your Lordship on this matter, had not M. Drouyn de Lhuys reverted more than once to it, as if he wished that it should be fully explained.

The fact of the Duchess of Leuchtenberg having written to the Grand Duchess Stephanie is, however, obtained from another source; and I request your Lordship to consider this part of my communication as confidential.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 442.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 90.)

Vienna, March 15, 1854.

[HAS written to Mr. Fonblanque respecting steps taken by Austrian Government in regard to M. Mouchine.)

No. 443.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 91.)

Vienna, March 15, 1854.

[AUSTRIAN Minister at Athens will remonstrate with Greek Government.]

No. 444.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 92.)

Vienna, March 15, 1854.

[HAS given to Count Buol a copy of No. 106. Confidence in Austrian policy.]

No. 445.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 351.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 20, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will have seen, from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 102, forwarded by Captain Rhodes this morning to London, that, although the French Ambassador at Constantinople had cooperated with his Excellency to obtain the acceptance by the Porte of a Treaty regulating the assistance to be given to the Sultan by Great Britain and France, yet that General Baraguay d'Hilliers had not been furnished with the full-powers necessary to enable him to sign that Treaty.

I called early this morning on M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and I found that his Excellency had been made aware of this omission only yesterday by a telegraphic despatch from General Baraguay d'Hilliers, dated the 13th instant. He expressed great regret at the oversight, for it was nothing else, and, at my suggestion, delayed the departure of to-morrow's mail from Marseilles for twenty-four hours, in order that the full-powers of General Baraguay d'Hilliers might be transmitted by the present occasion.

Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Hamdre" was telegraphed here yesterday as arrived at Marseilles, having left Constantinople on the 13th instant. I presume that she is the bearer of the Convention signed, as it would appears by General

Baraguay d'Hilliers' telegraphic despatch, between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Porte, and left open by Protocol for the signature of the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 446.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 352. Confidential.)

Paris, March 20, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received yesterday a very interesting despatch from M. de Moustier, giving an account of a conversation which that Minister had held with M. de Manteuffel on the subject of the attitude taken by Prussia on the Eastern question.

M. de Moustier, having learnt that the King of Prussia had written to the Emperor of Austria, proposing a declaration of neutrality on the part of Germany, appears to have resolved to question Baron Manteuffel upon the subject; and a convenient opportunity having enabled M. de Moustier to advert to the retrograde policy of Prussia, M. de Manteuffel inquired to what he alluded.

The French Minister replied by asking whether the Prussian Government had not some time back declined a suggestion of the Austrian Government that the two great German Powers should make a declaration of neutrality to the Diet. True it was that Austria had declared that she had never made any such suggestion, but, however that might be, the Prussian Government had had an opportunity of proclaiming that they would make no declaration which would put their policy advisedly in opposition to that of the maritime Powers with whom they were united in conference.

M. de Manteuffel assented to this statement. M. de Moustier then asked him whether it was not equally true that the Prussian Government had addressed a despatch to the Prussian Minister at Vienna, explaining the reasons why Prussia could not sign the proposed Quadruple Convention, but requesting that her refusal might not prevent the signature by Austria, whose interests in the Eastern question were very different from those of Prussia.

Not only that, rejoined M. de Manteuffel, but we engaged, in case of any peril threatening Austria, in consequence of her signature, to come to her assistance.

I must say, then, answered M. de Moustier, that, when the King now writes a letter to the Emperor of Austria to recommend a contrary course, I am am justified in saying that your policy is retrograde.

But how do you know that the King has so written? asked M. de Manteuffel, evasively. M. de Moustier replied, that it was well known. To his surprise M. de Manteuffel then said, that he must correct one part of M. de Moustier's statement, namely, that any despatch had been sent to Vienna urging Austria to sign the Convention. It had been written and read to the Austrian Minister, Count Thun, but had not as yet been expedited from Berlin.

It is to be observed, that M. de Moustier asserts that M. de Manteuffel had assured him that the despatch had been transmitted to Vienna ten days ago; and, indeed, M. de Manteuffel does not appear to deny that he did give that assurance.

Some discussion then ensued concerning the word "neutrality," M. de Moustier observing that a neutrality such as that proposed by the King amounted almost to a position of hostility towards the maritime Powers. M. de Manteuffel explained, that such was not its intention; that he was about to make a declaration to the Chambers, in which, although M. de Moustier might not be satisfied with its terms, the word "neutrality" would be carefully avoided; that the King had yielded this point, and that in general His Majesty was coming round to his (M. de Manteuffel's) views; but M. de Manteuffel requested that this might not be talked about, as noticing it would have the effect of throwing the King back into the arms of the Court party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 447.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 234.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 332 of the 18th instant, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is willing to agree to the signature of a Protocol, as suggested by the Austrian Cabinet, in place of the proposed Quadruple Convention; and I have to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this intelligence.

With reference to the substitution of a Protocol for the above-mentioned Convention, I inclose herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Lord Westmorland, stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the proposed change.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 447a.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 236.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to that part of your Excellency's despatch No. 337 of the 18th instant, stating that General Baraguay d'Hilliers had reported to his Government that the Ottoman Government appeared to be engaged in the furtherance of measures to ameliorate the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects, I have to instruct your Excellency to ask M. Drouyn de Lhuys what information has been received on this point by the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 448.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 237.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1854.

My Lord.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 340 of the 18th instant, I have to instruct you to thank M. Drouyn de Lhuys for his communication to your Excellency respecting the alleged sympathy of the Pope for the cause of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 424a.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 449.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 238.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your despatch, marked Confidential, No. 336 of the 18th instant, stating the object of Prince Hohenzollern Sigmaringen's special mission to the Emperor of the French; and I have to state to your Excellency that the purpose and the result of Count Gröben's mission to London were precisely the same as those of Prince Hohenzollern to Paris; and I transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the letter which the King of Prussia has addressed to Her Majesty, and of which Count Gröben was the bearer, and also a copy of the answer which Her Majesty has returned thereto.*

Your Excellency may communicate the contents of Her Majesty's letter to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but you will not give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 450.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 239.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I OBSERVE by the copy of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter to Count Nesselrode, inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 331 of the 18th instant, that the 15th of April is the day named by which Russia is to evacuate the Principalities.

In my letter to Count Nesselrode, of which a copy was forwarded to your Excellency in my despatch No. 136 of the 27th February, the 30th of April was named; and I have now to acquaint your Excellency that this discrepancy arose from an alteration having been made in the English draft after it had been communicated to the French Government, and from that alteration having by accident not been made known through your Excellency to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I mentioned the alteration, however, to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 451.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 124.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 92 of the 15th instant, reporting your communication to Count Buol of my despatch No. 106 of the 8th instant, expressing the entire confidence felt by Her Majesty's Government in the policy of Austria, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Not printed.

No. 452.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 358.)

Paris, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

IT would appear, from a despatch received this morning by M. Drouyn de Lhuys from Berlin, that the Prussian Government is desirous of introducing into the Protocol, by which it is intended to replace the Quadruple Convention, modifications of the stipulations contained in the latter instrument.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked to me, with great indication of vexation, that this was in direct contradiction to a despatch from M. de Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt, which the latter had read to him some days ago, and in which not only were the different points contained in the Convention enumerated, and their introduction into a Protocol assented to, but it was proposed that the Conference should occupy itself with the measures which the signature of the Protocol might render necessary.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that this further tergiversation on the part of Prussia made him regret that he had given his assent to the substitution of a Protocol in place of a Convention. I reminded him that his assent depended on certain conditions being fulfilled, and that it rested with the Austrian Government, who had requested the substitution, to see that the conditions were fairly carried out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 453.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 108.)

Constantinople, March 13, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Tripartite Treaty concerning the reception of the allied armies destined for Turkey was finally agreed upon by the three Representatives at a late hour last night. General Baraguay d'Hilliers was prevented by the want of full-powers from adding his signature to those of Reshid Pasha and myself. I waited in vain at his request till after the arrival of the French steam-packet yesterday. Reshid Pasha joined with me in urging him to sign, on the ground of its being clear that the absence of his full-powers was a mere accidental omission. He persisted in declaring his inability to join with us in signing the Treaty, notwithstanding the importance of dispatch; and we were finally compelled to make the best arrangement that the view he took of his duties permitted. We passed the whole night at Reshid Pasha's house, and it was not till long after sunrise that the arrangement agreed upon was fully executed.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, the formal instrument concluded, signed, and sealed by the Ottoman Plenipotentiary and myself, together with the Supplementary Protocol, to which the Treaty is annexed, and which is invested with the signatures of the three Representatives. It has been the object of my exertions, seconded by those of Reshid Pasha, to bring the arrangements as near to a formal conclusion as the circumstances would allow, and I hope that what we have done, though necessarily imperfect, will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

Without entertaining any unworthy suspicions, and attributing General Baraguay d'Hilliers' difficulty to nothing but a mistaken scrupulousness, I thought it my duty to guard against the hazards which would arise out of the presence of a French army in this country on a formal invitation from the Porte before the definitive acceptance of the Treaty by France.

Your Lordship will observe that, although the Treaty has been signed in French, the English version transmitted officially from London has been strictly followed throughout, with the exception of Article IV, which is altogether new. In obtaining the consent of my colleagues to that Article, amended in one part

of it by the French Ambassador, I was moved by a strong sense of the importance of consulting the independence and efficiency of the allied armies while acting in this country, and of relieving them from the embarrassment of having to contend with misplaced pretensions on the part of the Turkish authorities. My first idea in framing the stipulations of that Article was to place them in the accompanying Protocol; but, finding that my colleagues preferred their insertion in the Treaty, I acquiesced in their opinion, and am willing to believe that, considering the nature and object of the new clauses, it will appear to your Lordship as to me that the more solemn and stringent form is preferable.

The closing paragraph of the Protocol was first prepared by Reshid Pasha in terms of a more positive character. The want of instructions for so important an innovation determined the French Ambassador and myself to keep within the limits of a recommendation to our respective Governments.

Should the full-powers, which may still be expected, arrive before the receipt of the Treaty in Paris and London is acknowledged, I hope that the irregular course adopted from necessity, for the moment, will be removed from that instrument.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 453.

Convention between Great Britain, France, and Turkey, concluded at Constantinople, March 12, 1854.

SA Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, ayant été invitées par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à l'aider à repousser l'agression dirigée par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies contre les territoires de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, agression par laquelle l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et l'indépendance du trône de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan se trouvent menacées; et leurs dites Majestés étant pleinement persuadées que l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman dans les limites actuelles est essentielle au maintien de la balance du pouvoir entre les Etats de l'Europe, et ayant en conséquence consenti à donner à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan l'assistance qu'il a demandée dans ce but; il a paru convenable à leurs dites Majestés, et à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, de conclure un Traité afin de constater leurs intentions conformément à ce que précède, et de régler la manière d'après laquelle leurs dites Majestés prêteront assistance à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Dans ce but, leurs dites Majestés et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ont nommé pour être leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir: Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande le Très-Honorable Stratford, Vicomte Stratford de Redcliffe, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son Conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand Croix du Très-Honorable Ordre de Bain, et son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près la Porte Ottomane; Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

; et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, Mustapha Rechid Pacha, son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, lesquels, après s'être réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles qui suivent:

ART. I. Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, ayant déjà à la demande de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, ordonné à de puissantes divisions de leurs forces navales de se rendre à Constantinople, et d'étendre au territoire et au pavillon Ottomans la protection que permettraient les circonstances, leurs dites Majestés se chargent par le présent Traité de coopérer encore davantage avec Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, pour la défense du territoire Ottoman, en Europe et en Asie, contre l'agression Russe, en employant à cette fin tel nombre de leurs troupes de terre qui peut paraître nécessaire pour atteindre ce but, lesquelles troupes de terre leurs dites Majestés expédieront aussitôt vers tel ou tels points du territoire Ottoman qu'il sera jugé à propos; et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan convient que les troupes de terre Britanniques et Françaises ainsi expédiées pour

la défense du territoire Ottoman, recevront le même accueil amical et seront traitées avec la même considération que les forces navales Britanniques et Françaises employées depuis quelque temps dans les eaux de la Turquie.

II. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent, chacune de leur côté, à se communiquer réciproquement, sans perte de temps, toute proposition que recevrait l'une d'elles de la part de l'Empereur de Russie, soit directement soit indirectement, en vue de la cessation des hostilités, d'un armistice, ou de la paix; et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan s'engage en outre à ne conclure aucun armistice et à n'entamer aucune négociation pour la paix, ou à ne conclure aucun préliminaire de paix, ni aucun Traité de Paix, avec l'Empereur de Russie, sans la connaissance et le consentement des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

III. Dès que le but du présent Traité aura été atteint par la conclusion d'un Traité de Paix, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français prendront aussitôt des arrangemens pour retirer immédiatement toutes leurs forces militaires et navales employées pour réaliser l'objet du présent Traité, et toutes les forteresses ou positions dans le territoire Ottoman qui auront été temporairement occupées par les forces militaires de l'Angleterre et de la France, seront remises aux autorités de la Sublime Porte Ottomane dans l'espace de quarante jours, ou plutôt si faire se peut, à partir de l'échange des ratifications du Traité par lequel la présente guerre sera terminée.

IV. Il est entendu que les armées auxiliaires conserveront la faculté de prendre telle part qui leur paraîtrait convenable aux opérations dirigées contre l'ennemi commun sans que les autorités Ottomanes, soit civiles soit militaires, aient la prétention d'exercer le moindre controle sur leurs mouvemens: au contraire, toute aide et facilité leur seront prêtées par ces autorités, spécialement pour leur débarquement, leur marche, leur logement ou campement, leur subsistence et celle de leurs chevaux, et leurs communications, soit qu'elles agissent ensemble, soit qu'elles agissent séparement.

Il est entendu de l'autre côté que les Commandants des dites armées s'engagent à maintenir la plus stricte discipline dans leurs troupes respectives, et feront respecter par elles les lois et les usages du pays.

Il va sans dire que les propriétés seront partout respectées.

Il est de plus entendu de part et d'autre que le plan général de campagne sera discuté et convenu entre les Commandants-en-chef des trois armées, et que si une partie notable des troupes alliées se trouvait en ligne avec les troupes Ottomanes, nulle opération ne pourrait être exécutée contre l'ennemi sans avoir été préalablement concertée avec les Commandants des forces alliées.

Finalement, il sera fait droit à toute demande relative aux besoins du service adressée par les Commandants-en-chef des troupes auxiliaires, soit au Gouvernement Ottoman par le canal de leurs Ambassades respectives, soit d'urgence aux autorités locales, à moins que des objections majeures, clairement énoncées, n'en empêchent la mise à exécution.

V. Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées à Constantinople, dans l'espace de six semaines, ou plutôt si faire se peut, à partir du jour de la signature.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait en triple pour un seul et même effet à Constantinople, le $\frac{12 \text{ March}}{\text{1st Poshtan}}$ 1854.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE. (L.S.) RECHID. (L.S.)

A true copy.

Constantinople, March 13, 1854.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 453.

Protocol of a Conference held at Constantinople, March 12, 1854.

LES Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France s'étant réunis aujourd'hui en conférence avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte à l'Hôtel de Son Altesse, les trois Représentants ont arrêté le présent Protocole pour constater ce qui suit.

Les Gouvernements Anglais et Français ayant pris la résolution, pour le cas où la Porte Ottomane en exprimait le désir, d'envoyer des troupes de terre pour aider Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à repousser l'agression de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et ce désir venant d'être manifesté au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan par Son Altesse Rechid Pacha, les trois Représentants ont arrêté d'un commun accord les Articles d'un Traité ci-annexé, qui a été signé par son Altesse Rechid Pacha et son Excellence Lord Stratford de Redcliffe en vertu des pleins-pouvoirs dont ils sont munis.

Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France n'étant pas muni des mêmes pouvoirs n'a pu signer le dit Traité pour le moment, tout en étant d'accord que les Articles stipulés dans cet Acte sont conformes aux intentions de son Gouvernement, et que l'arrivée des troupes Françaises en Turquie n'aurait lieu qu'après l'acceptation formelle du Traité par la Cour de France.

En employant d'un commun accord la langue Française pour la rédaction du Traité précité, les Représentants n'ont voulu préjuger en rien les cas à venir.

Son Altesse Rechid Pacha ayant proposé de laisser le susdit Traité ouvert à l'accession de toute autre Puissance amie qui désirerait y adhérer, les deux Ambassadeurs se sont engagés à soumettre cette proposition à leurs Cours respectives.

Fait en triple pour un seul et même effet.

Constantinople, le $\frac{12 \text{ Mars}}{\text{29 Février}}$, 1854.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.
BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.
RECHID.

A true copy.
Constantinople, March 13, 1854.
(L.S.) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 454.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 109.)

Constantinople, March 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, in translation, an official note addressed by the Porte to the French Ambassador and myself, complaining, amongst other things, of the conduct of the Greek Government in conniving at the assistance given by their subjects to the insurrectionary movements in Epirus. A copy of this document has been transmitted by me to Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, accompanied with a despatch, of which copy is likewise inclosed.

I avail myself of this opportunity to send copies of despatches which I have severally addressed on the same subject to Her Majesty's Lord High Commissioner at Corfu, and to our Consul at Monastir; together with a translation of the instructions addressed by the Porte to Fund Effendi, and of an official note sent in by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Athens, giving, to all appearance, a grossly false colouring to the aggressive and unwarrantable proceedings of the Hellenic Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 454.

Note addressed by the Porte to the Ambassadors of England and France.

(Traduction.) 9 *Djemazi-ul-Akhir*, 1270. (9 *Mars*, 1854.)

VOTRE Excellence est sans doute au fait des troubles qui viennent d'éclater à Arta et dans l'Agraphia, des insultes qui ont été faites au Représentant de la Sublime Porte à Athènes, et de tous les événements étranges qui se sont succédés depuis partout en Grèce.

Les réponses faites par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement Grec, M. Païcos, aux représentations verbales et par écrit de Néchat Bey, Chargé d'Affaires de la Sublime Porte, ainsi que les propos que le Ministre de Grèce, M. Metaxa, a tenus au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, sont pour la plûpart équivoques, ils ne sont pas de nature à passer pour une justification, ils sont incompatibles avec la dignité d'un Gouvernement.

A en croire, M. Metaxa, la Grèce serait tout-à-fait étrangère aux événements qui se passent en dehors de ses frontières. Il dit entre autre choses, que ces événements, ainsi que les pétitions contenant des plaintes que les habitants d'Arta ont fait parvenir en Grèce, ont excité les esprits à Athènes, et dans quelques autres parties de la Grèce; que les trois-quarts de la population d'Athènes étant composés d'émigrés des provinces voisins, c'est leur conduite qui a donné lieu à une foule de démonstrations inconvenantes; que le Gouvernement Hellénique ne pouvant pas, d'après les principes qui dirigent l'Administration du pays, faire cesser tout d'un coup cet état de choses, il est obligé de prendre du temps et d'user de délai; qu'en conséquence de la scène inconvenante qui s'est passée devant l'Hôtel de la Légation Ottomane, le Préfet de Police ainsi que le Professeur dont la Légation s'était plainte, il y a quelque temps, ont été déposés, et que les mesures que le Gouvernement Grec a prises pour empêcher qu'on ne franchisse les frontières ne pouvant pas être considérées comme étant suffisantes, si la Sublime Porte veut bien entreprendre de réprimer les désordres dans ses propres frontières, et de forcer les hommes qui sont sortis de la Grèce à y rentrer, dans ce cas le Gouvernement Hellénique usera, de son côté aussi, de rigueur envers eux.

M. Metaxa dit qu'il est chargé de donner des assurances que le Gouvernement Grec prendra par gradation des mesures pour faire cesser un état de choses aussi inconvenantes, mais que l'on ne saurait donner à cet égard une promesse positive.

Les pétitions qui ont été répandues ne sont pas venues d'Arta; il est parfaitement évident qu'elles ont été composées et rédigées en Grèce pour fomenter les esprits, et il existe une foule d'écrits conçus dans un sens également séditieux.

Si l'effervescence des esprits en Grèce est un effet des événements survenus sur les frontières voisines, il est clair que ces événements sont uniquement dûs aux excitations et aux séductions des hommes qui ont franchi les confins de la Grèce. Or tandis que Griva, Coraïscaki, le Général Tzavella, Hadji Carà-Thasso et autres personnes semblables bien connus qui sont au service du Gouvernement Grec, et qui ont tout l'air d'avoir donné leur démission par feinte, se trouvent les armes dans les mains, dans le foyer des troubles; comment le Gouvernement Grec peut-il se croire étranger à ces événements? Et quand même toute la population d'Athènes consisterait en émigrés, dès que ceux-ci aussi sont actuellement des sujets Hellènes, difficilement on comprendrait comment l'autorité peut les considérer comme des étrangers et se dire incapable de condamner leurs procédés et de les punir. On met en avant que la constitution de la Grèce est un obstacle à l'exécution rigoureuse des devoirs du Gouvernement en pareils cas; mais comment admettre qu'une constitution puisse contenir des dispositions aussi contraires aux droits des nations, que de favoriser le passage de ceux qui franchissent les frontières pour exciter à la révolte les sujets d'une Puissance voisine avec laquelle on est en paix? ou bien, si un Gouvernement laisse le champ libre à des hommes pernicieux et nuisibles comme ceux-là, à cause de sa faiblesse et de son impuissance, comment donner le nom de Gouvernement à un Gouvernement de cette espèce?

Quand la Grèce dit, "Nos mesures sur les frontières ne sont pas suffisantes;

en cas donc que la Sublime Porte force ceux qui ont passé la frontière de retourner en Grèce, nous autres aussi nous userons alors de rigueur envers eux, et nous tâcherons de mettre fin à cet état de choses; voilà les assurances que nous donnons, mais nous ne pouvons pas faire une promesse positive;" il suffit de la plus légère réflexion pour comprendre qu'un pareil langage trahit des intentions secrètes du Gouvernement de se soustraire à l'obligation qu'elle a de mettre sans le moindre délai les mesures nécessaires à exécution, et cela afin de donner par-là le temps aux troubles de prendre de la consistance.

Il est vraiment étrange qu'un Gouvernement qui est en état d'user de rigueur envers les hommes en question lorsqu'ils rentrent en Grèce, ne puisse leur rien dire lorsqu'ils en sortent.

Partout en Grèce les caisses des Héthéries sont ouvertes; on prépare et l'on expédie des troupes, on envoie de la poudre et des munitions de guerre, par terre et par mer, à tous les endroits dont on a le dessein de soulever les habitants. Plus encore, on fait sortir de quelques prisons tous les hommes détenus pour des crimes, et on les lance, comme tout le monde sait, hors des frontières. Dans quel pays a-t-on vu arriver des choses pareilles à moins qu'on ne compte sur la sympathie ou sur l'insouciance du Gouvernement?

Personne ne doute que les mouvements insurrectionnels dont la Porte se plaint ne prennent leur origine dans la question qui occupe actuellement la Sublime Porte, voulant profiter de cette occasion pour obtenir d'emblée, s'il n'est pas possible, par exemple, l'empire de Constantinople—chose dont on en parle et qu'on lit depuis quelque temps en Grèce—au moins pour annexer tout de suit aux Etats de la Grèce les Provinces de Yanina et de Tricala.

Il est certain que de pareilles intentions sont indignes d'un Gouvernement ami. Aussi la Sublime Porte se trouve-t-elle dans la nécessité d'exposer au Gouvernement Grec les demandes légitimes qu'elle juge nécessaire de faire pour sa propre sûreté, et afin de se régler en conséquence dans sa conduite future. Et comme elle a pour principe de ne s'écarter dans aucune occasion des règles de la modération, elle ne demande pas une satisfaction exorbitante pour les insultes qui ont été faites à l'Hôtel de la Légation Ottomane à Athènes. Si de la même manière qu'il a puni le Préfet de Police et le Professeur en les destituant, le Gouvernement s'empresse de punir aussi tels autres individus coupables que le Chargé d'Affaires de la Sublime Porte pourra désigner en les nommant et en identifiant leurs personnes, le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse se contentera de cette satisfaction. Mais quant au Gouvernement Grec, il ne doit pas se borner à cela; il faut qu'il mette fin aussi aux événements sinistres qui ont lieu, tant dans la partie intérieure que dans la partie extérieure de la Grèce.

Il faut d'abord que le Gouvernement Grec se déclare ouvertement contre les Héthéries et contre leurs opérations; secondement, qu'il prenne de bonne foi sur les frontières des mesures propres à empêcher désormais que de semblables malfaiteurs ne les franchissent et ne passent sur les frontières Turques; troisièmement, qu'il prenne à tâche de faire rentrer en Grèce ceux qui ont passé les frontières, en publiant que ceux qui n'auront pas obéi seront considérés comme contumaces et que comme tels ils auront à subir toute la rigueur des lois qu'on pourrait appliquer à ce cas spécial. Voilà ce qu'un Gouvernement ami doit faire. Si les propositions que le Chargé d'Affaires de la Sublime Porte fera à ces égards ne sont pas donc favorablement accueillies, il devra quitter Athènes et venir ici avec tout le personnel de la Légation; et conséquemment, la Légation Hellénique devra également partir d'ici.

Et comme, vû la gravité des faits qui se passent, la rupture des relations diplomatiques ne suffit point, les Consuls résidans dans les Etats Ottomans devront partir aussi, et les relations commerciales cesseront également; c'est ce que nous avons fait savoir à M. Metaxa d'une manière circonstanciée, et des instructions analognes ont été expédiés au Chargé d'Affaires de la Sublime Porte.

Nous avons jugé que cette affaire est de nature à devoir être portée à la connaissance aussi des Cours protectrices de la Grèce, qui sont en relation amicales avec l'Empire Ottoman; et ayant une confiance sans bornes en l'amitié de votre Gouvernement, la Sublime Porte a le ferme espoir qu'il n'approuvera point cette conduite si inconvenante de la Grèce, et qu'il voudra bien prendre les mesures que les circonstances exigent.

Je suis chargé par Sa Majesté Impériale de vous faire cette communication,

comme elle se fait officiellement aussi à votre collègue son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France, et je saisis cette occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence les assurances, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 454.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Mr. Wyse.

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an official note addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, respecting the Porte's late explanations with the Hellenic Envoy, and the insurrectionary movements to which those explanations refer. Considering the great importance under present circumstances of repressing or counteracting with all possible expedition those expressions of sympathy and other incitements from without which appear to be the principal, if not the only, causes of disorder now prevailing around Arta and Janina, I cannot doubt your readiness, and that of your French colleague, to support the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in the execution of his instructions. It is of the utmost consequence that the Turkish Government should place its relations with that of Athens on a footing of clear, unmistakeable certainty, and that His Majesty the Sultan should either be enabled to rely upon the maintenance of that fair and amicable policy on the part of Greece to which he is by Treaty entitled, or that he should be free to provide for the security of his dominions by the means which Providence has placed at his disposal.

The first intention of the Porte, on receiving the complaints articulated by Neshet Bey, was to suspend diplomatic relations between the two countries. I was fortunate enough to prevail on the Sultan's Ministers to adopt in the first instance a milder course, and a formal demand of explanation from M. Metaxa was the consequence. That demand is now transferred to the Government of His Hellenic Majesty; and it may still be hoped that a sense of justice towards a neighbouring Power, which has given no cause of offence, and consideration for those Sovereigns who have pledged their honour in support of the Sultan against an unjust and violent aggression, will prevent the necessity of a resort to any painful alternative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 454.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir Henry Ward.

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 9, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 25th ultimo. I have read the circular to which your Excellency has called my attention; and, in compliance with your request, declare my unreserved concurrence in the sentiments which it expresses. I am strongly impressed with the importance of putting down with vigorous resolution the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in the Turkish districts bordering on the frontiers of Greece, and of removing at the same time all shadow of excuse for so ill-timed and rebellious an enterprise, by redressing any grievances actually experienced by the Sultan's Christian subjects, and directing their hopes towards those improvements in their social condition, which the Sultan and His Majesty's allies are, no doubt, equally desirous of securing to them in proportion as they manifest their title to such benefits by a loyal and peaceable behaviour.

Such is the spirit and such the substance of my language to the Ottoman Government since the disturbances in Epirus first became known here; and your Excellency will be glad to learn that the Porte has given me assurances of its intention to act agreeably to my advice.

Four battalions of Turkish regulars have been sent down by steam to Volo and Prevesa. Other troops have been ordered into the disturbed districts

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by land. Bessim Pasha has been sent from Monastir to Janina with the appointment of Mushir in the latter province. Fuad Effendi has accompanied the troops to Prevesa in the capacity of the Sultan's Commissioner. A British and a French steamer accompanied the Turkish vessel which conveyed two battalions to Volo, for the express purpose of exhibiting the national colours at the time of their landing. I trust that a similar demonstration will have been given by one of Her Majesty's vessels on the Ionian station.

Learning from your Excellency's despatch that the movement, though not yet stopped, was spreading, but slowly, and rather in obedience to influences from without than to any spontaneous impulse, I venture to hope that the measures already taken by the Porte will suffice to arrest its progress. Should appearances warrant a different expectation, I shall endeavour to obtain such additional exertions as the case may be found to require. It is evident that the insurrection cannot extend without operating as a powerful diversion in favour of Russia, distracting the just efforts of the Porte against an unprincipled aggression, and occasioning serious embarrassment to France and England. The latest advices from the Danube, by which it would seem that the Russians intend to attempt the passage of that river in the course of a few days, render the inconvenience and eventual danger of its continuance still more striking.

With respect to occurrences within the Greek frontier, and particularly at Athens, I have much satisfaction in assuring your Excellency that the Porte has not been wanting either to its dignity or to its interests. The Hellenic Minister has been summoned to explain those proceedings of which the Porte so justly complains, and the respective Missions will, to all appearance, be withdrawn from Athens and Constantinople, unless the imperfect explanations afforded by that Envoy be promptly and fully seconded by suitable measures on the part of his Government.

There is much reason to believe that the system of propagandism and subscription is not confined either to Greece or to the Ionian Islands. I hear of considerable collections from England, Trieste, and the Danubian Principalities, transmitted by Greeks residing in those places; and it is more than probable that some, though I hope not many, of Her Majesty's Ionian subjects here, are prepared to swell the lists of subscription to what in the jargon of the Hetærists passes under the name of the "grand idea."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 464.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Longworth.

Constantinople, March 11, 1854.

Sir,

THE advices which I have just received from Athens respecting the progress of the insurrectionary movement between Arta and Janina are so alarming, and the importance of early information and of a prudent, though vigorous, direction of remedial measures so much increased thereby, that I revert to my original intention, and wish you to be near Bessim Pasha, whose friendship and confidence you appear to enjoy, while he is called upon to maintain the Sultan's authority in the disturbed districts, and to restore order by the united means of firmness towards the guilty, and of kind protection towards the loyal. I have, therefore, to request that you will set out for his place of residence as soon after the receipt of this despatch as you can conveniently leave Monastir. I inclose herewith a translation of the instructions addressed to Fuad Effendi, the Sultan's Commissioner, who proceeded several days ago to Prevesa in a Turkish war-steamer, having 2,000 regular troops on board.

I also inclose for your further information an extract of a despatch which I have this day addressed to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.

In communicating with the Mushir of Janina and his subordinate authorities, and generally with the inhabitants of that part of the country which you are about to enter, you will regulate your language and advice according to the principles exhibited therein. It is most desirable that the insurrection should be speedily repressed, that all allusions as to any sympathy to be expected by the insurgents

from the Sultan's allies should be removed, and that the Sultan's Christian subjects should have their hopes of an improved condition directed rather to His Majesty and to his allies than to the partisans of rebellion and to influence exercised by the Porte's enemies. Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to blow hot and cold at the same time with respect to the momentous contest in which the Sultan is engaged.

I have to request that you will afford me the earliest intelligence of passing occurrences, and that, when necessary, you will employ the most direct means at your disposal for that purpose.

For any extraordinary expenses which it may be indispensable for you to incur in the performance of this service, you will be duly reimbursed.

As soon as Mr. Holmes returns from Samsoon I shall direct him to proceed to Monastir and perform the Consular duties there during your absence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 464.

Instructions addressed by the Porte to Fuad Effendi.

(Traduction.)

CONSIDÉRANT que des malfaiteurs sortis dernièrement des frontières de la Grèce ont soulevé le district de Radovitz, un des cantons d'Arta, ainsi que quelques villages d'Agrapha, pour chasser et châtier ces malfaiteurs, et pour apaiser les troubles qui ont éclaté dans ces endroits-là, on va prendre, sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, les mesures suivantes:

Il sera expédié d'ici, par la voie de Volo, à Larissa et à Tricala 2 bataillons; de Gomenitza à Janina 2 bataillons; les Redifs des Sandjaks de Berat et de Janina seront employés aux environs de Janina, où il sera expédié aussi un corps de troupes réglées; un nombre suffisant de troupes irrégulières est formé. Ainsi, il se réunira dans ces environs-là des troupes considérables qui seront envoyées en nombre suffisant aux endroits qu'il faut, pour battre, avec l'aide de Dieu, et détruire les brigands.

Ceux des habitans des pays Ottomans qui se seront joint aux brigands seront châtiés.

Si ces troupes ne suffisent point pour chasser et punir les rebelles, on levera et on employera des troupes irrégulières de l'Albanie aussi.

Voici, quant à la conduite que devront tenir les troupes qui seront envoyées aux endroits occupés par les rebelles, comment elles doivent se comporter: elles doivent combattre les rebelles pour les chasser de là, mais elles auront en même temps grand soin de respecter la vie, les biens, et l'honneur des femmes, des enfans et des hommes honnêtes vivant paisiblement.

Les troupes réglées, grace à leur excellente discipline, inspirent partout de la confiance à tout le monde par leur conduite, mais les troupes irrégulières ne sauraient être comparées, à cet égard, aux troupes réglées; les Albanais, surtout, sont, comme on sait, enclins au pillage, et à faire esclaves les femmes et les enfans, et cela étant, il faut que leurs chefs soient d'honnêtes gens, des hommes d'une conduite éprouvée et tenus responsables de la conduite de leurs troupes; et de cette manière on empêchera des choses qui sont incompatibles avec cette justice que la Sublime Porte tient tant à maintenir. On aura soin aussi de faire observer la plus stricte discipline aux troupes réglées. En un mot, les hommes paisibles, et particulièrement les femmes et les enfans, doivent être sauvegardés contre toute espèce de mauvais traitement; on cherchera à punir les brigands, et c'est ainsi qu'on aura rendu service à l'Etat.

Il sera envoyé un commissaire exprès aux Pachas de Janina, de Tricala, et de Salonique, pour leur intimer les ordres de la Sublime Porte sur ce qu'il faut qu'ils fassent comme mesures nécessaires dans les circonstances actuelles; et il est fortement recommandé à leurs Excellences, à chacun à part, de mettre tous leurs soins à faire tout ce qui est nécessaire dans les circonstances actuelles, et l'on prendra toutes les mesures propres à mettre fin le plutôt possible à cet état de choses.

Il est extrêmement important que dans ces circonstances l'introduction en

Turquie des gazettes et autres papiers pernicieux qui s'impriment en Grèce soit rigoureusement défendue. Il faudra donc prendre à cet égard les mesures nécessaires.

Le système de la garde de Derbend est tout-à-fait désorganisé. Ainsi Zeimel Pacha s'entendra avec les gens capables pour y mettre ordre.

S'il y a des abus dans le système administratif de ces pays-là, il faut y remédier; on prendra ce point en considération.

Comme il faudra donner de l'argent aux gens qui seront expédiés pour s'enquérir de ce qui se passe, le Gouvernement a autorisé le déboursement soit de l'argent à donner ces gens, soit pour faire face aux frais nécessaires pour les autres branches du service public.

Inclosure 6 in No. 454.

M. Païcos to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

Monsieur, *Athènes, le* $\frac{23 \text{ Février}}{7 \text{ Mars}}$, 1854.

LE Gouvernement Royal vient de recevoir du côté de la frontière occidentale une nouvelle bien grave.

Le $\frac{14}{26}$ Février la garnison Ottomane d'Arta, ayant opéré une sortie sur la plaine, et s'étant jetée sur les villages qui y sont situés, un grand nombre de familles Chrétiennes, habitant ces villages, vivement poursuivies se dirigèrent vers la frontière, et parvinrent à la franchir en cherchant asile dans le royaume.

Un corps d'environ 500 Albanais poussa alors la poursuite jusque sur le territoire Hellénique, où il n'hésita point à continuer la chasse sur des familles innocentes et inoffensives. Le Lieutenant-Colonel Skylodimo, commandant un bataillon de troupes légères en station à Anniso, informé de cette violation du territoire, s'empressa d'aller avec son bataillon à la rencontre des envahisseurs, et les ayant bientôt rencontrés il les somma de cesser la poursuite sur un territoire étranger et de rebrousser immédiatement chemin, tout en leur représentant dans les termes conciliants et modérés l'illégalité flagrante d'un acte si évidemment contraire à toutes les régles du droit international. Mais au lieu de se rendre à cette exhortation juste et modérée les Albanais envahisseurs, pour toute réponse, tournèrent tout-à-coup les armes contre le bataillon Grec, et ayant fait feu blessèrent mortellement un sérgent, cinq soldats, et le cheval du Commandant. Alors le bataillon tout entier, poussé par un juste sentiment d'indignation et de colère, se jeta impétueusement sur les envahisseurs et les refoula au-delà de la ligne frontière.

Je laisse, Monsieur, à votre sagacité de juger toute l'étendue de la gravité que présente un acte de cette nature. La violation du territoire Hellénique par des troupes Ottomanes et les méfaits qui s'y sont commis par elles sont flagrants. Leur agression contre les troupes Royales qui, usant de leur droit, ont voulu représenter l'inconvenance et l'illégalité de leur démarche dans les termes pleins de modération est incontestable. Le Commandant-en-chef des troupes frontières s'est empressée, aussitôt qu'il en a été informé, d'en donner connaissance au Dervenaga et de protester dans les termes les plus énergiques contre la violation du territoire Hellénique en temps du paix et au mépris de toutes les régles du droit des gens.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a donc lieu d'espérer que la Sublime Porte Ottomane s'empressera de lui donner satisfaction complète pour cet acte d'agression en sévissant avec toute la sévérité requise par les circonstances contre ceux qui ont commis une pareille violation.

En vous priant donc, Monsieur, de vouloir bien porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte une réclamation aussi légitime du Gouvernement Royal et d'intercéder auprès de lui pour que justice soit faite le plus tôt possible, je suis convaincu que, pénétré vous-même de la gravité que pourraient avoir dans la suite d'actes aussi agressifs, vous ferez à la fois tout votre possible pour qu'ils ne soient pas renouvélés sur les frontières.

Certes, le Gouvernement du Roi ne manquera pas des mesures propres à défendre dorénavant son territoire contre toute nouvelle agression de cette

nature qui pourrait mettre les relations amicales des deux pays en grand danger, et aggraver encore plus l'état actuel des choses sur les provinces limitrophes de l'Empire Ottoman.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) D. PAICOS.

No. 455.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 120.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1854.

I HAVE this day received your Excellency's despatch No. 109 of the 13th instant, inclosing copies of various papers having reference to the countenance and encouragement afforded by the Greek Government to the insurrection in the Turkish provinces, and I can only at present inform your Excellency that the advice which you have given to the Porte, and your despatches to Mr. Wyse, Sir Henry Ward, and Mr. Consul Longworth, in regard to that matter, are entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government.

The measures taken by the Porte, the mission of Fuad Effendi, and the instructions addressed to him, appear to be very judicious, and well suited to the exigencies of the case.

Your Lordship will learn by my despatches to Mr. Wyse and to Sir John Millbanke, of which copies are inclosed in my despatch No. 117, the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the unjustifiable course pursued by the Court and Government of Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 456.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 123.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1854.

I RECEIVED on the 21st instant your Excellency's despatches from No. 100 to No. 105, both inclusive, and on the 22nd instant your despatches from No. 106 to No. 110, both inclusive, the last of the 13th instant.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your Excellency's proceedings in regard to the Tripartite Treaty, as reported in your despatch No. 108 of the 13th instant, and of the addition which has been made to the draft originally sent to Constantinople of the Article marked No. 4 in the signed Treaty.

Her Majesty will be prepared to ratify the Treaty as soon as the original is received in this country, signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the three parties.

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* from Lord Cowley, respecting the omission, on the part of the French Government, to furnish General Baraguay d'Hilliers with a full-power to sign the Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 457.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 74.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1854.

COUNT GROEBEN called upon me on the 13th instant, and on the following day he had the honour of being received by the Queen at Osborne, where I accompanied him together with the Chevalier Bunsen, and he presented to Her Majesty the letter of which he was the bearer from the King of Prussia.

* No. 445.

At the interview on the 13th Count Gröben had read to me a paper which he said contained the different points he was instructed to bring under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. This document he afterwards placed in my hands, and I herewith inclose a copy* of it to your Lordship.

The observations I made upon these different points were to the following effect.

I said it was useless to discuss the proposals sent from St. Petersburgh to Vienna, as they had been unanimously declared to be inadmissible by the Conference, and that that opinion had been recorded in a Protocol which the Prussian Minister had signed with his colleagues; but, I added, that I could neither discuss nor entertain for one moment the suggestion of Count Gröben that further offers should be made to Russia, after she had been summoned to evacuate the Principalities by England and France, and that the British fleet had sailed for the Baltic, as it would be a degradation to England, of which I could not endure the thought, and would justify the Emperor of Russia in believing that we shrank from the course we had pursued, and were not fully prepared for the consequences. I expressed my astonishment to Count Gröben that his Government should expect any good result from again recommending the firmans of the Sultan to the favourable consideration of the Emperor, after the manner in which they had been already treated by His Imperial Majesty, who had given ample proofs that exclusive rights for himself in Turkey, and not the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, were the objects he had steadily kept in view.

In reply to Count Gröben's remark that the position of the King of Prussia was changed, and that the war would be local if Prussia and Austria remained neuter, but would become European if they took part in it, I said I could see no change in His Majesty's position except that which he appeared to have himself effected by not adhering to the Protocols of Vienna and the obligations they imposed; and that I was convinced the war must become general if the two German Powers did not at once determine by vigorous action to oppose its extension; and though it was true that the frontiers of Austria and Prussia touched those of Russia, yet that was no reason for fear on the part of two powerful States possessing armies as numerous and far better organised and more effective than those of Russia, and that such a reason, if valid now, would hold good at all times for a passive obedience to Russian dictation.

I begged entirely to dissent from Count Gröben's opinion that the maritime Powers had a greater interest in the issue of the question than Austria and Prussia, for, although we were all alike concerned in resisting the pernicious example of injustice and aggression, yet the real question had now become whether the power and influence of Russia should be restrained within due limits, and whether a large portion of Europe should be released from the thraldom in which it was now held by Russia; and Count Gröben could not doubt that if Russia were successful in the struggle, and were able to humiliate not the Porte alone but the four greatest Powers of Europe, the freedom and independence of Germany would be lost for ever, and that consequently the interest of Austria and Prussia was even more direct than that of the maritime Powers in the triumph of the cause that they had undertaken together.

I admitted that it had been right, and the bounden duty of the two German Powers to make every effort to maintain peace; but I said that those efforts had been sincerely made also by England and France, and we all knew with what result. England and France did not desire war—they had been compelled to accept it by the Emperor of Russia; and that it was utterly incomprehensible that the Prussian Government should now risk its most vital interests, its dignity and its position both abroad and at home, on account of the personal character of the Emperor of Russia; and because, if all Europe openly manifested what is felt by every man of courage and common sense, the Emperor would only become more inflexible: while, if His Imperial Majesty still found friends who spoke to him the voice of reason and truth, he would listen to them.

But what other language, I begged to ask, had his friends held to him for the last eight months; and had he not been deaf to every appeal that reason and justice could suggest?

With respect to Count Gröben's view, that the maritime Powers should proceed in the first rank, and that the others should follow in a second or third,

* No. 420.

I observed, that it was of course not for me say what rank Prussia might choose to assign to herself; but that for Prussia, at a critical moment like the present, to follow England and France as a second or third-rate Power, appeared to me an abdication of position, and an abandonment to all claim to influence the destinies of Europe, that I hardly thought would meet with approval or sympathy from the people of Prussia.

That as to the threats alluded to by Count Gröben, I assured him of my entire ignorance of the quarter from whence they proceeded; none certainly had been used by Her Majesty's Government, who had no right, and had too much respect for the independence of Prussia, to adopt such a course, and I could affirm the same on the part of the French Government; but I added, that I had heard of language most offensive to the King of Prussia and to his country used by the Emperor of Russia, and of a threat to reconstitute the kingdom of Poland, and to march an army of observation to the Prussian frontier; and I was glad, therefore, to learn that the King of Prussia was determined to resist all hostile demonstrations, come from what quarter they might.

I assured Count Gröben that I was equally ignorant respecting those promises of territorial aggrandizement that appeared to have been made to the King of Prussia; and I begged him to believe that Her Majesty's Government would as much disdain to offer a bribe as to accept one.

I expressed my concurrence in Count Gröben's opinion, that war would rouse the evil passions and antagonistic interests now dormant in Europe; but that these considerations had constantly, although in vain, been set before the Emperor of Russia, and that the only mode now left of averting such evils, was to contract the sphere and limit the duration of the war by prompt, vigorous, and decided action on the part of the Four Powers. Public opinion will then be universal in their favour, and the promoters of revolution will find no support.

I told Count Gröben I could not admit that the more successful the war the more improbable peace would become; nor could I admit his parallel of 1812 and the burning of Moscow. At that time Russia was fighting for her national existence and all that was most dear to her; her cause was a righteous one, and she succeeded as she deserved to do. But such is not now the case; her cause is founded on injustice, and has been supported by violence, and she has exhibited a reckless disregard for the great interests of Europe. The King of Prussia himself has recorded this. In conjunction with his allies he has offered to Russia honourable terms of peace, which have been contemptuously rejected.

The opinion of the world was unanimously against the course that the Emperor of Russia had unfortunately determined to pursue, and I could see no reason to doubt the triumph of justice and reason.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 458.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 243.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 23, 1854.*

I APPROVE of the answer which your Excellency states in your despatch No. 358 that you returned to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations on the desire of Prussia to modify the Protocol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 459.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 144. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 21, 1854.*

THE Emperor of the French, being informed of the great interest taken by the King of Prussia in matters of architecture, lately forwarded to Berlin the drawings and plans of the improvements at the Louvre for presentation to His Majesty.

The King is much gratified by this attention, and sent for the Marquis de Moustier to-day, in order to convey, through him, to the Emperor his thanks on the occasion.

As it was desired that this audience should have no political character, the presence of Baron Manteuffel was dispensed with.

The Marquis de Moustier was with His Majesty upwards of an hour, and he has given me the following account of his interview:

After some conversation on the architectural work which he had received, M. de Moustier said that the King spoke with great emotion on the Eastern question, and so entirely perverted the meaning of every act which had taken place, that he was obliged to put His Majesty right in the best way he could; but that he had no sooner succeeded in giving the conversation a reasonable turn, than His Majesty immediately sought the means of embroiling it again; and that in his whole life he never held so incoherent a conversation with anybody, and which left the impression of so confused a mind as the King of Prussia's. In the midst of endless contradictions there was, however, one fixed idea prevailing in the King's mind, that he had a mission to maintain the peace of the world, and that all his efforts must be directed to this end.

His allusions to the Emperor of Russia were strangely contradictory. At first His Majesty expressed his admiration of His Imperial Majesty's character and loyalty; of the great position he had occupied in Europe; and of the use he had been in maintaining the cause of order; then, in the next moment, His Majesty said that his brother-in-law had latterly behaved extremely ill; that he had told him many untruths within the last six months; but that still he felt it was next to impossible to separate from him; and that he was occupied in writing to him ("la lettre est écrite de mon sang" were His Majesty's words); and had endeavoured to call his attention to the new laws promulgated in Turkey in favour of the Christians; telling him that when such things had taken place he could not see what cause the Emperor had to complain of the Turkish Government; and that he hoped he would order the evacuation of the Principalities, and show a better disposition to negotiate peace.

The Marquis de Moustier appears in vain to have urged on the King the inutility of expecting that the Emperor would give up the Greeks to the general Protectorate of the European Powers, for that his object was that the protection of the Greeks should devolve solely on himself. This point appeared to make no impression whatever on the King, and still less the possibility of regenerating Turkey; in fact, he expressed his hope that the Turks would be driven out of Europe; but he did not wish that the Greek Empire, either, should be extended, for the Greeks were an abominable race; and in fact His Majesty, instead of throwing any light on this dark corner of the political world, seemed bent on making things more incomprehensible and more difficult, from his desire to keep aloof from them, and above all, from his unwillingness to identify his policy with that of the Western Powers, though he would not go against us, and declared his resolution to do all in his power to keep up the most friendly relations with France.

His Majesty then made allusion to the naval expeditions which were being prepared to attack Russia; and said that he thought England and France would find the task they were about to undertake one of extreme difficulty, for he knew Cronstadt well, and the approaches to it, and the plans of Sevastopol also were known to him; that any attack on these places would be useless, and only lead to discomfiture; and that he should grieve to hear of the loss of life that must ensue, and of our fine ships being sadly crippled.

His Majesty appears to have told M. de Moustier that he had made proposals to the Austrian Government which he hoped would be well received, the nature, however, of which he did not disclose; but he assured him that they were by no means favourable to Russia, and that he believed, on the contrary, they would be acceptable to France.

This, said the French Minister to me, was the only part of the conversation that had any political importance, and yet the real purport of it was concealed, for not a word dropped from the King which could be seized on as indicating anything but a continuation in the vacillating policy for which this country has ever been remarkable.

M. de Moustier's impression is that no dependence whatever can be placed on the King; that his predilections and his fears are more likely to draw him into an alliance with Russia than with the Western Powers, whilst he believes that any threat from our side would at once turn the scale against us. He thinks, and I firmly participate in this opinion, that there is no use whatever in attempting to act on the Prussian Government at the present moment, but that it is essential for the influence of England and France to be brought to bear on the Austrian Cabinet, where, if nothing can be gained, much may at all events be prevented by timely interference, and any notion of neutrality put forward from hence rendered abortive.

It is evident that the King of Prussia is endeavouring to thwart our object of establishing a system of joint action against Russia, and we shall not be able to count on his moral support, or even on his sympathy, until the feelings of the country, expressed in the Chambers and in the press, compel a change of opinion and system.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 460.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 146.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 21, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has already directed Chevalier Bunsen, by telegraph, to inform your Lordship of the King of Prussia's intention to send General Lindheim to St. Petersburgh, and I have the honour to report that that officer was to set out on his journey this evening.

His Excellency has mentioned to me that General Lindheim is not charged with any communication to the Russian Government, and is the mere bearer of a letter from the King to the Emperor, the object of which is much the same as those lately sent to the Queen and to the Emperor of the French, and is an appeal to His Imperial Majesty still to hesitate before taking any step which will irrevocably plunge Europe into war.

Baron Manteuffel thinks this mission will turn out as unprofitable as those to London and Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 461.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 147.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 21, 1854.*

COUNT GROEBEN delivered to me on the 19th instant your Lordship's despatch No. 67 of the 17th instant, transmitting to me a letter from the Queen to the King of Prussia, which I have delivered to Baron Manteuffel in the usual form observed at this Court.

His Excellency has since informed me that the King has been much pleased

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with the gracious reception of Count Gröben by Her Majesty, and of the attentions which he received during his stay in England, and that a salutary effect appears to have been produced by his report of all he had heard and seen, but that nevertheless the firm tone in which Her Majesty's letter was written, showing that much as the Queen was desirous to listen to any observations that might be addressed to Her Majesty by the King of Prussia, no change was to be expected in the policy which England was resolved to pursue on the Eastern question, had caused some regret.

Prince Hohenzollern has also arrived from Paris, and the impressions reported by His Highness regarding the policy of the French Government have produced a like effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 462.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 23.)

(No. 148.)
Berlin, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Special Committee in the Second Chamber to report on the proposed loan of 30,000,000 of dollars, as reported in my despatch No. 140 of the 18th instant, was elected yesterday; and of the twenty-one members of which it is composed, there are but five who are the partisans of the Court party, and decidedly favourable to Russia. The remaining sixteen are of liberal conservative opinions, and inclined to an alliance with the Western Powers.

On speaking on the subject of this Committee this morning, Baron Manteuffel expressed himself as rather satisfied than otherwise with the selection which has been made; and I am inclined to think that this demonstration of public opinion in the Chambers may give additional weight to his influence, and assist him in the prosecution of his own personal views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 463.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 23.)

(No. 149.)
Berlin, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE privately obtained the analysis of two circulars lately addressed by the Prussian Government to their diplomatic agents at Foreign Courts, of which I have the honour to inclose copies herewith for your Lordship's information.

These documents do not throw much light on the future intentions of the Prussian Government. They are vague, undecided, and are merely confirmatory of the timid and vacillating policy which is now pursuing here.

The circular bearing date of the 5th instant, seeks to explain the exceptional position of Prussia, the part which she had hitherto taken in the negotiations at Vienna, and the grounds on which the signing of the Convention had been refused. It further expresses an opinion, that it would have been preferable to have adopted the more simple, yet equally efficacious form of a Protocol.

The second (bearing date of the 16th instant), refers to certain negotiations with Austria, and expresses the satisfaction felt "at the perfect understanding with Austria."

The nature of these negotiations is not stated, mere reference being made to the hope of forming an alliance with the German States and with Austria, reserving to a later period the determination of the degree in which the Federal

Government might participate in the Convention which will be signed. Further information is promised in the course of the negotiations which are now being carried on.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 463.

Analysis of a Circular addressed by the Prussian Government to their Diplomatic Agents abroad, dated March 5, 1854.

QUOIQUE éloignée du théâtre de la guerre, ayant des intérêts moins directs engagés dans la question que les autres Puissances, exposée par la position géographique à une agression du côté de la Russie, liée à la Cour de St. Pétersbourg par des liens de parenté et d'amitié, la Prusse n'a pas hésité à prendre part à l'œuvre de pacification. Le Plénipotentiaire Prussien a signé les protocoles de Vienne, et le Gouvernement du Roi a eu pleine conscience les suites de cette démarche. La Prusse avait refusé plusieurs propositions faits par la Russie, tendants à lui enlever la liberté d'action dont elle avait besoin pour remplir sa place dans le concert Européen constaté par la Conférence de Vienne. L'accord de la Prusse ainsi établi avec les autres Puissances, la Convention proposée ne changeait rien à la substance des protocoles, au but des efforts communs, et à la base de l'union des Cabinets. On a dû se demander si la forme solennelle d'une Convention était de mise dans un moment où la portée politique des stipulations était sur le point de ne plus s'attacher à des principes sur lesquelles on était tombé d'accord, mais à des mesures exécutives très variées dans leurs détails et dans leur caractère général. Si l'Angleterre et la France ont cimenté leur accord par une Convention spéciale relative aux opérations militaires, si l'Autriche prend conseil de ses intérêts limitrophes pour régler le degré de sa coopération matérielle, la Prusse a des obligations et des égards à prendre d'une nature différente. Cette position exceptionnelle de la Prusse aurait nécessité qu'on introduisit dans la Convention certains réserves afin d'éviter des interprétations erronées. Les réserves n'auraient servi qu'à atténuer l'effet moral qu'on attendait de la forme solennelle d'une Convention. La forme plus modeste, mais tout aussi efficace des protocoles était donc préférable, d'autant plus qu'on aurait pu continuer ces protocoles selon les besoins du moment. En tout cas, le fait qu'une partie des Puissances médiatrices devenait Puissances belligerantes, n'imposait pas la nécessité d'abandonner la forme dans laquelle on avait agi en commun jusqu'ici, et n'excluait pas les mesures spéciales que quelques unes des Puissances ayaient prises. La manière de procéder la plus pratique était de laisser subsister les Conférences de Vienne, et de leur donner les attributions que le projet de Convention destinait aux nouvelles Conférences. Il peut être d'ailleurs dans l'intérêt de la paix d'une grande utilité que l'une ou l'autre des Puissances soit moins engagée.

Inclosure 2 in No. 463.

Analysis of a Circular addressed by the Prussian Government to their Diplomatic Agents abroad, dated March 16, 1854.

LE Gouvernement Prussien a adressé aux Cours Allemandes une circulaire au sujet de ses négociations avec l'Autriche. Après les avoir remerciées des réponses bienveillantes qu'elles ont faites à ses dernières communications, M. de Manteuffel ne leur dissimule pas que la situation prend un caractère menaçant, mais il ajoute en même temps avoir la consolation d'être en parfaite accord avec l'Autriche, qui pour sauvegarder ses intérêts de Puissance Européenne et ses intérêts plus particuliers, a pris des mesures énergiques pour défendre ses frontières.

Par cette attitude décidée l'Autriche croit avoir le droit de compter sur l'assistance et le secours des autres Etats Allemands. Sur les rives du Danube, il y aura des intérêts Germaniques à défendre et l'on espère former une alliance entre les Etats Allemands et l'Autriche en se réservant de déterminer ultérieure-

ment jusqu'à quel point la Diète Fédérale pourrait participer à la Convention qui sera conclue.

Les négociations au surplus continuent; on donnera plus tard des détails plus circonstanciés.

No. 464.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 98.)

Vienna, March 19, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith to your Lordship the copy of a letter I have received from M. de Fonblanque, and the reply which I have addressed to him.

I had the honour of forwarding to your Lordship this morning a telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which had been transmitted to me by M. de Fonblanque.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 464.

Consul Fonblanque to the Earl of Westmorland.

Belgrade, March 14, 1854.

My Lord,

It has been agreed that Aziz Pasha should proceed at once to Vienna in order to ascertain clearly what the intentions of the Austrian Government as to Servia really are.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. DE FONBLANQUE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 464.

The Earl of Westmorland to Consul Fonblanque.

Vienna, March 19, 1854.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant. I learn from the Turkish Ambassador that he has received from Count Buol assurances, with which he has been entirely satisfied, in answer to the inquiries he made of him with reference to the communications brought by Aziz Pasha, and alluded to in your letter.

I beg also to state that I have forwarded your despatch under flying seal, addressed to Mr. Addington, by my messenger to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—I have this day received the telegraphic message you have transmitted from Lord Stratford, and have immediately forwarded it to London.

No. 465.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 100.)

Vienna, March 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE seen the Turkish Ambassador, who in answer to my inquiry informed me that the statement made to him by Count Buol was, that the intentions of the Austrian Government in assembling a corps of troops upon the

Servian frontier were not to pass that frontier, for which at present there was no existing reason whatever, but in no case to do so unless a corps of Russian troops should enter the Principality, or unless an extensive insurrection should take place, not only in Servia, but in the neighbouring Provinces, which would menace the authority and rights of the Sultan, and that in such case the only action of the Austrian troops would be for the maintenance of those rights.

The Ambassador stated to Count Buol in reply his satisfaction at this communication, and added that as his Excellency had declared that for the moment there was no intention of passing the frontier, he thought that before such a movement could be undertaken he would have time to enter into concert with regard to it with the Government of the Sultan.

Count Buol replied that he had already done so.

The Ambassador stated that he had immediately transmitted the purport of these assurances by telegraph to the Governor of Belgrade, and he had made his report to his Government, in which he had stated the satisfaction he had felt at the communications he had received.

The Ambassador informed me that the ground upon which the Governor of Belgrade had taken alarm was, that the Austrian troops had assembled boats for the formation of bridges in case they should be required at Biccaria, near Belgrade, at Radcha, opposite the Bosnian frontier, and at Metrofcha, about twenty hours from Belgrade, and that they had placed some artillery in support of these points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 466.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 366.)

Paris, March 23, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS' attention had been already called from St. Petersburgh to the difference of term assigned by Her Majesty's Government, and that of the Emperor of the French for the evacuation of the Principalities. It appears that Count Nesselrode had remarked it to the Consuls.

Nothing can now be done to remedy the mistake, but it will probably appear to your Lordship of minor consequence, as it is not likely that the Emperor of Russia would acquiesce in one date rather than the other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 467.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 367.)

Paris, March 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received the following information from a person who has a relation at Bucharest, with whom he is in correspondence. The Russian army now in the Principalities amounts to from 160,000 to 180,000 men. There is no difficulty whatever in finding subsistence for them; and the Russian agents had lately passed contracts at Galatz under very favourable terms. The report that Russian paper money had been put into forced circulation in the Principalities was not founded on fact, though an order of the kind was daily expected to appear. The only act of arbitrary authority which had been perpetrated, was the fixation of the price of provisions at two-thirds of their real value.

It was generally expected that the Russians would attempt to turn the Balkans by Sophia; but the latest accounts received here of the movements of their troops, do not coincide with this expectation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 468.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 368.)
Paris, March 23, 1854.

My Lord,

THE "Banshee" was the bearer of despatches to the French Government from General Baraguay d'Hilliers, dated the 12th instant.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers recounts the measures taken in concurrence with Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, to induce the Porte to accept the Convention, which was forwarded to your Lordship by Her Majesty's Ambassador. He excuses his not having signed it himself by saying that he had no full-powers, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' instructions had enjoined him to sign a "Projet de Convention," but not the Convention itself.

It really appears that, partly from the negligence of not sending the proper full-powers, and partly from the wording of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' instructions, General Baraguay d'Hilliers did not think himself authorised to sign a Treaty; and he rather prides himself on having shown so much sagacity.

I cannot think that there was any intention on the part of the French Government to create this dilemma, though it is impossible to answer for the instructions which General Baraguay d'Hilliers may have received from others, as well as from his diplomatic chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 469.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 369.)
Paris, March 23, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship inquires in your despatch No. 336 what are the measures alluded to in my despatch No. 337 for the amelioration of the Sultan's Christian subjects, in the furtherance of which the Porte, according to General Baraguay d'Hilliers' reports, appears to be engaged.

I have the honour to state, in reply, that General Baraguay d'Hilliers has entered into no details.

In a despatch dated the 12th instant, and received subsequently from that Ambassador, he mentions the issuing of a firman for establishing, in certain of the large provincial towns, particularly those where Christians form the majority of the population, mixed tribunals, in which Christian evidence would be received; Constantinople, however, was excluded from the arrangement.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers continues to write vaguely of other measures, but he specifies none.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 470.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 370.)
Paris, March 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to apprize your Lordship, by my despatch No. 333, of a conversation which I had had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, respecting an intention imputed to the French Government of establishing a hospital and depôts for stores in the Island of Candia.

In that conversation M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated that he had not done more than make inquiry of Vely Pasha as to the practicability of such an

arrangement; while he had stipulated that any advantages that might be granted would be considered as conceded as much to the English as to the French Governments.

Vely Pasha was absent from Paris when I communicated with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the matter, and I could not question him upon it; but I had an opportunity of asking him some particulars this morning, and I regret to find that his account does not quite agree with that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

According to Vely Pasha, the concession asked was in favour of the French Government alone, except in regard to a depôt of coals whence, the French Minister appears to have observed, "les flottes pourraient s'approvisionner."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 471.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 374.)
Paris, March 24, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HATZFELDT has informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the King of Prussia is about to send an officer to St. Petersburgh to state to the Emperor of Russia, that since the Sultan has made large concessions to his Christian subjects, the object which the Emperor had in view in occupying the Principalities has ceased, and that he ought to evacuate them. The Prussian Government is desirous that the French Government should make a similar declaration at St. Petersburgh.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys told Count Hatzfeldt that he had no longer any means of communicating with the Russian Government, and that he was not in possession of information which would enable him to make such a statement as that suggested by the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 472.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 375.)
Paris, March 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE apprized M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the authorisation given to Mr. Wyse to cause the port of Athens to be blockaded, should he deem it a necessary and advisable measure.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has sent instructions of a similar nature to M. Forth Rouen, but he states that Minister to have been, when he last wrote, averse to such a measure, as likely to drive the Greek people to desperation.

I observed that your Lordship's instructions left full latitude to Mr. Wyse to act as he thought best, and that of course the two Ministers would weigh well, in any resolutions they might take, the consequences by which the execution of such resolutions would be followed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 473.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 377. Confidential.)

Paris, March 24, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE MOUSTIER has made a report received yesterday of a conversation which he had had with the King of Prussia. M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me that it is impossible (to use a homely expression) to make head or tail of His Majesty's observations, and that he is no wiser since he read M. de Moustier's despatch than he was before. The only remark of real importance made by His Majesty was, that Austria and Prussia were about to make a communication to the Germanic Diet, with which His Majesty did not doubt the Maritime Powers would be satisfied.

The Emperor received by the same messenger a letter from the King of Prussia in answer to one which His Imperial Majesty had addressed to His Prussian Majesty in sending him some plans or drawings before the mission of Prince Hohenzollern, and in which His Imperial Majesty had taken an opportunity of assuring His Prussian Majesty among other things, that if in supporting the policy laid down by the Conference at Vienna Prussia was attacked by Russia, France would be ready to assist her.

The King of Prussia, in his answer, alludes to the possibility of hostilities with Russia, and says that if his own army was not sufficient to protect the interests of Prussia, he would avail himself with gratitude of the Emperor's offer.

I have not seen the letter in question, and I believe this phrase to have been very loosely worded. Still it appears to have produced an impression on the Emperor's mind that if Austria declares against Russia, Prussia will follow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 474.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 105.)

Vienna, March 22, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch addressed to me, No. 116, incloses one from Lord Stratford, referring to the statements made in Conference by the Ministers of Austria and Prussia as to a communication from Reshid Pasha, which it appears from the report made by M. Pisani is not confirmed by that Minister.

I can have no knowledge of these transactions which took place at Constantinople. I have only to report to your Lordship what passed in my presence at the Conference of the 12th of January last, and, as I have already assured your Lordship, the statement I made in my despatch No. 16 was entirely correct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 475.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 108.)

Vienna, March 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I BEG to return my thanks to your Lordship for the manner in which you have conveyed to me the approval of Her Majesty's Government of my proceedings on the occasion of the signature in Conference of the Protocol of the 5th instant by the Representatives of the Four Powers.

I communicated your Lordship's despatch No. 117, conveying this approval, to Count Buol, who was happy to learn the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Conference had unanimously and in clear and decided terms recorded their objections to the preliminaries proposed by Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 476.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 111.)

Vienna, March 22, 1854.

My Lord,

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MANTEUFFEL, one of the King of Prussia's aides-de-camp, having been charged to deliver a letter from His Majesty to the Emperor of Austria, proceeded with it to Munich, and having executed his commission there he was on his way from Munich to this place in order to communicate with Count Buol, when he was recalled by telegraph to Berlin, and he arrived here on the 19th instant from Berlin, bearing a second letter from the King, which he has delivered to the Emperor.

Count Buol stated to me yesterday that His Imperial Majesty had not yet replied to this letter, and when I called upon him to-day at his usual hour of reception, he was obliged to leave me, as he was called by the Emperor to a council, at which the measures to be adopted with reference to the communications from Prussia would be discussed and decided upon. He merely stated that he could not object to the attitude which Prussia appeared to have assumed by the speech of Baron Manteuffel, in which he maintained the entire concordance of Prussia with the acts of the Conference of Vienna, and the determination of the Prussian Government to act in support of their allies for the defence of German interests, and to assist those Governments which, from their geographical position, might be called upon sooner than Prussia to assume an active part in the complications which might be expected to arise. Count Buol also expressed himself as most desirous of keeping up the action of Prussia with the Three Powers, and of maintaining the unity which has hitherto prevailed in the councils of the Conference, and with which he hoped the whole of Germany might be united.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 477.

Consul Michele to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

St. Petersburgh, March 19, 1854.

My Lord,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of the despatch which your Lordship did me the honour to address to me on the 27th of February ultimo. This despatch, together with its inclosure from your Lordship to Count Nesselrode, was delivered to me by the Queen's messenger, Captain Blackwood, at a few minutes after 11 o'clock on the morning of the 13th instant; and I lost not a moment in endeavouring to give effect to your Lordship's instructions.

Within an hour after the arrival of the messenger, the despatch forwarded to me by his Excellency Lord Cowley (inclosing a communication from the French Government to their Consul here) was placed by me in the hands of M. de Castillon; and before the expiration of another hour, M. de Castillon and myself had presented ourselves at the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and solicited the honour of an interview with the Chancellor of the Empire, for the purpose of simultaneously presenting the notes of the English and French Cabinets. Count Nesselrode, through the Director of his Chancellerie, expressed his inability to see us at that moment, but appointed 12 o'clock on the following day to receive the communications of which we were respectively the bearers. When I parted from M. de Castillon about 2 o'clock, it was

arranged that I was to call for him the following morning at half-past 11, in order that we might proceed together to the Chancellor.

By 2 o'clock (on the 13th) I had placed in the hands of his Excellency Count Valentin Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, the packet of despatches brought to me by Captain Blackwood from his Excellency the Earl of Westmorland at Vienna; and by a little after 2 I had communicated to his Excellency General Rochow, the Prussian Minister here, the purport of Lord Bloomfield's despatch, dated Berlin, 2nd of March instant; viz.: "that no packet had been received by his Lordship from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for transmission to St. Petersburgh, but that despatches from the Prussian Government would be forwarded to the Prussian Representative by their own separate courier."

From the Prussian Embassy I proceeded to my own private residence, where I remained until a few minutes before 4. On my return home to dinner at 6 o'clock, I found M. de Castillon's note (Inclosure No. 1). I immediately addressed to M. de Castillon a reply (Inclosure No. 2), and forwarded it to him by a special messenger; and at 11 o'clock P.M. I received his rejoinder (Inclosure No. 3). When I called on M. de Castillon on the following morning, he expressed his regret that I should have disapproved of the course he had felt it his duty to adopt. He said he had kept back his letter to Count Nesselrode until the return of the messenger who was the bearer of his note to me; but hearing that I was from home, he had not felt justified in longer withholding M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter from the Chancellor. I repeated to M. de Castillon my fear that the receipt by Count Nesselrode of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch, apart from your Lordships', would have an unfortunate effect on the Russian Government, who were already too prone to consider the alliance, and consequent unity of action, of the French and English Cabinets as by no means complete.

A few minutes before the appointed hour (12 o'clock on Tuesday the 14th March instant) M. de Castillon and I arrived at the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and after waiting a few minutes, the effect of the separate transmission of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note become apparent. Instead of the Chancellor receiving M. de Castillon and myself together, it was intimated to me by the Director of the Chancellerie "that Count Nesselrode would receive the English Consul alone," and I was ushered into his room, while M. de Castillon was kept waiting below.

Count Nesselrode received me with his usual courtesy. I handed to his Excellency your Lordship's letter, and stated from a memorandum which I had drawn up the precise terms of your Lordship's instructions with reference to the return to England of the Queen's messenger.

Count Nesselrode requested permission to peruse this memorandum, and I handed it to him. He then informed me that "the Emperor was not at that moment in St. Petersburgh; that on His Majesty's return (which would probably be on Friday, the $\frac{17}{5}$th instant), your Lordship's communication should be laid before His Majesty, and His Majesty's commands taken thereon; when a reply to your Lordship's letter should be forwarded to me."

The Chancellor then remarked upon the length of time that had elapsed since the date of your Lordship's despatch to me, viz., February 27, and asked me what had detained the messenger so long on the road.

I explained that the Queen's messenger had not come direct from London to St. Petersburgh, but had been the bearer of despatches for the British Ministers at Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, which latter capital Captain Blackwood left only on the 7th instant, and had arrived at St. Petersburgh on the morning of the 13th, thus making a rapid journey, considering the very bad state of the roads.

On quitting Count Nesselrode, I was about to take with me the memorandum I had at his desire handed to his Excellency for his perusal, when he requested "that I would be kind enough to leave it with him." I said that I had merely transcribed your Lordship's instructions for my own guidance, and to prevent any misapprehension of your Lordship's intentions with reference to the time fixed for the return of the Queen's messenger to England; that I had no instructions to make any written communication in presenting your Lordship's note, but since his Excellency desired to retain this paper (which was only a transcript of your Lordship's instructions to me relative to the precise moment

for despatching the messenger to England), I felt that I should not be acting otherwise than in accordance with your Lordship's wishes by rendering any misunderstanding on this head impossible, and accordingly I allowed the Chancellor to retain this memorandum, a copy of which I have the honour to send herewith.

M. de Castillon, who was received by the Chancellor after I had quitted his Excellency, informed me, that on entering he found him in the act of completing the perusal of your Lordship's letter. Count Nesselrode's first observation was, "I perceive Lord Clarendon in his letter mentions April 30, for the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, while M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note gives us only until the 15th. Can you, M. de Castillon, explain this discrepancy? Your Government, it seems, is more exacting (exigeant) than the English."

M. de Castillon told me, that in reply to the Chancellor, he expressed his inability to offer any explanation of the discrepancy in the dates, and showed Count Nesselrode M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note to himself (M. de Castillon), in which the 15th April was also the day named for the evacuation of the Principalities.

On my return home, I immediately addressed a despatch to Lord Bloomfield at Berlin (through the medium of the post office), apprizing his Excellency that I had placed your Lordship's letter of the 27th February in Count Nesselrode's hands at 12 o'clock that day, March $\frac{3}{1}$, 1854; and M. de Castillon, the following day, informed me that he had made a similar communication (also by post), to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in Paris.

The Emperor returned to St. Petersburgh early on the morning of the $\frac{5}{17}$th instant from Finland, whither he had proceeded on Sunday evening the 12th instant, in company with three of his sons, the Grand Dukes Alexander, Nicholas, and Michael, to inspect the fortifications at Wiborg, Helsingfors, and Sveaborg; the Grand Duke Constantine having gone to Finland some days previously.

At 10 o'clock last night I received a note from the Chancellor of the Empire inviting me to call upon him at 1 o'clock P.M. this day. I was punctual in my attendance: and on sending up my name to the Chancellor, I was informed that the French Consul was with his Excellency.

After waiting a short time, I was told Count Nesselrode would receive me. On entering the room, his Excellency's greeting was of the most friendly description. He said, "I have taken His Majesty's commands with reference to Lord Clarendon's note, and the Emperor does not think it becoming to make any reply to it." I replied, "M. le Comte, in a matter of so much importance I am sure I shall be excused for desiring to convey to my Government the exact words employed by your Excellency." The Count at first used the words "His Majesty does not think it becoming in him to give any reply to Lord Clarendon's letter" (ne le croit pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon). Upon my repeating this phrase after Count Nesselrode, his Excellency said, "L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable," &c.; and I again repeated after him the entire sentence. After I had done so, the Count said, "Yes, that is the answer I wish you to convey to your Government. 'L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon.'"

Having delivered to me this official message, Count Nesselrode begged me to be seated, and explained to me that he had only waited the return of the Emperor to submit your Lordship's letter to His Majesty. His Excellency then asked me, "when I proposed to despatch the Queen's messenger?" I told him, "This afternoon, provided his passport, &c., could be got ready in time." Count Nesselrode informed me he had already sent a courier's pass for Captain Blackwood to the Baron de Plessen; and then asked me, "Whether to-day was not the sixth day?" I said, "From his arrival at St. Petersburgh it is; but had I been left without any reply, or without such an intimation as I have to-day received from your Excellency, I should not have despatched the messenger until to-morrow, the 20th instant, at 12 o'clock, when six entire days would have elapsed since I placed Lord Clarendon's despatch in your Excellency's hands."

In the course of our subsequent conversation, I asked Count Nesselrode what the intentions of his Government were with reference to the Consular arrangements between the two countries in the event of a declaration of war?

His Excellency replied, "That will entirely depend upon the course Her Britannic Majesty's Government may adopt; we shall not declare war."

My present despatch has been extended to a much greater length than I intended. I have, however, felt that in the responsible position in which I am placed, I had rather bear the charge of prolixity than omit any circumstance, however minute, that your Lordship might consider of interest.

At the moment of closing my despatch, I am assured by a nobleman of the most trustworthy character, and one who has the best means of knowing the confidential sayings and doings of the Imperial family, that within the last forty-eight hours the Emperor has said, "That the conduct of the Sultan, in granting the recent privileges he has accorded to his Christian subjects, has, in a great measure, deprived Russia of her *casus belli* against Turkey." This seems a most startling assertion, but it reaches me in such a form that I cannot doubt its accuracy. I entertain so high an opinion of the Emperor, personally, that I feel convinced if His Majesty really entertains this opinion he would not hesitate to give expression to it, with the utmost frankness and candour. It is to the people about His Imperial Majesty, and not to the Emperor himself, we are indebted for the war that is about to devastate Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. EASTLAND DE MICHELE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 477.

M. de Castillon to Consul Michele.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{1}{13}$ *Mars*, 1854.

Monsieur,

EN relisant la lettre de M. Drouyn de Lhuys je vois qu'elle m'invite à remettre ma dépêche sans retard. Je me dispose donc à l'envoyer à M. de Nesselrode en lui disant que je ne puis prendre sur moi d'en retarder la remise de 24 heures.

Je crois devoir vous donner avis de cette dé ermination, et vous prie, &c.

(Signé) G. DE CASTILLON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 477.

Consul Michele to M. de Castillon.

St. Petersburgh, March $\frac{1}{13}$, 1854, 6 *o'clock* P.M.

Sir,

I WILL not attempt to conceal from you my surprise and regret at the intimation contained in your note of this day's date.

Within an hour of the arrival of the British Cabinet messenger this morning, I placed in your hands the packet addressed to you, and forwarded to me by Lord Cowley, inclosing a letter from your Government to Count Nesselrode. I told you I was in receipt of a similar communication from the Earl of Clarendon, and that I was instructed to concert with you for the simultaneous delivery of the two letters to the Chancellor of the Empire. I moreover proposed that we should send a joint note to Count Nesselrode, informing him that we had each an important communication to hand to him from our respective Governments, and begging his Excellency to name an hour at which it would suit him to receive us.

Having perused the despatch I brought you, you said "you thought a written communication on our part, under existing circumstances, might be objectionable," and you suggested that we should proceed together to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the hope that Count Nesselrode would receive us at once. Accordingly, we drove to the Chancellor's, and explained to one of the chiefs of the department our desire to place in Count Nesselrode's hands the two notes from the French and English Governments of which we were the bearers. This gentleman, after some little delay, expressed to us the Count's regret that he could not see us then, and appointed 12 o'clock to-morrow for our interview with the Chancellor of the Empire. When I left you, at nearly 2 o'clock to-day, it was arranged that I should call upon you in the morning, in order that we might proceed together to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

After so positive, and, as it seemed to me, so satisfactory an arrangement, you may judge my surprise, on my return home at 6 o'clock this afternoon, at receiving your note.

In that note you tell me that, "on perusing M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch, you perceived he requested you to forward the inclosure without delay, and in consequence that you were disposed to send it to M. de Nesselrode, and to tell him that you would not take upon yourself a delay of twenty-four hours in forwarding it to him, and that you considered it your duty to apprize me of your determination."

I am sure you will give me credit for as much anxiety to acquit myself of the responsible duty assigned to me as you yourself displayed. I felt I was acting in strict accordance with my instructions in hastening to place Lord Clarendon's despatch in Count Nesselrode's hands simultaneously with the communication you were called upon to present on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. You have now decided, as appears by your note, to transmit M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch to Count Nesselrode by itself, and without waiting our appointed interview with the Chancellor. Am I to understand that you decline to accompany me to M. de Nesselrode at 12 o'clock to-morrow?

I confess that I deeply regret this circumstance, because I much fear it may tend to throw unjust suspicion upon that unity of action which my instructions enjoin, and may possibly cast a shadow of doubt upon that perfect accord which I feel sure continues to animate our respective Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. E. DE MICHELE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 477.

M. de Castillon to Consul Michele.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{1}{13}$ *Mars*, 1854.

Monsieur,

LA démarche que nous avons faite ensemble ce matin auprès du Comte de Nesselrode avait, je crois, très ouvertement le caractère d'intelligence parfaite que nous devions tenir à lui conserver. Ce caractère ne saurait être infirmé par la remise non simultanée des deux plis qui nous ont été adressés, circonstance dont je me suis empressé de vous donner avis et de vous expliquer le motif comme je l'avais fait au Comte de Nesselrode par écrit.

Je ne vous attends pas moins, Monsieur, demain matin à onze heures et demi pour nous rendre conjointement au rendezvous du Chancelier.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) G. DE CASTILLON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 477.

Memorandum given by Consul Michele to Count Nesselrode.

IN pursuance of the instructions conveyed to me by my Government, dated the 27th of February ultimo, I have the honour of placing in your Excellency's hands a letter from the Right Honourable the Earl of Clarendon, Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In doing so, I am further instructed to acquaint your Excellency that the Queen's messenger, who was the bearer of this communication, and who reached St. Petersburgh only yesterday morning, will be ready to return to England with your Excellency's reply as soon as it shall be sent to me; but if on the expiration of six days from to-day your Excellency should not have sent me any letter to the Earl of Clarendon's address,

or if previously to the expiration of that period your Excellency should inform me that the messenger need not remain at St. Petersburgh, in either of these cases I am to direct the Queen's messenger to return to England with the utmost speed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. E. DE MICHELE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 477.

Count Nesselrode to Consul Michele.

St. Pétersbourg, le 6 Mars, 1854.

LE Chancelier de l'Empire, Comte de Nesselrode, prie M. de Michele, Consul Britannique, de vouloir bien passer chez lui demain, Dimanche, le 7 Mars, à une heure après midi.

Il profite, &c.

No. 478.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul Michele.

Foreign Office, March 27, 1854.

Sir,

I RECEIVED on the 25th instant your despatch No. 24 of the 19th instant, reporting your proceedings in regard to the delivery to Count Nesselrode of my letter to his Excellency, which was inclosed in my despatch to you of the 27th ultimo; and I have to acquaint you that I approve of the manner in which you executed my instructions on that subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.